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ABSTRACT. 
ABSTRACT. 
This thesis examines the practices and procedures 
of the Human Rights Committee, the body established 
under the International Covenant On Civil And Political 
Rights (ICCPR) (1966). 
Chapter 1 examines the origins of the ICCPR, the 
principal drafting issues that arose, and the 
significance of the ICCPR in international law. Chapter 
2 examines the organisation and the institutional 
characteristics of the Human Rights. Committee. Chapter 3 
examines and evaluates the practices and procedures of 
the Human Rights Committee under the reporting procedure 
in article 40 ICCPR. Chapter 4 examines and evaluates 
the practices and procedures of the Human Rights 
Committee under the provisions for individual 
communications in the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 
Chapters 5-12 examine the jurisprudence of the 
Human Rights Committee under the reporting procedure (article 40) and the Optional Protocol in respect of 
selected articles of the ICCPR. Chapter 5 considers 
article 1 (self-determination). Chapter. 6 considers 
article 2 (general obligations to respect and ensure the 
rights in the ICCPR, to give effect to it, and to 
provide a remedy in the event of violation). Chapter 7 
considers article 4 (derogation provision). Chapter 8 
considers article 6 (right to life). Chapter 9 considers 
article 7, (torture and other prohibited treatment and 
punishment), and, in part, article 10 (treatment of 
persons deprived of their liberty). Chapter 10 considers 
article 14 (fair trial). Chapter 11 considers article 19 (freedom of opinion and expression). Chapter 12 
considers article 20 (war propaganda and advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred). 
Chapter 13 provides a general appraisal of the the 
work of the Human Rights Committee. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
INTRODUCTION. 
According to Louis Henkin "Human rights is the idea 
of our time". In concrete terms the "idea" of human 
rights is given expression through a myriad of regional 
and global international instruments. The most general 
of -those instruments, the 'Universal Declaration Of 
Human Rights' (1948), the 'International Covenant On 
Civil And Political Rights' (1966), the 'Optional 
Protocol' thereto (1966), and the 'International 
Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights' 
(1966), collectively form the "International Bill Of 
Rights". The two Covenants and the Optional Protocol 
entered into force in 1976. 
Under the terms of the International Covenant On 
Civil And Political Rights a "Human Rights Committee" 
was established in 1977 with certain functions in 
respect of the Covenant and the Optional Protocol 
thereto. This thesis examines the work of the Human 
Rights Committee. Through that examination it is 
possible to determine and evaluate the nature of the 
Human Rights Committee and assess its contribution to 
the development of the "idea of our time"., 
Chapter One and the opening section'". df Chapter Four 
provide brief accounts of the origins, drafting, and 
significance in international law, of the Covenant and 
the Optional Protocol thereto. S. knowledge of these 
matters is a necessary precondition to a proper 
evaluation of the work of the Human Right$'"C9mmittee. 
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Chapter Two analyses the institutional nature of 
the Human Rights Committee. The aim-is to determine what 
kind of a body the Human Rights Committee is. 
Chapters Three and Four provide a full examination 
of the practices and procedures under the two functions 
exercised by the Human Rights Committee to date. These 
are the reporting system provided for in article 40 
ofthe Covenant and the individual communications system 
provided for in the Optional Protocol. Each Chapter 
offers an appraisal of the development of the respective 
systems to date. 
To obtain a more specific insight into the work of 
the Human Rights Committee the thesis proceeds with the 
examination of its work under the two implementation 
systems in respect of selected rights in the Covenant. 
Initially it was hoped to consider each of the articles 
on which the Human Rights Committee had seen fit to 
express a "General Comment",, under article 40 (4) of the 
Covenant. In the event that proved to be impossible. 
However, each of the articles examined have been the 
subject of a "General Comment" by the Human Rights 
Committee and this may perhaps be taken as some 
reflection of their relative importance in the view of 
the Human Rights Committee. In any event it is submitted 
that the articles chosen are self evidently important. 
Chapter Five considers the article 1 
(self-determination). Chapter Six considers article 2 
(general obligations to respect and ensure the rights in 
the Covenant, to give effect to it, and to provide a 
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remedy in the event of violation). Chapter Seven 
considers article 4 (derogation provision). Chapter 
Eight considers article 6 (right to life). Chapter Nine 
considers article 7 (torture and other prohibited 
treatment and punishment), and, in part, article 10 
(treatment of persons deprived of their liberty). 
Chapter Ten considers article 14 (Fair Trial). Chapter 
Eleven considers article 19 (freedom of opinion and 
expression). Chapter Twelve considers article 20 (war 
propaganda and advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred). Each of Chapters Five to Twelve concludes with 
a general appraisal which links the consideration of the 
respective articles to the general themes of the nature 
of the Human Rights Committee and the development of 
the Covenant and the Protocol. For the sake of 
completeness I have appended the texts of the two 
"General Comments" of the Human Rights Committee to date 
which are not considered in lull in this thesis 
(Appendix IV). These concern the position of aliens 
under the Covenant and the right to privacy in article 
17 of the Covenant. 
Chapter Thirteen provides a general appraisal of 
the work )f the Human Rights Committee in giving life to 
the structures and mechanisms of the Covenant and the 
Protocol and meaning to its language. 
CH. 1. 
CHAPTER 1. 
1 
THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND 
THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL THERETO. I 
1 This account is mainly drawn from the following 
United Nations records. The Reports, of the Human Rights 
Commission, 1947-1954: 1st session, U. N. Doc. E/259, 
ECOSOC, O. R., fourth session, Supp. 3, (1947); 2nd 
session, U. N. Doc. E/600, ESCOR, O. R., sixth session, 
Supp. l, (1948); 3rd session, U. N. Doc. E/800, ECOSOC, O. R., 
seventh session, Supp. 2, (1948); 5th session, 
U. N. Doc. E/1371, ECOSOC, O. R., ninth session, Supp. 10, (1949); 6th session, U. N. Doc. E/1681, ECOSOC, O. R., 
eleventh session, Supp. 5, (1950); 7th 
" session, 
U. N. Doc. E/1992, ECOSOC, O. R., thirteenth session, 
Supp. 9, (1951); 8th session, U. N. Doc. E/2256, ECOSOC 
O. R., fourteenth session, Supp. 4, (1952); 9th session, 
U. N. Doc. E/2447, ECOSOC, O. R., sixteenth session, 
Supp. 8, (1953); 10th session, U. N. Doc. E/2573, ECOSOC, 
O. R., eighteenth session, Supp. 7, (1954). An excellent 
annotation of the work of the HECion can be found at 
U. N. Doc. A/2929,10 GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 28, Part 
II, (1955). 
From 1954 to 1966 the draft Covenants were 
considered by the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly. For its Reports see the following 
U. N. Documents: 
A/2808 and Corr. 1,9 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item. 58, part 
1, (1954); 
A/2907,10 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item. 28, part. I, (1955); 
A/3077,10 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item. 28, part I, (1955); 
A/3525,11 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item. 31, (1956); 
A/3764, and Corr. 1,12 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item. 33, (1957); 
A/4045,13 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item. 32, (1958); 
A/4299,14 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item. 34, (1959); 
A/4625,15 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item. 34, (1960-61); 
A/5000,16 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item. 35, (1961-62); 
A/5365,17 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item. 43, (1962); 
A/5655,18 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item. 48, (1963), which is 
accompanied by A/5411, a Report of the Secretary-General 
updating A/2929 above; A/6173,20 GAOR, Annexes, 
Ag. Item. 65, (1966); A/6546,21 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item. 62, 
(1966). 
There is an extensive literature dealing with the 
matters dealt with in this chapter. See H. O. Agarwal, 
Implementation Of The Human Rights Covenants With 
Special Reference To India, (1983); A. Cassese, 
International Law In A Divided World, ch. 11, (1986); 
R. Chakravarti, Human Rights and the United Nations, 
(1958); R. Cohen, International Ccvenant on Civil and 
political Rights, 6 International Problem o, pp. 38-49, 
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(1968); A. L. Del Russo, International Protection of Human 
Rights, chs. I-III, (1970); P. N. Drost, Human Rights As 
Legal Rights-The Realization of Human Rights In Positive 
International Law, (New York, 1951, Leiden, 1965); 
G. Ezejiofor, Protection of Human Rights-under the law, 
chs. 2-3, (1964); T. J. Farer, The United Nations And Human 
Rights: More Than A Whimper Less, Than A Roar, 9 HRQ 
(1987) pp. 550-585; D. P. Forsythe, The United Nations and 
Human Rights, 100 Pol. S. Q., pp. 249-269, (1985); M. Ganji, 
International Protection Of Human Rights, (1964); 
J. F. Green, The United Nations and Human Rights,. chs. 1-3, (1956); W. P. Gormley, The Implementation Of United 
Nations Human Rights Covenants: Contemporary Legal 
Precedent And Future Procedural Remedies, 3 Vols, Ph. D. 
thesis, (Manchester, 1972); W. Korey, The Key To Human 
Rights-Implementation, 570 International Conciliation, 
pp. 5-70, (Nov., 1968); L. Henkin, ' Introduction, to 
L. Henkin (ed. ), The International Bill Of Rights 
- 
The 
Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, (1981); 
J. P. Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nation -A 
Great Adventure, (1984); Fareed Nabiel Jamiel, The 
United Nations Commission On Human Rights And Its Work 
For Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms, chs. 1 and 3, 
(1979); F. Jhabvala, The Practice Of The Covenants' Human 
Rights Committee 1976-82: Review Of State Party Reports, 
6 HRQ (1984), p. 81 at pp. 81-95; H. Lauterpacht, 
International Law and Human Rights, Part II, (1950); H. 
Lauterpacht, The International Protection Of The 
Individual, in E. Lauterpacht, ed., H. Lauterpacht, 
International Law-Collected Papers, Vol. 3, The Law Of 
Peace, pp. 407-430, (1977); M. Lippman, Human Rights 
Revisited 
- 
The Protection Of Human Rights Under The 
ICCPR, 26 NILR (1979) PP. 221-277; E. Luard (ed. ), The 
International Protection of Human Rights, chs. 1-4, 
(1967); M. S. McDougal and G. Bebr, Human Rights In The 
United Nations, 58 AJIL (1964), pp. 603-641; M. Moscowitz, 
Human Rights and World Order-The Strugggle For Human 
Rights, (1958); M. Moscowitz, The Politics and Dynamics 
of Human Rights, (1968); M. Moscowitz, International 
Concern with Human Rights, ch. 1, (1974); M. Neal, The 
United Nations and Human Rights, 489 International 
Conciliation, pp. 111-174, (March, 1953); V. Pechota, The 
Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, i: i Henkin (ed. ), The International Bill Of 
Rights 
- 
The ICCPR, above, ch. 2, (1981); A. H. Robertson, 
Human Rights in the World, ch. 2, (1982); P. Sieghart, The 
International Law of Human Rights, chs. 1 and 2, (1983); 
J. Simarsian, periodic notes on the drafting at 42 AJIL 
(1948), pp. 879-883,43 AJIL (1949), pp. 779-786; 45 AJIL 
(Footnote Continued) 
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1.1 A. ORIGINS. The traditional rule of international 
law2 was that, apart from the treatment of aliens, 
3 
and 
possibly humanitarian intervention, 
4 the rights of 
(Footnote Continued) 
(1951), pp. 170-177; 46 AJIL (1952), pp. 710-718; L. B. Sohn, 
A Short History Of United Nations Documents On Human 
Rights, In The United Nations And Human Rights, 
Eighteenth Report of the Commission to Study the 
Organisation of Peace, pp. 39-186, (1968); E. Schwelb, 
Notes On The Early Legislative History Of The Measures 
Of Implementation Of The Human Rights Covenants, in 
Melanges Offerts A Polys Modinos, pp. 270-289 (1968); 
E. Schwelb, Civil and Political Rights: The International 
Measures of Implementation, 62 AJIL (1968), pp. 827-868 (revised in 12 Tex. ILJ (1977), pp. 141-186); E. Schwelb, 
Some Aspects Of The International Covenants On Civil And 
Political Rights 1966, in Eide & Schou, (eds. ), The 
International Protection Of Human Rights, pp. 103-129, (1968); L. Sohn and T. Buergenthal, International 
Protection Of Human Rights, pp. 505-556, (1973); I. Szabo, 
Historical Foundations Of Human Rights And Subsequent 
Developments, in K. Vasak (ed. ), P. Alston (English 
Edition, ed. ), The International Dimensions of Human 
Rights, Vol. 1, ch. 2, (1982); H. Tolley, Jr., The U. N. 
Commission on Human Rights, chs. 1-3, (1987); United 
Nations Action In The Field Of Human Rights, U. N. Doc. 
ST/HR/2/Rev. 2/, chpts. 1 and 2, (1983); J. H. W. Verzijl, 
International Law In Historical Perspective, Vol. V, 
chpt. IV, (1972); Ton. J. M. Zuidjwick, Petitioning The 
United Nations-A Study In Human Rights, chpt. 1, A, 
sections 7-10, (1982). 
2 Traditional international law is taken as all 
international law (both customary and conventional) 
predating the U. N. Charter in 1945. 
3 See in particular Chakravarti, n. 1 above, ch. 1; 
R. B. Lillich, The Human Rights of Aliens In Contemporary 
International Law, pp. 1-40, Manchester University Press, (1984); M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. C. Chen, Human Rights 
And World Public Order, pp. 473-508, (1980). For some 
examples of seventeenth and eighteenth century treaties 
providing for human rights protection see Verzijl, n. 1 
above. 
4 See in particular Sohn and Buergenthal, n. 1 
above, ch. 3; Ganji, n. 1 above, ch. 1; R. Lillich, Forcible 
Self-Help To Protect Human Rights, 53 Iowa LR (1967), 
pp. 325-351; M. Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in 
H. Bull (Ed. ), Intervention In World Politics, 
pp. 93-118, (1984); I. Pogany, Humanitarian Intervention In (Footnote Continued) 
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individuals were not matters regulated by international 
law. 5 Some of the earliest examples of international law 
concerning itself with individual rights can be observed 
in the attempts in the nineteenth century to - abolish 
slavery and the slave trade. 
6 The revolutionary 
development of the twentieth century (though some would 
argue it is more properly viewed as an evolutionary 
development) 7 has been the internationalisation of the 
concept of human rights. 
8 Among the most significant 
milestones in this development were the Covenant of the 
(Footnote Continued) 
International Law: The French Intervention In Syria 
Re-examined, 35 ICLQ (1986), pp. 182-190; N. Ronzitti, 
Rescuing Nationals Abroard Through Military Coercion And 
Intervention On Grounds Of Humanity, (1985). 
5 See Sohn and Buergenthal, n. 1 above, chpt. 1; 
L. Oppenheim, International Law, H. Lauterpacht (Ed. ), 
pp. 636-642, (8d, 1955). A State could, however, assume 
legal obligations towards individuals by virtue of an 
international agreement. See the Case Concerning The 
Jurisdiction Of The Courts Of Danzig, P. C. I. J. Series B, 
No. 15, (1928). For a recent view see R. Higgins, 
Conceptual Thinking , About The Individual In 
International Law, 4 Brit J. I. S. (1978) pp-1-19" 
reprinted in R. Falk et al, (Eds), International Law -A 
Contemporary Perspective, pp. 476-494, (1985). 
6 See Ganji, n. 1 above, ch. 3; Robertson, n. l above, 
pp. 15-17. For more recent developments see U. N. Action, 
n. 1 above, chpt. VII, B; Slavery, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/ 
1982/20/ Rev. l, (1984), updating report by B. Whittaker; 
K. Zoglin, U. N. Action Against Slavery: A Critical 
Evaluation, 8 HRQ (1986), pp. 306-339. 
7 See F. Capatorti, Human Rights: The Hard Road 
Towards Universality, in R. St. J. MacDonald and 
D. M. Johnstone, (eds) The Structure And Process Of 
International Law, pp. 977-1000 at p. 978, (1984). 
8 See Humphrey, n. 1 above, p. 46 (1984); Humphrey, 
The World Revolution And Human Rights, in A. Gotlieb 
(ed. ), Human Rights Federalism and Minorities, 
pp. 147-179, (1969); L. B. Sohn, The New International Law: 
Protection Of The Rights Of Individuals Rather Than 
States, 32 Am. ULR (1982) pp. 1-64. 
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League of Nations (1919), 9 the Mandates System, 10 the 
establishment of the International Labour Organization 
(1919), 11 the Minorities Treaties and Declarations, 12 
President Roosevelts' "Four-Freedoms" address in his 
message to Congress on 6 January 1941,13 the Declaration 
of the 'United Nations' of 1 January 194214 and the 
Charter of the United Nations (1945). 15 
1.2 The rise of totalitarianism and the horrors and 
excesses of the Second World War had shaken the moral, 
legal and political foundations of the world community. 
9 The League of Nations Covenant does not 
specifically mention human rights but some important international developments did take place concerning 
limited areas of human rights matters, see Green n. l 
above, pp. 8-13. 
10 See Sohn and Buergenthal, n. 1 above, chpt. 5. 
11 See E. A. Landy, The Effectiveness Of 
International Supervision-Thirty Years Of I. L. O. 
Experience, Stevens, London, (1966); N. Välticos, The 
ILO, in Vasak/ Alston, (eds), n. l above, pp. 363-399; 
F. Wolf, Human Rights And The I. L. O., in T. Meron (Ed. ), 
Human Rights In International Law 
- 
Legal And Policy 
Issues, pp. 273-304, (1984). 
12 See P. De Azcarate, League Of Nations And 
National Minorities-An Experiment, 1945); Sohn and 
Buergenthal, n. 1 above, 'ch. 4; Ganji, n. 1 above, ch. 2; 
J. F. Green, Protection Of Minorities In The League Of 
Nations And The United Nations, in Gotlieb (ed. ), n. 8 
above, pp. 180-210; W. McKean, Equality And Discrimination 
Under International Law, chs. 1 and 2, (1983). 
13 87 Congressional Record, Pt. I, pp. 46-47, (77th 
Congress, 1st session). 
14 For the text see 36 AJIL 
Supplement(1942), pp. 191-192.27 other countries later 
adhered to the Declaration, see U. N. Yearbook 
(1946-47), p. 1. Mention should also be made of the 
influential 'Declaration Of The Rights Of Man' adopted 
by the Institute Of International Law in 1929, see 35 
AJIL (1941), pp. 662-665; and Professor Lauterpacht's 
work, 'International Bill Of Rights' (1945). 
15 Text in Brownlie, Basic Documents In 
International Law, (3d, 1983). 
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The defence and re-establishment of human rights came to 
be seen, in a sense, as one of the 'war-aims'. 
16 By the 
early 1940's a widespread human rights movement had 
developed that was to exercise a critical influence on 
the injection of human rights provisions into the 
institutional framework of the new post-world order. 
17 
1.3 Some of the early American drafts of the United 
Nations Charter included a Bill of Rights or a 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
18 However, in the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposals (1944) for the United Nations Charter 
there was only one general reference to the promotion of 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as one 
of the functions of the proposed General Assembly, and 
under its authority the Economic and Social Council. 
19 
The United Nations Conference On International 
Organization (1945) considered a large number of 
amendments to the proposed United Nations Charter that 
would have made more detailed and specific reference to 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Support for these 
amendments came not only from various states but also 
from numerous non-governmental interest and pressure 
groups. 
20 Only in the final stages were the sponsoring 
powers persuaded to accept the proposed amendments but 
with their support success was assured. 
21 The result was 
16 See Green, n. 1 above, p. 13. See also the 
Atlantic Charter (1941), 35 AJIL (1941), Supp. P-191, 
and the second preambular paragraph of the U. N. Charter. 
17 See Humphrey, n. 1 above, (1984), pp. 12-13. 
18 See Huston, n. 25 below. 
19 See Chpt. IX, sect. A(I) of the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals, UNCIO iv, 13. Text in Goodrich, Hambro and 
Simons, Charter Of The United Nations, p. 664 at p. 672, 
(3d, 1969). 
20 See Green, n. 1 above, p. 16 and n. 17 above. 
21 See Green, n. 1 above, pp. 15-23. 
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that the highest constitutional document of the new 
world order, 
22 the United Nations Charter (1945), 
specifically refers to human rights in its Preamble and 
in six of its articles. 
23 The nature of the human rights 
obligations imposed on States by the U. N. Charter has 
been extensively debated but there is no doubt that 
their inclusion in the Charter was of fundamental 
importance to the internationalisation of human 
rights. 
24 
Among the proposals not adopted at the Conference 
were those that would have incorporated within the U. N. 
Charter some form of an "International - Bill Of 
Rights". 25 The Conference did not adopt these proposals 
because the time available did not permit the detailed 
consideration thought necessary. One proposal which was 
adopted was the inclusion in Article 68 of the Charter 
of a specific reference to the establishment by the 
ECOSOC of a Commission for the promotion of human 
rights. The United States Secretary of State commented 
22 Cf. R. St. J. McDonald, The United Nations Charter: 
Constitution or Contract, in R. St. J. McDonald and 
D. M. Johnstone (Eds. ), n. 7 above, pp. 889-912. 
23 Articles 1 (3) 
, 
13(1) (b) 
, 
55(c), (and see article 
56), 62,68 and 76. 
24 Many of the works cited in n. 1 above deal with 
this question. See also E. Schwelb, The International 
Court Of Justice And The Human Rights Clauses Of The 
Charter, 66 AJIL (1972), pp. 337-351; N. Singh, Enforcement 
Of Human Rights, pp. 20-36, (1986); L. Sohn, The Human 
Rights Law Of The Charter, 12 Tex. ILJ (1977), pp. 129-140; 
R. Lillich and F. Newman, International Human Rights - 
Problems Of Law And Policy, problems 1 and 2, (1979); 
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic And Consular 
Staff In Tehran, I. C. J. Reports (1980), p. 3. 
25 See e. g., UNCIO, Vol. I, p. 425, (proposal of 
South Africa); UNCIO, Vol. III, pp. 266-269 (Panama); 
UNCIO, Vol. III, pp. 64,70,91 (Mexico). See J. Huston, 
Human Rights Enforcement Issues At The United Nations 
Conference On International Organization, 53 Iowa L. R. 
(1967) 
, 
pp. 272-290. 
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in his Report To The President on the Conference that, 
"The unanimous acceptance of this proposal may well 
prove one of the most important and most significant 
achievements of the San Francisco Conference" 
. 
2.6 It was 
clearly envisaged therefore that one of the first tasks 
of the new Human Rights Commission (HRCion) would be to 
draft an International Bill Of Rights. 
27 The ECOSOC 
established the HRCion and instructed it to submit 
proposals, recommendations and reports regarding an 
International Bill Of Rights and suggestions regarding 
ways and means for the effective implementation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 28 
- 
26 Charter Of The United Nations 
- 
Report To The 
President, p. 118, (1945, reprint 1969). See also UNCIO, 
vol. I, p. 683 (Pres. Truman). 
27 The establishment and work of the Human Rights 
Commission is dealt with in a number of works in n. 1 
above. In particular see those by Lauterpacht, Jamiel, 
Tolley and Zuidjwick. A Panamanian proposal that the 
first General Assembly adopt a Declaration On Human 
Rights was not adopted, see G. A. Resn. 43(I), 11 Dec, 1946. 
28 See ECOSOC Resns. 5(I) and 9(11), ECOSOC OR, 1st 
year, 2nd session, pp. 400-402 (1946). 
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B. DRAFTING. 29 
1.4 The HRCion held its first session in early 1947.30 
Mrs. F. D. Roosevelt was elected Chairman. She held that 
office until 1951 and remained a member of the HRCion for 
a further year. She exerted an immensely important 
influence in the HRCion in its formative years when the 
first steps towards an International Bill of Rights were 
taken31. The HRCion's discussions began with a general 
debate on the form and content of an International Bill 
of Rights. The possible forms included a Declaration, 
32 
a 
Resolution of the General Assembly, a multilateral 
Convention binding on all States ratifying it, or an 
amendment to the Charter of the U. N. The initial 
concensus was that the Bill would be a Declaration to be 
adopted by Resolution of the General Assembly. A Drafting 
Committee of eight members was ultimately established to 
prepare a preliminary draft International Bill of 
Rights. 33 The drafting Committee initially based its work 
on a draft Declaration prepared by the Secretariat. 
34 
1.5 In the drafting Committee the different views as to 
the form the International Bill should take were further 
29 See n. 1 above. 
30 Doc. E/259, n. 1 above. See Humphrey, n. 1 above, 
pp. 23-28. 
31 See A. J. Glen Mower, Jr., The U. S., the U. N. and 
Human Rights 
- 
The Eleanor Roosevelt and Jimmy Carter 
Eras, Part I, (1979); M. G. Johnson, The Contributions Of 
Eleanor And Franklin' Roosevelt To The Development Of 
International Protection Of Human Rights, 9 HRQ 
(1987), pp. 19-48. 
32 On the legal status of a'Declarations see G. Von 
Glahn, Law Among Nations, pp. 17-19, (5d, 1986). 
33 For details see Humphrey, n. 1 above. 
34 See U. N. Human Rights Yearbook, 1947, p. 484. 
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developed. 35 The major division was between those who 
favoured a Declaration or Manifesto and those who 
favoured a Convention. The divisions proved not to be 
fundamental. Those who favoured a Declaration agreed that 
it should be accompanied or followed by a Convention or a 
series of Conventions on specific groups of rights. 
Similarly those who favoured a Convention agreed that the 
General Assembly, in recommending a Convention to member 
States, might make a Declaration which was wider in 
content and more general in expression. Accordingly, it 
was decided to draft two documents. The Draft Declaration 
was to set forth general principles or standards of human 
rights. The Draft Convention was to define specific 
rights and the limitations or restrictions on their 
enjoyment. The Drafting Committee also considered the 
question of implementation and transmitted a memorandum 
on this matter prepared by the Secretariat. 36 
At its second session in late 1947 the HRCion decided 
that it would prepare a Declaration and a Convention (to 
be called a Covenant) as well as measures of 
implementation. The term "International Bill Of Rights" 
was to apply to all three documents in preparation. 
37 
Three working groups were established to consider each of 
these matters. A draft Declaration and a draft Covenant 
were produced and along with the report of the working 
group on implementation were transmitted to Governments 
for observations, suggestions and proposals. 
38 
35 See Doc. E/CN. 4/56; SR. E/CN. 4/AC. 3/SR. 1-9. (1947). 
36 See Doc. E/CN. 4/21, Ax. H, pp. 68-74, Report of the 
Drafting Committee (1947). 
37 Doc. E/600, n. 1 above, pr. 18. 
38 Ibid., annexes (A-C). The representative of the 
Ukrainian SSR withdrew from the working group on 
implementation on the basis that the question of 
implementation demanded previous knowledge of the rules (Footnote Continued) 
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The third session of the HRCion 
on the draft Declaration. 
39 The 
submitted to the ECOSOC which after 
11 
in 1948 concentrated 
revised draft was 
brief consideration 
transmitted the draft Declaration to the General Assembly 
for adoption. 
40 The "Universal Declaration Of Human 
Rights" was finally adopted by the General Assembly on 10 
December 1948.41 The first stage of the International 
Bill of Rights was complete. 
(Footnote Continued) 
to be implemented. It is interesting to note the measures 
of implementation proposed at this stage in annex III. It 
was agreed that the primary responsibility for the 
enforcement should be at the State level and that each 
State should be under an obligation to incorporate (in 
the sense of giving effect through national laws and 
practices) the provisions of the Covenant. This basic 
principle survived to become article 2 of the ICCPR. See 
ch. 6 below. Disputes concerning alleged violations were 
to be referred to a Standing Mediation, and Conciliation 
Committee, appointed by the ECOSOC, which would provide a 
remedy if possible. Disputes not settled by this 
Committee would be sent to the HRCion which would decide 
whether the dispute should be referred to an 
international tribunal to be created. The decisions of 
that tribunal were to be binding on the States parties 
and were to be implemented by the General Assembly. 
39 Doc. E/800. n. 1 above. 
40 U. N. ECOSOC OR, 7th session, Vol. 1, (1948), pp. 642-660,694-702. 
41 G. A. Resn. 217(A), GAOR, 3rd session, Part I, 
Resolutions, p. 71. See Green, n. 1 above, pp. 24-37; 
Tolley, n. l above, pp. 19-24; P. Alston, The Universal 
Declaration at 35,31 Rev. I. C. J., pp. 60-70, (Dec. 1983); 
H. Lauterpacht (1950), n. 1 above, pp. 394-428; 
B. G. Ramcharan (Ed. ), Thirty Years After The Universal 
(Footnote Continued) 
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1.6 Attention then focused on the draft Covenant an, 
measures of implementation. 
42 At its fifth session (1949) 
the HRCion conducted a detailed article by article 
examination of the draft Covenant. 
43 Increasing attention 
was being focused on the question of implementation. A 
variety of proposals were made for the establishment of 
an International Court or Committee Of Human Rights with 
different powers and functions. The HRCion requested the 
Secretary-General to prepare a methodical questionnaire 
for Governments on the basis of the proposals put 
forward. 44 One of the most significant matters considered 
by the HRCion was whether a right of petition to an 
international conciliation body would extend to 
individuals and groups of individuals. The HRCion was 
equally divided on this issue there being eight votes for 
and eight against. Under the HRCion's rules of procedure 
this meant that the proposal was not adopted. 
45 Although 
(Footnote Continued) 
Declaration, (Nijhoff, 1979); The Proclamation Of Tehran 
(1968), Human Rights International Instruments, pp. 18-19, (1983). 
42 G. A. Resns. 217E (III) and 217B (III) (1948). 
43 See Doc. E/1371, n. l above. New articles were 
proposed concerning economic and social rights. See also 
the survey prepared by the U. N. Secretary-General of the 
activities of U. N. organs and Specialized Agencies 
falling within the scope of articles 22-27 UDHR which 
cover economic and social rights, Doc. E/CN. 4/364. 
44 That questionnaire itself constitutes an 
interesting document, see Doc. E/1371, n. 1 above, 
Ax. III, pt. II. 
45 See U. N. Docs. E/1371, n. 1 above and E/CN. 4/SR 118. 
It is interesting to note the voting pattern at this 
stage. The following States voted for a resolution laying 
down that a right of petition by individuals, groups and 
organizations should be recognised forthwith in the 
Covenant: Australia, Denmark, France, Guatemala, India, 
Lebanon, the Philippines and Uruguay. The following 
States voted against: China, Egypt, Iran, the Ukraine, 
the USSR, the U. K., the U. S. and Yugoslavia. 
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similar proposals were consistently made at subsequent 
sessions none was ever adopted. 
46 
At its sixth session (1950) 47 the HRCion gave further 
consideration to the question of implementation. By a 
narrow vote the HRCion approved the principle of the 
establishment of a permanent body in the measures of 
implementation in the draft Covenant. That body was to be 
known as the Human Rights Committee (HRC). The HRC would 
consider Inter-State complaints but not complaints from 
individuals or non-governmental organizations. 
48 The HRC 
was to offer its good offices to the- States concerned 
with a view to the friendly solution of the matter on the 
basis of respect for human rights as defined in the 
Covenant. A proposal that the HRC should have as one of 
its functions the general supervision of the observance 
of the provisions of the Covenant was rejected. 49 
On the question of economic, social and cultural 
rights it was decided that they should not be included in 
the first Covenant but that the HRCion would proceed at 
its next session to consider "additional covenants and 
measures dealing with economic, social, cultural, 
6 
46 Note also the negative position taken by the 
HRCion itself that it had no jurisdiction to take any 
action with regard to complaints concerning human rights, 
That position 
was maintained until the late 1960's. See Zuidjwick, n. l 
above; Tolley, n. l above, pp. 16-19 and ch. 4. 
47 Doc. E/1681, n. 1 above. 
48 Ibid, prs. 34-50. Humphrey, n. 1 above, comments 
that, "It was clear from the voting patterns that 
opposition to an effective right of petition was 
hardening", p. 108. 
49 
"To this end it should collect information, 
including legislation and judicial decisions, regarding 
the observance within States parties to the Covenant, of 
human rights as defined in the Covenant, and initiate an 
inquiry if it thought it necessary", Doc. E/1681, pr. 43. 
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political and other categories of human rights". 
50 It was 
also decided to secure the co-operation of the 
Specialized Agencies in the drafting of articles on 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
51 
1.7 The ECOSOC considered the draft Covenants at its 
eleventh session (1950). 52 In one of its most important 
decisions concerning the Covenants it requested the 
General Assembly to take four policy decisions. 
53 The 
first policy decision concerned the general adequacy of 
the first eighteen draft articles. The General Assembly 
expressed the opinion that the draft should be revised to 
include additional rights and to define the rights and 
the permissible limitations with the greatest possible 
precision. 
The second policy decision concerned the desirability 
of including special articles on the application of the 
Covenant to federal States and non-self-governing and 
trust territories. The General Assembly requested the 
HRCion to study a federal State article and prepare 
recommendations which would, "have as their purpose the 
securing of the maximum extension of the Covenant to the 
constituent units of federal states and the meeting of 
the constitutional problems of federal States". 
54 
50 Doc. E/1681, n. 1 above, prs. 34-46 and Ax. I. 
51 Ibid., prs. 29-33. 
52 See ECOSOC OR, 11th session, SR. 377-79 and 
E/CN. 4/AC. 7/ 
SR. 139-157 and 159. 
53 ECOSOC Resn. 303I (XI). See Humphrey, n. 1 above, 
pp. 119-133. A bitter debate ensued at ECOSOC'S 12th 
session on receipt of the G. A. 's policy decisions, ECOSOC 
OR, 12th session, (1951), SR. 438-442. 
54 G. A. Resn. 421C (V) (1950). For some contemporary 
views see Y. L. Laing, Colonial And Federal Clauses In U. N. 
Multilateral Instruments, 45 AJIL (1951), pp. 108-128; 
Lauterpacht (1950), n. 1 above, pp. 359-365; 'M. Sorenson, 
(Footnote Continued) 
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Notwithstanding the clear recognition of the 
constitutional problems of federal States by the G. A. the 
HRCion interpreted this decision as a direction to 
exclude any provision for a federal State article. This 
is the position adopted in the final text of the 
Covenant. 55 Regarding the territorial application (or 
colonial clause) the G. A. was more direct. It instructed 
the HRCion to insert a specified text into the 
Covenant. 56 That text, however, was subsequently deleted 
in the Third Committee of the G. A. 57 The G. A. also 
requested the HRCion, "to study ways and means which 
would ensure the right of all peoples to 
self-determination and to prepare recommendations" 
thereon. 58 Professor Humphrey has commented that, "these 
decisions marked the beginning of the politicization of 
the Covenants. The developing countries were in revolt 
and new voices were beginning to be heard". 59 
The third policy decision concerned the desirability 
of including articles on economic, social and cultural 
rights. The G. A. decided that these rights should be 
included in the Covenant on human rights together with an 
explicit recognition of the equality of men and women in 
related rights as set forth in the U. N. Charter. The 
HRCion was requested to include in the draft Covenant, "a 
clear expression of economic, social and cultural rights 
(Footnote Continued) 
Federal States And The International Protection of Human 
Rights, 46 AJIL (1952), pp. 195-218. See also Johnson, n. 31 
above, pp. 41-44. 
55 See article 50 ICCPR and article 10 O. P. 
56 G. A. Resn. 422 (V), (1950). See Doc. A/2929, n. 1 
above, ch. 1, pr. 21. 
57 See Doc. A/6546, n. 1 above, prs. 131-138. 
58 G. A. Resn. 421D (V), (1950). 
59 Humphrey, n. 1 above, p. 129. 
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in a manner which relates them to the civil and political 
freedoms claimed in the draft Covenant". 
60 
The final policy decision related to the adequacy 
of the articles relating to implementation. The G. A. 
requested the HRCion, "to proceed with the consideration 
of provisions, to be inserted in the draft Covenant or in 
separate Protocols, for the receipt and examination of 
petitions from individuals and organizations with respect 
to alleged violations of the Covenant", and to take into 
consideration a number of proposals on measures of 
implementation. 61 However, as we have noted the HRCion 
never adopted measures to give individuals or 
organizations a right of petition. 62 
1.8 At its seventh session (1951)63 the HRCion drafted 
fourteen articles on economic, social and cultural rights 
and ten articles on measures of implementation under 
which States parties would submit periodic reports to the 
ECOSOC concerning the progress made in achieving the 
observance of economic, social and cultural rights. 
64 The 
HRCion did not decide whether the reporting system would 
be applied to civil and political rights. The provisions 
concerning the proposed'Human Rights Committee were also 
further revised. 
The policy decision of the G. A. to have a single 
Covenant had not ended the disagreements between States 
60 G. A. Resn. 421E (V), (1950). Humphrey, Ibid., notes 
that, "After the British defeat in the United Nations (when it was decided to include economic and social 
rights in the Covenant), the Government was considering 
not only abandoning the Covenant but with drawing from 
the Commission", p. 145. 
61 G. A. Resn. 421F (V), (1950). 
62 See n. 45 above and ch. 5 below. 
63 Doc. E/1992, n. 1 above. 
64 A State party could, however, refer to a report 
which it had submitted to a Specialized Agency. 
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over this issue. The matter was again considered by the 
ECOSOC at its thirteenth session (1951). After a 
protracted debate it decided to invite the G. A. to 
reconsider its decision on this matter. 
65 
The G. A. took 
up this invitation and after a bitter debate it requested 
the ECOSOC to ask the HRCion, 
"To draft two Covenants on human rights 
.... 
one to 
contain civil and political rights and the other to 
contain economic, social and cultural rights, in 
order that the General Assembly may approve the two 
Covenants simultaneously and open them at the same 
time for signature, the two Covenants to contain, in 
order to emphasise the unity of the aim in view and 
to ensure respect for and observance of human 
rights, as many similar provisions as possible". 
66 
The G. A. also decided to include in the Covenants an 
article stipulating that, "All peoples shall have the 
right to self-determination", and that, "all States, 
including those having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories, should 
promote the realization of that right, in conformity with 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and 
that States having responsibility for the administration 
of Non-Self-Governing Territories should promote the 
realization of that right in relation to the peoples of 
such territories". 
67 
65 ECOSOC Resn. 384(XIII), ECOSOC OR, 13th session. 
66 G. A. Resn. 543(VI) (1952), GAOR, 6th session, 
Supp. 20, (A/2199), p. 36. See Humphrey, n. 1 above who 
comments that, "The largely ideological controversy and 
decision split the United Nations down the middle", 
p. 129,160. 
67 G. A. Resn. 545 (VI). See Humphrey, Ibid, p. 163. 
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In response to the G. A. 's decision most of the 
HRCion's eighth session (1952) 68 was. taken up with the 
drafting of a provision on self-determination which it 
was decided would be included as article 1 of each-of the 
Covenants. Further revision took place of both draft 
Covenants. A proposal to request the G. A. to reconsider 
the decision to prepare two Covenants was not adopted. 
1.9 At its ninth session (1953)69 the HRCion adopted 
additional articles dealing with civil and political 
rights and revised the provisions concerning the 
establishment, composition and jurisdiction of the 
proposed Human Rights Committee. 70 Again a proposal to 
request the G. A. to reconsider its decision to have two 
Covenants was not adopted. However, a special 
implementation procedure for the right of 
self-determination was adopted. 
71 
The HRCion concluded its work on the draft Covenants 
at its tenth session (1954). 72 The articles relating to 
the system of periodic reports for the implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights were redrafted. A 
new article was adopted on a reporting procedure for the 
Civil and Political Rights Covenant. The State reports 
were to cover, "The legislative or other measures, 
including judicial remedies, which they have adopted and 
which give effect to the rights recognized herein". The 
68 Doc. E/2256, n. 1 above. Humphrey, Ibid., 
pp. 167-168. 
69 Doc. E/2447, n. 1 above. 
70 The proposed nine member Human Rights Committee 
was to be chosen for five year terms by the ICJ from 
nominations made by States parties to the Covenant. 
71 Draft article 48, Doc. E/2447, n. 1 above, p. 48. 
The G. A. at its eighth session (1953) discussed the 
questions of a federal State article and a right of 
petition but made no policy decision on either question. 
72 See Doc. E/2573, n. 1 above. 
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reports were also to indicate the factors and 
difficulties, if any, affecting the progressive 
implementation of draft article 22(4) of the Covenant 
which concerned the equality of rights and 
responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during 
marriage and at its dissolution and special measures for 
the protection of children. 
73 The reports were to be 
transmitted, "for the ECOSOC which may transmit them to 
the Commission on Human Rights for information, study 
and, if necessary, general recommendations". 
74 The HRCion 
also did not adopt any provisions concerning the 
applicability of the Inter-State complaint procedure 
under the draft ICCPR to the Economic, Social and 
Cultural 
. 
Rights Covenant. 75 There was further discussion 
of extending the right of petition but no provision was 
adopted. Finally, the provision extending the civil and 
political Covenant to all parts of federal states was 
adopted. 
76 The HRCion's final drafts were the submitted 
through the ECOSOC to the G. A. 77 
1.10 The G. A. reviewed the draft Covenants at its ninth 
session (1954)78 and recommended that its Third Committee 
73 This draft provision became article 23(4) ICCPR. 
74 Doc. E/2573, n. 1 above, draft article 49. It was 
argued that the HRCion was a more appropriate body to 
receive reports as the proposed Human Rights Committee 
would be a "quasi-judicial" organ concerned with, 
inter-State complaints, Ibid., pr. 178. It was explained 
that the words "general recommendations" had been taken 
from the system of periodic reports adopted for inclusion 
in the draft Covenant on economic, social and cultural 
rights, Ibid., prs. 124,128,132 And 181. 
75 Ibid., prs. 215-225. Proposals to that effect were 
withdrawn. 
76 See text to note 55 above. 
77 For the text of the HRCions final draft see Doc. 
78 GAOR, 9th session, Third Committee, SR. 557-586; 
(Footnote Continued) 
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(Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions) begin an 
article by article discussion at its tenth session. So 
began over a decade of detailed scrutiny. A series of 
amendments were made to the substantive rights adopted by 
the HRCion. A new article on the rights of the child was 
adopted but proposals for a right to asylum and a right 
to property failed. To assist the Third Committee in its 
consideration of measures of implementation the 
Secretary-General had prepared, at the request of the 
G. A., a detailed explanatory paper which examined all of 
the possibilities in the light of contemporary 
developments in international implementation procedures. 
That paper clearly indicated the feasibility of reporting 
and petition systems as international implementation 
measures. 
79 
1.11 The result of the Third Committee's deliberations 
were some fundamental changes in the measures of 
implementation. 80 The final text of the ICCPR provided 
for three measures of international implementation. 
Firstly, a compulsory reporting procedure covering 
all of the rights set forth in the Covenant (Article 
40). 81 The reports were to indicate, "the progress made 
in the enjoyment of those rights", and to indicate the 
factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the 
implementation of the Covenant. The particular 
implementation provision dealing with the rights and 
responsibilities of spouses and protection for children 
(Footnote Continued) 
Plenary Meetings, SR. 504. See G. A. Resn. 833(IX), A/2929, 
n. l above, ch. l, pr. 50. 
79 G. A. Resn. 1843B (XVIII) of Dec. 19, (1962). For the 
Secretary-Generals' paper see Doc. E/&411, n. 1 above. 
80 See in particular Jhabvala, n. 1 above, and ch. 3 
below. The changes made by the Third Committee were 
accepted by the General Assembly in 1966. 
81 This procedure is examined in detail in ch. 3 
below. 
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was deleted82 as was the special implementation procedure 
for the right of self-determination. 
83 The State reports 
were to be considered by the new Human Rights Committee 
rather than by the ECOSOC and the HRCion. 
84 The HRC was 
to "study" the reports and "transmit its reports, and 
such general comments as it may consider appropriate, to 
the States parties". 
85 The role envisaged for the 
Specialized Agencies was minimal. 
86 
Secondly, the Inter-State Good Offices, Fact-Finding 
and Conciliation procedure was made optional rather than 
mandatory as it had been under the HRCion's draft. 
87 The 
provisions themselves were spelt out in much greater 
detail and became a more distinct two stage procedure. 
During the first stage the HRC would exercise its Good 
Offices (Article 41). The second stage would be conducted 
by a Conciliation Commission appointed by the HRC with 
the consent of the States parties (Article 42). It is 
also noteworthy that all references in the HRCion's draft 
to the International Court Of Justice were deleted, even 
its election of members of the HRC. This has been seen as 
an adverse reaction to the judgement of the I. C. J. in the 
" 
South West Africa Cases (1966). 88 
Thirdly, the Third Committee introduced an Optional 
provision for the receipt and consideration by the HRC of 
82 See n. 73 above. 
83 Doc. E/6546, n. 1 above, prs. 541-543. See n. 71 
above, and Green. n. 1 above, p. 53. 
84 See n. 74 above. 
85 Ibid. 
86 On the HRC and Specialized Agencies see ch. 3 
below. 
87 See Doc. A/2929, n. 1 above, ch. vii, prs. 59-98; 
Doc. E/6546, n. 1 above, prs. 398-436. 
88 I. C. J. Rep. 1966 
, 
p. 6. See Pechota, n. 1 above, 
p. 62; Korey, Ibid., p. 56; Cf. Article 22 ICERD (1965). 
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communications from individuals, but not non-governmental 
organizations, claiming to be victims of violations of 
rights recognized in the Covenant. The HRC would then 
express 'its views' on the communication. This provision 
ultimately emerged as the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR. 89 
1.12 The HRC had clearly survived then to become the 
central international implementation organ in the ICCPR 
and the O. P. 
90 It was to study the reports submitted by 
states parties and make such 'general comments' as it 
considered appropriate (Article 40); exercise its good 
offices concerning Inter-State complaints (Article 41); 
appoint a Conciliation Commission if its good offices 
failed to resolve the matter (article 42); and consider 
and express its views on communications submitted by 
individuals under the O. P. In addition to altering its 
functions the Third Committee increased the size of the 
HRC from nine to eighteen members and provided for it to 
be elected at meetings of States parties to the 
Covenant. 91 
In Resolution 2200 (XI) of 16 December 1966 the G. A. 
adopted and opcned for signature the International 
Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, the 
International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights and 
the O. P. 92 Thus the International Bill Of Rights was 
89 This procedure is examined in detail in ch. 4 
below. 
90 On the HRC see ch. 2 below. 
91 See Doc. A/6546, n. 1 above, prs. 188-303. 
'92 The ICESCR was adopted by 105 votes to none; the 
ICCPR by 106 votes to none. The O. P. to the ICCPR was 
adopted by 66 votes to 2 with 38 abstentions. See U. N. 
Yearbook, 1966, p. 418; U. N. Juridical Yearbook, 1966, 
pp. 69-70,170-195. The ICCPR and the O. P. both entered 
into force on 23 March 1976. 
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complete. 
93 
The Bill was the product of almost two 
decades of detailed consideration by the HRCion, the 
ECOSOC, the Third Committee of the G. A. and to a lesser 
extent the plenary G. A. At each stage of preparation 
Governments were afforded the opportunity of close 
consultation through the submission of their 
observations, recommendations and proposals. The HRC has 
thus been left with a wealth of travaux preparatoires at 
their disposal which could be of enormous value when 
faced with problems of interpretation and application. 
94 
1.14 No account of the drafting of the International Bill 
of Rights would be complete without drawing attention to 
two highly significant influences on its development. 
Firstly, the Secretariat of the then U. N. Human Rights 
Division played a fundamental role. 
95 It continually 
acted in a positive and constructive manner introducing 
new ideas and initiatives either of its own motion or 
through the State representatives in the HRCion and in 
the Third Committee. 
1.15 Secondly, throughout the drafting process a large 
number of 
93 See F. Newman, The International Bill Of Rights: 
Does It Exist?, in A. Cassese (Ed. ), Current Problems Of 
International Law, pp. 107-116, (1975); C. W. Jenks, The 
United Nations Covenants On Human Rights Come To Life, in 
Recueil D'Etudes En Hommage A Paul Guggenheim, 
pp. 805-813, (1968);. E. Schwelb, Entry Into Force of The 
International Covenants On Human Rights And The Optional 
Protocol, 70 AJIL (1976), pp. 511-519. 
94 See M. Bossuyt, A Guide to the Travaux 
Preparatoires To The ICCPR AND OP. (1987). The HRC have 
had recourse to the travaux preparatoires on a number of 
occasions. 
95 See in particular Humphrey, n. 1 above and ch. 2 
prs. 2.16-2.17 below. A number of Specialized Agencies 
also contributed to the drafting of the Covenants. These 
included the I. L. O., U. N. E. S. C. O., W. H. O., the Commission 
On The Status Of Women and the Sub-Commission On The 
Prevention Of Discrimination And The Protection Of 
Minorities. On the HRC, and Specialized Agencies see ch. 3 
pr. 3.13-3.16 below. 
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non-governmental-organizations made a very positive 
contribution. 
96 Their representatives served to keep the 
pressure on governmental representatives to produce the 
most comprehensive provisions to protect rights and the 
most effective international measures of implementation 
possible. Non-governmental-organizations have played a 
very significant role in the development of a 
consciousness of human rights at both national and 
international levels. We have already noted that it was 
partly their efforts that led to the inclusion of the 
human rights provisions in the U. N. Charter. 97 Their 
activities have continued and expanded ever since and 
their work represents a very important part of the 
machinery for the international protection of human 
rights. 
98 
96 The representatives attending each session of the 
HRCion are recorded in the reports of the HRCion, n. l 
above. 
97 See n. 17 above. 
98 For some of the roles played by NGO's see 
P. Archer, Action By Unofficial Organizations On Human 
Rights, in E. Luard (Ed. ), n. 1 above; J. D. Armstrong, 
Non-Governmental Organizations, in R. J. Vincent, ed., 
Foreign Policy And Human Rights, pp. 243-260, (1986); 
C. Desmond, Persecution East And West: Human Rights, 
Political Prisoners and Amnesty, (1983); M. Kamminga and 
N. S. Rodley, Direct Intervention At The U. N.: NGO 
Participation In The Commission On Human Rights And Its 
Sub-Commission, in H. Hannum (Ed. ), Guide To International 
Human Rights Practice, ch. l1, (1984); V. Leary, A New Role 
For NGO's In Human Rights: A Case Study Of NGO 
Participation In The Development of International Norms 
Of Torture, in A. Cassese (Ed. ), U. N. Law/Fundamental 
Rights 
- 
Two Topics In International Law, pp. 197-210, 
(1979); J. Shestack, Sisyphus Endures: The International 
Human Rights NGO, 24 N. Y. S. L. R. (1978), pp. 89-123; 
H. Thoolen and B. Verstappen, Human Rights Missions (1986); 
D. Weissbrodt, The Contribution Of International NGO's To 
The Protection Of Human Rights; in T. Meron (Ed. ), Human 
Rights In International Law 
- 
Legal And Policy Issues, 
ch. 11, (1984); Ibid., The Role Of International NGO's In 
The Implementation Of Human Rights, 12 Tex. ILJ (1977), 
(Footnote Continued) 
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We now examine some of the principal issues that 
arose during the drafting. 
(Footnote Continued) 
pp. 293-320; Ibid., Fact-Finding by NGO's, in B. Ramcharan 
(Ed. ), International Law And Fact-Finding In The Field Of 
Human Rights, ch. IX, (1982). On the HRC and NGO's see 
ch. 3, prs. 3.17-3.18 below. 
_CH. 
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C. One Covenant or Two. 
99 
1.16 We have already noted how this question was finally 
resolved during the drafting by the decision of the 
General Assembly in 1951-2 to have two separate 
Covenants. 100 The question bitterly divided both the 
HRCion and the Third Committee of the G. A. Those who 
favoured two Covenants argued that civil and political 
rights were "enforceable", or "justiciable" and of an 
"absolute character" and that this was not the case with 
economic, social and cultural rights. Civil and 
political rights were said to be immediately applicable 
and obliged States to protect individuals against 
unlawful action by the State. Moreover, economic, social 
and cultural rights were to be progressively implemented, 
called for positive action by the State to promote them 
and depended on domestic and international economic and 
social conditions. 101 Against this view it was argued 
that human rights could not be so neatly divided into 
different categories and should not be so classified in a 
hierarchical manner. All human rights should be protected 
and promoted at the same time. 
102 
The question of whether there should be one or two 
Covenants was inextricably linked to that of the 
appropriate systems of implementation. It was strongly 
argued that whatever the merits of the preceding 
99 See Doc. A/2929, n. l above, ch. II, prs. 4-12; 
Pechota, Ibid., pp. 41-43; Green, Ibid., pp. 39-42; Neal, 
Ibid., pp. 126-129; Th. C. Van Boven, Distinguishing 
Criteria Of Human Rights, in Vasak, Alston, (eds. ), 
Ibid., pp.. 43-59. 
100 See prs. 1.7-1.8 above. 
101 Cf. The comments of the EUCT in the Airey v. 
Ireland, vol. 32 Eur. Ct. H. R., Series A, pr. 26, (1979). 
. 
102 Generally see M. Bossuyt, La Distinction Juridique 
Entre Les Droits Civils Et Politiques Et Les Droits 
Economiques, Sociaux Et Culturels, 8 RDH/HRJ (1975), 
pp. 783-820. 
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arguments the two groups of rights called for different 
implementation machinery. To incorporate two systems of 
implementation within one Covenant would have resulted in 
a Covenant within a Covenant. 
103 In the HRCion it was 
originally argued that while an inter-State complaint 
machinery was appropriate to civil and political rights 
which were to be given immediate effect the progressive 
nature of economic, social and cultural rights rendered 
some form of reporting machinery more appropriate. 
104 
Debate continues as to the relationship between the 
two sets of rights and the most appropriate 
implementation machinery for them. 105 In retrospect it is 
submitted that the separation of the two sets of rights 
has proved beneficial from the point of view of the 
ICCPR. The HRC's brief of twenty seven substantive 
articles (articles 1-27 ICCPR) is still very wide and 
onerous. However, the subsequent chapters of this thesis 
103 See Humphrey, n. 1 above, pp. 144 and 162. See, 
e. g., E/CN. 4/SR. 273 p. 13. 
104 At this time the HRCion proposal was for a 
compulsory inter-State complaints procedure for the ICCPR 
and a reporting procedure for the ICESCR. Note that the 
compulsory individual applications procedure and the 
optional inter-state complaint procedure under the American 
Convention On Human Rights (1970) do apply to the economic, 
social and cultural rights in article 26 though that article 
is clearly in terms of progressive development, see 
T. Buergenthal, R. Norris and D. Shelton, Protecting Human 
Rights In The Americas, (2d, 1986). 
105 See e. g. D. Harris, The European Social Charter, 
pp. 268-272, (1984); A Berenstein, Economic And Social Rights: 
Their Inclusion In The ECHR- Problems of Formulation And 
Interpretation, 2 HRLJ (1981), pp. 257-280; L. J. Macfarlane, 
The Theory And Practice Of Human Rights, ch. 7 (1985); 
P. Sieghart, The Lawful Rights Of Mankind, pp. 81-84, (1985). 
See the important G. A. Resn. 32/130 (16 Dec, 1977) discussed 
by Ramcharan, A Critique Of Third World Responses To 
Violations Of Human Rights, in Cassese, (ed. ) (1979) 
, 
n. 98 
above, pp. 249-258; Principle 6 of the Draft Principles On 
Responsibility, n. 187 below. Note that the African Charter 
Of Human And Peoples Rights draws no distinction between 
categories of rights, see n. 268 below. 
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will relate how the HRC has built up a constructive 
practice on the framework of the article 40 reporting 
procedure and the O. P. individual petition procedure. 
106 
By contrast the record of the implementation procedures 
and practices established under the ICESCR has been 
somewhat disappointing to date. 107 Indeed, the 
contrasting fortunes of the two sets of implementation 
machinery are vividly illustrated by the fact that a new 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
largely modelled on the HRC, has now been established to 
replace the machinery established under the ICESCR. 
108 
The fears of those who argued that the separation of 
human rights into two Covenants with different 
implementation machinery would relegate the importance 
of, and hinder the effective implementation of, economic, 
social and cultural rights have in practice been 
realized. 
109 
106 See chs. 3-12 below. 
107 See Report Of The Sessional Working Group On The 
Implementation Of The ICESCR, Doc. E/CN. 4/1981/64 (1981). See 
27 Rev. ICJ (1981) pp. 26-39; Alston, n. 108 below. 
108 See P. Alston, Out Of The Abyss: The Challenges 
Confronting The New U. N. Committee On Economic, Social And 
Cultural Rights, 9 IIRQ (1987), pp. 332-361; P. Alston and 
B. Simma, First Session Of The UN Committee On Economic, 
Social And Cultural Rights, 81 AJIL (1987) pp. 747-756. 
109 See prs. 1.7-1.8 above. Note that almost every 
State that has ratified the ICCPR has also ratified the 
ICESCR, see the 'Introduction' to this thesis, above. 
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D. Progressive or Immediate Obligations. 
110 
1.17 There were marked differences of opinion during the 
drafting on the matter of the obligations that would be 
incurred by a State party to the ICCPR. Some 
representatives argued that the obligations under the 
ICCPR were absolute and immediate and that, therefore, a 
State could only become a party to the ICCPR after, or 
simultaneously with, its taking the necessary measures to 
secure those rights. If there were disparities between 
the Covenant and national law they could best be met by 
reservations. These representatives criticized the draft 
article 2(2) of the ICCPR whereby States would undertake 
"to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in this 
Covenant", where they were not already provided for, 
because it introduced the notion of progressiveness. 
ill 
Similar criticism was also directed to the draft 
reporting procedure. 112 
Against this view it was argued that the prior 
adoption of the necessary measures in domestic law was 
not required by international law. 113 Moreover, 
"At the same time the need for paragraph two arose 
because it was essential to permit a certain degree 
of elasticity to the obligations imposed by the 
Covenant, since all States would not be in a 
position immediately to take the necessary 
legislative or other measures for the implementation 
110 See the Report of the Working Group on 
Implementation, Doc. E/600, n. 1 above, prs. 26-27; Doc. A/2929, 
Ibid., ch. VII, prs. 162,165; U. N. Doc. A/5655, Ibid., pr. 21. 
See also the literature cited in ch. 6, n. l. below. 
111 See Doc. A/2929, n. 1 above, ch. v, pr. 10; 
Doc. A/5655, Ibid., pr. 21. 
112 See Doc. E/2573, n. 1 above, prs. 171-205. 
113 This view was supported by a Legal Opinion 
submitted by the Secretary-General at the request of a 
drafting Committee of the HRCion, see U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/116 
(1948). 1 
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of its provisions. The Covenant, it was pointed out, 
unlike ordinary Conventions, concerned a vast field 
so that no State could claim its legislation to be 
in complete harmony with all its provisions. 
Paragraph two would also take into account the 
constitutional processes of various countries which 
differed as regards the implications of an act of 
ratification of an international instrument". 
114 
It was further suggested that the draft article 2(2), 
unlike a system of reservations, would not perpetuate the 
law of any State that did not conform to the Covenant. 
Proposals to provide that the necessary measures be 
taken within a specified time limit or within a 
reasonable time were rejected as was a suggestion that 
each State fix its own time limit in its instrument of 
ratification. The only clear intentions of the HRCion 
that emerged were those of avoiding excessive delays in 
the full implementation of the Covenant and of not 
introducing the general notion of progressiveness that 
was a feature of the obligations under the then draft 
ICESCR. 115 
The objections to the draft article 2(2) were again 
voiced in the Third Committee but the provision remained 
unchanged. The Committee's report stated that, 
"It represented the minimum compromise formula, the 
need for which, particularly in new States building 
up their body of legislation, was manifest. The 
notion of implementation at the earliest possible 
moment was implicit in article 2 as a whole. 
Moreover, the reporting requirement in article 49 
114 U. N. Doc. A/2929, n. 1 above, ch. V, pr. 8. 
115 See E. W. Vierdag, The Legal Nature Of The Rights 
Granted In The ICESCR,. 9 NYIL (1979), pp. 69-105; G. J. H. Van 
Hoof, The Legal Nature Of Economic, Social And Cultural 
Rights: A Rebuttal Of Some Traditional Views, in P. Alston 
and K. Tomasevski, (eds. ), The Right To Food, pp. 97-110, 
(1984). 
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(later article 40) would indeed serve as an 
effective curb on undue delay". 
116 
The approach of the HRC to article 2 ICCPR is dealt 
with below. 
117 
116 See U. N. Doc. A/5655, n. 1 above, pr. 23. See also 
O. Schacter, The Obligation To Implement The Covenant In 
Domestic Law, in Henkin (Ed. ), n. 1 above, p. 311 at p. 325. 
117 See ch. 6. 
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E. International Measures Of Implementation. 118 
1.18 There was general agreement during the drafting that 
the primary obligation under the ICCPR would be 
implementation at the national level by States. 119, There 
was continuing disagreement, however, on the question 
whether there should also be international measures of 
implementation. A minority of States, principally the 
Soviet bloc, insisted that there should be provisions to 
ensure implementation but that there should be no 
international measures of implementation. 
12.0 It was 
argued that such measures were a system of international 
pressure intended to force States to take particular 
steps connected with the execution of obligations under 
the Covenant. They were, therefore, contrary to the 
principle of domestic jurisdiction in article 2(7) of the 
118 This matter is dealt with in many of the works 
cited in n. 1 above. See, e. g., Green, pp. 50-53; P. Sieghart, 
The Lawful Rights Of Mankind, ch. 10, (1985). 
119 See n. 38 above. P. Sieghart, Ibid., ch. 9. It was 
frequently proposed during the drafting that States parties 
be obliged to establish national human rights commissions to 
review the national provisions for the protection of the 
rights in the Covenant and report to the Head of State and 
to the Government. The proposals were not adopted and the 
question was submitted for further study to the HRCion, see 
U. N. Doc. A/6546, prs. 557-561,613-626. For subsequent* 
developments see U. N. Action In The Field of Human Rights, 
n. 1 above., pp. 344-345; Report Of, The Secretary-General, 
"National Institutions For The Promotion And Protection Of 
Human Rights", Doc. E/CN. 4/1987/37. 
120 With the exception of Yugoslavia. See e. g., the 
USSR statement with regard to the drafts and proposals on 
implementation of 18 May 1948, in Doc. E/1371, n. 1 above, 
pp. 47-48. See Ganji, n. 1 above, pp. 186-189; 
. 
F. Jhabvala, 
The Soviet Bloc's View Of The Implementation Of Human 
Rights Accords, 7 HRQ'(1985), pp. 461-491; V. Kartashkin, 
The Socialist Countries And Human Rights, in K. Vasak/ 
P. Alston, (eds. ), n. 1 above, pp. 631-650. The soviet bloc 
was, however, willing to accept an international system 
of implementation for the right, of peoples to 
self-determination, see U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4. / SR. 476, and 
notes 71 and 83 above. 
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United Nations Charter, 121 would undermine the 
sovereignty and independence of States 
122 
and would upset 
the balance of powers established by the U. N. Charter. 
Moreover, the establishment of petitions systems would 
transform complaints into international disputes with 
consequent effects upon peaceful international relations. 
1.19 Against these views it was argued that the 
undertaking of international measures of implementation 
were an exercise of domestic jurisdiction and not an 
interference with it. International measures were 
essential to the effective observance of human rights, 
which were matters of international concern. 
-However, 
even within those States that agreed that international 
measures were essential, there were significant 
differences of opinion as to the appropriate types of 
121 On this fundamental question see R. Bernhardt, 
Domestic Jurisdiction Of States And International Human 
Rights Organs, 9 HRLJ (1987) pp. 205-216: F. Ermacora, 
Human Rights And Domestic Jurisdiction, 124 Receuil De 
Cours, 1968-II, pp. 371-415; J. Fawcett, Human Rights And 
Domestic Jurisdiction, in E. Luard (Ed. ), n. 1 above, 
pp. 286-303; G. J. Jones, The United Nations And The 
Domestic Jurisdiction Of States, ch. III, (1979); 
R. Higgins, The Development Of International Law Through 
The Political Organs Of The United Nations, Part II, 
particularly at pp. 118-139 (1963); L. Henkin, Human Rights 
And Domestic Jurisdiction, in T. Buergenthal (Ed. ), Human 
Rights, International Law And The Helsinki Accords, 
pp. 21-40, (1977); H. Lauterpacht, International Law And 
Human Rights, ch. 12, (New York, 1950); H. Kelsen, The Law 
Of The United Nations, pp. 27-50, (1950); M. Markovic, 
Implementation Of Human Rights And The Domestic 
Jurisdiction of States, in Eide And Schou (Eds. ), n. 1 
above, pp. 47-68; J. S. Watson, Autointerpretation, 
Competence And The Continuing Validity Of Article 2(7) Of 
The U. N. Charter, 71 AJIL (1977), pp. 60-83; M. Bossuyt, 
Human Rights And Non-Intervention In Domestic Matters, 35 
Rev. ICJ (1985), pp. 45-52; See also Principle 42 of the 
Draft Principles On Responsibility, n. 187 below. 
122 See R. Falk, Human Rights And State 
Sovereignty, (1981) ; H. Lauterpacht, State Sovereignty And 
Human Rights, in H. Lauterpacht, International Law, 
E. Lauterpacht (Ed. ), Vol. 3, pp. 416-430, (1977). 
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measures. 
123 The proposals included an International 
Court of Human Rights empowered to settle disputes 
concerning the Covenant; 
124 
settlement by diplomatic 
negotiation and, in default, by ad-hoc fact-finding 
Committees; the establishment of an Office of High 
Commissioner (or Attorney-General) for Human Rights; 125 
the establishment of reporting procedures covering some 
or all of the provisions in the Covenant; empowering the 
proposed Human Rights Committee to collect information on 
all matters relevant to the observance and enforcement of 
human rights and to initiate an inquiry if it thought one 
126 
necessary. 
1.20 There was further division of opinion as to whether, 
if an international right of petition were included, it 
would be limited to States or whether it would be 
extended to individuals, groups of individuals, or to all 
or selected non-governmental organizations. 127 As noted, 
the HRCion rejected the latter possibilities in 1949 and 
never reversed that position. 
128 Only during its final 
session did the Third Committee adopt the optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR which provides an international 
right of petition for individuals but not for 
non-governmental organizations. 
129 
123 See Doc. E/600, n. 1 
Ibid., pp. 37-49. 
124 Australia was the 
view. See, e. g. Doc. E/1371, 
Doc. E/2573, Ax. III. 
above, p 
. 
43-44; Humphrey, 
leading proponent of this 
n. 1 above, pp. 36-49 (1949); 
125 See Korey, n. 1 above, pp-59-64; Humphrey, 
Ibid., pp. 130. See R. S. Clark, A United Nations 
Commissioner For Human Rights (1972). 
126 See Doc. A/2929, n. 1 above, prs. 87-89, (India). 
127 The respective arguments are briefly rehearsed 
in ch. 4, pr. 4.2-4.3 below. 
128 See pr. 1.6 above. 
129 See n. 127 above. 
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1.21 The lengthy drafting process of the ICCPR largely 
coincided with the depths of cold war confrontation, the 
explosive development of notions of self-determination130 
and independence, the accompanying political tensions of 
large scale decolonization, and the consequential effects 
of a rapidly altering balance of diplomatic power within 
the United Nations. 131 In retrospect then it must be 
acknowledged that it was much more difficult to agree on) 
the text of a Covenant containing binding legal 
obligations and limited measures of 
. 
international 
implementation that it had been to agree upon the, 
statement of political principles in the Universal 
Declaration in 1948.132 It is submitted, therefore, that 
the completion of the the ICCPR and the O. P. should be 
viewed. as an achievement of considerable significance. 
The presence of at least some limited international 
implementation procedures offered some hope that the 
Human Rights Committee, the body of, independent experts 
to be established to operate them, could fashion 
something constructive and influential from them. The 
subsequent chapters of this work essentially seek to 
determine whether that hope has been fulfilled. 
133 
130 See pr. 1.22 below and ch. 6 below. 
131 See Pechota, n. 1 above, pp. 63-64. For a 
political history of part of the period sei E. Luard, A 
History Of The United Nations, Vol. l: The Years Of 
Western Domination, (1982). See also J. F. Green, Changing 
Approaches To Human Rights: The U. N. 1954 and 1974,12 
Tex ILJ. (1977) pp. 223-238. 
132 See Green, n. 1 above, pp. 65-67 and n. 41 above. 
133 Note that the ICERD (1965) contains a mandatory 
reporting procedure (art 9),. a mandatory inter-state 
complaint procedure (arts. 11-13) and an optional 
provision on individual communications (art. 14). 
Humphrey, n. 1 above, suggests that their inclusion 
without substantial objection can be explained in terms 
of the U. N. 's pre-occupation with discrimination, 
pp. 331-334. A petition system relating to the 
implementation of the 1960 Declaration On The Granting Of 
Independence To Colonial Countries And Peoples had- also 
been established, see Zuidjwick, n. 1 above, ch. VI. 
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F. Self-Determination. 134 
1.22 Perhaps the most controversial provision included in 
the ICCPR was the provision on self-determination. As we 
have noted it was considered and included at the request 
of the G. A. in 1950.135 However, its inclusion was 
strenuously opposed on various grounds particularly by 
the Western powers. It was argued that it was a vague and 
undefined concept, that it was a political principle 
rather than a legal right, that it was a collective 
rather than an individual right, and that the 
implementation systems in the Covenant could not be 
applied to it and that its inclusion would disturb the 
system of functions and powers allocated to the United 
Nations organs in the Charter. The opponents of its 
inclusion in the Covenant suggested that it could be 
included in a separate covenant or protocol. In the 
event, however, the tide of political opinion in favour 
of including a right of self-determination proved 
irresistible. 136 Its proponents argued that it was a 
fundamental collective human right and a pre-condition to 
the enjoyment of all the rights and freedoms of the 
individual. 
A minority of States argued that the right should be 
limited to the colonial situation. The majority, however, 
including those States that opposed inclusion, took the 
view that if the right was to appear in the Covenant it 
should not be limited to colonial territories but should 
134See U. N. Doc. A/2929, n. 1 above, ch. iv; Doc. E/2256, 
Ibid., prs. 27-77; Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 252-266; U. N. Doc. A/3077, n. 1 
above prs. 27-77; See A/C. 3/SR. 562-573,575,578,580-582 (9th session), SR 641-655,667-676 (10th session); Ganji, 
Ibid., pp. 192-203; Green, Ibid., pp. 48-50; Humphrey, Ibid., 
pp. 165-169; Chakravarti, Ibid., ch. IV; See also ch. 6 below. 
135 See n. 17 above. 
136 The important "Declaration On The Granting Of 
Independence To Colonial Countries And Peoples", 
G. A. Resn. 1514(XV) had been adopted in 1960. 
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apply to the people of any territory whether independent, 
trust or non-self-governing. A particular fear expressed 
with respect to self-determination was its invocation by 
minorities and the consequential destruction of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. 
137 it 
is, therefore, important to note that the drafting 
history clearly indicates that the Covenant does not 
accord to minorities, as such, the right of 
self-determination generally. 
138 The problems of 
minorities were conceived of as different matters. Thus 
limited provision dealing with ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities was included as article 27. ICCPR. 
This provides that such minorities shall not be deprived 
of the right, "to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language". 139 
1.23 In the HRCion an important addition to the proposed 
right of self-determination was that it would include a 
right to permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and 
resources. 
140 Those opposed to this addition argued that 
137 
The central problem of G. A. Resn. 1514 is the 
conflict between self-determination of the people and the 
maintainance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the State. For a recent view see K. W. Blay, 
Self-Determination Versus Territorial Integrity In 
Decolonization Revisited, 25 Ind. JIL (1985), pp. 386-410. 
138 See e. g., Cassese, The Self-Determination Of 
Peoples, in Henkin, ed., (1981) n. 1 above, p. 92 at 96; 
n. 134 above. This does not necessarily mean that a 
minority cannot have a right to self determination. That 
depends on whether or not they constitute a "people" and 
that in itself is a most difficult question. 
139 On art. 27 see Sohn, The Rights of Minorities, in 
Henkin, ed., (1981), n. 1 above, pp. 270-289; F. Capatorti, 
Study On The Rights Of Persons Belonging To Ethnic, 
Religious And Linguistic Groups, 
Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/384/Rev. 1. (1979). 
140 See Doc. E/2556, n. 1 above, pr. 67. (proposal of 
Chile), Doc. E/2573, Ibid., prs. 62,65-66. See Humphrey, 
(Footnote Continued) 
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the concept of permanent sovereignty had little meaning 
and was untenable because any State could voluntarily 
limit its own sovereignty. Moreover, concern was 
expressed that the article would sanction unwarranted 
expropriation or confiscation of foreign property and 
would permit the unilateral-denunciation of international 
agreements. Against this view it was argued that the 
right to permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and 
resources was an essential part of self-determination. 
The purpose of the article was not to threaten foreign 
investment as suggested but to prevent such foreign 
exploitation as would deprive the local population of its 
means of subsistence. To meet some of the objections, 
however, the Third Committee deleted the reference to 
permanent sovereignty and inserted a reference to, 
"obligations arising out of international economic 
co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, 
and international law". (article 1(2)). 141 
It has been argued, however, that the subsequent 
adoption of article 47 ICCPR has substantially altered 
the compromise reached on the content of article 1. 
Article 47 provides that, "Nothing in the present 
Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent 
right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and 
(Footnote Continued) 
n. 1 above, p. 167. In 1962 the General Assembly had 
adopted an important resolution on 'Permanent Sovereignty 
Over Natural Resources', G. A. Resn. 1803(XVII), A/5217, 
GAOR, 17th session, Supp. 17. See also G. A. Resn. 2158(XXI) 
of 25 Nov., 1966, The Declaration On The Establishment Of 
A New International Economic Order, G. A. Resn. 3201 (S-VI), 
1 May 1974, and the Charter Of Economic Rights And Duties 
Of States, G. A. Resn. 3281(XXIX), 1974. For recent works on 
this subject see G. Elian, The Principle Of Sovereignty 
Over Natural Resources, (1979), K. Hossain and 
S. R. Chowdhurry, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources In International Law 
- 
Principle And 
Practice, (1984). 
141 See Doc. A/3077, n. 134 above. 
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freely their natural wealth and resources". 142 Article 47 
attracted great opposition from the Western States who 
argued that it was designed to modify the effect of the 
substance of article 1.143 Some commentators have 
accepted that the purpose of article 47 was indeed to 
override the contents of article 1.144 
In the final event then an identical text on 
self-determination appears in article 1 of each of the 
Covenants. From the perspective of the ICCPR this raises 
the question of whether this right is subject to the same 
implementation procedures as the other rights and 
freedoms in the ICCPR. 145 In terms of the practice of the 
HRC the answer has been in the affirmative. The right to 
self-determination has been considered under the 
reporting procedure in article 40,146 has been the 
subject of a general comment by the HRC under article 
40(4)147 and has been the subject of a number of 
important views under the Optional Protocol. 
148 
The practice of the HRC concerning the right to 
self-determination is considered below. 
149 
142 An identical text appears in article 25 ICESCR. 
143 See Doc. A/6546, n. 1 above, prs. 95-101. 
144 See K. P. Saskena, International Covenants On Human 
Rights, 15-16 Ind. Y. I. A. (1966-67), p. 596-613 at p. 602; 
Y. Dinstein, Collective Rights Of Peoples And Minorities, 25 
ICLQ (1976), pp. 102-120 at pp. 110-111; E. Schwelb, in Eide 
and Schou, (eds. ), n. 1 above, p. 112; D. Haiperin, Human 
Rights And Natural Resources, 9 William and Mary Law Review (1968) pp. 770-787. 
145 For comment see e. g., Ganji, n. l above, 
pp. 192-203. We have already noted that a different 
implementation mechanism was proposed at one time in the 
HRCion for the right of peoples to self-determination, 
see notes 71 and 83 above. 
146 See ch. 5 below. 
147 Ibid. 
148 See ch. 5 below. 
149 See ch. 5 below. 
CH. 1.40 
G. THE TERRITORIAL (COLONIAL) CLAUSE, THE FEDERAL CLAUSE, 
RESERVATIONS. 
1.24 We have already noted the outcome concerning the 
territorial and federal State clauses. 
150 It only remains 
to note that both provisions were the subject of 
considerable controversy. Questions concerning the 
territorial application of the ICCPR and its application 
in federal States have arisen and the approach of the 
States parties and the HRC are noted below. 
151 
The matter of reservations was also subject to 
extensive consideration. 
152 In the event no provision 
dealing with reservations appears in the ICCPR or in the 
O. P. 153 Their admissibility and validity are thus matters 
regulated by general international law. 
154 In fact a 
considerable number of reservations and interpretative 
declarations have been made to the ICCPR and to the 
O_P. 155 A number of objections have been made to 
these. 156 Many of those reservations raise interesting 
150 See pr. 1.7 above; Doc. A/2929, ch. X, prs. 8-12, 
13-20; Green, n. 1 above, pp. 53-59. 
151 See ch. 6 below. 
152 See Doc. A/2929, n. 1 above, ch. X, prs. 25-39; Doc. 
E/2573, Ibid., prs. 28-33,274-301. 
153 Cf. D. Shelton, State Practice On Reservations To 
Human Rights Treaties, (1983) C. H. R. Y. B, pp. 205-234. 
154 See articles 19-23 VCLT (1969) on which see 
I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention On The Law of Treaties, 
ch. III, (2d, 1984). Generally see the Reservations To The 
Convention On Genocide case, ICJ Rep. (1951) p. 15; 
P. H. Imbert, Reservations And Human Rights Conventions, 
3 H. R. Rev. (1981), pp. 28-60; P. H. Imbert, Reservations To 
The European Convention On Human Rights Before The 
Strasbourg Commission: The Temeltasch Case, 33 ICLQ 
(1984) pp. 558-595; D. Shelton, n. 153 above. 
155 See Reservations, Declarations, Notifications 
And Objections Relating To The International covenant On 
Civil And Political Rights And The Optional Protocol 
Thereto, Note By The secretary-General, 
Doc. CCPR/C/2/Rev. l (11-5-1987). Human Rights 
- 
Status Of 
International Instruments, pp. 25-94 (1987). 
156 Ibid. 
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questions as to their validity and indicate in some cases 
how States parties interpret their obligations under the 
ICCPR and the O. P. Their presence also raises the 
question as to whether the HRC has jurisdiction to 
pronounce on the validity of a reservation during the 
consideration of reports or under the O. P. process. 
157 
The approach of the HRC to these questions is noted at 
various points in this thesis. 
158 
157 This question has been raised within the HRC but no 
formal decision has been taken, see ch. 6, pr. 6.3 below. 
158 See e. g., ch. 4, prs. 4.92-4.96 below. 
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H. THE POSITIONS OF THE SUPERPOWERS. 
1.25 It is interesting to note briefly the positions of 
the two superpowers concerning the Covenants. In the 
early post World War Two years the United States assumed 
the position of leadership of the international human 
rights movement with Mrs. Roosevelt as a major force and 
inspiration. 159 However, from 1948 onwards there were 
signs that the U. S. Senate would reject any human rights 
treaty. 160 Concerted domestic opposition and concern over 
the constitutional implications of ratification of 
international human rights treaties culminated in the 
introduction of the celebrated "Bricker Amendments" 
(1952-53) which would have restricted the treaty making 
powers under the Constitution. 161 Although the amendments 
were defeated they substantially contributed to the 
adoption of a new policy by the administration concerning 
human rights treaties. Essentially this new policy 
rejected the treaty approach as the proper and most 
effective way to promote human rights. With respect to 
the International Covenants the policy meant that 
henceforth the U. S. would not actively participate in the 
drafting of binding human rights Covenants and would not, 
in any event, ratify any Covenant approved by the United 
159 See n. 31 above; Simarsian, n. 1 above. See Human 
Rights In The World Community: A Call For U. S. Leadership, 
The Subcommittee On International Organizations And 
Movements Of The Committee On Foreign Affairs, 27 March 
1974, pp. 59-64. 
160 See Green, n. 131 above. 
161 See W. Bishop, Cases And Materials On 
International Law, pp. 110-112, (3d, 1971); V. Van Dyke, 
Human Rights, The United States And The World Community, 
ch. 7, (1970); S. Garrett, Foreign Policy And The American 
Constitution: The Bricker Amendment In Contemporary 
Perspective, 16 Int. S. Q. (1972), pp. 187-220; Johnson, 
n. 31 above, who comments that, "It was designed in part 
as a unilateral federal state clause, denying effect to 
any treaty which would have been unconstitutional as a 
simple act of Congress", p. 45. 
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Nations. 162 The alternative approach advocated by the 
U. S. was the so-called "Action Programme" which in time 
made an important contribution to the United Nations 
human rights programme. 
163 
The U. S. did continue to take part in the drafting of 
the Covenants but with decidedly less vigour. On specific 
issues the initial U. S. position as regards the proposed 
international measures of implementation was that it 
favoured inter-State procedures rather than petition 
procedures for individuals or non-governmental 
organizations. 
164 This position was later modified to 
support the latter procedures. 165 The U. S. supported the 
reporting procedures, favoured two Covenants, opposed the 
inclusion of an article on self-determination, and fought 
vigorously for the inclusion of a provision that would 
take account of the constitutional problems of federal 
States. 166 
162 For the U. S. announcement see 
U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 340, pp. 8-12, (1953); U. S. Dept. of 
'State Bulletin, Vol. 28, 
"p. 592, (April 20,1953). See 
Green, n. 1 above, pp. 59-64; Ganji, n. 1 above, pp. 221-224; 
Humphrey, n. 1 above, pp. 176-177; Johnson, n. 31 
above, pp. 44-47. See the Dulles Memorandum of 20 Feb. 1953, 
"United States Policy Regarding Draft International 
Covenants On Human Rights", in Foreign Relations Of The 
United States, 1952-54, Vol. 3, pp. 550-555, (1979), cited 
in Johnson, n. 31 above, p. 46, n. 90. 
163 On the Action Programme see Green, n. l above, 
ch. III; U. N. Action In The Field Of Human Rights, ibid., 
pp. 357-362; Humphrey, Ibid., pp. 174-181; Tolley, ibid., 
ch. 3. 
164 See n. 41 above. As early as 1947, however, the 
U. S. had submitted a draft proposal supporting individual 
and group positions, see Doc. E/CN. 4/21, p. 95, (July 
1,1947). For its view in 1948 see Doc. E/800, n. 1 above', 
p. 41, n. l. 
165 See e. g., the draft U. S. proposal for a protocol 
on petitions from 
-individuals and non-governmental 
organizations in Doc. E/1992, n. 1 above, Ax. V, (1951), later 
withdrawn. 
166 See Ganji, n. 1 above, pp. 168-172; Green, n. 1 
above, pp. 53-55; see pr. 1.7 above. 
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More recently the Carter presidency gave a new 
momentum to the international human rights movement by 
his efforts to integrate human rights considerations as 
priority aspects of U. S. foreign policy. 
167 A number of 
human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, but not the 
O. P., were submitted to the Senate for. advice and consent 
to ratification but unfortunately such consent was not 
forthcoming. 168 There seems little prospect of the 
167 
Johnson, n. 31 above, points out that the Carter 
presidency picked up on increased Congressional activity 
on human rights from 1970-75. See generally P. G. Brown and 
D. Maclean (eds. ), Human Rights And U. S. Foreign Policy, 
(1980); Symposium: Human Rights And U. S. Foreign Policy, 
14 Virg. JIL (1973-74), pp. 591-701; N. K. Hevener, The 
Dynamics Of Human Rights In U. S. Foreign Policy, (1981); 
R. Lillich and F. Newman, International Human Rights: 
Problems Of Law And Policy, Problem XII, (1979); 
J. Mayall, The United States, in R. J. Vincent (ed. ), 
Foreign Policy And Human Rights, pp. 165-187, (1986); 
A. G. Mower, n. 31 above; J. C. Tuttle, (ed. ) 
, 
International 
Human Rights Law And Practice, (1978). For some specific 
analyses and criticisms of U. S. human rights foreign 
policy see N. Chomsky and E. S. Herma. n, The Washington 
Connection And Third World Fascism 
- 
The Political 
Economy Of Human Rights, Vol. 1, (1979); L. Schoultz, Human 
Rights And U. S. Policy Towards Latin America, (1981); 
H. Shue, Basic Rights, Subsistence, Affluence And US 
Foreign Policy, (1980). 
168 See S. Exec. C, D, E and F, 95th congress, 2d. Sess, 
III-IV, (1978). M. L. Nash, Contemporary Practice Of The 
U. S. Relating To International Law, 72 AJIL (1978) 
pp. 620-631; M. D. Craig, The ICCPR: Department Of State 
Proposals For Preserving The Status Quo, 19 Harv. ILJ 
(1978)- pp. 845-886; D. Weissbrodt, U. S. Ratification Of The 
Human Rights Covenants, 63 Minn. L; (1978) pp. 35-78; 
McChesney, Should The U. S. Ratify The Covenant? A 
(Footnote Continued) 
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present U. S. administration supporting the ratification 
of the ICCPR or the O. P. 
169 
As for the U. S. S. R., and indeed the rest of the 
Soviet bloc, with the partial exception of Yugoslavia, 
170 
we have already noted their different understanding of 
implementation and their opposition to all international 
measures of implementation. 
171 They favoured provisions 
on economic, social and cultural rights, opposed the 
separation of human rights into two Covenants, and 
opposed what they considered to be special exceptions 
clauses in favour of federal States and colonial 
172 
powers. 
1.26 Considering the position of most of the Soviet bloc 
as regards international measures of implementation it 
was perhaps surprising when the U. S. S. R. and the other 
members of the bloc ratified the two international 
(Footnote Continued) 
Question Of Merits, Not Of Constitutional Law, 62 AJIL 
(1968) pp. 912-917; R. Lillich (Ed. ), U. S. Ratification Of 
Human Rights Covenants: With Or Without Reservations, 
(1981); U. Haksar, The International Human Rights 
Treaties: Some Problems Of Policy And Interpretation, 126 
Pa. LR (1978) pp. 886-929; J. Skelton, Jr., The U. S. 
Approach To Ratification Of the International Covenants 
On Human Rights, 1 Hous. JIL (1979) pp. 103-125. 
169 Note though that the U. S. recently ratified the 
Genocide Convention, see 80 AJIL (1986) pp. 612-622. 
170 Yugoslavia does not consistently vote with any 
political caucus at the U. N. 
171 See pr. 1.18 above; Jhabvala, n. 120 above; 
H. O. Bergeson, Human Rights 
- 
The Property Of The Nation 
State Or A Concern For The International Community? 
-A 
Study Of Soviet Positions Concerning U. N. Protection Of 
Civil And Political Rights Since 1975, XIV Cooperation 
And Conflict, (1979), pp. 239-254. 
172 Note that the U. S. S. R. is itself a federal 
State. See generally A. P. Movchan, The Human Rights 
Problem In Present Day International Law, in G. Tunkin 
(ed. ), Contemporary International Law, pp. 233-250, 
(. 1969); J. Carey, Human Rights 
- 
The Soviet View, 53 
Kentucky LJ (1964) pp. 115-134; A. Rees, The Soviet Union, 
in R. J. Vincent (Ed. ), n. 167 above, pp. 61-83; 
V. Kartashkin, Human Rights And Peaceful Co-Existence, IX 
HRJ/RDH (1976) pp. 5-19; V. Kartashkin, n. 120 above. 
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Covenants. 173 They are, therefore, subject to the 
respective reporting procedures of the two Covenants 
although they may take a limited view of the nature and 
purpose of those reporting procedures. 
174 None of, these 
States, however, have accepted the optional inter-State 
complaint procedure or the O. P. 
175 There would seem to be 
little possibility that they will do so as they appear to 
remain opposed in principle to such procedures. 
176 
1.27 The adoption of a new human rights policy of the 
U. S. in the early 1950's allowed the U. S. S. R. to assume, 
at least formally, the mantle of human rights leadership 
at the United Nations. 
177 The absence of the U. S. from 
the International Covenants, and indeed from most of the 
U. N. human rights treaty network, is greatly to be 
regretted. 
178 Apart from depriving the American people of 
international protection of their basic human rights, and 
173 For comment see K. Tudin, The Development Of 
Soviet Attitudes Towards Implementing Human Rights Under 
The United Nations Charter, 5 RDH/HRJ (1972) p. 399-418; 
Jhabvala, n. 120 above. "In 1953 Mrs. Roosevelt expressed 
the view that, 'Many of us are fairly sure that it (the 
Soviet Union) will not ratify', " cited in Johnson, n. 31 
above, p. 46. 
174 By 1963, however, the U. S. S. R. and the other 
eastern bloc States had declared that the reporting 
provisions of both draft Covenants were acceptable in 
principle, see A/C. 3/SR. 1273, p. 13, (Dec. 2,1963); Tudin, 
n. 173 above. 
175 Note, however, that some socialist countries 
have ratified the O. P., e. g., Senegal, Mauritius. 
176 See G. Tunkin, Theory of International Law, 
pp. 83-86, (1974); See Szawlowski, The International 
Protection Of Human Rights 
-A Polish And A Soviet View, 28 
ICLQ (1979) pp. 775-781. 
177 See pr. 1.25 above; Humphrey, n. 1 above, p. 180. 
178 The U. S. have ratified only six out of the 20 
principal international human rights instruments listed 
in the U. N. 's Status Of International Instruments, n. 155 
above (as of 1/9/87). Cf. D. Dhelton, The Baby Boy Case 2 
HRLJ (1981) pp. 309-318. 
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setting a poor precedent for other States, 
179 it more 
particularly deprives the ICCPR and the O. P. of the world 
wide publicity attendant upon any American international 
involvement. Ironically, however, it may have allowed the 
HRC to escape the overt "politicisation" of most other 
U. N. human rights institutions. 
180 The consequences of 
such "politicisation", real or imagined, have led most 
recently to U. S. withdrawal from U. N. E. S. C. O., 
181 
and to 
repeated threats of U. S. S. R. withdrawal from the 
I. L. O. 
182 The absence of politicisation and conflict has 
allowed the HRC to develop a remarkable 'consensus 
practice. 
183 To date no decision taken by the HRC has 
been forced to a vote. This consensus has allowed the 
development of a surprisingly constructive and critical 
practice under the reporting procedure (article 40) 184 
and the emergence of a potentially effective system of 
individual petition under the O. P. 185 
0 
179 A number of other non states parties might then 
follow the U. S. in ratifying the ICCPR. 
180 Particularly the HRCion, see Tolley, n. l above. 
181 See 23 ILM (1984), p. 218 and 24 ILM (1985), p. 489. 
The U. K. and Japan have also left. 
182 For a recent comment see The Economist, Vol. 296, No. 7403, pp. 50-51, (July 20,1985). The U. S. withdrew from 
the ILO from 1977-78. 
183 See ch. 2, pr. 2.7. 
184 See ch. 3 below. 
185 See ch. 4 below. 
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I. AN OUTLINE OF THE ICCPR. 
1.28 The ICCPR consists of a preamble and fifty three 
articles divided into six parts. The Preamble recognizes 
the inherent dignity of the human person as a source of 
equal and inalienable rights and proclaims that the, 
"ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear 
and want can only be achieved if conditions are created 
whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political 
rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural 
rights". The Preamble also notes the obligations on 
States under the United Nations Charter to promote human 
rights, 
186 
and the duties and responsibilities of the 
individual. 187 In accordance with General Assembly 
Resolution 543 (VI) the preambles in the two Covenants 
are identical, mutatis mutandis. The aim was to underline 
the unity of the two Covenants. 
188 
1.29 Part I (Article 1) concerns the rights of all 
peoples to self-determination. 
189 Part II (Articles 2-5) 
contains certain general provisions relevant to all of 
the rights set out in the ICCPR. Article 2 contains the 
basic undertakings to respect and ensure the rights in 
the Covenant, to adopt the necessary measures to 
. 
give 
effect to those rights, and to ensure that an effective 
remedy exists and is enforced in the event of violation 
186 See n. 24 above. 
187 See the Draft Body of Principles And Guidelines 
On The Right And Responsibility of Individuals, Groups 
And Organs Of Society To Promote And Protect Human Rights 
And Fundamental Freedoms, of the Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention Of Discrimination And The Protection Of 
Minorities, Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1985/30. The draft is now 
being considered by a working group of the HRCion. For 
its first report see Doc. E/CN. 4.1987/30. See also art. 29 
UDHR; arts. 27-29 AFR; art. 32 AMR. 
188 See text to n. 66 above. 
189 See prs. 1.22-1.23 above and ch. 5. 
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of those rights. 
190 Under article 3 States parties 
undertake to ensure the equal rights of men and women to 
the enjoyment of the rights in the ICCPR. Article 4 is 
the derogation provision. Derogation is permitted, "in 
time of public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation". However, it is only permitted to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and 
no derogation is permitted from certain specified 
articles. There is also a requirement of notification of 
derogation. 191 Article 5(1) is a provision designed to 
avoid abuse of the ICCPR by preventing the use of the 
ICCPR as a justification for the destruction of the 
rights in the ICCPR or at their limitation to a greater 
extent than is provided for in the ICCPR. 
192 Article 5(2) 
is a saving provision which prevents the use of the ICCPR 
to restrict or derogate from human rights that are 
recognized or exist in a State party. 
1.30 Part III (Articles 6-27) contains a catalogue of 
civil and poAitical rights. Each article begins with a 
general statement of the right concerned. This is then 
followed by a more detailed formulation of aspects of 
that right and any applicable limitations or 
restriction. 
193 In general terms the rights and freedoms 
190 See ch. 6 below. 
191 See ch. 7 below. 
192 See ch. 4, prs. 4.84-4.85 below for an 
interpretation of the Covenant and the Protocol based in 
part on article 5 of the Covenant. 
193 See generally E. I. A. Daes, The Individual's 
Duties To the Community And The Limitations On Human 
Rights And Freedoms Under Article 29 Of The UDHR, 
U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/432/ Rev. 2 (1983); E. Orucu, The Core 
Of Rights And Freedoms: The Limits Of Limits, in 
T. Campbell et al, (eds), Human Rights: From Rhetoric to 
Reality, pp. 37-59 (1986); A. Kiss, Permissible Limitations 
On Human Rights, in Henkin (Ed. ), n. 1 above, pp. 290-310. 
For an example of the HRC's approach to limitation 
clauses see the consideration of art. 19 in ch. 11 below. 
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in Part III cover the right to life (Article 6) 
, 
194 the 
prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (Article 7), 195 the prohibition 
of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour 
(Article 8), the liberty and security 'of the person 
(Article 9), the humane treatment of persons deprived of 
their liberty (Article 10), 196 non-imprisonment for 
failure to fulfil a contractual obligation (Article 11), 
freedom of movement and residence (Article 12), the 
expulsion of aliens lawfully in the territory of a State 
party (Article 13), the right to a fair trial (Article 
14), 197 the prohibition of the retroactive application of 
criminal law (Article 15), equal recognition of persons 
before the law (Article 16), the right to privacy 
(Article 17), freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
(Article 18), freedom of opinion and expression (Article 
19), 198 the prohibition of propaganda for war or advocacy 
of national, racial or religious hatred (Article 20), 199 
the right to peaceful assembly (Article 21), the right to 
freedom of association (Article 22), rights relating to 
marriage and to the family (Article 23), certain rights 
relating to children (Article 24), certain political 
rights of citizens (Article 25), equality before the law 
and equal protection of the law (Article 26), and rights 
of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities (Article 
27) 
. 
200 
194 See ch. 8 below. 
195 See ch. 9 below. 
196 Ibid. 
197 See ch. 10 below. 
198 See ch. 11 below. 
199 See ch. 12 below. 
200 See Capatorti, n. 139 above; Sohn, Ibid.; (Footnote Continued) 
Ln. l: 51 
1.31 Part IV (Articles 28-45) contains provisions for the 
establishment and operation of an independent Human 
Rights Committee and provisions concerning two 
international measures of implementation. Firstly, a 
reporting procedure under which each State party submits 
periodic reports for examination by, the HRC (Article 
40). 201 Secondly, an inter-State complaint procedure 
(Articles 41 and 42). 202 Note should also be made of 
article 45 which provides that the HRC shall submit an 
annual report on its activities to the General Assembly 
through the ECOSOC. 203 
1.32 Part V (Articles 46-47) deals with two matters of 
interpretation of the ICCPR. Firstly, the ICCPR shall not 
be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the U. N. 
Charter and the constitutions of the specialized agencies 
which define the respective responsibilities of the 
various organs of the U. N. and of the specialized 
agencies in regard to matters dealt with by the ICCPR 
(Article 46) 
. 
204 Secondly, nothing in the ICCPR is to be 
interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all 
peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their 
natural wealth and resources (Article 47). 205 
(Footnote Continued) 
Tomuschat, Protection Of Minorities Under Article 27 Of 
The ICCPR, Volkerrecht Als Rechtsordnung, Internationale 
Gerichtsbarkeit. Mensrechten: Festschrift Fur Hermann 
Mosler, pp. 949-979 (1983). The most notable omissions 
from the ICCPR are the right of asylum, to a nationality 
(except for children, article 23(4)), and a right to 
property. 
201 See ch. 3 below. 
202 This procedure has not yet been used and is not 
considered in this thesis. See Rules 72-77E of HRC's Rules 
Of Procedure; Doc. A/34/40 prs. 28-53; SR 156 and 169. 
203 See ch. 3, pr. 3.40 below. 
204 See Bossuyt, 'Guide', pp. 731-734. 
205 Ibid., pp. 735-736. See pr. 1.23 above; J. N. Hyde, 
(Footnote Continued) 
-C. 
1.33 Part VI (Articles 48-53) contains the final clauses 
dealing with signature, ratification or accession 
(Article 48), 206 entry into force (Article 49), the 
extension of the ICCPR to all parts of federal States 
without any limitations or exceptions (Article 50), 207 
amendment to the ICCPR (Article 51), 208 and the authentic 
texts (Article 53). 209 There are no provisions dealing 
with denunciations 
210 
or reservations. 
211 
(Footnote Continued) 
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 50 AJIL 
(1956) pp. 854-867. 
206 Ibid., pp. 737-752. Objections have been made to 
this article by most of the Eastern European states on 
the basis that it is of a discriminatory nature and that 
the Covenants should be open to all state concerned. See 
e. g., Human Rights - Status Of International Instruments 
(1987) 
, 
p. 46 (USSR) 
. 
207 See pr. 1.7 above. 
208 See Bossuyt, 'Guide', pp. 769-779. Cf. Article 11 
O. P. 
209 The HRC have discovered at least one difference 
in the authentic texts of the O. P. concerning article 
5(2)(a) O. P., see ch. 4, notes to pr. 4.87 below. 
210 There is no denunciation clause in the ICCPR 
although there is one in article 12 of the O. P. Schwelb 
has argued, correctly is it submitted, that in the light 
of article 56 VCLT (1969) it is not possible to denounce 
the ICCPR. See E. Schwelb, The Law Of Treaties And Human 
Rights, in W. M. Reisman and B. H. Weston, (eds. ), Towards 
World Order And Human Dignity, pp. 262-290 (1976); 
Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights, 
pp. 119-121 (1984). See generally P. Weis, The Denunciation 
Of Human Rights Treaties, 8 HRJ/RDH (1975) pp. 3-7. 
211 See pr. 1.24 above. 
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For convenience the provisions of the O. P. are 
outlined in the chapter on the O. P. 212 
212 See ch. 4, prs. 4.4-4.5 below. 
CH. 1.54 
J. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ICCPR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. 213 
1.34 The most signally important feature of the ICCPR is 
that it is a universal instrument which contains binding 
legal obligations for the States parties to it. 
214 The 
rights enshrined within it represent the basic minimum 
set of civil and political rights recognised by the world 
community. The fact that the ICCPR was adopted by more 
than one hundred States in 1966 and has been ratified by 
87 States from all of the geo-political regions of the 
world render it less susceptible to` criticism as being 
founded on a Western, individualistic or alien 
philosophy. 
215 Moreover, whatever the disagreement over 
213 The significance of the O. P. to the ICCPR is dealt 
with in ch. 4, prs. 4.2-4.3,4.19 below. 
214 See F. Jhabvala, The ICCPR As A Vehicle For The 
Global Promotion And Protection Of Human Rights, 15 
Isr. H. R. Yb. (1985), pp. 184-203; C. Tomuschat, Human Rights 
In A World Wide Framework, 45 Za. A. O. R. (1985), pp. 547-584; 
C. Tomuschat, Is Universality Of Human Rights An Outdated 
Concept, in Das Europa Der Zweiten Generation - 
Gedachtnisschrift Fur Christophe Sasse, pp. 585-609 
(vol. 2,1981); R. Bystricky, The Universality Of Human 
Rights In A World Of Conflicting Ideologies, in A. Eide 
and A. Schou, n. 1 above, pp. 83-93; F. Capatorti, n. 7 above. 
The strongest challenge to the "universality" of the 
ICCPR has come in the form of arguments based on cultural 
relativism. See J. Donnelly,. Cultural Relativism And Human 
Rights, 6 HRQ (1984), pp. 400-419; R. Howard, Is There An 
African Concept Of Human Rights?, in R. J. Vincent (ed. ), 
n. 167 above, pp. 11-32, (1986); A. D. Renteln, The 
Unanswered Challenge Of Relativism And The Consequences 
For Human Rights, 7 HRQ (1985), pp. 514-540; F. R. Teson, 
International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 
Va. JIL (1985) pp. 869-898. The only State reported to have 
expressly rejected philosophy of the U. D. H. R. is Iran, 
see Sunday Times, January 20th, 1985,8a, and Tomuschat, 
this note, p. 553, n. 21. However, Iran has remained a 
party to the ICCPR. See generally, Human Rights In Islam 
(ICJ, 1982); M. I. Malik, The Concept Of human Rights In 
Islamic Jurisprudence, 3 HRQ (1981) pp. 56-67. 
215 See P. Alston, The U. D. H. R. at 35: Western And 
Passe or Alive And Universal, 31 Rev. ICJ (1983), 
pp. 60-70; O. M. Garibaldi, On The Ideological Content Of 
Human Rights Instruments: The Clause: "In A Democratic 
. 
(Footnote Continued) 
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the nature of the human rights obligations in the United 
Nations Charter216 and in the Universal Declaration Of 
Human Rights, 217 there is no doubt that *the obligations 
in article 2 ICCPR to "respect and ensure" the rights in 
the ICCPR are legally binding. 218 The debate over the 
precise effect of those obligations and the fact that 
there is no coercive mechanism to enforce those 
, 
219 
obligations does not alter this conclusion. 
1.35 The ICCPR is also of significance with respect to 
the standards required of States in the treatment of 
(Footnote Continued) 
Society", in T. Buergenthal, (ed. ), Contemporary Issues in 
International Law, pp. 23-68 (1984); H. M. Scoble and 
L. S. Weisman, Access To Justice- The Struggle For Justice 
In South East Asia, (1985); R. P. Claude, The Western 
Tradition Of Human Rights In Comparative Perspective, 14 
Comparative Judicial Review (1977), pp. 3-66. 
216 See n. 24 above. 
217 See n. 41 above. 
218 On article 2 ICCPR see ch. 6 below. 
219 The disparity between human rights standards and 
the human rights practices of States raised important 
questions concerning the validity of human rights law. 
For some contributions to the debate see J. S. Watson, 
Autointerpretation, Competence And The Continuing 
Validity Of Article 2(7) Of The Charter, 71 AJIL (1977) 
pp. 60-83; J. S. Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy And Validity 
In The Development Of Human Rights Norms In International 
Law, Univ. Illinois Law Forum (1979), pp. 609-641; E. Lane, 
Demanding Hi; man Rights: A Change In The World Legal 
Order, 6 Hofstra L. R. (1978), pp. 269-295; E. Lane, Mass 
Killings By Governments: Lawful In The World Legal 
Order?, 12 N. Y. U. J. I. L. P. (1979), pp. 239-280; L. Sohn, 
The International Law Of Human Rights, 9 Hofstra L. R. 
(1981), p. 347; R. Higgins, Reality And Hope In 
International Human Rights, 9 Hofstra L. R. (1981), 
pp. 1485-1499; L. F. Schechter, The Views Of 'Charterists' 
And 'Skeptics' On Human Rights In The World Legal Order: 
Two Wrongs Don't Make A Right, 9 Hofstra L. R. (1981), 
pp. 357-98; A. D'Amato, The Concept Of Human Rights In 
International Law, 82 Col LR (1982) pp. 1110-1159. 
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aliens. 
220 it is a controversial question of 
international law as to whether an alien- is entitled to 
the protection of an "international minimum standard" of 
treatment or only to equality of' treatment with the 
nationals of the State concerned, that is, "national 
treatment". 221 However, most of the rights in the ICCPR 
are stated to be applicable to "everyone", or to "all 
persons", or "every human being". As Professor Lillich 
has commented, "The inescapable conclusion is that aliens 
are generally covered". 
222 Further support for this 
conclusion can be adduced from the non-discrimination and 
equality provisions of articles 2(1) and 26 of the ICCPR 
and the provision in article 16 ICCPR that, "Everyone 
shall have the right to recognition as a person before 
the law". Articles 12 and 13 concerning freedom of 
movement and the expulsion of aliens lawfully within the 
State's territory are clearly of specific concern to 
aliens. Conversely, the article 25 guarantee of certain 
political rights is extended only to "every citizen". 
Clearly then an alien may be entitled to a greater 
measure of protection under the ICCPR than under general 
international law and the ICCPR may itself contribute to 
the the further development of customary international 
220 See R. B. Lillich, n. 3 above, (1984), ch. 3; 
P. S. Chandra, Civil And Political Rights Of Aliens (1982). 
221 A third possibility is that there is no 
international standard at all and that a State may treat 
aliens at its complete discretion and not necessarily as 
favourably as it treats its own nationals. This view can 
possibly be seen in the Charter Of Economic Rights And 
Duties Of States, G. A. Resn. 3281 (XXIX). See generally 
I. Brownlie, Principles Of Public International Law, ch. XX 
(3d, 1979); D. J. Harris, Cases And Materials On 
International Law, ch. 8, (3d, 1983). 
222 Lillich n. 3 above, p. 145. See also the important 
general comment by the HRC on the position of aliens, Apx. IV 
below. 
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law concerning aliens. 
223 Finally in this respect 
attention should be drawn to the fact that communications 
under the O. P. may be submitted by "individuals subject 
to (the) jurisdiction (of the) State party" (article 1 
O. P. ). This clearly includes aliens, and indeed, 
communications from aliens have been considered by the 
HRC. 224 
1.36 The ICCPR may well be of some significance even for 
States which are not party to it. This argument is based 
on the view that at least some of the provisions in the 
ICCPR reflect norms of customary international law. and 
are therefore binding on States on that basis*. 
225 it 
could also be argued that the provisions of the ICCPR are 
declaratory of the law laid down in the United Nations 
Charter and therefore bind the members of the U. N. on 
that basis. 
226 Although there is a clear historical link 
between the U. N. Charter and the International Bill Of 
Rights227 it is difficult to sustain this declaratory 
theory particularly as the complex of rights and 
limitations in the ICCPR have only been accepted by just 
over half of the members of the U. N. It is submitted 
that the link between the ICCPR and the U. N. Charter is 
not sufficiently strong to justify recourse to the latter 
223 Ibid., pp. 1-3. 
224 See ch. 4, pr. 4.67 below. 
225 Torture might be an obvious example in this 
respect, see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d. p. 876 (1980), 19 ILM (1980), p. 966, U. S. Circuit Court Of 
Appeals, 2nd Circuit; N. Rodley, The Treatment Of 
Prisoners In International Law, ch. 2 and pp. 104-106 
(1986); Lillich, n. 3 above, pp. 44-47. 
226 E. Schwelb has advanced a similar argument as 
regards the ICERD, See n. 24 above, (1972), p. 337 at 
p. 351; D'Amato, n. 219 above, pp. 1128-1149. See also 
Singh, n. 24 above. 
227 See ch. l, prs. 1.1-1.3 above. See also the 
preamble to the ICCPR, Apx. I below. 
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to impose the obligations of the ICCPR on non-States 
parties. A further argument on which the applicability of 
the ICCPR to non-States parties could be based is that 
certain of its provisions may reflect "the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations". 
228 
This argument may be more acceptable with respect to 
particular provisions of the ICCPR than the declaratory 
theory noted above. 
229 
1.37 The status of the ICCPR in international law is also 
important from the perspective of domestic law. 
230 
According to the particular constitutional system of a 
State it may be open to an individual to invoke the ICCPR 
as directly applicable superior law or as persuasive 
authority as regards the interpretation of 
constitutional, legislative and administrative 
provisions. 
231 The provisions of the ICCPR are 
increasingly being invoked in this manner in, for 
example, Australia, 
232 Canada, 233 Federal Republic of 
228 Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ. See 
N. K. Hevener and S. A. Mosher, General Principles Of Law And 
The U. N. Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, 27 ICLQ 
(1978), pp. 596-613. 
229 See n. 226 above. 
230 In addition to the references below see the 
bibliography in Bossuyt, 'Guide' 
, 
pp. 826-836. On the 
domestic implementation of the ICCPR see ch. 6 below on 
article 2 ICCPR. Cf. A. Drzemczewski, European Human Rights 
Convention In Domestic Law, (1983). 
231 See R. Lillich, The Role Of Domestic Courts In 
Enforcing International Human Rights Law, in H. Hannum 
(Ed. ), Guide To International Human Rights Practice, 
ch. 13 (1984); Ibid., The Enforcement of International 
Human Rights Norms In Domestic Courts, in J. C. Tuttle 
(ed. ), n. 167 above, pp. 105-131; Ibid, Invoking 
International Human Rights Law In Domestic Courts, 54 
Univ. Cin. LR (1985) pp. 367-415. 
232 See Lebanese Muslim Association v. Minister For 
Immigration And Ethnic affairs, 67 ALR 195 (1986). See 
also the Australian Bill Of Rights Bill (1985), and (Footnote Continued) 
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Germany, 234 France, 235 India, 236 the Netherlands, 237 New 
Zealand, 238 the United Kingdom239 the United States, 240 
(Footnote Continued) 
Explanatory Memorandum. 
233 See e. g., Re Mitchell and the Queen (1983) 42 
O. R. (2d) p. 481 (article 15); Re Vincent And Minister Of 
Employment And Immigration (1983) 148 DLR (3d) p. 385 (article 13). Both cited in XXII Can. YIL 1984 (1985) 
pp. 405-407. Before the HRC in 1984 the Canadian 
representative stated that the Covenant was influencing 
the interpretation of the Charter. There were at least 
twenty decisions to date in which judges referred to the 
Covenant and other human rights instruments to interpret 
provisions of the Charter, (SR 559 pr. 26). 
234 See Tomuschat, ch. 6, n. 1, below (1984), p. 38 who 
cites a decision of the Federal Administrative Court in 1982 
which cited the decision of the HRC in the Mauritian Women 
Case which is dealt with in ch. 4, pr. 4.75 below. 
235 Before the HRC in 1983 the French representative 
stated that the Covenant had been invoked in one case 
concerning a doctor who had invoked freedom of opinion in 
refusing to pay his contribution to a professional 
association, SR 439 pr. 10. The Nicaraguan representative 
stated that the Covenant was frequently invoked in courts, 
SR 428 pr. 11. 
236 See H. O. Agarwal, n. 1 above, chs. 4-6, (1983); 
Justice Bhagwati, Human Rights As Evolved By The 
Jurisprudence Of The Supreme Court Of India, (Part I), 13 
Comm. L. B. (1987) pp. 236-245; statement of the Indian 
representative before the HRC, Doc. A/39/40 pr. 268. 
237 See SR 321 pr. 3 (48 reported cases in which 
Covenant mentioned in the courts opinion). See e. g. notes in 
NYIL (1984), p. 424-5,445-7,641-4,451, n. 101,448-450. 
238 See R. v. Wjee, (1981) 1 NZLR 561; Broadcasting 
Corporation Of New Zealand v. Attorney-General, (1982) 1 
NZLR 120; Department Of Labour v. Latailakepa, (1982) 1 NZLR 
(Footnote Continued) 
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Norway, 241 and Yugoslavia. 242 Similarly national 
commentators have attempted to to compare domestic 
provisions with standards established in the ICCPR in, 
243 244 
example, Canada, Australia, 
-India, 245 Japan, 246 
(Footnote Continued) 
632. See also Tay, NZLJ (1979) p. 365-370. 
239 See Ministry Of Home Affairs and Another v. Fisher 
and Another, 1980 A. C. 319; R. v. Secretary Of State For The 
Home Office, ex. p. Chubb, (Queens Bench Divisional Court, 1 
July 1986, unreported); The Bank Of Tokyo Ltd. v. Karoon, (QBD, 1 May 1986, unreported). 
240 See e. g. the celebrated decision in Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala, n. 225 above. See also Lillich, n. 231 above and 
Lillich, International Human Rights Instruments (1983). 
241 D. Sandifer, The Re-Emergence Of Indigenous 
Questions In International Law, Can H. R. Y. (1984-85), at 
p. 24-25 cites a Norweigan case in which article 27 ICCPR was 
cited although the decision of the Supreme Court was not 
based on it. 
242 See the decision of the Constitutional Court of 
Yugoslavia in the I. C. J. Study, ch. 7, n. l below, p. 84, 
n. 121-122. It is understood that the provisions of the 
ICCPR played an important part in the consideration within 
Yugoslavia of the appropriate interpretation of a certain 
law concerning discrimination on political grounds in the 
context of employment. 
243 See H. Fischer, The Human Rights Covenants And 
Canadian Law, 15 Can. YIL (1977), pp. 42-83; M. Cohen and 
A. F. Bayefsky, 61 Can. Bar. Rev. (1983), pp. 265-313; 
A. Bayefsky, The Human Rights Committee And the Case Of 
Sandra Lovelace, 20 Can. YIL pp. 244-266 (1982); A. Brudner, 
The Domestic Enforcement Of International Covenants On Human 
Rights: A Theoretical Framework, 35 Univ. Tor. LJ (1985) 
pp. 219-254; W. S. Tarnopolsky, A Comparison Between The 
Canadian Charter Of Rights and Freedoms And The 
International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, 8 
Queens LJ (1982-83) pp. 211-231. 
244 See G. Triggs, Australia's Ratification Of The 
(Footnote Continued) 
CH. 1.61 
New Zealand, 247 the U. S. S. R., 248 the U. S., 249 and the 
25 U. K. 0. 
1.38 As a basic universal standard the ICCPR is 
frequently invoked in resolutions of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, 
251 the- reports252 and 
(Footnote Continued) 
ICCPR: Endorsement Or Repudiation? 31 ICLQ (1982), 
pp. 278-306; Ibid., Australia's Ratification Of 'The ICCPR: 
Its Domestic Application To Prisoners Rights, 3 HRLJ (1982), 
pp. 65-102; S. K. N. Blay, The ICCPR And The Recognition Of 
Customary Law Practices Of Indigenous Peoples: The Case Of 
Australian Aborigines, 19 CILSA (1986) pp. 199-219. 
245 See Agarwal, n. 1 above; G. H. Guttal, Human 
Rights: The Indian Law, 26 Ind. JIL (1986) pp. 53-71. 
246 See S. Yasuhiko, Japan And Human Rights Covenant, 
2 HRLJ (1981), pp. 79-107; Y. Iwasawa, Legal Treatment Of 
Koreans In Japan: The Impact Of International Human 
Rights Law On Japanese Law, 8 HRQ (1986), pp. 131-179; Y. 
Kawashima, The International Covenants On Human Rights 
And The Japanese Legal System, 22 Japanese Annual Of 
International Law (1978), pp. 54-74. 
247 J. B. Elkind, Application Of The International 
Covenant On Civil And Political Rights In New Zealand, 75 
AJIL (1981), pp. 169-172; J. B. Elkind and A. Shaw, A 
Standard For Justice (1986). 
248 V. Kartashkin, Covenants On Human Rights And Soviet 
Legislation, X HRJ/RDH (1977), pp. 97-115. 
249 A. Noble, The Civil And Political Rights Covenant As 
the Law Of The Land, 25 Vill. LR (1979) pp. 119-140. See n. 168 
above. 
250 See e. g. the JUSTICE Report, Compensation For 
Wrongful Imprisonment, (1982). 
251 See e. g. the resolutions cited by Weissbrodt in 
80 AJIL (1986) pp. 685-699; Zuidjwick, n. 1 above, p. 380 et 
seq. 
252 For example, the reports of UN Working Groups 
and Special Rapporteurs consistently make reference to (Footnote Continued) 
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resolutions253 of the United Nations human rights bodies, 
regional institutions 
254 
and national Parliaments. 255 It 
is also interesting to note the reference to the ICCPR in 
the Final Act Of The Conference On Security And 
Co-Operation In Europe (The'Helsinki Final Act) 256 and in 
the Treaty between the United Kingdom And China 
concerning Hong Kong. 
257 The ICCPR is often used as the 
standard by which to measure and assess the human rights 
performance of States258 and as the starting point for 
the development for the development of new international 
human rights instruments. 
259 
(Footnote Continued) 
the Covenant. See, e. g., the reports on summary and 
arbitrary executions in ch. 8, n. 1 below. 
253 See e. g. Commission On Human Rights, Report of 
42nd session, 1986, ECOSOC OR 1986, Supp. 2; 
U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/ 1986/65. 
254 See e. g. Resolutions Of The European Parliament, 
4 HRLJ (1983) pp. 1-17. The ICCPR has also been referred 
to in a number of cases under the ECHR. 
255 See e. g. Marston, UK Materials In International 
Law, 65 BYIL 1985 pp. 426-431 (1986); Ibid., 55 BYIL 1984 
(1985) pp. 451-458. 
256 14 ILM (1975), p. 1292. See J. Frowein, The 
Interrelationship Between The Helsinki Final Act, The 
International Covenants On Human Rights And The European 
Convention On Human Rights, in T. Buergenthal (Ed. ), Human 
Rights, International Law And The Helsinki 
Accords, (1977), pp. 71-82. 
257 Joint Declaration Of The Governments Of The U. K. 
And The Peoples Republic Of China On The Question Of Hong 
Kong, 26 UKTS (1985); Cmnd. 9543. 
258 See e. g. E. R. Cohen, Human Rights In the 
Israeli-Occupied Territories 1967-1982, (1985). 
259 See e. g. H. Hannum, The Right To Leave And Return 
In International Law And Practice (1987); 
W. H. Bennett, Jr., A Critique Of The Emerging Convention On 
The Rights Of The Child, 20 Corn. ILJ (1987) pp. 1-64; 
Lillich, n. 3 above, appendices. 
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1.39 Finally, it is useful to set the ICCPR in its 
international perspective both in terms of the rights 
established by it and its implementation procedures. As 
to the rights established we have already noted that the 
Covenants were intended to be a further development of 
the Universal Declaration Of Human Rights (1948). 260 We 
have also drawn attention to the division of human rights 
into a set of civil and political rights and a set of 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
261 The two 
international covenants co-exist with a myriad of 
international human rights instruments. 262 The official 
U. N. compilation contains fifty seven such instruments 
which detail human rights and provide for various 
implementation procedures. 
263 Many of these instruments 
are of relevance to particular rights established in the 
ICCPR and reference has been made to them in the 
procedures established by the ICCPR. 
264 However, the 
principal overlap in terms of rights covered lies at the 
regional level in the form of the American Declaration Of 
The Rights And Duties Of Man (1948), 265 the American 
260 See ch. 1, prs. 1.4-1.5 above. 
261 Ibid., and pr. 1.16 above. 
262 See T. Meron, Human Rights Law Making In The 
United Nations: A Critique Of Process And Instruments, 
(1986); J. Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime 
Analysis, 40 Int. Org. (1986) p. 599-642. 
263 Human Rights: A Compilation of International 
Instruments, U. N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev. 2, (1983). 
264 See chs. 3-12 below. 
265 O. A. S. Resn. XXX, adopted by the Ninth 
International Conference Of American States, Bogota, 
Colombia, (1948) 
. 
Reprinted in Handbook Of Existing Rules 
Pertaining To Human Rights In The Inter-American System, 
OEA, Series. L/V/II. 60, doc. 28, (1983). See. P. Sieghart, The 
International Law Of Human Rights, p. 28,55, (1984). 
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Convention On Human Rights (1969), 266 the European 
Convention For The Protection Of Human Rights And 
Fundamental Freedoms (1950), 267 and most recently, the 
African Charter On Human And Peoples' Rights (1981). 268 
As regards implementation procedures there now exists 
a sophisticated range of organs and procedures with 
jurisdiction to implement the human rights provisions 
established in the international and regional instruments 
noted above. 
269 For the purposes of this thesis the most 
instructive comparisons to be drawn are those concerning 
266 O. A. S. T. S. No. 36, p. 1. Reprinted in Handbook, 
n. 264 above, pp. 31-63; P. Sieghart, Ibid., pp. 28-29. See 
T. Buergenthal, The Inter-American System For The 
Protection Of Human Rights, in T. Meron, (ed), n. 11 above, 
ch. 12; T. Buergenthal et al, n. 104 above; R. Piza, 
Coordination Of The Mechanisms For The Protection Of 
Human Rights In The American Convention With Those 
Established By the United Nations, 30 Am. ULR (1981) 
pp. 167-187. 
267 U. K. T. S. p. 70 (1950); Cmnd. 8969. See Van Dijk 
and Van Hoof, The Theory And Practice Of The European 
Convention On Human Rights, (1984); J. Fawcett, The 
Application Of The European Convention On Human Rights, 
(2d, 1987); R. Higgins, The European Convention On Human 
Rights, in T. Meron, (ed. ), n. 11 above, ch. 13; R. Beddard, 
Human Rights In Europe, (2d, 1980). 
268 21 ILM (1982), pp. 58-68; 7 Comm. Law. Bull. (1982), 
pp. 1057-1068. See R. Gittleman, The African Charter On 
Human And Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis, 22 Va. JIL 
(1982), pp. 667-714; E. G. Bello, The African Charter On 
human And Peoples Rights 
-A Legal Analysis, 194 Rec. Des 
Cours (1985-V) pp. 21-268 (1987); B. O. Okere, The 
Protection Of Human Rights In Africa And The African 
Charter On Human And Peoples Rights: A Comparative 
Analysis With The European And American Systems, 6 HRQ 
(1984), pp. 141-159; U. O. Umozurike, The African Charter On 
Human And Peoples' Rights, 77 AJIL (1983), pp. 902-912; 
N. S. Rembe, Africa And Regional Protection Of Human 
Rights, (1985). The African Commission On Human Rights 
has now been elected. 
269 Arguably too many. See Sohn, Human Rights: Their 
Implementation By The United Nations, in Meron, (ed), 
n. 00 above, pp. 369-401; A. P. Vijapur, The UN Mechanisms 
For The Promotion And Protection Of Human Rights, 26 AJIL 
(1986) pp. 576-611. 
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the work of the Inter-American Commission On Human Rights 
(IACM) and Court (IACT), 270 the European Commission of 
Human Rights (EUCM) and Court (EUCT), 271 and the 
Committee On The Elimination Of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) under the International Convention On The 
Elimination Of Racial Discrimination. 272 
We begin our examination of the practices and 
procedures developed under the ICCPR by considering the 
permanent body established by the ICCPR: the HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMITTEE. 
270 See n. 265 above. 
271 See n. 266 above. 
272 U. K. T. S. 77 (1969), 
p. 195; 60 AJIL (1966), P. 690. 
Nations Convention On The 
Discrimination, (2d, 1980); 
pp. 7-52; Tolley, n. 1 above, pp, 
Cmnd. 4108; 660 U. N. T. S. 
See N. Lerner, The United 
Elimination Of Racial 
T. Meron, n. 261 above, 
45-50. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE. 1 
Introduction. 
2.1 As we noted in chapter one the principle of 
establishing a Human Rights Committee (HRC), a permanent 
human rights body to implement the Covenant, only just 
survived the drafting process. 
2 The HRC emerged as the 
only organ with express functions with respect to the 
Covenant and the Protocol. However, key changes had been 
made in the Third Committee concerning the composition 
and functions of the proposed Committee. 
3 This chapter 
examines the composition, organization, functions, nature 
and status of the HRC. 
A. Membership. 
2.2 Article 28(1) of the covenant provides for the 
establishment ofa "Human Rights Committee" to consist of 
eighteen members and to carry out the functions provided 
for in the Covenant and the Protocol. The members of the 
HRC shall both "be elected and shall serve" in their 
1 See M. J. Bossuyt, Le Reglement Interieur Du Comite Des 
Droits lie L'horrime, 14 Revue Belge De Droit International 
(1978-79) pp. 104-156; G. Cote-Harper, Le Comite De Droits De 
L'homme Des Nations Unies, 28 Cahier.: Des Droits (1987) 
pp. 533-546; E. Decaux, La Mise En Vigeur Du Pacte 
International Relatifs Au:: Droits Civils Et Politiques, 84 
Revue Generale De Droit International Public (1980) 
pp. 487-534; F. Capatorti, ch. 1, n. 1 above pp. 136-138; 
M. Lipmann, Ibid., pp. 250-251; A. H. Robertson, The 
Implementation System: International Measures, in L. Henkin 
(ed), ibid., pp. 337-341; F. Jhabvala, ibid., pp. 81-95; 
E. Schwelb, ibid., (1968) pp. 835-838; M. Nowak, ch. 3, n. 1 
below, ' pp. 143-146; A. J. G. Mower, organizing To Implement The 
UN Civil/Political Rights Covenant: First Steps By The 
Committee, 3 HRRev. (1978) pp. 122-131; A. J. G. Mower, The 
Implementation Of the UN Covenant On Civil And Political 
Rights, X HRJ (1977) p. 271; E. Mose And T. Opsahl, ch. 4, n. 1 
below; P. S. Brar, ch. 3, n. l below, ch. I; V. Dimitrijevic, The 
Roles of The Human Rights Committee (1986). 
2 See ch. 1, prs. 1.6-1.12 above. 
3 Ibid. See, in particular, Jhabvala, n. 1 above. 
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personal capacity (article 28(3)). 4 Article 28(2) 
provides that members "shall be of high moral character 
and recognized competence in the field of human rights, 
consideration being given to the usefulness of 
participation of some persons having legal experience". 
In the election of the Committee, "consideration shall be 
given to equitable geographical distribution of 
membership and to the representation of the different 
forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems" 
(article 31(2)). 5 
The experience of international human rights organs 
would suggest that the independence of HRC members from 
governmental or other institutional influences is 
fundamental to its nature and at least gives it the 
potential to be effective. 
6 However, the Covenant does 
not stipulate that a member must be personally 
4 Under article 38 every member of the Human Rights 
Committee must make a solemn declaration that he will 
perform his functions impartially and conscientiously. 
5 Article 8 ICERD follows article 31(2) ICCPR. 
The presence of experts from different legal systems can 
assists the HRC in its consideration of reports under 
article 40. For example, during consideration of the 
report of Morocco it was useful to have members of the 
HRC who were conversant with Islamic laws. The provision 
in article 31(2) can give States parties the confidence 
that their approach will at least be understood even if 
disagreed with' and avoids the necessity of having 
provision for. an "ad hoc" representative nominated by the 
particular State party concerned which could only detract 
from the independent status of the HRC. Ad hoc 
representation was proposed during the drafting stages 
but was deleted by the HRCion in 1951, see Doc. E/1992, 
ch. 1, n. 1 above, pr. 78. See SR 299 pr. 11 (Movchan). 
6 Independent international human rights bodies 
include the EUCM, EUCT, CEDAW, IACM, IACT, Committee 
Against Torture, Sub-Commission On The 
- 
Prevention Of 
Discrimination And The Protection Of Minorities, the 
Committee Of Independent Experts under the ESC, the 
Committee Of Experts On The Application Of Conventions 
And Recommendations of the ILO; and the new UN Committee 
on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights. 
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independent of his government. 
7 In practice membership of 
the HRC has included former cabinet and government 
ministers, members of Parliament, 
8 former ambassadors and 
senior governmental representatives. 
9 Membership of the 
HRC is part-time. Although members of the HRC receive 
emoluments from the United Nations rather then their 
respective national governments the level of emoluments 
has been very low. 
'0 The effect in practice has been that 
membership of the HRC has been limited to persons 
receiving a regular salary, for example, in academic or 
government posts. 
11 As the work of the HRC is very 
demanding both in terms of difficulty and the time 
involved there is an obvious case to be made for making 
membership of the HRC a full-time salaried occupation. 
12 
However, the continuous contact of members with high 
level political and legal activity within their 
respective national systems brings critically important 
practical knowledge and expertise to the HRC's 
7 Cf. Rule 4 of Rules Of the EUCT, see ECHR 
Collected Texts (1986) p. 147. 
8 E. g. Mr. Ermacora is a member of the Austrian 
Parliament. 
9 E. g. Mr. Graefrath has represented the GDR in the 
Third Committee of the General Assembly. 
10 The Chairman receives $5,000. The members receive 
$3,000 per year. See SR 263. There have been consistent 
complaints from HRC members concerning the level of 
emoluments and problems with other facilities, e. g. lack 
of medical insurance. Under article 8(6) ICERD members 
of the CERD receive their expenses from the national 
governments. There have been problems in members 
receiving their expenses. It has been argued that the 
ICCPR represents an advance in this respect. 
11 See the comments of Mr. Van Boven, SR 150 pr. 71. 
12 
"There is a strong case for making membership on 
the committee a salaried occupation to which members 
could devote all their time", Robertson , n. 1 
above, p. 339. 
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considerations. It is submitted that the HRC should 
remain a part time body but that its members should be 
properly remunerated "having regard to the importance of 
the Committee's responsibilities" (article 35). 13 
2.3 Nominees for the HRC have been of a very high 
quality. 
14 To some extent this suggests that States 
parties regard the HRC and the Covenant as important. 
Moreover, the fact that highly qualified individuals are 
willing to devote a substantial part of their time over a 
period of years bears testimony to the importance they 
see in the role of the HRC. 
15 However, the reference to 
"legal expertise" in article 28 has perhaps been too 
literally applied. Members of the HRC to date have all 
been legal experts of some kind. Although many of the 
members have had various periods of their careers as, for 
example, journalists or politicians, 16 the expertise of 
the HRC could usefully be broadened by experts from other 
disciplines such as social sciences or economics. No 
woman served on the HRC until one was elected in 1983 to 
replace the expert from Canada who resigned to take up a 
13 This submission is also based 'on the view that 
the UN Secretariat will need to play an increasing role 
in the work of the HRC, see prs. 2.16-2.17 below. 
14 See the bibliographies published for the meeting 
of States parties to elect members of the HRC, documents 
prefixed CCPR/SP. By contrast the regional groupings 
consistently failed to nominate enough candidates for the 
Sessional Working Group Of Experts under the ICESCR, See 
Alston, n. 97 below, ('p. 346 n. 97. 
15 The sessions of the HRC cover approximately three 
months of the year in total. 
16 E. g., the present Chairman, Mr. Prado-Vallejo was 
formerly a journalist. 
judicial appointment. 17 As of 1 January 1988 two women 
are serving on the HRC. 
18 
2.4 Whatever the governing provisions of a treaty or of a 
resolution establishing an independent human rights organ 
the proof, of course, lies in the practice. Since its 
inception members of the HRC have continually stressed 
their independence from governments, the Secretariat and 
other United Nations bodies. 
19 Whilst there is no denying 
that there have been marked differences between members 
as to the HRC's functions and powers and different 
approaches to the implementation of particular rights, 
these differences appear to stem from the various 
ideological and legal approaches mandated in the HRC's 
membership (article 31(2)) rather than from political 
pressures from governments or other forces. 
20 The line 
between the two is a thin and difficult one but in 
practice HRC members do appear to operate as independent 
experts. 
21 The fundamental pre-condition to the HRC's 
continued development is that they should continue to do 
22 
so. 
17 Docs. A/38/40, pr-8; A/39/40 pr. 6. 
18 Mrs. Higgins, independent expert from the U. K., 
is Professor of international law at the University of 
London, London School of Economics. Ms. Chanet, 
independent expert from France, is a judge. 
19 
"The Committee operated on a contractual basis, 
namely, the Covenant", SR 572 pr. 11 (Movchan). See 
B. Graefrath, Trends Emerging In the Practice Of The Human 
Rights Committee, 3 Bull. GDR Committee Human Rights 
(1980) pp. 3-32. 
20 See ch. 3, prs. 3.29-3.38 below. 
21 
occasionally members of the HRC have strayed into 
more overtly political questioning. See, SR 364,365,366 
and 368 on Iran. 
22 See SR 729; Doc. A/42/40 pr. 7. 
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B. Election. 
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2.5 The members of the HRC are elected by secret ballot 
by States parties to the Covenant at meetings convened by 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 23 The 
Secretary-General convened the first meeting of the 
States parties on 20th September 1976.24 Subsequent 
elections take place every two years. 
25 A list of 
nominees is submitted by the Secretary-General to the 
States parties no later than one month before the date of 
each election. 
26 Each State party to the Covenant is 
entitled to nominate not more than two persons who shall 
be nationals of the nominating State. 
27 The HRC may not 
include more than one national from the same State. 
28 The 
persons elected are those nominees who obtain the largest 
majority of the votes and an absolute majority of the 
votes of the representatives of States parties present 
and voting. 
29 
Each member of the HRC is elected for a term of four 
years. 
30 The States parties decided that the term of 
office of the initial members of the HRC should begin on 
1 January 1977.31 The terms of nine of the initial 
members, chosen by lot by the Chairman of the initial 
23 Article 30 (1), (4). 
24 See Doc. CCPR/SP/7 (1976): Decisions of the first 
meeting of the States parties to the ICCPR. 
25 Hence elections have taken place in 1978,1980, 
1982,1984 and 1986. See the series of documents prefixed 
CCPR/SP. 
26 See article 30 for details. 
27 Article 29. Cf. article 8(2) ICERD; article 36(2) 
AMR. 
28 Article 32. 
29 Article 30(4). 
30 Article 32. 
31 DoC. CCPR/SP/SR 2. 
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meeting of the States parties., expired at the end of two 
years. 
32 Consequently the States parties meet every two 
years to replace the terms of the nine members whose 
terms are to expire. This ensures some continuity of 
membership as does the provision in article 29(3) 
permitting the renomination of HRC members. The HRC has 
been fortunate in having both a good record of attendance 
by members and a strong degree of continuity of 
membership in its first decade, although there have been 
a number of significant changes recently. 
33 As of 1 
January 1988 only 3 of the original members remain. 
34 A 
member elected to fill a vacancy holds the office for the 
remainder of the term of the member who vacated the 
seat. 
35 As of 24 July 1987 the composition of the HRC was 
as follows: 
36 C* Term expires on 31 December 1988; ** 
Term expires on 31 December 1990). 
Name of member. Country of nationality. 
Mr. Andres AGUILAR * Venezuela. 
Mr. Nisuke ANDO ** 
Ms. Christine CHANET ** 
Mr. Joseph A. L. COORAY ** 
Mr. Vojin DIMITRIJEVIC ** 
Mr. Omran EL-SHAFEI ** 
Mrs. Rosalyn HIGGINS * 
Mr. Rajsoomer LALLAH * 
32 Article 32. 
Japan. 
France. 
Sri Lanka. 
Yugoslavia. 
Egypt. 
United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. 
Mauritius. 
33 In particular the following influential members have 
recently left: Sir Vincent Evans (U. K. ), Tomuschat (FRG), 
Graefrath (GDR) and Opsahl (Norway). 
34 Mr. Movchan, Mr. Mavrommatis, and Mr. Prado-Vallejo. 
35 Article 34(3). Article 33 of the Covenant deals 
with members ceasing to carry out functions, and with 
deaths and resignations. 
36 A/42%40, Annex II, p. 116. The previous members of 
the HRC are shown in the HRC's annual reports. 
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Mr. Andreas V. MAVROMMATIS * Cyprus. 
Mr. Joseph A. MOMMERSTEEG ** Netherlands. 
Mr. Anatoly P. MOVCHAN * Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. 
Mr. Biriame NDIAYE ** Senegal. 
Mr. Fausto POCAR * Italy. 
Mr. Julio PRADO VALLEJO ** Ecuador. 
Mr. Alejandro SERRANO CALDERO * Nicaragua. 
Mr. S. Amos WAKO * Kenya. 
Mr. Bertil WENNERGREN ** Sweden. 
Mr. *Adam ZIELINSKI * Poland. 
As regards geographical representation there is no 
precise rule in the Covenant beyond that in article 
31(2) 37 nor has any been adopted in the practices for 
electing the HRC. 
38 In practice, however, each of the six 
elections to date has produced a broadly balanced 
Committee in geographical terms. This would suggest that 
States parties do bear the geographical criteria in 
mind. 
39 
In accordance with article 43 the members of the 
HRC, "shall be entitled to the facilities, privileges and 
immunities of experts on mission for the United Nations 
as laid down in the relevant sections of the Convention 
37 See pr. 2.2 above. 
38 Cf. The "relatively inflexible formula" of five 
geographical groupings in the rules for the CESCR, see 
P. Alston, Out Of The Abyss: the Challenges Confronting 
The New U. N. Committee On Economic, Social And Cultural 
Rights, 9 HRQ (1987) pp. 332-381 at p. 349. See also 
Committee On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, Report 
of first session, ECOSOC OR, 1987, Supp. 17 (1987); 
P. Alston and B. Simma, First Session Of The New UN 
Committee On Economic, Social And *Cultural Rights, 81 
AJIL (1987) pp. 747-756. 
39 See Mower, n. 1 above (1978); Decaux, ibid. 
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on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations". 40 
C. Organization of Work. 
2.6 In accordance with article 37(1) the initial meeting 
of the HRC was convened at the headquarters of the United 
Nations in New York. Subsequent meetings were to be held 
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure drawn up by the 
HRC under article 39(2) and were normally to be held in 
New York or Geneva. 
41 In its Rules the HRC provided that 
it would hold such sessions as were required for the 
satisfactory performance of its functions. 
42 Initially 
the HRC decided to hold two sessions 
-a year- but as the 
volume of its work increased the practice of the HRC 
since 1978 has been to hold three sessions a year of 
three weeks duration. 
43 Normally one session has been 
held in New York in the spring and two sessions in Geneva 
in the summer and the autumn. 
44 However, economic 
40 Convention On The Privileges And Inununities Of 
The United Nations, 1 UNTS 15. 
41 Article 37(2), (3). The HRC adopted "Provisional 
Rules of Procedure" at its first and second sessions 
(hereinafter "Rules"). Subsequent amendments were made at 
its third and seventh sessions. See Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev. ]. 
(1979). The Rules remain provisional. On the Rules see in 
particular, Bossuyt, n. 1 above; Mower, (1978), ibid., 
Robertson, ibid. The CERD has recently upgraded its 
provisional rules, see Doc. CERD/C/35/Rev. 3 (1986). 
42 Rules 1 and 2. 
43 The General Assembly accepted the arguments of 
the HRC on the need for a third session. 
44 Some rescheduling of the HRC's sessions was 
experienced in the HRC's early years. HRC members have 
stressed the importance of holding at least one session a 
year in New York on the basis that it is the major 
headquarters of the UN, the information media there is 
more developed, and it is a more suitable venue for a 
number of States parties, particularly' developing 
countries most of which have permanent missions in New (Footnote Continued) 
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constraints seem to be forcing the HRC into a situation 
of holding almost all of its sessions in Geneva. Each 
session is normally preceded by one or two working groups 
of up to five days. 
45 Financial constraints within the 
United Nations system forced the cancellation of the 
HRC's proposed session in the autumn of 1986 and only 
permitted the establishment of one pre-sessional working 
group at HRC's spring and summer sessions in 1987, 
instead of the customary two. 
46 The HRC has pressed 
strongly to retain its three session per year. 
47 Only one 
session has been held outside of New York or Geneva. 
48 In 
accordance with the Rules the HRC established the offices 
of Chairman, three Vice-Chairmen and a Rapporteur. The 
(Footnote Continued) 
York which is not the case in Geneva. A number of States 
have requested that their reports are considered in New 
York rather than Geneva. See SR 44 prs. 20-22; SR 177 
prs. 6-17; Doc. A/35/40 pp. 96-97. 
45 The use of pre-sessional working groups has been an 
almost constant feature of the HRC's work subject to 
occasional resource problems. The working groups continue to 
meet during the sessions of the HRC. 
46 Doc. A/42/40 prs. 425-434; A/42/40 prs. 4,12-14. 
The single working group found it impossible to deal with 
its workload, SR 758 prs. 22-35. 
47 Ibid. Support has been expressed in the Third 
Committee for maintaining the normal pattern of the 
Committee's meetings, Doc. A/42/40 pr. 27. 
48 The fourteenth session was held in Bonn. See 
Docs. A/36/40 prs. 28-31; A/37/40 pr. 4; SR 290. 
Particularly in-its early years many members of the HRC 
indicated the desirability of the HRC holding sessions 
outside of New York or Geneva. The possibility was 
examined by the Secretary-General at the request of the 
General Assembly, (G. A. Resn. 38/145). The 
Secretary-General drew attention to G. A. Resn. 31/140 which 
provides in part that, "UN bodies may hold sessions away 
from their established headquarters when a Government 
issuing a request for a session to be held within its (Footnote Continued) 
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officers are elected for two years and may be 
re-elected. 
49 
2.7 The Rules provide that, "The meetings of the 
Committee and its subsidiary bodies shall be held in 
public unless the Committee decides otherwise or it 
appears from the relevant provisions of the Covenant or 
the Protocol that the meetings shall be held in 
private". 
50 The relevant provisions are article 41(1)(d) 
of the Covenant and article 5(3) of the Protocol which 
provide that the Committee shall hold closed meetings 
when considering inter-State and individual 
communications respectively. In practice almost all of 
the HRC's meetings are held in public except when they 
are considering communications under the optional 
Protocol. 51 A small number of representatives of non 
governmental organizations attend HRC meetings but 
members of the public have rarely been present. 
52 The 
Covenant contains only two mandatory rules of procedure. 
(Footnote Continued) 
territory has agreed to defer... the actual additional 
costs directly and indirectly involved". The financial 
crisis at the UN makes any change in the governing rules 
extremely unlikely. It is submitted that the developed 
States should give serious consideration to hosting a 
session of the HRC. 
49 The HRC has paid tribute to its expert chairmanship 
of Mr. Mavrommatis during its first ten years, Doc. A/42/40 
pr. 11. 
50 R. 33. The understanding was that the HRC would 
meet in private only in exceptional cases, see SR 5 and 
6. 
51 The working of the Optional Protocol has 
sometimes been discussed in public session. 
52 It would be helpful if the annual reports of the 
HRC listed the non-governmental representatives who have 
attended its sessions even though they have no formal 
role in the HRC's proceedings. Cf. Report of CESCR, n. 38 
above, prs. 6-7. Private individuals rarely attend HRC 
meetings and have 
. 
often faced difficulties in gaining 
access. See the comments at SR 91 pr. 43; SR 263 pr. 32; SR 
282 pr. 53. 
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Article 39(2) provides that (a) twelve members shall 
constitute a quorum and that (b) decisions of the 
Committee shall be made by a majority vote of the members 
present. Notwithstanding this clear rule the appropriate 
method of decision making was the subject of intensive 
discussion within the HRC. From its inception the HRC had 
taken decisions on the basis of consensus. 
53 When it came 
to adopting its Rules of Procedure the question arose as 
to whether the principle of decision making by consensus 
should be formally expressed within the corpus of the 
Rules. 54 In particular the independent experts from 
Eastern Europe were strongly in favour its being formally 
expressed. 
55 They referred to the increasing use of 
consensus decisions making in international 
organizations. 
56 However, a strong majority emerged 
against formal incorporation. 
57 In the event the HRC 
adopted the draft rule referring to majority voting but 
with the following footnote in its Rules, 
"1. The members of the Committee generally expressed 
the view that its methods of work should normally 
4 
53 See Fischer, ch. 3, n. 1 below, pp. 149-151; K. Zemanek, 
Majority Rule And Consensus Technique In Law-Making 
Diplomacy, in MacDonald and Johnstone, (eds), ch. 1, n. 7 
above, pp. 857-887; B. F. Selassie, Consensus And Peace, 
(UNESCO, 1980). 
54 For the HRC's discussion of consensus see SR 4, 
5,6,7,13,14 and 15; Doc. A/32/44 prs. 27-34. SR 14 pr. 2 
contains a summary of the various suggestions. 
55 See e, g, the comments at SR 7 prs. 5 (Hangs), 9 
(Koulishev), 10 (Graefrath), 22 (Movchan). 
56 E. g. by the Conference On The Law Of The Sea, the 
International Law Commission and the Conference On 
Security And cooperation in Europe. 
57 They argued, inter alia, that the consensus 
principle might be interpreted in a sense incompatible 
with the independence of members, that it might in 
practice operate as a veto and create working 
difficulties. 
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allow for attempts to reach decisions by consensus 
before voting, provided that the Covenant and the 
Rules of Procedure were observed and that such 
attempts do not unduly delay the work of the 
Committee. 
2. Bearing in mind paragraph 1 above, the Chairman 
at any meeting may, and at the request of any member 
shall, put the proposal to a vote". 
58 
In retrospect the adoption of consensus decision making 
has proved to be one of the most significant decisions 
made by the HRC. Despite the inevitable differences that 
have arisen between members on many issues the HRC has 
shown a remarkable ability to reach decisions by 
consensus. As of 1 July 1988 no decision of the HRC has 
been taken by vote. 
59 More than a decade of constructive 
development on the basis of consensus has made it 
something of a psychological barrier which members are 
loath to see destroyed. In theory there are obvious 
merits and demerits in consensus decision making. 
60 A 
more realistic assessment of its worth can only be made 
on the basis of the HRC's actual practice in specific 
areas. Hence an assessment is offered in the concluding 
chapter of this thesis after the practices and procedures 
of the HRC have been examined in some detail. 
61 More 
generally, however, it can be noted that the working 
relationships between members have been very good and 
references 
- 
are consistently made to the, "conciliatory 
and co-operative spirit prevailing within the Committee 
58 Rule 10. 
59 The consensus was nearly broken over the drafting 
of a general comment on article 20, see ch. 12 below. 
60 See n. 53 above. For some comments see SR 357 
pr. 60 (Vincent-Evans); SR 34 pr. 39(Opsahl). 
61 See ch. 13 below. 
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based on mutual respect". 
62 The most striking aspect of 
this has, of course, been the practice of consensus 
decision making itself. As Sir Vincent-Evans pointed out, 
this internal co-operation also assists in establishing 
relationships with the States parties, "States have 
consistently co-operated well and it appeared that the 
characteristic restraint and lack of polemics in the 
Committee's proceedings had helped it to gain the 
confidence of States parties". 
63 
2.8 The official languages of the HRC are Chinese, 
English, French, Spanish and Russian and, since 1984, 
Arabic. Its working languages are English, French, 
Spanish, Russian and, since 1984, Arabic. 
64 The Rules 
provide that, "Any speaker addressing the Committee and 
using a language other than one of the official languages 
shall normally provide for interpretation into one of the 
working languages". 
65 The HRC's Rules provide that the 
summary records of public meetings of the Committee shall 
be documents of general distribution unless, in 
exceptional circumstances, the Committee decides 
otherwise. 
66 The summary records of private meetings are 
subject to 
62 SR 6 pr. 9. See Anon, The New Human Rights 
Committee, 19 Rev. ICJ (1977) pp. 19-22. The meetings of 
the new CESCR have not been so harmonious, see 
E/CN. 12/1987/SR. 1-28. 
63 SR 232 pr. 24. See also SR 260 pr. 17 (Graefrath). 
64 Rule 28. see Doc. A/39/40 pr. 24. 
65 R. 30. So, for example, Iran provided its own 
translators when it appeared before the HRC under the 
reporting process. R. 30 was adopted on the understanding 
that, "the Committee had taken note of the fact that it 
might have to assist petitioners in providing for 
interpretation", SR 14 prs. 12-27. 
66 R_36(1). See SR 6 prs. 29-44; SR 14 prs. 1-17. The 
summary records are drafted in English and French and 
then translated into the other languages. Some long 
translation delays have occurred, see Doc. A/42/40 pr. 24; 
ECOSOC Resn. 1987/4 pr. 14. 
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restricted distribution. 
67 The reports and other official 
documents of the HRC are of general distribution unless 
the HRC decides otherwise. Official documentation related 
to articles 41 and 42 of the Covenant (the inter-State 
procedure) and to the Optional Protocol are subject to 
restricted distribution. 
68 Recently, temporary financial 
restrictions have meant that summary records are only 
provided for two weeks per session. 
69 
2.9 The. HRC has consistently recognized the importance of 
publicity for its work. 
7° Press releases are prepared on 
its consideration of State reports and announcing the 
publication of its views under the Optional Protocol. 
71 
Press conferences are held to try and publicize its 
work. 
72 The HRC's consistent pressure for broader 
publication of its records has had some success. Three 
volumes of a Yearbook of the Human Rights Committee have 
been published but they only cover its first two years 
and part of its third and fourth years. 
73 Further volumes 
are planned but financial constraints seem certain to 
hinder publication and in any event they are increasingly 
dated. More helpful has been a publication of a volume of 
Selected Decisions under the 
67 R. 36(2). See SR 6 prs. 48-53. So documents 
relating to the Optional Protocol are confidential until 
the views of the HRC under article 5(4) are made public. 
68 R. 64. 
69 Doc. A/41/40 pr. 432. 
70 See Docs. A/34/40 prs. 21-23; A/35/40 prs. 13-19; 
A/36/40 prs. 19-27; A/37/40 prs. 17-20; A/38/40 prs. 19-25; 
A/39/40 prs. 26-35. 
71 See R. 75. 
72 See Doc. A/41/40 pr. 10. 
73 Yearbook Of The Human Rights. Committee 1977-78, 
Vol. I, Doc. CCPR/1 (1986); Vol. If, Doc. CCPR/C/Add. l 
(1986); Yearbook Of The Human Rights Committee 1979-80, 
vol. I, DoC. CCPR/2 (1988). 
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Optional Protocol. 74 A second volume is under 
preparation. 
75 Publicity for the work of the HRC is also 
given by the United Nations 'Human Rights Bulletin' and 
the 'United Nations Yearbook On Human Rights'. 76 On a 
number of occasions members of the HRC have publicized 
the work of the HRC by representing it at international 
human rights meetings at various locations. 77 Similarly a 
number of HRC members have published articles explaining 
and commenting on the work of the HRC and the provisions 
in the Covenant. 78 The obvious problem faced by the HRC 
in attracting national and international publicity is 
that because it has conducted its work in a serious', 
de-politicized manner it is less "newsworthy" than, for 
example, the Human Rights Commission. Moreover, its 
sessions take place in countries which are not parties to 
the Covenant. Therefore, the publicizing roles of the 
Secretariat, national and international non governmental 
organizations and academics assume critical importance. 
79 
D. Functions. 
2.10 The functions of the HRC are those provided for in 
the Covenant and the Protocol. 80 These lay down three 
substantive procedures directed towards the effective 
observance of the rights in the Covenant. 
74 Selected Decisions, vol. I, ch. 4, n. 1 below. 
75 Publication is expected in 
views up to HRC's 28th session. 
76 See e. g the Special U. N. 
(Geneva, 1986) 
. 
77 Refs to A/38/40 prs. 35-39. 
1988 and will covers 
Human Rights Bulletin 
78 Members who have published include Tomuschat, 
Graefrath, Tarnopolsky, Dimitrijevic. 
79 See prs. 2.16-2.17 below. 
80 Article 28. See ch. 1 pr. 1.18-1.21 on 
international implementation measures. 
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2.11 Firstly, there is a mandatory reporting procedure. 
Article 40 of the Covenant provides for the 
"consideration" and "study" by the HRC of the national 
reports submitted by States parties on the measures they 
have adopted to give effect to the rights recognized in 
the Covenant and on the progress made in the enjoyment of 
those rights. The HRC must transmit "its reports" and 
such "general comments" as it may consider appropriate to 
the States parties. The HRC may also transmit to the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) these comments along 
with copies of the reports it has received from States 
parties to the Covenant. This reporting procedure is 
examined in detail in chapter 3. 
2.12 Secondly, there is an optional inter-State 
procedure. Articles 41 and 42 of the Covenant provide for 
a system of inter-State complaints that another State 
party is not fulfilling its obligations under the 
Covenant. The HRC's competence only arises if both States 
parties have made a declaration under article 41 
recognizing the HRC's competence to receive and consider 
such communications. Under article 41 the HRC, "shall 
make available its good offices to the States parties 
concerned with a view to the friendly solution of the 
matter". If the matter is not resolved within the 
framework of article 41 further functions may, with the 
prior consent of the States parties, be exercised with 
respect to such allegations but by an ad-hoc Conciliation 
Commission appointed under article 42 of the Covenant 
rather than by the HRC. 
81 
However, as of 1 January 1988 
the inter-State procedure has not been invoked and it is 
not, therefore, examined in this thesis. 
82 
81 See Rules 72-77E; Doc. A/34/40 prs. 28-53. 
82 On the inter-State procedure see Robertson, n. l 
above, pp. 351-356. Cf. the compulsory inter-State 
procedure under article 11 ICERD. See generally, S. 
Leckie, The Inter-State Complaint Procedure In 
International Law: Hopeful Prospects Or Wishful Thinking? 
10 HRQ (1988) pp. 249-303. 
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2.13 Thirdly, there is an optional individual 
communications procedure under the Optional Protocol to 
the Covenant. Under the Protocol the HRC is competent to 
receive and consider communications from individuals 
subject to the jurisdiction of a State party to the 
Protocol who claim to be victims of a violation of any of 
the rights set forth in the Covenant. On completing its 
examination the HRC, "shall forward its views to the 
State party concerned and to the individual". 
83 The 
Optional Protocol entered into force on 23 March 1976.84 
The procedure under the Optional Protocol is examined in 
detail in chapter 4. 
2.14 In addition to these substantive tasks the HRC is 
required to submit to the General Assembly, through the 
ECOSOC, an Annual Report on its activities under the 
Covenant and containing a summary of its activities under 
the Protocol. 85 The contents and function of these 
reports are considered in the appropriate parts of 
chapters 3 and 4 below. 
2.15 Finally, in April 1987 the HRC adopted a "Statement 
on the Second Decade to Combat Racism and Racial 
Discrimination". 
86 The HRC has no express jurisdiction to 
issue such statements. 
- 
E. Relations With The Secretariat. 
2.16 Article 36 of the Covenant provides that, "The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the 
necessary staff and facilities for the effective 
performance of the functions of the Committee under the 
present Covenant". The Secretariat for the HRC is 
83 Article 5(4) O. P. 
84 See ch. 4, pr. 4. 
85 Article 45 Covenant; article 6 O. P. 
86 See SR 725; Doc. A/42/40 pr. 18 and Apx. VI. 
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provided by the UN Centre for Human Rights in Geneva. 
Different Secretariat staff service the HRC under the 
reporting and petition procedures. 87 From as early as the 
HRC's fifth meeting it was apparent that adequate 
provision for secretarial resources had not been made 
although some improvement has taken place since. 
88 The 
HRC has recommended in its Annual Reports that the 
Secretariat be granted the necessary personnel and 
resources. 
89 As will be noted below, 
90 the HRC has a 
peculiar status in that its Secretariat is provided by 
the UN but it is not a UN organ. As Sir Vincent Evans 
commented, "The Committee was a unique body and might 
frequently find itself asking the Secretariat to perform 
unusual tasks. Rather than straitjacket the Secretariat, 
it might be better to define the Secretariat's rights and 
duties empirically. The Committee and the Secretariat 
should act as a team with a common purpose of promoting 
human rights". 
91 
Generally the working relationship between the HRC 
members and the Secretariat has been very good. Members 
of the HRC have consistently commended the work of the 
Secretariat. There have been some' problems but they 
appear to be as a ones of communication difficulties 
rather than of substance. 
92 However, during discussion of 
87 The International Instruments Unit and the 
Communications Unit respectively. The Secretary-General 
informed the General Assembly that he accepted the 
responsibilities under article 36. See also G. A. Resn. 31/86. 
88 See SR 5 pr. 11 (Schreiber, Director of the then 
Human Rights Division); SR 42 prs. 44,45; SR 74 pr. 38. 
89 See Doc. A/32/44 prs. 178-180. 
90 See prs. 2.18-2.19 below. 
91 SR 153 pr. 7. 
92 See the comments at SR 572 prs. 14-17; SR 727 
pr. 3. 
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the HRC's rules of procedure it was evident that the HRC 
members did not wish to delegate any substantive decision 
making power to the Secretariat. 93 
2.17 The role of the Secretariat was acutely raised in 
the reaction of the HRC to a speech delivered by Mr. Van 
Boven (then Director of the then Division of Human 
Rights) at the opening of the HRC's seventh session in 
which he commented on the HRC's work and pointed to some 
of the fundamental questions before it. 
94 A number of HRC 
members expressed misgivings about the speech and concern 
about the role the Secretariat was assuming while others 
expressed their appreciation of the support given by the 
Secretariat. 95 Mr. Van Boven himself commented forcefully, 
"He recognized that the Secretariat should be 
impartial and objective, but did that mean that the 
Secretariat was neutral? He did not think that the 
Secretariat should be a neutral and amorphous organ. 
In his opinion, that would not be in keeping with 
the provisions of the Charter. He cared greatly for 
the independent responsibility of the Secretariat as 
laid down in article 100 of the Charter. It was in 
the spirit of the Charter that all organs 
established in pursuance of the Charter should 
promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
it was against that background and in that spirit 
that he raised those issues.. ". 96 
In practice the Secretariat has had an increasing 
influence' on the practices of the HRC under both the 
Covenant and the Optional Protocol. The Secretariat plays 
93 See the discussion in SR 5 on the information to 
be provided to the HRC by the Secretariat. 
94 See SR 152 prs. 2-16. 
95 SR 153 prs. 4-12; SR 179 prs. 22 et seq. 
96 SR 153 pr. 11. Subsequently Mr. Van Boven's contract 
with the UN was not renewed. 
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a major role in the preparatory work for the 
consideration of State reports under article 40,97 the 
drafting of decisions on admissibility and final views 
under the Optional Protocol, 
98 
and the Annual Report of 
the HRC. 99 Other important aspects of its work include 
giving publicity to the work of the HRC, 
100 keeping HRC 
members informed of world wide developments concerning 
human rights, 
101 developing technical assistance and 
training schemes to assist States parties in complying 
with their reporting obligations under the Covenant. 
102 
The HRC has always struggled to cope effectively with 
its workload. Increases in that workload appear to be 
inevitable notwithstanding the slowdown in ratifications 
of the Covenant and in individual communications in 
recent years. With increased publicity for its work and 
an increasing awareness of the covenant and the Optional 
Protocol the HRC will almost certainly find it necessary 
to delegate more substantive tasks to the Secretariat. If 
so the role of the Secretariat and its relationship with 
the HRC will. be of increasing significance. The good 
relationship to date augurs well for such a development 
to take place constructively. 
103 
F. The Status of the Human Rights Committee. 
97 See ch. 3 below. 
98 See ch. 4 below. 
99 See ch. 3, pr. 3.40 below. 
100 See pr. 2.9 above. 
101 See ch. 3 below. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Mose and Opsahl, n. 1 above, suggest that the HRC 
needs the assistance of a permanent Secretariat, p. 330. 
Secretariats often play a very influential role in the 
development of international human rights law and 
practice. 
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F. The Status of the Human Rights Committee. 
2.18 The fundamental point to note here is that the Human 
Rights Committee is not, strictly speaking, a United 
Nations organ. It is a treaty based organ created by the 
States parties to the Covenant. 
104 Having recognized this 
independent status the HRC has sought to exert a degree 
of autonomous decision making on the basis of it. This 
has manifested itself in a number of decisions 
concerning, for example, the holding of and venue of 
sessions, 
105 
rules of, procedure, 
106 distribution of 
documents, 107 and the role of the Secretariat under the 
Covenant and the Optional Protocol. 
108 It is also 
interesting to note that the HRC's request that its 
Chairman be invited to present its first Annual Report to 
the General Assembly was refused on the ground that it 
might give the impression that the HRC was accountable to 
the General Assembly. 
2.19 Realistically, however, it must be recognized that 
in practice the HRC is, in effect, in the position of a 
United Nations organ. 
109, With one exception the HRC's 
sessions have been held at the two main seats of the 
104 See pr. 2.4 above; Doc. A/32/44 pr. 19. Mose and 
Opsahl, n. 1 above comment, "Nor is the activity of the 
Committee under the Protocol subject to any kind of 
control or review by other bodies, or backed by any 
machinery of enforcement. We have noted its independent 
status in not being a United Nations' organ. Depending on 
the Committee's approach, this position may be seen as a 
source of considerable weakness as well as a source of in 
some respects", p. 326. 
105 See SR 3 prs. 37-46. 
106 See e. g. SR 6 pr. 59 (Vincent-Evans); SR 8 pr. 27 
(Movchan). 
107 See e. g., SR 8 pr. 44 (Opsahl); Doc. A/32/44 
prs. 35-37. 
108 See prs. 2.16-2.17 above. 
109 See Farer, ch. 1, n. 1 above, p. 567. 
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United Nations and are likely to continue to do so. 
110 
They are totally financed from the United Nations budget 
and are therefore subject to the general and particular 
fiscal constraints as are imposed on all United Nations 
organs. The members of the HRC receive emoluments from 
the United Nations. ill The administrative functioning and 
servicing of the HRC depends totally on the assistance of 
the Secretariat within the United Nations Centre For 
Human Rights in Geneva. This extreme financial dependance 
on the United Nations was particularly evident when the 
HRC was equally, if not disproportionately, affected by 
the across the board financial cuts implemented by the 
United Nations Secretary-General because of the financial 
crisis at the United Nations. In the final event this 
led, inter alia, to the cancellation of the HRC's 
proposed session in autumn 1986.112 
Various other provisions of the Covenant and. the 
Protocol underline the link between the HRC and the UN. 
The UN Secretary-General has an important role in the 
conduct of elections to the HRC by the States parties and 
those elections take place at the UN. 
113 The 
Secretary-General is the depository for ratifications and 
accessions to the Covenant and the Protocol and 
circulates the information relating to it. 
114 Amendments 
to the Covenant and the Protocol must be submitted to the 
General Assembly for approval. 115 Finally, as we have 
already noted, the Annual Report of the HRC is submitted 
110 See pr. 2.6 above. 
111 Article 35. See pr. 2.2 above. 
112 See Docs. A/41/40 prs. 425-434; A/42/40 pr. 4. 
113 See pr. 2.5 above. 
114 See articles 48-49,51-53 Covenant; articles 
8-9,13-14 O. P. 
115 See article 51 Covenant; article 11 O. P. 
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to the General Assembly, through ECOSOC. 116 In practice 
the Annual Report is considered in some detail by the 
Third Committee of the General Assembly. 117 By contrast 
the meetings of the States parties have played no 
substantive role in the implementation of the Covenant or 
the Protocol. 118 
G. The Nature of the Human Rights Committee. 
2.20 We noted in chapter one the major changes made by 
the Third Committee to the functions of the HRC in the 
Human Rights Commission's draft. 119 We have also referred 
to the key elements in the composition of the HRC, 
namely, the independent status of HRC members, their 
geographical distribution and the representation of the 
different forms of civilization and of the principal 
legal systems. 
120 One of the major purposes of the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis is to indicate the 
nature of the HRC through its practices and procedures. 
However, on a number of occasions members of the HRC have 
indicated their perceptions of the institutional 
character and nature of the HRC and it is instructive to 
note some of these. 
121 
a 
116 See pr. 2.14 above. 
117 See ch. 3, pr. 3.40 below. 
118 See ch. 3, pr. 3.39 below. Mose and Opsahl, n. 1 
above, comment, "Whether the meeting (of States parties) 
may exercise additional or inherent powers in its 
electoral capacity or assume other functions has not yet 
been explored. It does not seem to be intended that such 
a meeting should act as a representative of the 
collectivity of States in matters of substance, for 
example, by issuing binding instructions to the 
Committee", p. 284. 
119 See ch. 1, pr. 1.6-1.12 above. 
120 See prs. 2.2-2.5 above. 
121 See also ch. 3, prs. 3.29-3.38 below. 
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2.21 Mr. Uribe-Vargas described it as a body whose work 
was of a "judicial nature". 122 Mr. Mora-Rojas said that 
"The Committee was quite different in nature from other 
bodies and, even though it was not a court or a tribunal, 
it did hear testimony and had evidence presented to 
it". 123 Mr. Tomuschat has commented that, "The Committee 
was... ruled by the Covenant and while it . 
-gas true that 
members were not judges they had the task of applying the 
provisions laid down in the Covenant and therefore had to 
exercise judgement. It was the duty of the Committee to 
ensure that States parties fulfilled their obligations 
under the Covenant". 
124 Mr. Tomuschat has also said that 
"The Committee was not an international court but was 
similar to one in certain respects, particularly in 
regard to its obligaticn to be guarded by exclusively 
legal criteria 
- 
which rightly distinguished it from a 
political body". 
125 Mr. Ermacora was concerned that the 
Committee should avoid. giving the impression that it was 
"a sort of advisory service, or had technical, assistance 
functions, whereas in fact its activities were based on 
legally binding instruments, with all the attendant 
consequences that that entailed". 
126 Mr. Aguilar commented 
that the Committee "was not a judicial body" and "its 
role was not to find fault". 
127 Mr. Bouziri commented that 
the "Committee was not a court of law". 
128 Mr. Pocar 
commented that the Committee's function "was not to judge 
122 SR 6 pr. 73. 
123 SR 7 pr. 17. 
124 SR 7 pr. 19. 
125 SR 117 pr. 35. 
126 SR 306 pr. 20. 
127 SR 743 pr. 12 and SR 719 pr. 32 respectively. 
128 SR 231 pr. 29. 
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and then either to condemn or congratulate States 
parties". 
129 
Mr. Graefrath, "did not share the view that 
the work of the Committee could be compared to that of a 
court... Unlike a court the Committee was not required to 
make judgements, but simply to consider and comment on 
reports and to act as a conciliatory body in dealing with 
complaints and communications". 
130 Mr. Opsahl has 
described the HRC as the "executive organ" of the 
Covenant. 
131 
Emphasis is often put on the HRC's role as a 
promoter, monitor or supervisory body with respect to 
improved human rights performances. 
132 
However, some 
members have expressed doubts as to whether the HRC can 
properly be called a "supervisory body" or a "parent 
organ". 
133. Finally, Mr. Suy (UN Legal Advisor) believed 
the HRC to be, "neither a legislative or a judicial body 
but that every expert body was sui generis", 
134 
and 
Mr. Herndl, former Under Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, recently described the HRC as "the guardian of 
the Covenant". 
135 
2.22 Clearly then, there are some differences within the 
HRC as to its nature and its purposes. However, many of 
these comments broadly accord with the shift from the 
129 SR 719 pr. 29. 
130 SR 7 pr. 1. 
131 SR 342 pr. 68. "In effect the meetings of States 
parties was the legislative organ for the Covenant", 
ibid. Cf. the comment of Mose and Opsahl, in'n. 118 above. 
132 SR 50 pr. 7 (Opsahl); SR 232 pr. 44 (Tarnopolsky); 
SR 117 pr-35 (Tomuschat), and the discussion in SR 231. 
133 See SR 174 Add. 1 pr. 28 (Graefrath), 45 (Hanga), 
47 (Koulishev). 
134 SR 13 pr. 6 (Mr. Suy, Under-Secretary-General, 
Legal Counsel). 
135 SR 702 pr. 4. 
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largely judicial nature of the HRC envisaged in the Human 
Rights Commissions draft to a HRC with a more amorphous 
nature. That nature includes elements of judicial, 
quasi-judicial, administrative, investigative, 
inquisitorial, supervisory and conciliatory functions. It 
is submitted that to understand the true nature of the 
HRC it must be recognized that its nature may alter in 
accordance with its exercise of the various functions and 
roles it performs or could perform. 
136 
We now examine in turn the principal functions of the 
HRC to date under the systems of periodic reporting 
(ch. 3) and of individual communications under the 
Optional Protocol (ch. 4). 
136 See V. Dimitrijevic, n. 1 above. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE SYSTEM OF PERIODIC REPORTING. 1 
Introduction. 
3.1 Periodic reporting is the most widespread and 
established implementation technique for the 
See Bossuyt, 'Guide', pp. 615-633. There have been 
a number of studies dealing with the provisions of the 
Covenant on reporting. There is a small but growing 
literature on the actual practices of the HRC under 
those provisions. See P. S. Brar, International Law And 
The Protection Of Civil And Political Rights: A Critique 
Of The United Nations' Human Rights Committee's Nature, 
Legal Status, Practices, Procedures And Prospects, 
(M. A. L. D. Thesis, The Fletcher School Of Law And 
Diplomacy, U. S. A., c. 1983); M. Bossuyt, ch. 2, n. 1 above, 
(1978-79); F. Capatorti, ch. 2, n. 1 above, (1967); K. Das, 
United Nations Institutions And Procedures Founded On 
Conventions On Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms, in 
K. Vasak/P. Alston (eds. ) The International Dimensions Of 
Human Rights, vol. I, p. 303 at pp. 336-338 (1982); 
E. Decaux, ch. 2, n. 1 above, (1980) p. 487 at pp. 512-519; 
J. L. Gomez Del Prado, United Nations Conventions On Human 
Rights: The Practice Of The Human Rights Committee And 
The Committee On The Elimination Of Racial 
Discrimination In Dealing With The Reporting Obligations 
Of States Parties, 7 HRQ (1985) pp. 492-513; B. Graefrath, 
Trends Emerging In The Practice Of The HRC, GDR 
Committee For Human Rights Bulletin, No. 1/80 (1980) 
pp. 3-32; B. Graefrath, ch. 6, n. 1 below; D. Fischer, 
Reporting Under The Covenant On Civil And Political 
Rights: The First Five Years Of The HRC, 76 AJIL (1982) 
pp. 142-153; D. Fischer, International Reporting 
Procedures, in H. Hannum (ed. ), Guide To International 
Human Rights Practice, p. 165 at pp. 168-173, (1984); 
(Footnote Continued) 
CH 3. 95 
(Footnote Continued) 
M. Lippman, ch. 2, n. 1 above, (1979); F. Jhabvala, The 
Practice Of The Covenant's HRC, 1976-82: Review Of State 
Party Reports, 6 HRQ (1984) pp. 81-106; P. Gormley, ch. 1, 
n. 1 above, (1972); M. Novak, The Effectiveness Of The 
ICCPR 
- 
Stocktaking After The First Eleven Sessions Of 
The U. N. Human Rights Committee, 1 HRLJ (1980) p. 136 at 
pp. 146-151 and 163-170; Ibid., 3 HRLJ (1982) p. 207 at 
pp. 207-210; Ibid, 5 HRLJ (1984) p. 199 at pp. 199-203; 
T. Opsahl, Human Rights Today: International Obligations 
And National Implementation, 23 Scandinavian Studies In 
Law (1979) p. 156; A. G. Mower, ch. 2, n. 1 above (1977); 
Ibid., ch. 2, n. 1 above, (1978); B. Ramcharan, The 
Emerging Jurisprudence Of The HRC, 6 Dalhousie LJ (1980) 
pp. 7-40; Ibid., Implementing The International Covenants 
On Human Rights, in B. Ramcharan (ed. ), Human Rights 
- 
Thirty Years After The Universal Declaration, p. 159 at 
pp. 174-187 and 190-195 (1979); Robertson, ch. 2, n. 1 
above, pp. 341-351 (1984); E. Schwelb, The International 
Measures Of Implementation Of The International Covenant 
On Civil And Political Rights And Of The Optional 
Protocol, 12 Tex. ILJ (1977) pp. 141 at 154-160; 
For purposes of comparison to other international 
reporting procedures reference is made in this chapter 
to the following works: P. Alston, ch. 2, n. 38 above 
(1987); T. Buergenthal, Implementing The Racial 
Convention, 12 Tex. ILJ (1987) pp. 187-221; M. Galey, 
International Enforcement Of Women's Rights, 6 HRQ 
(1984) pp. 463-490; D. Harris, The European Social 
Charter, (1984); E. A. Landy, The Effectiveness Of 
International Supervision 
- 
Thirty Years Of 
I. L. O. Experience, (1966); F. Wolf, Human Rights And The 
I. L. O., in T. Meron (ed. ), Human Rights In International 
Law 
- 
Legal And Policy Issues, vol. II., ch. 7, (1984); 
T. Meron, Human Rights Law-Making In the United Nations 
(1986); N. Valticos, The International Labour 
Organization (1979); N. Lerner, The International 
Convention On The Elimination Of Racial Discrimination, 
(2d, 1980). 
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international implementation of human rights. 2 The 
obligation to submit reports is the only obligation 
which States parties to the ICCPR assume, ipso facto, on 
ratification or accession. The national reports 
submitted are considered and examined by the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC), the independent body of experts 
established under article 28 ICCPR. 
3 This chapter 
analyses the reporting procedure as it. has developed in 
the first decade of practice by the HRC. 
The reporting obligation is contained in article 40 
ICCPR which provides that, 
"1. The States parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to submit reports on the measures they 
have adopted which give effect to the rights 
recognized herein and on the progress made in the 
enjoyment of those rights: 
(a) Within one year of the entry into force of the 
present Covenant for the States Parties 
concerned; 
(b) Thereafter whenever the Committee so requests. 
2. All reports shall be submitted to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall 
2 See article 22 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations; articles 19 and 22 of the Constitution of the 
I. L. O.; articles 73e, 87a and 88 of the U. N. Charter; 
article VIII of the Constitution of UNESCO; articles 21 
and 22 of the European Social Charter; article 57 ECHR; 
articles 16-22 of ICESCR (see now Alston, n. l above); 
articles 9 ICERD. In 1956 the ECOSOC established a 
system of periodic reporting by States on development 
and progress on human rights, ECOSOC Resn. 624B (XXII). 
The system was terminated by the General Assembly in 
1980, apparently on the initiative of the UN 
Secretariat, G. A. Resn. 35/209. On that system and 
criticisms of its termination see U. N. Action In The 
Field Of Human Rights, pp. 323-325 (1983); J. P. Humphrey, 
ch. 1, n. 1 above, p. 178; Ibid., The Implementation Of 
International Human Rights Law, 24 N. Y. S. L. R. (1978) 
pp. 31-62; L. Sohn, ch. 1, n. l above, p. 39 at pp. 74-79. 
3 See ch. 2 above. 
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transmit them to the Committee for consideration. 
Reports shall indicate the factors and 
difficulties, if any, affecting the implementation 
of the present Covenant. 
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations may, 
after consultation with the Committee, transmit to 
the specialized agencies concerned copies of such 
parts of the reports as may fall within their field 
of competence. 
. 
4. The Committee shall study the reports submitted 
by the States Parties to the present Covenant. It 
shall transmit its reports, and such general 
comments as it may consider appropriate, to the 
States Parties. The Committee may also transmit to 
the Economic and Social Council these comments 
along with copies of reports it has received from 
States Parties to the present Covenant. 
5. The States Parties to the present Covenant may 
submit to the Committee observations on any 
comments that may be made in accordance with 
paragraph 4 of this article. 
A. THE NATIONAL REPORTS. 
3.2 In practice three types of reports have emerged: 
initial, supplementary and periodic. 
4 It is necessary 
to explain these to understand the HRC's decisions on 
periodicity. 
4 The national reports are published as official 
U. N. Documents. The reports for the years 1977-1978 
appear in Yb. HRC (1977-78) vol. II. The reports form an 
extremely valuable account of the implementation by 
States parties of the provisions of the Covenant and 
provide important material for human rights researchers. 
The United Kingdom reports are compiled by the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office from information provided by 
more than half a dozen departments and the 
administrations of the Dependant Territories. 
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1. The Initial Reports. 
3.3 These are the reports submitted by the States 
Parties in accordance with the basic obligation under 
article 40(1)(a) ICCPR. The HRC has recently emphasized 
that, "the submission of such reports was an 
international legal obligation under article 40, 
paragraph 1 (a) 
, 
of the Covenant". 5 States Parties are 
required to report on the, "measures they have adopted 
to give effect to the rights recognized herein and on 
progress made in the enjoyment of these rights". The 
general term "measures" was preferred in the Third 
Committee of the General Assembly to more specific 
formulations as it was argued that it would afford 
states parties greater freedom to report on the entire 
range of laws and practices ensuring compliance with the 
Covenant. 6 The "rights recognized" are the rights 
contained in articles 1-27 of the Covenant? although 
other articles may also be relevant. 
8 It is not open to 
States Parties to accept only certain of the rights 
established in the ICCPR. 
9 In accordance with article 
40(1)(a), the first initial reports were due to be 
submitted on 23 March 1977, one year after the entry 
into force of the ICCPR for the original States 
parties*10 
5 SR 756 pr. 77; Doc. A/42/40 pr. 40. 
6 Doc. A/6546, ch. 1, n. 1 above, pr. 384. 
7 See the questions raised by Mr. Errara in a 
decision under the O. P. concerning self-determination, 
ch. 5, pr. 5.20-5.21 below. 
8 For example, article 47 may be relevant to 
article 1, see ch. l, pr. 1.23 above and ch. 5, pr. 5.12 
below. 
9 Cf. Article 20 European Social Charter, as to 
which see Harris, n. l above, pp. 14-21. 
10lnitial Reports Of States Parties Due In 1977, 
(Footnote Continued) 
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The Covenant itself gives no further indication of 
the required form and contents of State reports. The 
extreme qualitative 'and quantitative diversity of the 
early reports submitted clearly demonstrated the need 
for guidelines indicating the wishes of the HRC in this 
. 
regard. Having gained some initial experience in the 
consideration of reports, the HRC had no hesitation in 
producing general guidelines for the assistance of 
States parties in complying with their reporting 
obligations. 
11 The HRC stated that compliance with the 
guidelines "will help to ensure that reports are 
presented in a uniform manner and enable the HRC and 
States Parties to obtain a complete picture of the 
situation in each State as regards the implementation of 
the rights referred to in the Covenant", and, "reduce 
the need for the Committee to request additional 
information under its rules of procedure". 
12 In 
accordance with the general guidelines the initial 
reports of States were to be in two parts as follows. 
13 
Part I: General. This part should briefly describe the 
general legal framework within which civil and political 
(Footnote Continued) 
Note By the Secretary-General, Doc. CCPR/C/1; Yb. HRC 
(1977-78) Vol. II p. 15. 
11 
'General Guidelines Regarding The Form And 
Content Of Reports From States Parties Under Article 40 
Of The Covenant', Doc. CCPR/C/5; Doc. A/32/44, Apx. IV. 
Adopted by HRC at its 44th meeting (2nd session), 29 
August 1977. The guidelines are not legally binding but 
HRC members have strongly encouraged their use. 
12 Ibid., pr. 2. 
13 Ibid., pr. 3. Many national reports have been 
accompanied by substantial documentary appendices. The 
U. K. 's second periodic report was accompanied by 42 
reference documents, Doc. CCPR/C/32/ Add. 5, p. 21 (1984). 
The two reports submitted by Nicaragua were accompanied 
by 77 appendices. 
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rights are protected in the reporting State. In 
particular it should indicate: 
(a) Whether any of the rights referred to in the 
Covenant are protected either in the Constitution 
or by a separate "Bill of Rights", and, if so, what 
provisions are made in the Constitution or in the 
"Bill of Rights" for derogations and in what 
circumstances. 
(b) Whether the provisions of the Covenant can be 
invoked before and directly enforced by the courts, 
other tribunals or administrative authorities or 
whether they have to be transformed into internal 
laws or administrative regulations to be enforced 
by the authorities concerned. 
(c) What judicial, administrative or other competent 
authorities have jurisdiction affecting human 
rights. 
(d) What remedies are available to an individual who 
claims that any of his rights have been violated. 
(e) What other measures have been taken to ensure the 
implementation of the provisions of the Covenant. 
Part II: Information relating to each of the articles in 
parts It II and III of the Covenant. This part sl%ould 
describe in relation to the provisions of each article: 
(a) The legislative, administrative or other measures 
in force in regard to each rights; 
(b) Any restrictions or limitations even of a temporary 
nature imposed by law or practice or any other 
manner on the enjoyment of the right; 
(c. ) Any other factors or difficulties affecting the 
enjoyment of the right by persons within the 
jurisdiction of the State; 
(d) Any other information on the progress made in the 
enjoyment of the right. 
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The general guidelines also state that the State 
report should be accompanied by copies of the principal 
legislative and other texts referred to in the report 
and that the HRC would welcome at any time information 
on any significant new development in regard to the 
rights referred to in the Covenant. On the basis of the 
reports the HRC hoped to "develop a constructive 
dialogue with each State Party in regard to the 
implementation of the Covenant. 
14 This emphasis on 
"constructive dialogue" has been the keynote of the 
HRC's practice under article 40. 
2. Supplementary (or Additional) Reports. 15 
3.4 Notwithstanding the general guidelines established 
by the HRC the problem of incomplete reports has 
bedevilled its work under article 40 ICCPR. Many reports 
have been characterised by their brevity and inadequacy, 
containing little more than generalities and 
unsubstantiated references to national legislative and 
administrative provisions. Abstract legalism has been 
accompanied by proclamations of wholesale compliance 
with the Covenant. 
16 Few reports-have-made any serious 
. 
14 Ibid., prs. 4-6 (my emphasis). 
15 The terminology applied by the HRC has varied 
from time to time. This account uses the term 
'supplementary'. 
16 See Jhabvala, n. 1 above, pp. 102-104. During 
consideration of the report of the Lebanon Mr. Graefrath 
commented that, "The report appeared, however, to deal 
at greater length with, for example, legislation on 
prostitution than with the real situation of human 
rights and the Government's difficulties", SR 442 pr. 37. 
"It might be useful... to read the report of the 
Democratic Republic Of Korea (Docs. CCPR/C/22/Add. 3 
(1983) and Add. 5 (1985) and the summary records covering 
the consideration of that report (SR 509,510 and 516) 
in order to understand how difficult it is to come to 
grips with facts and not to remain in a mollifying 
nirvana of sheer verbalism", Tomuschat, ch. 2, n. 214 
above, p. 577 (1985). 
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attempt to identify the "factors and difficulties" 
affecting the implementation of the Covenant (Article 
40(4)). 17 States are perhaps naturally reluctant to 
identify their own difficulties and shortcomings 
although when State representatives appear before the 
HRC they are more forthcoming in identifying obstacles 
to the implementation of the Covenant. 18 
Faced with inadequate and incomplete reports and 
the fact that in the course of its consideration of 
State's reports Committee members have often been 
prompted to raise questions which State representatives 
have left unanswered, the Committee have in the case of 
all reports to date requested additional information 
under Rule 70 of the HRC's Rules in the oral hearings. 
19 
Similarly in many cases State representatives have 
promised additional information. This information is 
submitted in Supplementary (or Additional) reports. 
Whether States parties are under a legal obligation to 
submit such information has occasionally been questioned 
within the HRC. The majority of members, however, appear 
to take the view that a legal basis for such requests 
exist either in the obligation on States parties to 
comply fully with the basic reporting obligation under 
article 40(1) (a) or in the HRC's power to request a 
subsequent interim report whenever it chooses to do so 
(Art. 40(1)(b)) on the basis that this implies a lesser 
17 For an example of one that did see the report of 
Cyprus, Doc. CCPR/C/1/Add. 28, pp. 18-22. 
18 See e. g. SR 764 pr. 57 (State representative, 
Trinidad and Tobago). See also ch. 6 below. 
19 Rule 70 provides that, "If a report of a State 
party to the Covenant, in the opinion of the Committee, 
does not contain sufficient information, the Committee 
may request that State to furnish additional information 
which is required, indicating by what date the said 
information should be submitted". 
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power to request additional information. 
20 
It is 
submitted that the majority view is correct on either 
basis. It should not sensibly be open to a State to 
submit an inadequate report and then refuse to supply 
any further information. On a number of occasions the 
HRC have made it clear that they did not consider that 
the consideration of a State's report was complete until 
it had received and considered further information. 
21 
In an important recent development the HRC reached a 
consensus that it had the power under article 40(1) (b) 
to request additional information from a State in 
response to particular events. 
22 
No guidelines have been established for 
Supplementary reports. Their content has varied from 
State, to State. They have contained information omitted 
from initial reports, additional information to bring 
matters up to date or thought by the State party to be 
relevant, and answers and replies to questions put by 
members of the HRC during the consideration of the 
initial report. 
23 
As of 1 July 1988 the Committee has considered some 
91 initial reports and supplementary reports most of 
which were prepared after publication of the general 
guidelines. 
24 Although the Committee has noted that the 
guidelines have been followed by the majority of 
reporting States and proved useful both to those States 
and to the Committee it has indicated that it would 
review them in due time to see 
20 See e. g. the discussion in SR 630. 
21 E. g, Uruguay, El Salvador. 
22 See pr. 3.8.1 below. 
23 For example the U. K. Supplementary Report, 
Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add. 35 (1978). 
24 Figures calculated from the Annual reports of 
the HRC and information supplied by the UN Secretariat. 
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whether they could be improved. 
25 It has not yet chosen 
to do so. This might suggest that the Committee is 
reasonably satisfied with the guidelines as they stand. 
It can be argued, however, that part of the need which 
the Committee members have felt to ask a large number of 
questions requesting further information, explanations 
and detailed clarifications, stem from the very 
generality in which the guidelines are framed. 
There is no indication of the specific aspects of each 
article on which the HRC wishes to have information. 
The guidelines of the I. L. O. Committee of Experts and 
the Committee of Independent Experts under the European 
Social Charter are much more detailed and have produced 
fuller information. 26 Similarly, the Committee On The 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination has issued revised 
general guidelines on the form and content of State 
reports under article 9 ICERD which specify the 
information required in respect of each article of the 
ICERD. 27 Those revised guidelines have included some of 
the Recommendations of the CERD adopted under- Article 
9(2) ICERD. It could be argued that the very generality 
of the HRC's guidelines has been fruitful in that it has 
resulted in an extensive, substantial and informative 
dialogue between the HRC and the State Parties, through 
their State representatives. However, it is submitted 
that the HRC should revise and expand its general 
guidelines into more specific guidelines taking account 
of the General comments adopted by it under article 
40(4) and its established repertoire of questions under 
25 See G. C. 2/13; Doc. A/36/40 Ax. VII. Also issued in 
Doc. CCPR/C/21. 
26 See Landy, n. 1 above, pp. 15-16,23-25; Valticos, 
n. 1 above, prs. 591-592; Harris, n. 1 above, pp. 201-202. 
27 See Doc. CERD/C/70/Rev. 1, (6 Dec 1983); 
Doc. A/35/18. See Gomez Del Prado, n. 1 above. 
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the article 40 reporting procedure. 
28 More specific 
guidelines would make for a more efficient and 
productive consideration of future reports and allow 
more time for substantive comments by members rather 
than an extended series of questions and requests for 
further information. However, it must be recognised that 
the practical effect of new guidelines would not be very 
great as it is periodic reports which are now assumed 
more importance. 
3. Periodic Reports. 
3.5 In an important "Consensus Statement"29 on its 
duties under article 40 of the Covenant the HRC 
reaffirmed its aim to be that of engaging in a 
"constructive dialogue" with States Parties on the basis 
of periodical reports submitted under article 40(1) (b) 
ICCPR. 30 The aim of the periodic reports is to complete 
the information required by the HRC and to bring to the 
HRC's attention any developments with respect to the 
implementation of the ICCPR since the consideration of 
the previous State report. At its thirteenth session. 
(July 1981) the HRC adopted the following guidelines as 
regards the form and content of periodic reports under 
article 40(1)(b). 31 Again the reports were to be in 
two parts. 
28 Some members of the HRC have made similar 
suggestions, see SR 306 pr. 30 (Tomuschat), SR 414 pr. 20 (Hanga); Doc. A/41/40 pr. 26. 
29 Statement On The Duties Of The Committee Under 
Article 40 Of the Covenant, Doc. A/36/40, Ax. IV. Also 
issued in Doc. CCPR/C/18. See generally prs. 3.29-3.38 
below. 
30 Ibid., pr. (d). 
31 
'Guidelines Regarding The Form And contents Of 
Reports From States Parties Under Article 40, Paragraph 
1 (b) Of The Covenant", Doc. CCPR/C/20 (Adopted by the 
(Footnote Continued) 
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"Part I: General 
This part should contain informatior, con.. erning the 
general framework within which the civil and political 
rights recognized by the Covenant are protected in the 
reporting State. 
Part II: Information in relation to each of the articles 
in Parts I, II and III of the Covenant. 
This part should contain information in relation to each 
of the provisions of individual articles. 
Under these two main headings the reports should 
concentrate especially on: 
(a) the completion of the information before the 
Committee as to the measures adopted to give effect to 
rights recognized in the Covenant, taking account of the 
questions raised in the Committee on the examination of 
any previous report and including in particular 
additional information as to questions not previously 
answered or not fully answered; 
(b) information taking into account general comments 
which the Committee may have made under Article 40, 
paragraph 4, of the Covenant; 
(c) action taken as a result of experience gained in 
co-operation with the Committee; 
(d) changes made or proposed to be made in the laws and 
practices relevant to the Covenant; 
(e) factors affecting and difficulties experienced in 
the implementation of the Covenant; 
(f) the progress made since the last report in the 
enjoyment of rights recognized in the Covenant. 
It should be noted that the reporting obligation extends 
not only to the relevant norms laws and other norms, but 
also to the practices of the courts and administrative 
organs of the State Party and other relevant facts 
(Footnote Continued) 
HRC at its 308th meeting, thirteenth session, on 27 July 
1981). 
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likely to show the degree of actual enjoyment of rights 
recognized in the Covenant. 
The report should be accompanied by copies of the 
principle legislative and other texts referred to in 
it 
The Periodicity of Reports. 
3.6 Having confirmed that the dialogue with States 
parties was to be conducted on the basis of the regular 
periodic reports to be submitted under article 40 (1)(b) 
the HRC then considered the question of the appropriate 
reporting period*. 
32 The Covenant is silent on the 
periodicity of reports other than the initial ones. The 
operative part of the HRC's periodicity decision, 
adopted at its thirteenth session (1981), provides that, 
"In accordance with article 40, paragraph 1(b), the 
Human Rights Committee requests: 
(a) State parties which have submitted their 
initial reports or additional information relating 
to their initial reports before the end of the 
thirteenth session to- submit subsequent reports 
every five years from the consideration of their 
initial report or their additional information; 
(b) Other States parties to submit subsequent 
reports to the Committee every five years from the 
date when their initial report was due. 
This is without prejudice to the power of the 
Committee, under article 40, paragraph I(b), of the 
Covenant, to request a subsequent report whenever 
it deems appropriate". 33 
32 For the HRC's discussion see SR 295,296,299, 
303,306 and 308. See also pr. (f) of the HRC's 
"Consensus Statement" on its Duties, pr. 3.5 above. 
33 Decision On Periodicity, Doc. A/36/40, Ax. V. 
(Footnote continued) 
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The five year periodicity was established without 
prejudice to moving to a three or four year periodicity 
at a later stage as soon as this would appear feasible 
in terms of the HRC's workload. 
34 It has not yet proved 
feasible and seems unlikely to do so. Bearing in mind 
the detailed consideration of reports by the HRC, the 
wide scope of the rights covered by the Covenant and the 
large number of international reporting obligations 
imposed on States parties it is submitted that five 
years is a sensible and practicable period and should 
not be reduced unless the various international 
reporting procedures are rationalized. 
35 
The apparent simplicity of the periodicity decision 
belies the complexity of the issues involved. In the 
event members clearly acknowledged that the decision did 
not cover all aspects of a State's reporting obligations 
and that a number of issues awaited resolution. 
36 One of 
those issues concerned the effect on periodicity, if 
any, of the submission by States of Supplementary 
reports. The HRC had recognised that it might have to 
take account of the submission and consideration of such 
reports in setting submission dates for periodic 
(Footnote Continued) 
Adopted by the HRC at its 303rd meeting, (22 July 1981). 
Also issued in Doc. CCPR/C/19. 
34 Doc. A/36/40 pr. 388. On the periodicity under the 
ICESCR see Alston, ch. 2, n. 2 above, pp. 361-362. 
35 See Alston, ch. 2 n. 38 above pp. 332-333. 
Essentially States are complaining of too many and 
unduly onerous reporting obligations and questioning 
their effectiveness. The General Assembly has recognised 
the problem and called for meetings of the Chairpersons 
of the supervisory bodies entrusted with the 
consideration of reports submitted under United nations 
conventions on human rights, G. A. Resn. 42/405. See 
Doc. A/40/600 (1985). The next meeting is scheduled for 
October 1988, see Doc. CCPR/C/54. 
36 See n. 33 above. See also SR 312 pr. 65,318 
pr. 68. 
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reports. In its Consensus Statement it had indicated 
that, "As far as the States parties whose additional 
information or supplementary reports have already been 
considered by the Committee are concerned, these reports 
may be considered to be their second periodic 
reports". 
37 
3.7 In practice there have been substantial difficulties 
and delays in obtaining the Supplementary reports 
promised by State parties. Members of the HRC perceived 
the source of these difficulties to be its own 
periodicity decision which had given States parties the 
impression that the HRC would not take any action 
subsequent to the consideration of the initial report 
for a period of five years. 
38 The failure of States to 
submit reports meant that the "dialogue" between the HRC 
and States parties was breaking down for very long 
periods. In an effort to induce States to submit 
supplementary reports and continue their dialogue with 
the HRC the HRC adopted an amendment to its periodicity 
decision. The amendment provides that; 
"3. In such cases where a State Party submits 
additional information within one year or such 
other period as the Committee may decide, following 
the examination of its initial report or of any 
subsequent periodic report and the additional 
information is examined at a meeting with 
representatives of the reporting State, the 
Committee will, if appropriate, defer the date for 
37 See pr. (f) of the "Consensus Statement", pr. 3.5 
above. 
38 See SR 349,357 and 359. 
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the submission of the State party's next periodic 
3 
report". 
9 
The amendment was a useful one in that it offered some 
encouragement to States parties to submit supplementary 
reports punctually while clearly retaining the 
discretion to defer the date of submission of the State 
party's next periodic report. The discretion has already 
been exercised in a number of cases, for example, that 
of Canada. 
40 As for the future it appears from recent 
decisions noted below that the consideration of a 
supplementary report by the HRC is likely to be the 
exception rather than the rule. If so the amendment to 
the periodicity decision is likely to rarely be invoked. 
This is unfortunate in that it may again lead to States 
defaulting on the submission of supplementary reports. 
3.8 A second matter left open in the original 
periodicity decision was the scope of the HRC's 
authority to "request" a report under article 40(1) (b) 
ICCPR. Does this provision authorize the Committee to 
request Ad Hoc reports or only regular periodic reports 
in accordance with the general application of its 
periodicity decision. This issue has been variously 
mooted by members in respect of the troubled and 
emergency situations prevailing in Iran, Uruguay, Chile 
and elsewhere. An excellent summary of the views 
expressed in the HRC appears in its Annual Report, 
"Members of the Committee exchanged views on what some 
of them called the general problem of derogation and 
notification under article 4 of the Covenant and its 
relation to the reporting system and the obligations of 
39 Doc. A/37/40, Ax. IV. Adopted by the HRC at its 
380th meeting on 28 July 1982. Also issued in 
Doc. CCPR/C/19/Rev. 1. 
40 See SR 569 prs. 77-80. 
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both the States parties and the Committee under the 
Covenant, particularly article 40 (see CCPR/C/SR. 334, 
349 and 351). Reference was made to paragraph 3 of 
general comment 5/13 which, it was noted, implied that 
the procedures of notification and reporting were 
equally important but which did not explain how those 
two procedures should interact. 
Maintaining that the Committee could not discharge 
its responsibilities under the Covenant if it did not 
consider major changes in a country's constitution or 
law, or suspension thereof, which had a bearing on the 
protection of human rights, and that States parties 
under article 40 (1)(b) had undertaken to submit reports 
whenever the Committee so requested, some members were 
of the opinion that whenever a notification under 
article 4 (3) of the Covenant had been made, it should 
be transmitted forthwith to the members of the 
Committee, that the Committee had the power to request a 
speca_' report on how public emergency affected human 
rights; that the Committee should avail itself of all 
information available, at least in the United Nations 
system, in this regard; that such situation or report 
should be considered, if need be, at an extraordinary 
session of the Committee or by an intersessional working 
group, and that the procedure for requesting such 
reports must be formalised and be applied to all States 
parties without exception and should reflect a quick 
response to emergency situations and prevent possible 
cases of exces de pouvoir by States parties. 
The position of some members who favoured the 
establishment of a procedure for requesting reports on 
emergency situations was contested on various grounds. 
It was pointed out by other members that article 4 of 
the covenant specifically provided for the possibility 
of a State party's derogating from obligations under the 
Covenant in time of national emergency, that measures 
taken in such situations in accordance with article 4 
could not be characterised as wrongful nor considered 
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violations of the Covenant because the effect of such a 
derogation is that certain obligations are temporarily 
suspended and that the proclamation of a state of 
emergency might well be the last resort to protect human 
rights and that was precisely what was envisaged in 
article 4. It was also maintained that there was nothing 
in article 4 to indicate or justify the assumption that 
States parties had conferred on the Committee any 
competence to determine whether a situation threatening 
the life of a nation existed; that information from a 
State derogating from the Covenant was to be transmitted 
to other States parties or the Committee for approval or 
that states parties had accepted any third party 
scrutiny in regard to whether derogations were limited 
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation. It was recalled that, under article 4, a 
State party availing itself of the right of derogation 
was required to inform not the Committee but the other 
States parties and that only a notification, and not a 
report, was required. The Committee's role under article 
4 was described as being limited to ascertaining whether 
other States parties had been immediately informed, what 
rights were affected by the emergency measures and 
whether there had been derogations from the provisions 
mentioned in article 4 (2) and determining what were the 
reasons by which the State had been actuated and when 
the derogations had been terminated. Citing cases of 
public emergencies declared in several States parties, 
some of them dating back to the time when the Covenant 
came into force, and in connection with which no special 
report had been requested from any one of them, one 
member wondered what changes had occurred, prompting 
some members to urge the establishment of such a 
procedure now. He warned that if the proposal was 
adopted the Committee might lay itself. open to criticism 
that it was biased and be faced with suspicion and 
reluctance to co-operate on the part of States parties. 
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Other members, while asserting that the motives of 
Committee members were beyond question, stressed that it 
was important that the Committee should be seen to be 
acting with impartiality. Referring to article 1 of the 
Covenant, one member stated that the situation with 
regard to self-determination in southern Africa was even 
graver than a state of emergency, since it represented 
the institutionalization of the negation of humanity by 
law. Although South Africa was not a party to the 
Covenant, it was the duty of the Committee to bring the 
situation in that country to the attention of States 
parties. The Committee might wish to try to understand 
those people who thought that sanctions were desirable 
where the victims were white but not where they were 
non-white and that it should be seen to act, not because 
it contained members from third world countries or 
because it wished to politicize matters or react 
selectively, but because its deliberations reflected the 
provisions of the Covenant. It was pointed out that, in 
considering situations under article 4 of the Covenant, 
the Committee, for the time being, could only consider 
that article in terms of its functions under article 40, 
that the role of the Committee, however, was not limited 
to taking note of reports which had been submitted 
because if that had been the case there would have been 
no need for its independence to be safeguarded by the 
Covenant; that if the Committee requested a report on 
the emergency situation it would merely receive some 
indication of the legal framework; that the Committee 
should do everything possible to make States aware of 
their obligations under the Covenant, perhaps by 
altering the rules for the submission of reports or by 
making general comments. It was also suggested that the 
Committee could consider emergency situations in terms 
of their relevance to the implementation by the 
reporting State of its obligations under the Covenant in 
the course of the Committee's exercise of its functions 
under article 40. 
CH 3.114 
Members of the Committee agreed to defer for 
further consideration the question of derogations and 
notifications under article 4 of the Covenant and other 
questions raised during the discussion in relation to 
the reporting system and the obligations of States 
parties under article 40 (see CCPR/C/SR. 379)°. 41 
3.8.1 It is submitted that the majority opinion is the 
better one and certainly this approach would seem to be 
more in line with the general purpose of the ICCPR and 
especially the need to ensure non-derogation of the 
rights in article 4(2) in such emergency situations. 
Moreover, the Committee's decision on periodicity was 
expressly adopted without prejudice to the power of the 
Committee to "request a subsequent report whenever it 
deems it appropriate". 42 However, the objections of 
some members had prevented any further progress being 
made on the issue of Ad Hoc reports. No developments 
seemed likely on this matter and this seemed to 
illustrates again the limitations of consensus decision 
making. 
43 However, in what may prove to be an imporatant 
precedent the HRC has recent: y acted under article 
40(1)(b) in response to the assassination of the 
Chairman of the Human rights commission of El Salvador. 
Under article 40(1) (b) the HRC requested the Government 
of El Salvador, " to provide it with information on 
41 Doc. A/37/40 prs. 340-344. See also SR 334,349 
and 351 on the general problem of derogation and 
notification under article 4 of the Covenant and the 
obligations of both the States parties and the HRC under 
article 40. 
42 See pr. 3.6 above. 
43 See ch. 2, pr. 2.7 above. 
CH 3. 115 
measures it has taken relative to this case in its 
supplementary report due before the end of 1988". 
44 
C. The submission of reports. 
45 
3.9 Before proceeding to consider the nature of the 
examination to which State reports are subjected some 
attention must be directed to the matters of compliance 
with States parties with their reporting obligations 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. As noted, initial 
reports are due from States parties within one year of 
the entry into force of the ICCPR for that State. 
46 Of 
the 86 initial reports due from 1977 to 1987,11 were 
overdue as of 27 October 1987.47 However, very few of 
them have been submitted on time. 
48 The length of 
delayed submission has varied from a matter of months to 
several years. The worst case is that of Zaire whose 
report was submitted nine years late. 
9 The excuses 
4 
advanced by States have been various and diffuse 
including unforeseen preparatory difficulties, pending 
44 SR 767 pr. l. 
45 At each session the HRC is informed of and 
considers the status of the submission of reports. 
Details of the submission of reports in the period under 
review are given in each of the Annual Reports adopted 
by the HRC, see pr. 3.40 below. See also Note By the 
Secretary-General, Reporting Obligations Of States 
Parties To The International Covenants On Human Rights 
And The International Convention On The Elimination Of 
Racial Discrimination, Doc. A/39/484 (1984).; Report Of 
The Secretary- General Concerning The Obligations Of 
States Parties To The UN Conventions on Human Rights, 
Doc. A/40/600 and Add. 1 (1985). 
46 Article 40 (1) (a). 
47 SR 760 pr. 9. This includes three reports due in 
1987. For reports due as of 13 November 1987 see HRC's 
'Provisional Agenda And Annotations', (32nd session), 
Doc. CCPR/C/53 (20 Jan 1988). As of 1 July 1988 10 
initial reports were overdue. 
48 See G. C. 1/13, Doc. A/36/40 pp. 107-108. 
49 Doc. CCPR/C/4/Add. 10 (1987): Due in 1978. 
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constitutional or governmental reforms, co-ordination 
between the various domestic ministries, consultations 
required under federal systems, status as a developing 
country, and concurrent obligations to other 
international forums. These may well be valid reasons in 
some cases and the Committee must respond flexibility if 
convinced that the difficulties are genuine rather than 
evidence of bad faith. 
50 More reprehensible is the 
failure of Belgium to submit its initial report due in 
1983 (as of 13 November 1987). 51 There is no doubt that 
the reporting obligation under the ICCPR is a demanding 
one. In its first series of general comments under 
article 40(4) the HRC drew the immediate attention of 
States in the process of ratifying the ICCPR to their 
reporting obligations and stressed that, "The proper 
presentation of a report which covers so*many civil and 
political rights necessarily does require time". 
52 
Although the record on the ultimate submission of 
reports is perhaps surprisingly good the persistent 
delays in submission has represented a continuing 
problem to the HRC. In practice a fairly uniform set of 
procedures have emerged in dealing with defaulting 
States. The first steps are for the HRC to send a series 
of reminders to the State concerned couched in 
increasingly firmer language. 53 If these reminders seem 
to produce no effect the HRC has attempted to establish 
direct personal contacts with the State concerned. These 
50 See Doc. A/42/40 pr. 39. 
51 See Doc. A/42/40, Ax. IV, p. 118. The report was 
finally submitted in December 1987 and issued in. March 
1988, Doc. CCPR/C/31/Add. 3. 
52 G. C. 1/13, Doc. A/36/40 pp. 107-108. 
53 As of November 1987 Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines had been sent eight reminders concerning its 
initial report. Since July 1985 at the request of the 
HRC the Secretariat has sent automatic reminders of 
overdue reports at the end of each spring and autumn 
session, see SR 704 pr. 4 (Secretary to HRC). 
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have taken the form of personal approaches from either 
the Chairman of the HRC, a member of the HRC from the 
same geographical region as the State concerned, or the 
Director of the United Nations Centre For Human Rights 
(formerly the Human Rights Division). 54 The approaches 
are usually made to the Mission concerned in Geneva or 
New York, accompanied by an extremely firmly worded 
aide-memoire. 
On a number of occasions representatives from the 
permanent missions have been invited to an informal 
discussion with the HRC or the Bureau of the HRC 
concerning its reporting obligations. 
55 The most 
advanced form of direct contact established by the HRC 
was for a personal visit by a member of the HRC, Mr. 
Ndiaye, to Guinea with the consent of the State party to 
discuss its reporting obligations and the work of the 
HRC. 56 The visit was apparently a success and the 
report of Guinea was submitted shortly thereafter, some 
years late. Unfortunately, however, no representative 
from Guinea appeared before the HRC when its report was 
being considered. 
57 
If the above steps do not succeed three further 
sanctions have been developed. Firstly, the two ultimate 
sanctions to which the HRC has had to resort have been 
the sending of a letter to the meeting of the States 
Parties to the ICCPR informing the meeting of the 
non-compliance with their reporting obligations of the 
States concerned. 
58 Secondly, expressly citing those 
54 See Docs. A/41/40 pr. 38; A/42/40 prs. 41,49. 
55 See Doc. A/41/40 pr. 38. 
56 See e. g. Doc. A/41/40 pr. 38. 
57 See Docs. A/41/40 pr. 38; A/42/40 prs. 41,49. 
58 See Doc. A/35/40, Ax. IV. See SR 237. 
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States which have failed to submit reports in its Annual 
Report to the General Assembly under Article 45 ICCPR. 59 
Thirdly, a Special "Chairman's letter" is sent, on 
behalf of the HRC, directly to the Minister For. Foreign 
Affairs of the States concerned. 
60 
As regards supplementary reports we. have already 
noted that there have been substantial difficulties and 
delays in the submission of these. 61 As noted, these 
problems eventually resulted in an amendment to the 
HRC's decision on periodicity. 62 That decision as 
regards the consideration of Supplementary reports does 
not appear to have been very succe: sfu1.63 
3.10 The record of submission of second periodic reports 
from State parties has also been disappointing. 
Approximately 30% of the reports due had been submitted. 
Twenty eight periodic reports due in the period 1983 to 
June 1987 had not been submitted and a number of them 
were due from States parties whose third periodic 
reports were due in 1988.64 As of 1 July 1988 32 second 
periodic reports and 4 third periodic were overdue. 64A. 
59 This step was first taken by the HRC in its 1980 
report, Doc. A/35/40, pr. 36. The procedure was dropped 
for a number of years and then resumed, see SR 617 
pr. 4-15; Doc. A/40/40 pr. 43. The HRC's reports now give 
full details of the submission of reports, see e. g. 
A/42/40 Ax. IV (1987). 
60 See Doc. A/42/40, prs. 41,45 and Ax. VII, A. The 
letter was sent to nine States. See also the comments at 
SR 733 prs. 6-7; 772 pr. 1 which suggest that the letter 
did produce some response from States. 
61 See pr. 3.7 above. 
62 ibid. 
63 Doc. A/42/40, pr. 38 and Ax. IV. 
64 See Doc. A/42/40 Ax. IV, pp. 119-122. See the 
special 'C: iairman's letter' in Doc. 42/40, Ax. VII, B. the 
letter was sent to five States. 
64A. Information supplied by the UN Secretariat. 
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The-responses of the HRC have mirrored its approach 
to the submission of initial and periodic reports. 65 
However, the HRC has also given some consideration to 
the question of technical assistance to States 
parties. 
66 It was decided to make an informal request to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations as to how 
technical assistance could be provided to States parties 
which requested it, for example, with regard to the 
preparation of their national reports. 
67 A number of 
initiatives have been taken in this context, for 
example, training schemes on the preparation and 
submission of reports by States parties to the various 
international human rights Conventions, and others are 
actively being developed. 
68 Similarly, the meetings of 
the Chairman of the international human rights bodies 
may result in some moves towards the rationalization of 
and co-ordination between States' reporting 
obligations. 
69 
In its considerations the HRC has expressed 
continuing concern over the matter of the delayed 
submission of reports. That concern and the flexible 
approaches developed by the HRC have served to clearly 
indicate to State Parties the seriousness which the HRC 
attaches to the reporting obligation in the Covenant. 
65 See Doc. A/42/40 Ax. IV, pp. 119-122. See the 
special 'Chairman's letter' in Doc. 42/40, Ax. VII, B. the 
letter was sent to five States. 
66 See Docs. A/38/40 prs. 42-43; A/39/40 pr. 38; 
A/40/40 pr. 17; A/41/40 pr. 15; A/42/40 prs. 16-17,18-19. 
67 For steps taken by the ILO see Landy, n. 1 above, 
pp. 153-154. 
68 To assist States parties the HRC now send 
"model" initial reports by other States parties, its 
"General Guidelines" and copies of relevant summary 
records, SR 733 prs. 29,35. 
69 See n. 26 above. 
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In perspective, however, the record of submission is 
reasonably good and stands cci. parison with the records 
of submission under I. L. O. Conventions70 the European 
Social Charter, 71 and under the International 
-Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
72 
Among the State reports which have been seriously 
delayed have been those of Iran and Libya73 Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Bolivia, and Vietnam74 
Guinea, 75 Zaire76 and Belgium. 
77 However, it must be 
recognised that at no stage has the HRC been without 
reports to consider and, indeed, some reports have not 
been, considered until some considerable time after 
submission. 
78 
70 See Valticos, n. 1 above pr. 618. 
71 See Harris, n. 1 above, pp. 200-214., 
72 See. Alston, n. 1 above; Anon, 27 ICJ Rev. p. 26 at 
p. 34. 
73 Second periodic report due in 1983, not yet 
submitted. 
74 Initial reports due 1983, not yet submitted. 
75 Initial report due 1979, submitted 1980. 
However, the HRC decided to request this Government of 
Guinea to submit a new initial report because the report 
submitted did not comply with the HRC's "Guidelines". 
The new report, due in 1985, was submitted in 1987 and 
was scheduled for consideration as an initial report in 
March 1988. 
76 Initial report due 1978, submitted 1987. 
77 Initial report due 1984. Not submitted as of 
November 1987. 
78 For example the reports of Iceland and Austria 
were submitted to the HRC in March and April 1981 
respectively but were not considered by the HRC until 
October 1982 and March 1983 respectively. 
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3.11 Even more serious has been the deficient quality of 
a number of reports. 
79 The reporting obligation under 
the Covenant is a very extensive and demanding one. 
Preparation of an adequate report clearly demands time 
and expertise. 
80 The HRC's inquiry as to assistance to 
State Parties in respect of their reporting obligations 
has resulted in some useful developments. 
81 Moreover, 
on many occasions the initial consideration of a report 
by the HRC has indicated to the State representatives 
the breadth of information required by the HRC and has 
produced substantial additional information from the 
State representative and in the Supplementary report of 
the State Party. Similarly as the HRC adopt more and 
more General Comments these will provide further 
assistance to State Parties. It has also been submitted 
that could much improve its "General Guidelines" on the 
form and content of initial periodic reports. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that in the light of the slow 
pace of new accessions to the Covenant it is the 
periodic reports which are going to assume paramount 
importance rather than initial reports. 
To date the HRC has tended to, attempt to exhaust 
all possible use of reminders, aide-memoires and 
personal contacts, even if the processes have taken 
years, and it has been rather reluctant to publicize 
defaulting States. Such an approach may have been 
apposite as the HRC gained experience in the 
consideration of reports and developed its procedures 
for their consideration. In the final analysis, however, 
the HRC must have properly compiled reports and 
additional information if it is to perform its functions 
79 See e. g. th'e initial report of Zambia, 
Doc. CCPR/C/36/Add. 1 (1987) (8pp). 
80 See G. C. 1/13, 
-Doc. A/36/40 pp. 107-108. 
81 See also SR 
CH 3.122 
of consideration and study under article 40. If States 
parties do not comply with their reporting obligations 
by submitting adequate and timely national reports, then 
the HRC must give effective publicity to the breaches by 
the States concerned of their international legal 
obligations under the ICCPR. More trenchant and public 
criticism by the HRC as a body rather than just from 
individual members would clearly convey to States 
parties the seriousness which the HRC attaches to the 
reporting obligations under the ICCPR. The Conference of 
States Parties, ECOSOC and the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly are all bodies in which the HRC's 
criticisms should be considered and direct political 
pressure brought on States Parties to comply fully with 
their reporting obligations. 82 
82 See SR 760 for the HRC's latest discussions. The 
HRC have accepted the need to deal with problems on a 
case by case basis, SR 760 pr. 61 (Chairman). 
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C. Sources of Information. 83 
3.12 One aspect which necessarily plays some part in 
determining the very nature of the Committee's 
examination of States reports is the source and nature 
of the information that comes before it. The national 
reports submitted by the States parties inevitably 
present the official version of the situation regarding 
the implementation of the rights in the ICCPR. Despite 
the provision in article 40(2) requiring States "to 
indicate the factors and difficulties if any, affecting 
the implementation of the Covenant", one could hardly 
83 See Fischer, n. 1 above, pp. 146-147; Y. K. Tyagi, 
Co-Operation Between The HRC And Non-Governmental 
Organizations, 18 Tex. ILJ (1983) pp. 273-290. There are 
many sources the HRC could consult. See Amnesty 
International Reports on individual countries and its 
Annual Report (latest Report 1987); The annual "Freedom 
House Comparative Survey 
- 
Freedom In The World: 
Political And Civil Liberties", edited by G. Gill; The 
Annual Reports Of The United States Department To 
Congress On Human Rights, 'Country Reports On Human 
Rights' (latest Report 1988); World Human Rights Guide 
(revised and updated, 1986 and 1987) compiled by Charles 
Humana; J. Carey, U. N. Protection Of Civil And Political 
Rights, ch. XI (1970). There have been calls within the 
United Nations for "An Annual Worldwide Report On The 
Progress Made In The Implementation Of Human Rights In 
Each And Every Country", (Ecuador, 39th session General 
Assembly, 1984). For some of the problems involved in 
obtaining and assessing human rights information see 
J. I. Dominguez, Assessing Human Rights Conditions, in 
J. I. Dominguez and others (eds. ), Enhancing Global Human 
Rights, (1979), pp. 21-116; N. S. Rodley, Monitoring Human 
Rights Violations In The 1980's, Ibid, pp. 117-151; 
J. Salzberg, Monitoring Human Rights Violations 
- 
How 
Good Is The Information?, in P. G. Brown and D. Maclean 
(eds), Human Rights In U. S. Foreign Policy (1979) 
pp. 173-182; Symposium, Statistical Issues In The Field 
Of Human Rights, 8 HRQ (1986) pp. 551-699. See also the 
U. N. Legal opinion on "The use of information by the 
CERD from sources other than States parties to the 
(Footnote Continued) 
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expect States to do anything less than present their 
information in a subjective and most favourable light. 84 
The question of the availability or otherwise of 
other sources of information outside the State reports 
and the ability of the Committee to verify and complete 
the information transmitted to it thus assumes major 
proportions in any assessment of the effectiveness of 
its role as an implementation organ. 
85 
3.13 The natural and obvious source of some potentially 
valuable information might well be thought to be the 
specialized agencies to which, in accordance with 
article 40(3) of the ICCPR, the Secretary-General may, 
after consultation with the Committee, transmit such 
parts of the State reports as may fall within their 
fields of competence. 
86 In fact the character of the 
(Footnote Continued) 
ICERD, and the conditions under which co-operation could 
be established between the CERD and ILO and UNESCO 
bodies dealing with discrimination", 1972 U. N. Juridical 
Yearbook, pp. 163-167. The opinion concluded, inter alia, 
that, "especially in respect of article 9 (the reporting 
procedure) it is not clear that CERD is precluded from 
using extraneous information for ancillary purposes, 
i. e., in evaluating the completeness of the reports 
submitted to it and in formulating requests for 
supplementary data, and the early practice of the 
Committee indicates that it does indeed rely on such 
information. Thus there would not seem to be any legal 
bar to the utilization, within the indicated limits, of 
information obtained from ILO or UNESCO", pr. 8. 
84 See Jhabvala, n. 1 above, p. 102. 
85 See Capatorti, n. 1 above, p. 137. 
86 In the Third Committee of the General Assembly 
it was understood that the Secretary-General would-not 
transmit the report of a State that was not a member of 
the specialized Agency concerned, Doc. A/6546, ch. l, n. 1 
above, pr. 385. See also article 46 ICCPR, Ax I below. 
There were some difficulties in determining which 
articles actually fell within the fields of competence 
of the Specialized Agencies. The HRC agreed to draw the 
attention of the UNESCO to the relevant parts of States' 
parties reports concerning articles 18,19 and 27. The (Footnote Continued) 
CH 3. 125 
relationship between the Committee and the specialized 
agencies has proved to be both complex and elliptical 
and a brief look at the evolution of that relationship 
is useful. 
The specialized agencies upon which most attention 
has been concentrated are the International Labour 
Organisation (I. L. O. ) and the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) both of which have repeatedly expressed the 
desire to establish strong and fruitful co-operation 
with the Committee. 
87 The general approach of the 
Committee was to avoid taking any decision in haste but 
rather waiting until it had acquired the practical 
experience to enable it to give the question of 
co-operation fuller and more mature consideration. 
The necessity for co-operation at both the 
procedural and normative levels was appreciated by the 
Committee on a number of counts. Among these were the 
need to avoid conflicting standards and definitions of 
rights common to other international instruments, the 
advantages of considering those studies already 
completed in order to avoid conflicting decisions at-the 
(Footnote Continued) 
UNESCO Board intimated that it further wished to study 
articles 6,7,8,13,22,23 and 24. UNESCO also 
submitted a document to the Committee detailing its 
contribution to the implementation of the ICCPR 
(108/EX/CR/SS. 1). There was no similar difficulty with 
the ILO which indicated that the articles of interest to 
it were articles 8(3) and 22. See the comparative 
analysis of the International Covenants on Human Rights 
and International Labour Conventions And 
Recommendations, 52(2) ILO Bulletin (1969) pp. 188. The 
ICESCR contains much more specific provisions on the 
role of Specialized Agencies in the implementation of 
that Covenant, see P. Alston, The U. N. Specialized 
Agencies And The Implementation Of The ICESCR, 18 
Col. J. Trans. L. (1979) pp. 79-118; P. Alston, ch. 2, n. 38 
above, pp. 362-374. 
87 See SR 180,181 and Docs. CCPR/C/L. 3 And Add. 1-3, 
in Yb. HRC (1977-78) vol. II, pp. 11-14. 
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international level and any obligations incumbent on 
States parties to both the ICCPR and to I. L. O. and 
UNESCO Conventions, the petitions procedures for 
violations of human rights under the Optional Protocol 
and those established by UNESCO. Further advantages of 
co-operation. pointed to by members of the Committee were 
that the information and decisions which the specialized 
agencies could supply would facilitate a useful 
intermediate stage in the procedure since they would 
enable members to put more pertinent and meaningful 
questions to the State representatives concerning their 
obligations under the ICCPR. 
3.14 Quite clearly then the Committee recognized the 
value of co-operation and evinced a strong desire to 
establish close and effective co-operation. To formalize 
that recognition however proved a difficult task. The 
first problem concerned the determination of "such parts 
of the reports as may fall within their fields of 
competence". Some members considered that to transmit 
the whole of States reports would be ultra vires article 
40(3). Such an interpretation raised practical 
difficulties since references to articles were often 
scattered throughout and could only be understood in the 
context of the rest of a national report. In practice 
the whole of reports are sent with an accompanying note 
to indicate those parts considered to fall within their 
field of competence. 
More difficult and substantive problems for the 
Committee concerned the question of any more positive 
role which article 40(3) might be thought to accord to 
the specialized agencies on their receipt of the parts 
of the national reports referred to them by the 
Committee and the legal value to be placed on any 
material supplied by the specialized agencies. At its 
simplest the fundamental question before the Committee 
was whether the role envisaged for the specialized 
agencies included the submission of comments on the 
reports transmitted to them under article 40(3). In 
CH 3. 127 
adopting its procedural Rules in 1977 the Committee had 
included a provision that, 
"The Committee may invite the specialized agencies 
to which the Secretary-General has transmitted 
parts of the reports to submit comments on those 
parts within such time limits as it may specify". 
88 
A minority of the members indicated that they would find 
such comments valuable in the consideration of States 
reports but the majority of the members were clearly 
against such a role and suggested that on further 
reflection they considered rule 67(2) to be ultra vires 
the Covenant. Among the most influential arguments was 
that to give the specialized agencies power to make 
specific comments and judgements would be to usurp and 
surpass the Committee's own role in commenting on 
possible violations of human rights and effectively 
place the specialized agencies in a position to claim 
that a State party was not fulfilling its obligations 
under the Covenant something for which article 41 of the 
ICCPR had laid down a special procedure. It was argued 
that such an approach was undesirable not only because 
it would enable States parties to the specialized 
agencies but not to the ICCPR to comment on the 
performance of the States who were, but also that it was 
likely to dissuade States from acceding to the ICCPR and 
co-operating with the Committee if they conceived of 
article 40 as a procedure of inquiry whereby they might 
effectively be accused of transgressions by an agency 
not privy to the "intimate dialogue" to which States 
believed they were committing themselves. It was 
further suggested that the authors of the Covenant were 
unaware that the Committee's documents would be 
88 R. 67(2). 
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documents of general distribution and thus the purport 
of article 40(3) as drafted was rather for the Committee 
to help the specialized agencies than vice-versa. 
3.15 The provisional decision taken by the Committee was 
to the effect that, 
"The specialized agencies could not submit 
comments, it being understood that the Committee 
could revert to the matter at a later stage and in 
the light of the experience it had gained seek ways 
to further strengthen its co-operation with the 
specialized agencies". 
89 
As to the nature of the information to be received 
it was agreed that information, mainly on the 
specialized agencies interpretation of, and practice in 
relation to, the corresponding provisions of their 
instruments should be made available to members of the 
Committee on a regular basis, and that information of 
any other kind may be made available to them on request 
during meetings of the Committee which were attended by 
representatives of the specialized agencies concerned. 
This decision was adopted on the understanding that 
members were free to use the information in any manner 
they deemed fit. 
90 
3.16 In practice only one Specialized Agency, the I. L. O. 
has responded to the HRC's desire for information. All 
members of the HRC receive the notes supplied by the 
I. L. 0.91 Although the I. L. O. has consistently supplied 
89 See e. g., SR 99 prs. 39-46; Doc. A/35/40 pr. 605. 
90 See SR 181; Doc. A/35/40 prs. 410-414. The 
practice of the CERD is similar, see Gomez Del Prado, 
n. 1 above, pp. 498-500; Yb. HRC (1977-78) vol. II p. 12; 
Lerner, n. 1 above, pp. 118-120. 
91 Although apparently not all HRC members were 
aware of it. See also the discussion in SR 180. 
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information to the HRC, its I. L. O. representatives are 
rarely present at HRC meetings. 
92 The reluctance of 
other Specialized Agencies to supply the HRC with 
information is perhaps a result of the rather negative 
approach of the HRC to the question of co-operation with 
the Specialized Agencies. The impression given is that 
the HRC will allow the Specialized Agencies an almost 
negligible role in the implementation of the ICCPR. 
Symptomatic of this negative attitude of the HRC was the 
reaction of certain members to the inclusion in the 
HRC's Annual Report in 1984 of a section entitled, 
"Co-operation with the Specialized Agencies". 93 The 
section would have stated that the HRC "Took note with 
appreciation the information"94 supplied by the I. L. O. 
Objection with taken to this section by Mr. Movchan and 
Mr. Graefrath on the grounds that the matter had not 
been formally included on the HRC's agenda at any of the 
sessions concerned, the HRC had not devised a formula 
for its relations with specialized agencies and that 
although its previous decisions had indicated that the 
HRC might request information from specialized agencies 
it had never in fact done so. 
95 The eventual result was 
that the section in question was deleted from the Annual 
Report on the understanding that it would be taken up 
again at some future date. 
96 
92 It would be helpful if the HRC's Annual Report 
indicated which Specialized Agencies and 
non-governmental organizations had attended sessions of 
the HRC. Such information was included in the first 
report of the CESRC, ch. 2, n. 38 above. 
93 See the discussion at SR 542 prs. 27-42. 
94 This is the formula used by CERD. 
95 See SR 542 pr. 36 (Movchan) and prs. 27,38 
(Graefrath). 
96 The matter does not appear to have been dealt 
with since. 
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This attitude of the HRC, dictated by the 
opposition of the two members, is most unfortunate. The 
breadth and quality of the work done by the major 
specialized agencies could be of significant assistance 
to the HRC, bearing in mind its wide approach to some of 
the rights in the ICCPR. 
97 However, it should not be 
overestimated. 
98 It is submitted that the HRC could at 
least take a much more positive attitude to. the role of 
the specialized agencies even if it maintains the view 
that they cannot submit comments to the HRC on the 
reports of the States Parties. The HRC has certainly now 
acquired the experience and maturity on the basis of 
which it could seek to further develop and strengthen 
its co-operation with the specialized agencies. 
99 
3.17 Apart from article 40 (3) ICCPR dealing with 
specialized agencies there is no other provision in the 
ICCPR dealing with the question of sources of 
information open to members of the HRC. In particular 
there is no provision according to non-governmental 
organizations (NGO's) any role or function in the 
implementation procedures. 
100 
A minority of members, 
notably Mr. Graefrath and Mr. Movchan, have argued that 
the absence of any further provision means that the HRC 
is not entitled to base its consideration of reports on 
anything other than the official report of the State 
97 See e. g. the HRC's approach to article 6 ICCPR 
in ch. 8 below. 
98 On article 6 ICCPR see ch. 8 below. The obvious 
limitations on the jurisprudence of specialized agencies 
are that the precise terms of the relevant Conventions 
may be different and the reporting systems may be 
operating on different timetables. 
99 In the General Assembly some representatives 
have expressed the hope that the exchange of information 
and experience would be extended under article 40. 
100 See Tyagi, n. 83 above. 
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party or other United Nations documentation. 101 The 
majority of members of the HRC, however, have rejected 
this view and accepted that the ICCPR places no 
restriction on the sources of information that the 
Committee is entitled to use. 
102 Many of the questions 
and comments of members, including Mr. Graefrath and Mr. 
Movchan103 are clearly based on outside information. 104 
The general, though not invariable, practice of members 
though has been to not refer directly to the source of 
their information. So members often simply say that, "I 
understand", "I have reason to believe", "It had been 
101 See e. g., SR 65 pr. 30 and SR 345 pr. 36 
(Graefrath), SR 366 pr. 30 and SR 473 prs. 45-46 
(Movchan). Note the comment of Alston, ch. 2, n. 38 above, 
"UN documentation is, at best, reticent about and, at 
worst, thoroughly averse to, reflecting information on 
the situation concerning civil and political rights", 
p. 374, n. 215. 
102 See e. g. the comments in notes. 103-104 below. 
103 See e. g., SR 128 pr. 40 (Tomuschat), SR 346 
pr. 10 (Tarnopolsky) and pr. 39 (Ermacora); SR 321 pr. 33 (Opsahl); SR 368 pr. 44 (Tarnopoisky); SR 483 pr. 40 
(Dimitrijevic). SR 594 prs. 9-10 (Movchan), SR 595 pr. 39 
(Movchan), SR 598 prs. 29-32 (Movchan). 
(Footnote Continued) 
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104 See e. g., SR 128 pr. 40 (Tomuschat), SR 346 
pr. 10 (Tarnopolsky) and pr. 39 (Ermacora); SR 321 pr. 33 (Opsahl); SR 368 pr. 44 (Tarnopolsky); SR 483 pr. 40 
(Dimitrijevic). SR 594 prs. 9-10 (Movchan), SR 595 pr. 39 
(Movchan), SR 598 prs. 29-32 (Movchan). Mr. Movchan and 
Mr. Graefrath have suggested that a "gentleman's 
agreement" had been reached within the HRC that the 
Secretariat should not distribute in-sessional documents 
emanating from NGO's and that members should in no case 
refer to documents issued by a NGO or mention the name 
on a NGO during the exchange with delegations or in 
their presence. Mr. Movchan complained that some members 
were violating this agreement and thereby damaging the 
HRC's prestige by not agreeing to the "Rules of Play", 
SR 572 pr. 11. Mr. Tomuschat replied that he wished to 
"State specifically that, the Committee had no clearly 
defined rules that members had undertaken not to mention 
their sources. It seemed to him that there had never 
really been an agreement along those lines and that, 
consequently, there could be no question of violating 
established rules. He also considered that. all members 
of the Committee had always been duly discreet in that 
regard", Ibid., pr. 13. 
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reported", 
105 
"He had information", 106 or referred 
only to "Other sources" 
107 
or "Reliable sources". 
108 
This general practice makes it difficult to determine 
the sources and the extent of the use made of. outside 
information. However, those occasions when members have 
indicated their sources reveal the following examples: 
1. Information derived from the HRCion Resolution 1503 
procedure; 
109 
2. The Reports of the Ad Hoc Working Group and the 
SpecLal Rapporteur on Chile; 
110 
3. The reports of the Special Rapporteurs of the 
HRCion on El Salvador, 
ill, Afghanistan, 112. 
4. The Reports of the HRCion Working Group On Enforced 
and Involuntary Disappearances; 
113 
5. The Reports of the IACM; 
114 
105 E. g., SR 128 pr. 21 (Tomuschat on Chile). 
106 E. g., SR 421 pr. 50 (Aguilar on El Salvador). 
107 E. g., SR 271 pr. 7 (Opsahl on Kenya), SR 469 
pr. 23 (Errara on El Salvador). 
108 E. g., SR 365 pr. 17 (Dieye on Iran), SR 469 
pr. 18 (Tomuschat on El Salvador). 
109 E. g., SR 475 pr. 15 (Opsahl on Guinea). 
110 Doc. E/CN. 4/1310; E/CN. 4/1984/7; A/38/385 and 
Add. 1. 
111 P/CN. 4/1983/20. It is interesting to note that 
the representative of El Salvador also relied on the 
official report to substantiate some of his replies to 
the HRC, SR 468 pr. 46. 
112 Doc. E/CN. 4/1985/21. The report is reproduced in 
6 HRLJ (1985) pp. 29-76. 
113 E. g., SR 421 pr. 16 (Ermacora on Nicaragua). 
114 E. G., 421 pr. 40 (Aguilar on Nicaragua). 
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6. The I. L. O.; 115 
7. The International Commission of The Red Cross and 
National Red Cross Commissions; 116 
8. Cases decided in the EUCT; 117 
9. The national reports submitted to the CERD and the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women; 118 
10. The considerations of the CERD; 
119 
11. National Human rights institutions; 
120 
12. Parliamentary debates and Parliamentary Committee 
reports; 
121 
13. The Bar Association of New York; 
122 the Lima 
Lawyers Association; 123 
115 E. g., SR 281 pr. 37 (Tarnopolsky on Tanzania), 
SR 522 prs. 5-8 (Opsahl on Panama). 
116 E. g., SR 422 pr. 28 (Prado-Vallejo on El 
Salvador). 
117 E. g., SR 258 prs. 76-77 (Opsahl on Italy 
referring to the Guzzardi Case); SR 403 pr. 48 (Tomuschat 
referring to the Sunday Times Case, though as a standard 
rather than a source of information); SR 321 pr. 24 (Movchan on the Netherlands). 
118 E. g., SR 522 prs. 19-21 (Cote-Harper on Panama). 
At its own request the HRC is now provided with reports 
submitted under the ICESCR, the ICERD and the CEDAW, 
Doc. A/41/40 pr. 13. 
119 SR 321 pr. 26 (Movchan on the Netherlands). 
120 E. g., SR 421 pr. 26 (Tarnopolsky on Nicaragua), 
SR 403 pr. 24 (Graefrath on Australia). 
121 E. g., SR 412 prs. 13-14 (Graefrath on 
Australia), SR 430 pr. 37 (Prado-Vallejo on Peru). 
122 See SR 469 pr. 3 (Opsahl on El Salvador). 
123 See SR 430 pr. 44 (Prado-Vallejo on Peru). 
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14. Non-Governmental Organizations, 124 like Amnesty 
International, 125 the International Commission of 
Jurists126 and the International League for Human 
Rights; 127 
15. Church Organisations; 128 
16. The Press, 129 the British Press, 130 and the 
European Press; 131 
124 NGO's known to have supplied information to the 
HRC include the Minority Rights Group (London), the 
Americas Watch Group (on El Salvador), the Bahai 
International Association (on Iran), and the 
International League for Human Rights (on various 
States). 
125 E. g., SR 282 pr. 36 (Tarnopolsky on Tanzania), 
SR 468 pr. 32 (Prado-Vallejo on El Salvador), SR 717 pr. l 
(Zielinski on El Salvador). Note that Zielinski is 
Polish. 
126 E. g., SR 321 pr. ll (referred to by the State 
representative from the Netherlands). 
127 E. g., SR 436 pr. 10 (referred to by 
Tarnopolsky). 
128 E. g., SR 430 pr. 37 (Prado-Vallejo on Peru), SR 
522 pr. 10 (Opsahl on Panama), SR 421 pr. 51 (Errara on 
Nicaragua). 
129 E. g., SR 364 pr. 36 (Sadi on Iran), SR 442 pr. 19 
(Al Douri on Lebanon). 
130 E. g., SR 248 pr. 21 (Vincent-Evans on Mali). 
131 E. g., SR 547 pr. 40 (Cote-Harper on Chile). 
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17. Information derived from the consideration of cases 
under the O. P. 
132 
3.18 It is submitted that in the light of the fact that 
the HRC has no independent fact-finding machinery under 
the ICCPR and that National Reports under Article 40 
will almost always be self-serving it is completely 
unrealistic for any members of the HRC to suggest that 
members should limit themselves to the State report and 
other official U. N. information. Many State reports have 
been abstract, legalistic, insubstantial and, have 
totally ignored the existence of human rights problems 
and difficulties. Official U. N. documents are not 
sufficient to present a comprehensive perspective on the 
human rights situations in all the States Parties. 
Therefore, recourse to a whole range of outside 
information is both inevitable and essential. Indeed, 
the broader the range of material consulted the more 
likely that a reliable picture of the prevailing human 
rights situation will be obtained. 
133 The general 
practice of refraining from direct reference to the 
source of material should be maintained and should be 
sufficient to avoid the reporting procedure being 
perceived as a adversarial trial for the State 
concerned, an image which the HRC has been at pains to 
avoid. On occasions State representatives have asked for 
the source of or access to the information used by HRC 
members. Such requests should be complied with so long 
as to do so would not endanger the sources. Among the 
national and international bodies who should engage in 
132 See e. g, SR 373 pr. 12 (Vincent-Evans on 
Uruguay); SR 735 pr. 6 (Movchan on Zaire). 
133 As Mr. Errera commented during consideration of 
the report of El Salvador, "The coincidence and 
precision of the information received from a variety of 
sources could not but raise questions", SR 469 pr. 23. 
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the important task of supplying the HRC members with 
information are, for example, trade unions, civil rights 
bodies, human rights commissions, parliamentary 
associations, pressure groups and NGO's. 
134 
D. The Process Of Consideration: Initial and 
Supplementary (or Additional) Reports. 
3.19 The general rule is that the National Reports 
submitted by State Parties are considered in 
chronological order as they are received. 
Exceptionally, however, the HRC may accord priority to a 
report because of the critical human rights situation in 
the State concerned. 
135 In scheduling the consideration 
of reports the HRC attempts to maintain a geographical 
balance between the reports considered at each session 
although this has no always proved possible. Experience 
has shown that the HRC had found it difficult to 
consider more than four initial reports per session, 
each report taking two or three days to consider. The 
consideration of Supplementary reports usually takes a 
shorter period. The consideration of periodic reports 
has generally taken as long, if not longer, than the 
consideration of initial reports but the HRC hopes to 
reduce this time by further rationalization of the 
procedure for the consideration of such reports. 
After an exchange of views within the HRC the 
following provisional practice was adopted in respect of 
the examination of initial reports. 
136 In accordance 
134 See Tyagi n. 83 above. 
135 For example, the report of El Salvador was 
accorded priority on this basis, SR 462 Add. l prs. 1-24. 
Similarly, the second periodic report of Ecuador was not 
considered at the HRC's twenty ninth session because of 
the recent earthquake in that country. 
136 For the exchange of views see Doc. A/32/44 
prs. 104-111; SR. 25. The practice has been maintained to 
date. 
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with Rule 68 of the HRC's Rules of Procedure the HRC 
invites the State concerned to have a. representative 
attend the meetings at which its report is to be 
discussed and make an oral introduction to that 
report. 
137 Many States have made full use of this 
opportunity to deliver a comprehensive oral supplement 
to the written report setting that report in its 
relevant socio-economic context and adding significant 
new information in the light of political or legal 
changes. 
138 
The First Round. 
3.20 In what became known the "first -round" of the 
consideration of the report members of the HRC are 
accorded the opportunity of addressing comments and 
putting questions to the State representatives. It 
became customary that the first speaker to be a member 
from the same geographical region as the State Party 
concerned. Similarly, it is customary practice that 
members do not address questions and comments to the 
representatives of the State of which they are a 
national. 
139 This is a sensible approach because it 
avoids a member being put in the position of criticising 
the State of which he is a national. There is no reason, 
however, for the HRC to be deprived of the particular 
members familiarity with the human rights problems of 
the State concerned. There is no difticulty in the 
members concerned informally making other members aware 
137 This practice copied that of the CERD where it 
had been introduced in 1972 after the General Assembly 
had suggested that it would facilitate the Committee's 
work, see Lerner, n. 1 above, p. 105. A similar practice 
has been adopted by the new CESCR. 
138 See e. g., SR 108 prs. 2-26, SR 564 prs. 1-5 
(USSR). 
139 Cf. The practice of the HRC under the Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR, see ch. 4 pr. 4.10, n. 124 below. 
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of the human rights problems and difficulties on which, 
in his or her opinion, attention can best be focused. 
The State representatives are allowed the time 
necessary to prepare replies to the matters raised and 
they may then give comprehensive oral replies or refer 
such questions as they choose back to their respective 
Governments along with requests from HRC members for 
additional information. The additional information is 
supplied in Supplementary Reports. 
140 After the State 
representative has replied members of the HRC 
occasionally address them again to draw attention to 
important questions and comments which have received 
unsatisfactory or incomplete replies. Finally, the State 
representative is often asked to indicate when the HRC 
will receive the Supplementary report from the State 
party. The whole process normally lasts between two and 
three full days. There is no formal determination by the 
HRC of whether a report is satisfactory or not or 
whether the replies of State representatives have been 
adequate. 
141 
The Second Round. 
3.21 The consideration of the Supplementary report 
follows the practice of the so-called "second round". 
142 
The questions and comments tend to be more specific and 
detailed and they are presented together according to 
140 See pr. 3.4 above. 
141 On the former practice of the CERD in this 
respect see Gomez Del Prado, n. 1 above, p. 507. 
Exceptionally, however, the HRC have stated that they 
would not consider that they had not finished 
consideration of a State's initial report until it had 
submitted further information, e. g. El Salvador. 
142 For the discussion which preceded the adoption 
of this practice see SR 117 prs. 60-70. For the fist 
example of the "second round" in operation see the HRC's 
consideration of the report of Ecuador (Doc. CCPR/C/1/Add. 8 and 29) at SR 118, in 1978. 
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the particular parts of provisions of the Covenant. The 
questions are again directed to the State 
representatives to be answered ad hoc, if possible, as 
they are put. The "dialogue" nature of the examination 
is much more in evidence during this second round. 
143 In 
the early years of HRC practice a critical problem arose 
which threatened to destroy the atmosphere of 
co-operation and consensus within the Committee. This 
concerned the function of the "second round" 
examination. 
144 Committee members were agreed that the 
general purport was to deepen and strengthen the 
"dialogue" initially established but the tendency of 
certain members to put questions in the manner of a 
cross examination led to a withdrawal of Eastern 
European members from active participation in the 
"second round" examination for a period of time. 
145 The 
different conceptions of the "second round" relate 
closely to the general and more important question of 
the very extent of the Committee's jurisdictional power 
under the ICCPR which will be discussed below. 
146 It is 
sufficient to note at this point that after extensive 
discussion, the Committee adopted the 
. 
"Consensus 
Statement" on its future work on State reports and since 
the twelfth session all members have contributed to the 
second round process. 
143 Fischer, n. 1 above, comments that, "This 
procedure is far from cross-examination, but it does 
result in a public record that exposes more clearly a 
country's efforts to evade or ignore uncomfortable 
issues", p. 170. 
144 See Jhabvala, n. 1 above, pp. 84-95; Nowak, 
(1980), Ibid., pp. 150-151. See also Graefrath SR 275 
pr. 12. 
145 The reports concerned were those of Finland, 
Sweden and Hungary, see SR 170-172,188,189,225 and 
228. 
146 See prs. 3.29-3.38 below. 
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3.21.1 The HRC has recently taken some important 
decisions with respect to the consideration of 
Supplementary Reports. The HRC's Working Group on 
article 40 suggested that before supplementary reports 
were placed on the agenda the working group or a member 
of the HRC would go through them and determine whether 
they were comprehensive enough to form a topic for 
special consideration. If so they would be placed on the 
agenda for consideration in the normal way and, in 
accordance with its amendment to the decision on 
periodicity, the HRC would then have to decide whether 
it was appropriate to defer the date for the submission 
of the State party's next periodic report. Normally, 
however, it was expected that the HRC would just take 
note of the supplementary reports and discuss them 
together with the next periodic report. 
* 147 
This approach was formalised at the HRC's twenty 
sixth session (1985) when the HRC agreed to the 
following procedure for the handling of any additional 
information submitted by State parties and for dealing 
with cases where additional information had been 
promised but not submitted: 
(a) Whenever additional information is received at the 
same time as the next periodic report or shortly before 
the next periodic report is due, to consider the 
additional information together with the periodic 
report; 
(b) When additional information is received at other 
times, to decide on a case to case basis, whether it 
should be considered, and to notify the State party 
concerned of any eventual decision to examine the 
additional information; 
(c) Where promised additional information has not been 
received, the Bureau of the Committee will consider 
147 See SR 549 prs. 39-62. 
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sending appropriate reminders to the States parties. The 
Secretariat, in corresponding with States parties 
concerning the date for submission of their next 
periodic report, is also to remind them of their 
promise, during consideration of their previous reports, 
that additional information would be supplied to the 
Committee. 148 
It is submitted that these decisions were sensible 
ones. The HRC maintains its flexibility to consider a 
supplementary report if it considers is sufficiently 
important to do so but it retains the option of 
postponing consideration of. the supplementary report 
until the next periodic report is considered. 
149 The 
result thus combines flexibility with practicality and 
should save the HRC some time which it can then devote 
to matters of more pressing importance. 
3.22 There can be no doubt that the HRC has largely been 
successful in achieving its stated aim of establishing 
and developing a "constructive dialogue" with each State 
party in regard to the implementation of the 
Covenant. 150 The work of the HRC under article 40 on 
selected articles of the Covenant is analysed in 
chapters 5-12 below. States Parties have generally 
co-operated with the HRC as regards the submission of 
reports although, as we have noted, there have been 
problems of inadequacy and delay. Similarly, all States 
Parties, including Guinea, 151 have sent a representative 
or group of representatives to appear before the HRC. 
This is a remarkably good record and compares favourably 
with 
148 Doc. A/41/40 pr. 45. 
149 This has now been done on a number of 
occasions. 
150 General Guidelines, pr. 3.3 above. 
151 Guinea finally sent a representative in March 
1988. 
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the experience of the CERD. 
152 Some States have sent 
large top-level delegations while others have sent low 
level representatives usually from the Permanent 
Missions in New York or Geneva. 153 The existing 
practices of the HRC for the consideration of reports 
subjects State representatives to intensive time 
pressure and experience has shown that a single 
representative will not normally be in a position to 
deal adequately with all the questions and comments made 
by members. 
154 The HRC has clearly recognized the vital 
role that State representatives have in establishing the 
dialogue which it regards as so important. 155 In its 
very first general comment under Article 40(4) the HRC 
commended States for their co-operation and noted that, 
"the level, experience and the number of representatives 
has varied". The Committee wishes to state that if it is 
to be able to perform its functions under Article 40 as 
effectively as possible and if the reporting State is to 
obtain the maximum benefit from the dialogue, it is 
desirable that the State representatives should have 
such status and experience (and preferably be in such 
number) as to respond to questions put, and comments 
152 See Buergenthal, n. 1 above, p. 201. 
153 Canada sent a top level delegation of a dozen 
members. India sent its Attorney-General to head its 
delegation. Some State representatives have been able to 
answer very few of the HRC's questions, for example, the 
representative of Barbados, SR 264,265 and 267. It was 
very difficult for the United Kingdom to send an 
appropriate person before the HRC in respect of its 
Dependant Territories. 
154 300 questions were raised during consideration 
of the report of Yugoslavia. The French representative 
identified 153 separate questions put to him during the 
first round examination of the French report. 
155 SR 351 pr. 12. 
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made, in the Committee over the whole range of matters 
covered by the Covenant". 
156 
3.23 However, the procedures adopted by the HRC to 
consider initial and supplementary reports have however 
been criticised by some members of the HRC. Mr. Dieye 
criticised the existing procedure as too time-consuming 
and proposed that the introductory statements by State 
representatives should be briefer and that the "second 
round" practice alone should be used in the 
consideration of State reports. These suggestions 
however met with strong opposition, for example, on the 
ground that the dialogue method used for the second 
round would not be useful in the initial consideration 
of a State's report because members' questions often 
raised very technical questions which could not be 
answered immediately. 
157 
The first round practice was seen to facilitate the 
duplication of questions by members and to place 
intensive pressures on State representatives and on 
Committee members. The problems noticeably lessened as 
the Committee gained experience and members refrained 
from repetition unless they- wanted to further develop a 
previous question, but the need to systematise the 
procedure into a more progressive and constructive 
process has been recognised. 
158 One possibility that 
warrants further investigation and has been mooted on a 
156 See G. C. 2/13 pr. 4; Doc. CCPR/C/21, Doc. A/36/40 
pp. 108-109. See also the HRC's discussion of this 
comment at SR 308 pr. 44 et seq. 
157 See SR 150 pr. 46 et seq. Mr. Dieye criticized 
the HRC's procedures as irrelevant and academic as 
regards developing countries but he never complied with 
requests to submit concrete proposals for reform. 
158 See e. g. SR 466 pr. 21 (Prado-Vallejo) The 
Iranian representative complained that at least five 
members of the HRC had put the same question concerning 
the treatment of the Bahai's. 
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number of occasions is that of decentralizing the 
consideration of initial reports to a special 
rapporteurs. 
159 A variation on this theme would be to 
assign small groups of members particular articles for 
them to look at in depth. The groups could rotate if 
that was thought desirable and the right of each member 
to make comments and ask questions on any matter he 
wished would obviously be preserved. Not all members 
seem to favour decentralization however and prefer 
instead to try to improve the committee's existing 
working methods. The essential organizational problem is 
that their is no discussion by the HRC as to how to 
consider a particular State report as there is before 
the consideration of periodic reports. 
160 
3.24 As each member of the HRC addresses questions and 
comments individually to the state representatives the 
questions put tend to reflect the particular interests 
of each member. It should also be noted that members 
rarely reply specifically to the comments of other 
members. 
161 For example, Mr. Bouziri has repeatedly made 
clear his view that it should be open to women to secure 
abortions if they wish to do so. 
162 Normally, the other 
members of the HRC make no direct reply to his comments. 
This could be taken to mean that they agree with him 
that they have no particular view on the matter or 
perhaps that they consider the the matter is not within 
the scope of the Covenant at all. The consequence of the 
159 See e. g. SR 219 pr. 6. 
160 Cf. the decentralized procedures for the 
consideration of State reports under the ILO system, see 
Landy, n. 1 above, pp. 28-31; and under European Social 
Charter, Harris, ibid., p. 223. 
.1 161 Although there seems to be an increasing 
tendency to associate with the comments of another 
member. 
162 On abortion see ch. 6 pr. 6. below. 
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procedures used by the HRC is that no clear or balanced 
view emerges on the view of the HRC of the human rights 
performance of the state party concerned in general or 
on many important human rights issues affecting that 
State. 163 This problem is partially met now by the 
practice of members to make "final observations" at the 
end of the consideration of a States' periodic report. 
Those observations have often included an evaluation of 
the human rights performance of the States concerned. 
164 
It is submitted that many of the criticisms of the 
HRC's practices for the consideration of reports relate 
back to the inadequate general guidelines on the form 
and contents of reports adopted by the HRC. 
165 Their 
inadequacy has been a factor in producing inadequate 
reports. Such reports have attracted hundreds of 
questions as members have attempted to obtain the basic 
information on the implementation of the Covenant. The 
time spent asking for questions has subjected State 
representatives to unreasonable burdens. They are left 
trying desperately to fill in the huge gaps in the 
reports submitted by their respective Governments. Many 
State representatives have been surprised by the range 
and depth of information desired by members of the HRC 
and many matters have had to be referred back to the 
Government concerned. Moreover, time spent asking 
questions reduces the time available for critical and 
constructive comments from HRC members. These 
deficiencies have been accentuated by the individually 
orientated and unstructured procedure for the 
consideration of reports. It is submitted then that the 
163 The HRC has not yet adopted a practice of 
preparing specific reports on the implementation of each 
State party, see prs. 3.29-3.38 below. 
164 See the discussion in SR 755 on the practice of 
making general observations. 
165 See pr. 3.4 above. 
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HRC could do much to improve its general guidelines and 
to rationalize and structure the consideration of 
reports for example through more decentralized 
procedures. The HRC's procedures for the consideration 
of periodic reports are of a more rational and 
structured nature as we will see below. 
166 Another 
suggestion which might then be taken up is that of 
creating a working group to consider the adequacy of a 
State report before its consideration by the plenary 
Committee or that a similar function be performed by the 
Secretariat. 167 With the co-operation of the state party 
this might then ensure that when the report is 
considered by the HRC it is substantive enough for the 
HRC to be able to build up a constructive dialogue with 
the state party on the basis of it. Another suggestion 
with the same aim of obtaining more adequate reports is 
the drawing up by the Secretariat of a list or digest of 
the questions most frequently asked by members relating 
to various subjects under the ICCPR. Such documents, 
up-dated from time to time, were to be circulated to the 
States Parties for their information. 
168 In fact only 
one' such document has been produced but it is very 
brief, has never been formally adopted by the HRC and 
has never been up-dated. 
169 
166 See prs. 3.25-2.28 below. 
167 See the discussion in SR 49 prs. 27-54. The 
representative of the then Division of Human Rights 
expressed doubts as to whether this could be done 
without making substantive judgements on State reports 
and thereby usurping the role of the HRC. 
168 Pr. (h) of the HRC's "Consensus Statement", 
Doc. A/36/40 pp. 101-103. 
169 See Doc. CCPR/C/XII/CRP. 1. 
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E. The Process Of Consideration: Periodic Reports. 
3.25 In the "Consensus Statement" on its duties under 
article 40 the HRC looked forward to the consideration 
of second periodic reports. 
170 It decided that two 
procedures would be adopted. Firstly, before the 
consideration of the report with the State 
representatives a working group of three members of the 
HRC would meet to review the information so far received 
by the Committee in order to identify those matters 
which it would seem most helpful to discuss with the 
representative of the reporting State. 
171 This procedure 
was expressly adopted without prejudice to any member of 
the Committee raising any other matter which appeared to 
him to be important. Secondly, the HRC would request 
the Secretariat to prepare an analysis of the 
examination of each report. The analysis would set out 
systematically both the questions asked and the 
responses given with precise references to the domestic 
legal sources, quoting the main ones. 
172 
3.26 The first of the "second periodic reports" 
scheduled for consideration was that of Yugoslavia in 
October 1983.173 The HRC's Working Group On General 
Comments (now known as the Working Group on article 40) 
submitted a Conference Room Paper to the HRC entitled, 
"Proposed Approach and Procedure for the Consideration 
of Second Periodic Reports". 
174 The working group 
suggested that the HRC should focus on the progress made 
170 Doc. A/36/40 pp. 101-103. 
171 Ibid., pr. (i). 
172 Ibid., pr. (j). 
173 Doc. CCPR/C/28/Add. 1, considered at SR 483,484 
and 488. 
174 Unpublished. Summarized in A/39/40 pr. 39. 
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in each State party and on the points stressed in pr. (g) 
of the "Consensus Statement" of Duties175 and elaborated 
in pr. I(b) of the guidelines for periodic reports. 176 As 
to the procedure to be followed it was submitted that 
the method for considering second periodic reports need 
not in principle differ significantly from that followed 
by the Committee in considering initial reports, 
although a different method whereby replies to questions 
posed could be expected during the same meeting may be 
desirable provided that the States parties 
representative would be willing to do that, and that the 
State party could be approached in advance to secure its 
acceptance to the conduct of the dialogue in this way. 
3.27 After some discussion177 the HRC agreed to the 
setting up of the working group envisaged in the 
consensus statement and the Secretariat prepared an 
analysis of the examination of the initial report of 
Yugoslavia. 178 The analysis was not intended to pass any 
value judgements on the initial report but simply to 
facilitate-the task of the members. The list of issues 
and questions prepared by the working group was quite 
brief containing four general questions, for example, on 
progress made and response to the proceedings of the 
HRC, and questions on ten articles of the Covenant. 
179 
Though some members expressed misgivings it was decided 
to transmit the informal, unofficial list, with some 
supplementary questions, to the Mission of Yugoslavia 
with a note indicating, however, that the questions were 
175 See pr. 3.5 above. 
176 See pr. 3.6 above. 
177 SR 466 and 467; Doc. A/39/40 prs. 58-66. 
178 Unpublished. 
179 SR 480 pr. l. Subsequent lists have tended to be 
longer and more detailed. 
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not exhaustive and that members of the HRC retained the 
right to put additional questions. It was also decided 
that the list of questions would be put by the members 
of the working group on the points that they had 
selected. It was accepted by members that the procedure 
satisfied most members of the HRC and made for a frank 
and informative dialogue in which the co-operation of 
the Yugoslavian representatives was a major factor. 180 
The working group was asked to repeat a similar 
process with respect to the consideration of the reports 
of Chile and the G. D. R. The lists prepared by the 
working group are considered, discussed and amended by 
the HRC. 181 The lists attempt to be as exhaustive as 
possible so that the HRC can expect immediate replies 
from the State representatives who would have had the 
list for some period in advance of consideration by the 
HRC. It was again stressed that members reserved the 
right to put any additional questions and comments to 
State representatives, though these were expected to be 
reduced to a minimum, and the State representatives 
would be accorded time to prepare their replies to 
further questions if necessary. The list of issues is 
accompanied by an explanation of the procedure to be 
followed. When they appear before the HRC the 
representatives of the States parties are asked to 
comment on the issues listed, section by section, and to 
reply to any additional questions raised by members. 
Finally the Chairman of the HRC invites members to make 
"final observations" and may request an indication of 
when any additional information that may have been 
promised will be submitted. 
182 
180 SR 488 prs. 38-49. 
181 See, e. g., consideration of the list of issues 
for the report of Chile, discussed in SR 519,523,524. 
182 Doc. A/41/40 pr. 44. 
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In discussing its procedures on periodic reports 
the HRC members have stressed a number of matters 
including the need for rational and structured 
consideration of periodic reports, with the lists 
serving as "a frame of reference for organizing the 
discussion"; 183 the importance of obtaining precise 
information on the actual human rights situation in 
States; the key role played by the State representatives 
who appeared before the HRC; 
184 the necessity of 
focusing on a smaller number of particularly important 
human rights issues; and the need for members to 
exercise self-discipline in order not to frustrate the 
very purpose of the new procedures which was to allow 
the most efficient and effective consideration of 
reports as possible. 
185 
3.28 As of 1 July 1988 the HRC has completed the 
consideration of 24 second periodic reports on the basis 
of the procedures indicated above. 
186 A number of 
members have expressed concern about and even the 
opposition to the new procedures. It was observed that 
the lists were too long, too many questions were asked 
and aspects discussed that were not of any real 
interest, and that the consideration had gone on too 
long and, therefore, had not solved the problem of the 
time constraints on the HRC. 
187 It was noted that the 
drawing up of lists created problems because it required 
a subjective 
183 SR 523 pr. 22 (Serrano-Caldero). 
184 See pr. 3.19 above. 
185 See the comments at SR 540 prs. 28-41, SR 541 
prs. l-28, SR 542 pr. 75, SR 543 prs. 3,9. 
186 Figures calculated from the Annual reports of 
the HRC and information supplied by the UN Secretariat. 
187 The Iraqi representative spoke for so long 
before the HRC that only a few members were able to put 
comments and questions. 
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judgement188 and because care had to be taken to ensure 
that the wording used did not appear to label the 
reporting States. 
189 Some members though saw some merit 
in the procedure which they considered to be 
balanced, 190 time well-spent191 and a marked improvement 
over the procedure for the consideration of initial 
reports which had, in their view, become almost 
impossible because of the countless questions asked. 
Ultimately it was decided to set up a "Working 
Group on Article 40" to, inter alia, prepare further 
lists of issues and to review the HRC's methodology in 
the light of its experience of consideration of second 
periodic reports and the comments expressed by 
members. 
192 
The working group submitted that there should be no 
radical departure from the experimental procedure for 
the consideration of periodic reports, that the lists 
had to be more concise and be forwarded to the State 
Party concerned as far in advance as possible and that 
the HRC should inform the State representatives of how 
it intended to proceed. 
193 Opinion was divided, however, 
on the question of whether the procedure should be 
flexible, depending on the quality of the State 
representatives, or applied to all States without 
distinction. The procedures adopted for periodic reports 
are still in operation as of November 1987 and it 
appears likely that it will be continued though there 
188 SR 541 pr. 7 (Tomuschat). 
189 Ibid., pr. 3 (Cote-Harper). 
190 SR 541 pr. 18 (Ermacora). 
191 Ibid., pr. 6 (Tomuschat). 
192 Ibid., pr. 27. 
193 See SR 545 prs. 10-12; SR 598 pr. 20 (Graefrath). 
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may be attempts to refine it. 
194 No decision has been 
taken on the procedures for the consideration of third 
pericdic reports. The first of these are due in 1988 
though they may not be considered until 1989. It appears 
likely that the procedures for the consideration of 
second periodic reports will be the basis of any 
procedure adopted. 
The general opinion of Committee members seemed to 
be that the procedures it had established to consider 
reports had been substantially effective in establishing 
the desired dialogue with States Parties many of whom 
had remarked on the value of the questions, comments and 
observations of individual members. As already noted a 
number of suggestions have been made to improve yet 
further the effectiveness of those initial stages, but 
it was generally recognised that the Committee had not 
yet fulfilled its full potential of collective "study" 
prescribed in article 40(4) and that steps should be 
taken to complete the process though differences soon 
emerged as to the mode and purpose of that follow-up 
process. 
It is evident from the summary records of the HRC 
that many State representatives have found the detailed 
questions, comments and criticisms of the HRC somewhat 
disconcerting if not intimidating. It has often been 
necessary to assure State representatives that the 
approach of the HRC is consistent from State to 
State. 195 Many State representatives have ultimately 
replied with detailed information, sometimes accepting 
difficulties of implementation and providing lengthy 
explanations. Many State representatives have thanked 
the HRC in their final comments for its serious 
considerations, offered their continued co-operation and 
194 See Doc. A/42/40 pr. 53. 
195 See e. g. SR 364,365,366 and 368 (on Iran). 
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expressed the hope that the process had contributed to 
the universal implementation of the Covenant. 
196 
F. The Committee's Jurisdiction under Article 40.197 
3.29 Under article 40 (2) and (4) of the ICCPR the 
Committee's mandate is to engage in the "consideration" 
and "study" of the reports submitted to it in accordance 
with article 40(1). The vague and rather ill-defined 
nature of these terms was commented upon in the course 
of the articles drafting history but no further 
clarification was inserted. 
198 In practice terms such as 
appraisal, analysis, comparison, and evaluation could be 
applied to the tasks positively undertaken by Committee 
members as they have subjected States reports to very 
close, critical and specific analysis. 
199 
3.30 The "study" of reports is to be followed by the 
Committee's transmission of "its reports, and such 
general comments as it may consider appropriate, to the 
States Parties". Two central but related jurisdictional 
difficulties have arisen within the Committee in the 
interpretation of this vital sentence. The first 
concerns the reports to which "its reports" refers, the 
second to the scope and meaning of the phrase "general 
comments". The difficulties can only be understood in 
the light of the differing approaches that have emerged 
regarding the very nature of the reporting procedure 
under article 40 and, as Jhabvala has noted, much of the 
196 See e. g., the comments by the State 
representative from Tunisia in SR 715. 
197 See Fischer, n. 1 above, pp. 147-151; Jhabvala, 
Ibid., pp. 91-95; Nowak, Ibid., pp. 147-151. See also SR 
48,49,50,55,73,219 Add. 1, (Doc. A/34/40 prs. 15-20); 
SR 231,232, (Doc. A/35/40 prs. 370-383); SR 275,276, 
295,304,306,308,309, (Doc. A/36/40 prs. 380-389). 
198 See Jhabvala, n. 1 above, pp. 84-95. 
199 See Schwelb, n. 1 above, p. 843. 
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discussion reflects a, "manifestation of the various 
views expressed during the drafting stages of the 
Covenant in the Commission on Human Rights and the Third 
Committee of the General Assembly". 
200 
3.31 Broadly speaking there emerged two distinct schools 
of thought. The first school of thought was shared by 
the majority of the members at the time. 201 They took 
what might be described as a liberal, purposive approach 
to the scope of its powers under article 40 bearing in 
mind the object of the Covenant to promote and ensure 
the observance of the civil and political rights 
recognized therein. The limitations of an abstract, 
theoretical approach to the consideration of reports was 
stressed as was the ineffectiveness of bland general 
comments. Reference was made to the independent nature 
of the committee and the attributes specified for its 
members and the adoption of rule 70(3)202 which it was 
suggested reflected the purpose of the study called for 
in article 40(4). 
According to this school the purpose of the studies 
to be undertaken by the Committee was to ascertain 
whether or not a State Party has implemented the rights 
in the Covenant. The nature of this exercise was neither 
200 Jhabvala, n. 1 above, p. 93. On the drafting of 
the Covenant see chapter 1 above. 
201 Some of the key actors in the debate on 
jurisdiction have now left the HRC notably Mr. Graefrath, 
Mr. Tomuschat, Sir Vincent-Evans and Mr. Opsahl. It is 
therefore uncertain whether the new members take a 
different approach but there is no evidence of any 
significant pressure within the HRC to reopen or 
reconsider the issues involved. 
202 This rule provides that, "If, on the basis of 
its examination of the reports and information supplied 
by a State party, the Committee determines that some of 
the obligations of that State party under the Covenant 
have not been discharged, it may, in accordance with 
article 40, paragraph 4, of the Covenant, make such 
general comments as it may consider appropriate". 
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to be inquisitorial nor accusative and its end was to be 
neither condemnation nor approbation. Rather the 
dialogue was to be constructive and instructive, 
pointing to situations in which a State's domestic 
provisions were at variance with the Covenant or made 
insufficient provision for the rights protected under 
the Covenant, with suggestions being made as to how 
States could overcome the factors and difficulties that 
hindered the full implementation of the Covenant. 
This approach was given textual justification by 
reference to the phrase "its reports" in article 40(4) 
which it was argued could refer to separate reports 
drawn up by the Committee in respect of each of the 
reporting States, for example, commenting article by 
article on how well each State was fulfilling its 
obligations under the Covenant. Only such specific 
comments, it was argued, would allow the Committee to 
effectively supervise the implementation of the 
Covenant. Any other approach, such as that restricting 
the Committee to general comments addressed to all 
States, was dismissed as implicitly condoning violations 
of human rights in certain countries and a procedure 
that "risked being nothing more than a stylistic 
exercise" whereby "human rights would suffer by an 
excess of diplomacy" and whereby the Committee would be 
abdicating its duties under the Covenant. Further the 
Annual Report sent through ECOSOC to the General 
Assembly under article 45 were not "reports" in the 
sense of article 40(4) because it contained neither 
positive nor negative results and were essentially only 
descriptive accounts. Mr. Lallah argued that if separate 
reports were adopted the Annual Report to the General 
Assembly under article 45 should continue to give only, 
"general indications of the Committee's work since it 
was essential to preserve the dialogue established 
between State's Parties and the Committee and to protect 
that dialogue from the disadvantages which might arise 
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from discussion of those matters by the General 
Assembly". 203 
While advocating such a liberal interpretation of 
article 40(4) the majority view recognized that the 
preparation of separate reports would be a complex and 
time-consuming activity which would almost certainly 
call for a restructuring of the consideration of reports 
through working groups, more efficient Committee 
practices, additional resources from the Secretariat and 
perhaps even extended or additional sessional time. The 
subject of comments might need precise definition and 
the substance of such reports would have to be flexible 
enough to allow it to indicate whether there had been a 
consensus or a majority or a divergence of views. These 
separate reports would be transmitted to the State Party 
concerned which, in accordance with article 40(5), would 
be entitled to submit to the Committee any observations 
on the comments contained therein. 
More generally it was argued that the adoption of 
separate reports would in no way preclude the Committee 
from adopting general comments based on an over-all 
analysis of -the major trends and difficulties which 
emerged from their experience in considering State 
reports, for example, possible amendments to the ICCPR, 
the general aspects of the reporting obligations, 
general and specific implementation difficulties, the 
status of the ICCPR in the national law of States 
parties, the general and particular nature of the rights 
in the ICCPR. 
3.32 The second school of thought conceived of the 
nature of the Committee's mandate in a much more 
restrictive way. The only duty on States was to report 
and the "dialogue" between the HRC and the States 
203 In practice the General Assembly has only 
considered the reports of the HRC in broad terms rather 
then in respect of specific States parties. 
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parties was purely voluntary in nature. Mr. Graefrath 
commented that, "The purpose of the State reports and 
their study by the Committee was.. to exchange 
information, to promote co-operation among States, to 
maintain a steady dialogue and to assist States to 
overcome difficulties... The Committee was not called 
upon to make an appraisal or to indicate whether or not 
a given State had failed to fulfil its obligations. Nor 
could it say that a State had failed to fulfil its 
obligations or that certain national actions were 
contrary to the Covenant. To do so would be to go beyond 
its mandate". 
204 It logically followed then that the 
Committee had no jurisdiction to prepare separate 
reports for each State concerned and no Rule of 
procedure adopted by it (Rule 70(3)) could give the 
Committee jurisdiction beyond that in the ICCPR. 205 The 
"reports" which the Committee was required to submit 
under article 40(4) were, it was argued, the Annual 
Reports submitted to the General Assembly under article 
45.206 Otherwise, it was argued, the Covenant would have 
specified the content of the reports and the State 
parties for whom they were intended, 
. 
as it did in 
articles 41 and 42. General comments were what they 
literally indicated, that is, comments of a general 
character relating to matters of common interest to the 
States parties, for example, matters of general 
importance affecting the implementation of the Covenant 
and not in the form of suggestions or recommendations to 
particular States, the Covenant or the specific rights 
in the Covenant. It was for the States parties to draw 
their own conclusions from the Committee's Annual Report 
and any General Comments the Committee chose to prepare. 
0 
204 See SR 49 and 231. 
205 See n. 202 above. 
206 See pr. 3.40 below. 
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Through these mediums the Committee could promote the 
observance of human rights in a constructive way with 
the voluntary assistance of States. Any other approach 
would be an unjustified interference in the internal 
affairs of States. 
207 
3.33 Recognizing the vital role that their consideration 
of reports was likely to play in their efforts to secure 
the implementation of the ICCPR all members of the 
Committee, despite the differing opinions which existed, 
were anxious to make at least some progress. To that end 
a working group was set up to meet before the 
Committee's eleventh session to consider the formulation 
of such general comments, "as would be likely to gather 
the support of the Committee as a whole, and to examine 
what further work, if any, the Committee should 
undertake at this stage to give effect to its duties 
under article 40 of the Covenant". After extensive 
informal consultations and intensive work within the 
group a "Consensus Statement" was adopted on "The Duties 
of the Human Rights Committee under article 40 of the 
Covenant". 208 Committee members stressed that the 
consensus was no more than a first, though useful 
compromise step, that the procedure agreed upon was 
without prejudice to further consideration of the 
Committee's duties under article 40(4) on which members 
retained their previous positions and that the Committee 
recognized that it had to keep its procedures for the 
examination of reports under constant review in the 
light of its experience. 
209 
207 See ch. 1, pr. 1.18 above. 
208 Doc. A/36/30 pp. 101-103. Adopted by the HRC at 
its 260th meeting, 30th Oct. 1980. Also issued in 
Doc. CCPR/C/18. It is often referred to by members as 
the 'October Consensus'. 
209 See SR 260. See also SR 525 prs. 16-18. 
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With respect to the issue of General Comments the 
consensus stated that: 
" (b) In formulating general comments the Committee will 
be guided by the following principles: 
They should be addressed to the States Parties in 
conformity with Article 40, paragraph 4 of the 
Covenant; 
They should promote co-operation between States 
Parties in the implementation of the Covenant; 
They should summarize experience the Committee has 
gained in considering States reports; 
They should draw the attention of States Parties to 
matters 
. 
relating to the improvement of the 
reporting procedure and the implementation of the 
Covenant; 
They should stimulate activities of State Parties 
and international organizations in the promotion 
and protection of human rights. 
(c) The general comments could be related, inter alia, 
to the following subjects; 
The implementation. of the obligation to submit 
reports under article 40 of the Covenant; 
The implementation of the obligation to guarantee 
the rights set forth in the Covenant; 
Questions related to the application and the 
content of individual articles of the Covenant; 
Suggestions concerning co-operation between States 
Parties and international obligations in applying 
and developing the provisions of the Covenant. 
(d) The Committee confirms its aim of engaging in a 
constructive dialogue with each reporting State. 
This dialogue will be conducted on the basis of 
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periodical reports from States Parties to the 
Covenant". 210 
3.34 The two schools of thought again appeared when the 
Committee reconsidered the consensus statement with a 
view to taking certain decisions based upon it. 211 The 
particular difficulties arose because some of the 
members argued that paragraph (b) of the "Consensus 
Statement" was ambiguous as it would permit of an 
interpretation allowing specific as well as general 
comments addressed to States Parties. The view which 
prevailed, even amongst those who advocated separate 
reports containing specific comments addressed to 
individual States, was that for the time being the 
Committee should proceed initially with the preparation 
of comments relating to States generally bearing in mind, 
the principles outlined in the consensus statement. 
This approach allowed the Committee to make further 
progress in performing its functions under article 40 
while preserving its right to proceed further on 
individual reports at a later date. In accordance with 
this decision a working group of five met before the 
Committee's thirteenth session to draft general comments 
which after discussion and amendment were adopted. 
According to the Committee the purpose of those 
general comments was to make the Committee's cumulative 
experience, "available for the benefit of all States in 
order to promote their further implementation of the 
Covenant; to draw their attention to insufficiencies 
disclosed by a large number of reports; tQ' suggest 
improvements in the reporting procedure and to stimulate 
the activities of these States and international 
organizations in the promotion and protection of, human 
210 Doc. A/36/40 pp. 101-103. 
211 See SR 275 and 276. 
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rights. These comments should also be of interest to 
other States, especially those preparing to become 
parties to the Covenant... ". 
212 Certainly the comments 
adopted to date have been very much concerned with 
reporting obligations rather than specific, concrete 
instances of non-implementation of the ICCPR. There is 
no doubt however that their adoption does little or 
nothing to resolve the divergent interpretations of 
article 40M. 
213 
The initial drafts are prepared by the Working 
Group on article 40 (formerly known as the Working Group 
on General Comments) of the HRC. After consideration by 
its members and taking account of the views of written 
proposals submitted by other members the working group 
then attempts to submit a consensus text to the HRC. 
That draft is then considered in the HRC, sometimes in 
212 Introduction to the HRC's first general 
comments, Doc. A/36/40 p. 107. 
213 Capatorti, n. 1 above, comments that the aim of 
the expression 'General Comment' is, "... to exclude the 
possibility of specific recommendations, namely 
recommendations addressed to a single government and 
concerning its attitude in the field of human rights. 
But, evidently, only specific recommendations might be 
efficient instruments to promote respect of the 
Covenants". He goes on to argue that whenever the 
examination of reports is superficial 
- 
as he suggests 
it is with the ICCPR because its verification machinery 
is ill-devised- "the only possible outcome consists in 
general recommendations: and these have the function of 
means for political pressure, rather than of true 
instruments for the observance of agreements", p. 138. 
Robertson, n. 1 above, (1984) comments that, "The term is 
not defined. It does not mean that these comments must 
be addressed to all States parties and not to particular 
States. As the drafting history makes clear, the Human 
Rights Committee may make recommendations to particular 
States parties. But they must be in general terms and 
not relate to individual cases, and cannot therefore 
focus attention on specific violations and bring 
influence to bear to remedy them", pp. 350-351. The 
reference for this proposition, Doc. A/5411, pr. 22, does 
, 
not, per se, support it. 
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public sessions. Members may comment on the draft text, 
seek explanations or clarifications, and propose 
additions or amendments. Normally the draft is referred 
back to the working group for further consideration in 
the light of the views expressed by members of the HRC. 
If a consensus text is finally-reached by the HRC it is 
adopted sometimes initially in a single or two language 
version. 
214 The comments are transmitted to all States 
parties my notes verbale, and are included in the Annual 
report of the HRC215 and given publicity in a number of 
other ways. 
216 
3.35 As of 1 July 1988 the HRC has adopted sixteen 
general comments. The most recent was on article 17 
(right to privacy). 217 The first set of general comments 
dealt with certain aspects of the reporting obligations 
and procedures, 
218 the obligation on States parties 
under article 2 to take specific activities to enable 
individuals to enjoy their rights and the importance of 
individuals knowing their rights under the Covenant and 
of all administrative and judicial authorities being 
aware of their obligations under the Covenant 
(G. C. 3/13). 219 
Subsequent general comments have dealt with 
elements of the implementation of articles 3220, article 
214 This procedure has caused a number of problems 
when the HRC has attempted to adopt the other language 
texts. See e. g. SR 537 on the general comment on article 
1. 
215 See pr. 3.40 below. 
216 See ch. 2, pr. 2.9 above. 
217 G. C. 16 (32), Doc. CCPR/C/21/Add. 6, adopted at 
HRC's 791st meeting on 23 March 1988. See SR 749,751, 
752,770,791; Doc. A/42/40 pr. 392. For the text see 
Apx. III below. 
218 G. C. 1/13 and 2/13, Doc. A/36/40 pp. 107-108. 
219 Ibid., p. 109. 
220 G. C. 4/13, Ibid., pp. 109-110. 
CH 3. 164 
4221, article 6222, article 7223, article 9224, article 
10225, article 19226, article 20227, article 1 
228, 
article 14229, a second comment on article 6230, and on 
the position of aliens under the Covenant. 
231 All of the 
General Comments to date have been addressed to all 
States parties and not to individual States. 
232 Some of 
these general comments have been of a high quality and 
represent valuable indications of the content of the 
respective rights and the steps that States parties 
could or should undertake to ensure the implementation 
of those rights. Other general comments have been much 
less helpful. The terms of most of the General Comments 
are dealt with elsewhere in this work in their relevant 
contexts. The HRC has stressed the importance of the use 
of the general comments primarily within the context of 
221 G. C. 5/13, Ibid., p. 110. 
222 G. C. 6/16, Doc. A/37/40 pp. 93-94. 
223 G. C. 7/16, ibid., pp. 94-95. 
224 G. C. 8/16, ibid., pp. 95-96. 
225 G. C. 9/16, ibid., pp. 96-97. 
226 G. C. 10/19, Doc. A/38/40 p. 109. 
227 G. C. 11/19, ibid, pp. 109-110. 
228 G. C. 12/21, Doc. A/39/40 pp. 142-143. 
229 G. C. 13/21, ibid., pp. 143-146. 
230 G. C. 14/23, Doc. A/40/40 p. 162. 
231 G. C. 15/27, Doc. A/41/40 p. 117. 
232 
"The Committee (CERD) has, thus far, adopted 
general recommendations and decisions aimed at obtaining 
more informative reports of States parties. The CERD has 
not yet formulated as a collective body formal 
suggestions (regarding a single State) or general 
recommendations (regarding a group of States or all 
States parties), concerning to what extent obligations (Footnote Continued) 
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the reporting system but also in other areas, for 
example, the adoption of views under the Optional 
Protocol. 233 The guidelines adopted by the HRC for 
periodic reports specifically refers to the need to take 
account of the general comments adopted by the HRC in 
the preparation of such reports. 
234 A copy of the HRC's 
General Comments are sent to State representatives with 
the list of issues prior to the consideration of 
periodic reports. The HRC has recently agreed that it 
should be more specific in soliciting information from 
States parties concerning its general comments. 
235 As 
the number of general comments adopted has "increased 
members have increasingly referred to them during the 
examination of State reports and referred to general 
comments to support proposed amendments to the HRC's 
procedures. 
236 Similarly, some State reports have 
expressly referred to the General Comments adopted but 
not in sufficient numbers to satisfy the HRC. 
237 In 1985 
the Congo and Madagascar were the first States to make 
(Footnote Continued) 
under the Convention have been discharged at the 
national level", Gomez, n. l above, p. 507. The CERD has, 
however, adopted a number of country specific decisions 
concerning the problem of territories occupied or 
controlled de facto by another country. The cases have 
concerned the Golan Heights, the West Bank of the River 
Jordan, Cyprus, and the Panama Canal Zone. See Ibid., 
pp. 502-503; Lerner, n. l above, ch. IV. 
233 A specific reference was made to a General 
Comment by the HRC in Hamel v. Madagascar-, Doc. A/42/40 
p. 130, pr. 19.2. 
234 See pr. 3.5 above. 
235 SR 758 pr. 64. 
236 See SR 595 prs. 30-40 Movchan on U. K. ); pr. 34 
(Mavrommatis); reply at SR 596 prs. 3-5. 
237 Members of the HRC have noted that that 
requirement has not been adequately met by many States 
parties, Doc. A/42/40 pr. 391; SR 744 pr. 30 (Movchan on 
Iraq). 
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formal use- of the opportunity in article 40(5) ICCPR to 
submit observations to the HRC on general comments 
adopted by the HRC on articles 1 and 14 ICCPR. 
238 The 
observations submitted by the two States were not 
observations on the general comment adopted by the HRC 
but an account of how their respective domestic systems 
implemented the provisions of the article concerned. 
The HRC made no formal response to the observations 
submitted but requested the Secretariat to convey its 
gratitude to the States concerned and indicate to them 
that the information submitted might have more 
appropriately been included in the information submitted 
by those States to the HRC for consideration under the 
reporting procedure. Subsequently comments under article 
40(5) have been received from a small number of 
States. 239 Mr. Graefrath has suggested that it, "might be 
useful to give Governments some guidance on the form and 
content of the observations expected of them" 
. 
240 This 
suggestion should be acted upon as it would be a useful 
way of continuing the "dialogue" between the HRC and the 
States parties between the consideration of State 
reports. 
3.36 The only substantive comment and observations on 
the general comments adopted by the HRC has come from 
the Third Committee of the G. A. 241 Those comments, 
sometimes critical, are noted in the respective context 
238 Doc. CCPR/C/40 (18 July 1985). The feedback on 
General Comments has been disappointing and compares 
unfavourably to the feedback to general recommendations 
adopted by the CERD, see Gomez Del Prado, n. 1 
above, p. 512-513. 
239 See SR 729 pr. 3. 
240 SR 633 pr. 14. 
241 See pr. 3.40 below. 
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of each general comment. 
242 Further publicity to the 
general comments is given by the Centre for Human Rights 
in Geneva which regularly draws attention to them in the 
various organs it serves. Similarly, academic 
commentators and interest organisations are increasingly 
referring to the General Comments in their respective 
publications. 
243 
3.37 Some criticism has been expressed within the HRC of 
its procedures for the preparation of general 
comments. 
244 It has been suggested that their 
preparation was too dependent on the isolated 
initiatives of members of the HRC and that despite 
repeated appeals members had been slow to make 
suggestions and proposals for general comments. The 
working group on article 40 is now spending most of its 
time on the lists of issues for periodic reports. The 
preparation of General Comments is one area where the 
Secretariat could play a greater role by initiating 
proposals and undertaking research on the articles 
concerned including relevant work undertaken by other 
human rights bodies. The Secretariat has offered more 
assistance in this direction and this is now being more 
fully realised. 
3.38 The General Comments adopted by the HRC are 
potentially very important as an expression of the 
accumulated and unparallelled experience of an 
independent expert human rights body of a universal 
character in its consideration of the implementation of 
the ICCPR. Whether this potential has been realised is 
242 See e. g. in ch. 8 below on article 6. 
243 See "e. g., B. Ramcharan, ch. 8, n. 1 below; 
N. Rodley, The Treatment Of Prisoners In International 
Law, ch. 9, n. 1 below. 
244 See SR 525 prs. 14-23; 540 prs. 23-27; 545 
prs. 15-17; 633. However, the consensus was that there 
should be no change in those procedures. 
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considered in the relevant parts of subsequent chapters. 
It is appropriate at this point, however, to note that 
it is necessarily a most difficult task to obtain a 
consensus agreement from eighteen experts from different 
geographical regions and legal schools. The application 
of the technique of consensus decision making in this 
context inevitably results in general comments that to 
some extent represent the highest common denominator 
between members. The chairman of the HRC acknowledged 
this point recently when, in the light of substantial 
difficulties among members concerning a draft general 
comment concerning article 27 ICCPR (minority' rights), 
he suggested to members that they would have to try to 
be less maximalistic in their approach if there was to 
be any hope of reaching a consensus. 
245 Ultimately, the 
draft general comment on article 27 was dropped because, 
it was argued, there was not enough information 
available to form a sound basis for decision. 
246 As 
Professor Higgins pointed out the lack of information 
available might have been taken to indicate the 
desirability of making a general comment that would 
indicate to States parties the information the HRC 
required. 
247 However, at least the HRC emerged from the 
debate on article 27 with an established criteria to 
guide their work in respect of general comments. The 
applicable considerations are: "the relevance of the 
proposed subjects to the problems encountered by States 
parties in implementing the Covenant; the topicality of 
the proposed subject; and the prospects for reaching 
245 See SR 624 pr. 7. 
246 SR 633 pr. 35 (Chairman). 
247 SR 633 pr. 26. 
CH 3. 169 
consensus within the Committee on the eventual draft 
general comments". 
248 
G. The role of the ECOSOC. 
3.39 In accordance with article 40(4) ICCPR the HRC 
shall transmit "its reports" and "may" also transmit 
copies of any General Comments it considers appropriate 
to adopt to the States parties. The HRC "may" also 
transmit these comments to the ECOSOC along with the 
copies of the reports it has received from the States 
parties. 
249 There is no express indication in the ICCPR 
of the role, if any, of ECOSOC on receipt of any General 
Comments transmitted to it by the HRC and the reports of 
States parties. Presumably then it is open to the ECOSOC 
to exercise whatever powers it assumes under its general 
jurisdiction to consider human rights matters. Arguably 
this could include making specific, formal 
recommendations directly to particular States on the 
basis of the General Comments adopted by the HRC and the 
State reports. There is a precedent for this in a 
similar function performed by ECOSOC under the periodic 
reporting system established under ECOSOC Resolution and 
operated by the Human Rights Commission. 
250 In practice, 
however, ECOSOC has not taken any action with respect to 
the General Comments of the HRC or the reports of States 
parties. 
Under article 45 ICCPR the HRC is obliged to submit 
an Annual Report on its activities to the General 
Assembly through the ECOSOC. 251 There is no indication 
in the ICCPR of whether the ECOSOC is to conduct any 
248 Doc. A/41/40 pr. 411. 
249 The reports are in fact transmitted, see SR 571 
prs. 10-11. 
250 See n. 2 above. 
.P 
251 See pr. 3.40 below. 
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consideration of the Annual Report. Again any such 
powers can only be deduced from ECOSOC's general 
jurisdiction. It was apparent at the first occasion on 
which the HRC's Report was transmitted to ECOSOC that 
ECOSOC was unclear as to what its role should be. 252 It 
is clear that at least some delegations envisaged that 
ECOSOC would play an active role in considering 
reports. 
253 In practice, however, the ECOSOC has 
authorized the Secretary-General to transmit the Annual 
Report of the HRC directly. to the General Assembly 
unless the ECOSOC was invited at the request of either a 
member or the Secretary-General to consider it. 254 To 
date no such request has ever been made. The 
non-consideration of the report by ECOSOC ensures that 
there is no danger of the report not being considered by 
the General Assembly in the same year as its 
adoption. 
255 It is difficult to see what useful function 
the ECOSOC could perform with its composition and 
political nature bearing in mind the consideration of 
the HRC's Annual Report by the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly. 
H. The Annual Report of the HRC to the General Assembl 
3.40 Article 40(5) ICCPR provides that, "The Committee 
shall submit to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, through the Economic And Social Council 
256 (ECOSOC), an annual report on its activities". The 
252 See Doc. E/SR 2087. 
253 See A/C. 3/SR 1435 pr. 13 (representative of 
Hungary). 
254 See ECOSOC Resn. 1985/117. 
255 The HRC has been very concerned to ensure that 
this remains the situation. See e. g., SR 571. 
256 See also article 6 O. P. For the HRC's Annual 
(Footnote Continued) 
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Annual Report serves as a vital link between the HRC, 
the States parties and the General Assembly. 
257 The 
Annual Reports have in practice been substantial 
documents containing thorough accounts of the 
consideration of reports and of communications under the 
O. P. together with basic information on the practices 
and procedures of the HRC. As noted, to date the ECOSOC 
has not exhibited any serious interest in the work of 
the HRC. 258 
Within the G. A. the Annual report is considered by 
the Third Committee of the G. A. (Social, Humanitarian 
and Cultural Questions) in the autumn of the same year 
of its publication. 
259 The role of the Third Committee 
is not spelt out in the ICCPR. In fact since 1978 the 
Third Committee has spent an increasing amount of its 
time discussing the HRC's Annual Report. Indeed, it is 
an interesting question as to the relationship between 
the HRC and the Third Committee. 
260 We have already 
noted that the HRC is not a United Nations body but an 
independent body established by the State parties to the 
(Footnote Continued) 
Reports to date see the documents listed in 'Principal 
Documentation' at the beginning of this thesis. Since 
1979 the HRC's Annual Report has covered the Autumn, 
Spring and Summer sessions. The draft annual report is 
prepared by the Rapporteur of the HRC with the 
substantial assistance of the Secretariat. The report is 
then considered, amended and adopted by the HRC at the 
close of its summer session. There have occasionally 
been difficulties concerning its drafting, see e. g., SR 
542,543 and 544 As part of the economy measures at the 
U. N. the HRC has agreed to reduce the size of its annual 
report by 10%. 
257 See ECOSOC OR, 16th session, Supp. 8, 
prs. 195-197). 
258 See pr. 3.39 above. 
259 The discussion of the HRC's reports is 
interspersed within the summary records of the Third 
Committee on the appropriate agenda item. 
260 See Brar, n. 1 above, pp. 15-21. 
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Covenant, although the HRC is dependant on the U. N. for 
finance and administration. 
261 A number of members have 
suggested that the HRC is not bound by the opinion of 
the Third Committee. 262 In recent discussions, "It was 
understood that the members of the Committee, 
notwithstanding their capacity as independent experts, 
would bear in mind, in the exercise of their functions, 
the observations made by delegations". 
263 
During its spring session (normally in New York) 
the HRC discusses the considerations of the Third 
Committee. 264 HRC members have recognised the importance 
of establishing an effective dialogue with the Third 
Committee and giving serious consideration to the views 
expressed by it. Generally the Third Committee has 
commended the work done by the HRC. The Annual Report 
has been subjected to searching consideration and 
various views have been expressed, for example, on the 
procedures adopted by the HRC, the functions of the HRC 
under the reporting procedure, the comments proposals 
and amendments considered by the HRC, the comments 
expressed with regard to particular countries, views 
expressed under the O. P., publicity for the Covenant, 
the Optional Protocol and the work of the HRC. Very 
occasionally, however, certain representatives in the 
Third Committee have seen fit to attack certain aspects 
of the HRC's work, for example, an alleged political 
261 See ch. 2 above. 
262 See e. g. the discussion in SR 338. 
263 See e. g. Doc. A/41/40 pr. 22. 
264 At its fifteenth session (1982) the HRC decided 
to place on the agenda of its spring session every year 
an item on, "Action by the General Assembly on the 
annual report submitted by the Committee under article 
45 of the Covenant". The views expressed in the HRC's 
debates are now reflected in its Annual Reports. See 
e. g., A/42/40 prs. 26-32. 
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cover up by certain members of the systematic genocide 
pf the Palestinian Peoples. 
265 Similarly, Uruguay raised 
some objections to the HRC's practices under the 
Optional Protocol, 266 and a number of States criticized 
parts of the HRC's second General Comment on article 
6.267 More generally the Third Committee has drawn the 
attention of the HRC to the standard setting work of 
some of the other human rights organs, called for it to 
deepen the reporting process and the follow up action, 
requested the HRC to give specific content to the rights 
recognized in the Covenant and point to any weak points 
that might need to be improved, asked the HRC to 
consider the role of people in the processes engaged in 
by their Governments under the ICCPR, called upon all 
States to become parties to the Covenant, 268 and 
recognized the need to co-ordinate the reporting 
obligations of States parties under the various 
international reporting procedures and organize the flow 
of information among the relevant bodies. 
I. Appraisal. 
3.41 This chapter has reviewed the institutional aspects 
of the reporting system established by the ICCPR and the 
practices and procedures adopted by the HRC in 
implementing that system. The sy. scem must be subject to 
critical appraisal in the light of the increasing 
criticism of international reporting procedures. It has 
been argued that the systems are inherently defective 
and that the increasing number of them has led to an 
265 Statement of the representative of the G. D. R. 
in the Third Committee. 
266 See the comment at SR 318 pr. 7 (Tomuschat). 
267 See ch. 8, prs. 8.12-8.13 below. 
268 Cf. Article 48 of the Covenant, Ax. 1 below. See 
ch. l, pr. 1.33 above. 
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apparent decline in the willingness of States parties to 
submit reports and to financial and logistical 
problems. 
269 As we noted in chapter 2 the HRC has 
established itself as a respected body of independent, 
highly qualified members who have attracted consistent 
praise for the serious and constructive nature of their 
deliberations both from State representatives that have 
appeared before them and in the Third committee. We also 
noted that in its consideration of reports under article 
40 it has established a remarkable consensus practice 
and although there are clear political differences 
between members the HRC has avoided the overt 
politicization evident in many human rights 
institution. 270 It is perhaps a measure of the HRC's 
success that the new Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has been modelled to some degree on the 
HRC and its practices under article 40.271 The 
groundwork for the success of the HRC has been 
established by the commitment displayed by the members 
who have served on the HRC in its formative years. Its 
continued success will to a large part depend on the 
continuing integrity of its present and future 
members. 
272 
3.42 With respect to the submission of reports the HRC 
has displayed great patience and flexibility. Although 
the eventual record of submission has been commendable 
269 See Alston, ch. 2, n. 38 above; 'SR 760 pr-38 
(Mommersteeg). 
270 See ch. 2, r. 2.7. See p generally T. D. Gonzales, 
The Political Sources Of Procedural Debates In The 
United Nations: Structural Impediments To The 
Implementation Of Human Rights, 13 N. Y. U. J. Int'l. L. & 
Pol. (1981) pp. 427-472. 
271 See ch. 2, n. 38 above. 
272 See the comments of Mr. Herndl (Assistant 
Secretary-General for Human Rights, SR 702 pr. 3. 
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the delays involved have often been considerable. 
Having established itself as a serious and important 
human rights body the HRC would do well to take a firmer 
line regarding the delayed submission of reports. The 
HRC's very success gives it greater potential to exert 
pressure on State parties to submit reports on time and, 
if that fails, to give effective publicity to that 
default. However, it must be recognized that the problem 
is a very difficult one to resolve. The co-operation of 
States parties is critically important and the HRC must 
retain sufficient flexibility to be able to respond to 
situations on a case by case basis as they arise. Some 
failures, however, for example that of Belgium in 
submitting an initial report, must be open to severe 
criticism. 
3.43 It has been submitted that the guidelines for the 
preparation of initial reports could be expanded and 
improved. Despite suggestions to this effect within the 
HRC no action has been taken. 
273 Similarly the procedure 
for the consideration of initial reports is capable of 
rationalization. Such rationalization might even allow 
the consideration of initial reports, provided they' 
substantial enough, to be conducted in accordance with 
the "second-round" procedure developed by the HRC. This 
is important because the second round procedure is 
generally much more productive than the "first-round" 
and the use of the second round procedure may be greatly 
reduced in the light of the HRC's decision that 
henceforth whether the HRC will conduct a consideration 
of a Supplementary Report will be decided on a case to 
case basis depending in part on the timing of the 
submission of reports. 
274 The procedures for the 
273 SR 633 pr. 7 (Aguilar), pr. 19 (Movchan); 
Doc. A/41/40 pr. 26. 
274 See pr. 3.21.1 above. 
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consideration of periodic reports are now well 
established and although there may be some refinement, 
substantial changes seem unlikely. Those procedures 
appear to work very well and the comments by both HRC 
members and State representatives suggest that 
consideration of periodic reports to date have been very 
useful and informative in obtaining a better 
understanding of the implementation of civil and 
political rights in the States concerned and of the 
factors and difficulties encountered. This is critically 
important as it appears that the consideration of 
periodic reports that will come to play the major role 
in the future work of the HRC. 
3.44 The great majority of States have exhibited an 
attitude of co-operation with the HRC and appear to have 
taken their reporting obligations very seriously. Many 
of the second periodic reports of States parties have 
been substantially better than their initial reports. 
That all but one State, Guinea, has sent a 
representative or a group of representatives to appear 
before the HRC bears testimony to that seriousness and 
" 
to respect for the HRC. The even higher quality of State 
representatives who have attended for the consideration 
of periodic reports confirms this view. In retrospect 
the decision of the HRC to invite State representatives 
to appear before it constitutes one of its most 
important procedural decisions to date. The presence of 
State representatives has been fundamental to the 
establishment of the "constructive dialogue" sought by 
the HRC. The development of this dialogue has enabled 
members of the HRC to clearly indicate whether they are 
of the view that violations of the Covenant have 
occurred or that domestic legislation or provisions are 
inconsistent with the Covenant. It can be argued that 
this dialogue with the State party, through its 
representatives has pre-empted any necessity for the HRC 
to adopt formal determinations of non-compliance. Such a 
course could ultimately be adopted by the HRC if its 
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deliberations are seen to produce no effective results 
but there has been no consensus to date in favour of 
such a development. Indeed, as we have noted, 
considerable disagreement exist within the HRC 
concerning its jurisdictional powers under article 40 
including the permissible scope of its "General 
Comments". 275 At present it seems unlikely that there 
will be any development towards the adoption of country 
specific reports or of General Comments addressed to one 
particular State party. This may encourage members to 
try and make the established reporting procedures as 
specific and penetrating as possible, to make the 
General Comments as specific as possible in respect of 
each right in the ICCPR and further develop the general 
observations and evaluations of the performance of a 
State in their concluding statements. 276 
However, it appears from the consideration of 
reports that members of the HRC have legitimate 
differences on the question of implementation in 
particular States. 
277 It would seem then that it would 
in any event be difficult, if not impossible, to each a 
consensus agreement on specific reports on each. State 
party or on general comments addressed to particular 
States. The alternative of majority voting has not 
commended itself to the HRC and has, indeed, become 
something of a psychological barrier. 278 
3.45 only time will reveal whether the HRC's failure to 
draw up specific reports on each State party and General 
Comments addressed to particular State parties are 
275 See prs. 3.29-3.38 above. 
276 See pr. 3.24 above. See e. g. SR 743 pr. 4 
277 Compare the concluding comments of Tomuschat, 
SR 598 prs. 15-16, and Movchan, SR 598 prs. 29-32, on the 
U. K. 
278 See ch. 2, pr. 2.7 above. 
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fundamental defects in the reporting procedure. Part of 
the relative success of the reporting systems of the ILO 
and under the European Social Charter has stemmed from 
the publicity and political support given to the 
observations, reports and conclusions reached by the 
relevant examining bodies. 
279 Under the ICCPR it is 
uncertain as to which body, if any, is charged with 
taking any further action subsequent to the work of the 
HRC. The absence of any specific reports or specific 
General Comments makes the task of any superior 
political body very difficult because it has no agreed 
basis from which to work. For example, the 
considerations of the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly are based on the Annual Reports of the HRC. The 
Annual Reports are drafted in a neutral manner and 
merely summarize the considerations of the HRC. It does 
not form an adequate basis for the adoption of specific 
recommendations addressed to particular States 
concerning the implementation of their obligations under 
the ICCPR. In the absence of specific reports and 
specific general comments the inevitable tendency will 
be for the considerations of the HRC to lie largely 
hidden within the mass of general United Nations 
documentation. Without effective publicity and specific 
political backup the effectiveness of the HRC's 
considerations is likely to be marginal in all but the 
most exceptional of cases. 
280 Therefore, national and 
international non 
- 
governmental organisations have an 
important role to play in following up the consideration 
of State reports. Similarly national Parliaments or 
Assemblies, where they exist, could play a role. 
279 See Land y, n. 1 above, ch. 3; Harris, Ibid., 
ch. V. 
280 See Jhabvala, n. 1 above, pp. 104-106. 
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3.46 The establishment of a periodicity of five years 
would appear realistic considering the range of rights 
covered by the ICCPR and the existence of several other 
international reporting procedures that are time 
consuming for States. However, as the rate of new of 
ratifications or accessions has declined consideration 
should be given to reducing the period to three or four 
years as envisaged in the HRC's original periodicity 
decision but it has been submitted that the issue is not 
crucial. 
281 The establishment of any shorter period than 
this might prejudice the quality of reports and the 
practice of only considering the reports in the presence 
of State representatives. 
It was unfortunate that the original periodicity 
decision had the unintended effect of reducing the 
incentive for States parties to promptly submit 
supplementary reports containing additional information. 
The subsequent amendment to correct this defect may yet 
prove to be effective but seems to date to have produced 
little result. The approach now developed by the HRC as 
regards Supplementary Reports is both sensible and 
flexible. 282 It is submitted that it is important for 
the HRC to keep open the possibility of the 
consideration of supplementary reports because the 
second round procedure used has often proved very useful 
and has done much to remedy the inadequate first round 
consideration of reports. 
3.47 We noted that no general decision was adopted 
concerning the HRC's powers to request a report 
"whenever it deems it necessary" other than in 
accordance with its general periodicity decision. 
283 it 
is submitted that the proposals made should have been 
281 See pr. 3.6 above. 
282 See pr. 3.21.1 above. 
283 See prs. 3.8-3.8.1 above. 
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adopted as they were sufficiently flexible to leave the 
decision to the HRC on a case by case basis but would 
have removed the appearance of them being selective, ad 
hoc and political requests. The absence of a general, 
formal decision on this matter is to be regretted. 
However, the decision to request a report from El 
Salvador under article 40(1) (b) after the killing of a 
member of their national human rights commission may 
have set an important precedent. 
284 
3.48 A disappointing aspect of the reporting procedures 
are the minimal roles played by the specialized agencies 
and the non-governmental organizations. 
285 Of the 
specialized agencies only the I. L. O. regularly submits 
notes to the HRC members and it rarely sends a 
representative to the meetings of the HRC at which State 
reports are being considered. As for non-governmental 
organizations, they have no formal role at all and are 
limited to submitting information to HRC members in 
their individual capacities. 286 However, a number of 
members accept such information on a regular basis. The 
restrictive opinion of the members of the HRC from 
Eastern Europe would appear to preclude the possibility 
of any formal decision recognizing a legitimate role for 
the non-governmental organizations. It is vital, 
therefore, that HRC members make NGO's aware that they 
are willing and ready to receive appropriate information 
and that NGO's continue to take an active interest in 
the work of the HRC notwithstanding the absence of a 
formal decision recognizing their role. Similarly, it 
has been submitted that the HRC could exhibit a much 
more positive attitude to the specialized agencies even 
if the HRC does not change its present formal decision 
284 See pr. 3.8.1 above. 
285 See 3.13-3.16 above. 
286 See prs. 3.17-3.18 above. 
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that they are not competent to submit comments on the 
reports submitted by States. 
3.49 Having regard to the absence of any judicial 
determination, binding decisions or recommendations, and 
enforcement powers it is apparent that the key to the 
effectiveness of the reporting procedure established by 
the ICCPR will be the HRC's powers to persuade. The 
HRC's weight lies in its moral and legal authority as a 
respected and independent human rights body. Further 
pressure and persuasion can be derived from effective 
publicity and the political support of superior 
bodies. 287 Unfortunately, the former has been sadly 
lacking. Consideration of the United Kingdom's reports, 
for example, attracted little national publicity. 
Ironically, the serious and depoliticized nature of the 
HRC's considerations have made it less newsworthy. 
Academic attention to the actual practices of the HRC 
has also been infrequent although it is now increasing. 
3.50 The political support for the HRC could have come 
from various bodies. However, the Conference of States 
parties and ECOSOC have taken no substantive roles 
concerning the HRC's work. The only serious attention to 
the HRC's work has come from the Third Committee of the 
G. A. during its discussion of the HRC's Annual Report. 
We have noted the development of extensive consideration 
of the HRC's work in the Third Committee with various 
views and opinions being expressed. The actual 
relationship between the HRC and the Third Committee is 
not spelt out in the ICCPR but in practice the HRC has 
287 The HRC has been concerned to see that their 
functions under article 40 have not been misrepresented 
or incorrectly reported by newspapers or academic 
commentators. E. g. some members criticized the article 
by Professor Nowak, n. 1 above, which pointed to alleged 
political differences within the HRC. See also SR 428 
prs. 1-5 concerning a report in the New York Times on 
31/1/87 on the HRC's consideration of the report of 
Nicaragua. 
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given very serious consideration to the views expressed 
in the Third Committee. The Third Committee is an 
important forum where at least a limited amount of 
political' pressure can be brought to bear on State 
parties who default on their obligations to submit 
reports and on their obligations to implement the 
provisions of the Covenant. 
3.51 The substantive deliberations of the HRC under the 
article 40 process are extensively illustrated in 
chapters 5-12 with respect to selected rights in the 
ICCPR. The foregoing account would appear to suggest 
that the HRC has established a workable reporting 
procedure. A oral dialogue has been established with all 
States except Guinea. That dialogue has been conducted 
in a searching, critical manner by members of the HRC. 
Acrimonious exchanges with State representatives and the 
introduction of Inter-State disputes have generally been 
avoided though a number of exchanges have been marked by 
a degree of tension. 
288 There is also some limited 
evidence that the HRC's considerations have had some 
direct effect on the protection of human rights in some 
States parties. This evidence is considered in Chapter 
13. However, it is much less systematic than the record 
of formal changes in laws and practices that can be 
given under the system of I. L. O. Conventions289 or under 
the European Social Charter. 290 
3.52 On balance, despite some of the deficiencies noted 
in this chapter, the reporting procedure has been 
developed into a much more useful procedure of 
international implementation (in the broad sense) than 
288 E. g. during the consideration of repprts from 
Iran, Rumania, Chile, El Salvador. 
289 See Valticos, n. 1 above, prs. 618-619. 
290 See Harris, n. 1 above pp. 188-191 and 
appendices II and III. 
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might confidently have been predicted when the Covenant 
was adopted in 1966.291 Moreover, as Professor Tomuschat 
has noted, there is a broader dimension to the HRC's 
work which must not be overlooked, 
"The meetings being held by the Committee marked a 
turning point in the history of human rights: for 
the' first time, a procedure had been established 
which applied to the States of all regions in the 
world, irrespective of the ideological and 
political differences separating them, and which 
was designed to exercise, through a friendly and 
constructive dialogue, a kind of international 
control". 
292 
However, there remains little doubt that the some 
fundamental jurisdictional questions remain unresolved 
and the system is open to further improvement, 
rationalization and development along the lines 
suggested in this Chapter. 
291 See Capatorti, n. 1 above. Cf. "The reporting 
system is essentially a means of providing 
information,... the reporting system as articulated in 
article 40 is not a monitoring system", Wallace, 
International Law, p. 189 (1986). 
292 SR 117 pr. 35. 
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This chapter examines the work of the HRC in 
implementing the O. P. to the ICCPR. A right of petition 
1 For full text of the O. P. see appendix II below. 
There is a substantial amount of literature on, the O. P. 
Most of this deals with the drafting process or comments 
on the provisions of the O. P. Very little of it is 
directed to the actual practices of the HRC. See Anon, 
23 Rev. ICJ (1979) p. 26 at pp. 28-30; Anon, 25 Rev. ICJ 
(1980) p. 35 at pp. 37-38; Anon, 31 Rev. ICJ (1983) p. 42 at 
pp. 46-49; Anon, 35 Rev. ICJ (1985) p. 18 at pp. 21-25; 
Anon, 37 Rev. ICJ (1986) p. 25 at pp. 28-31; A. K. Ahmed, 
Analysis Of Decisions Of The Committee On Human Rights, 
LLM thesis, c. 1982; Agarwal, ch. l, n. l above, pp. 40-47; 
Bossuyt 'Guide', pp. 793-818; M. Bossuyt, Le Reglement 
Interieur Du Comite Des Droits De L'Homme, XIV Revue 
Beige De Droit International, (1978-79), p. 104 at 
132-156; P. S. Brar, ch. 3, n. 1 above, ch. III; P. S. Brar, 
The Practice And Procedures Of The Human Rights 
Committee Under The Optional Protocol Of The 
International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, 26 
Ind. JIL (1986) pp. 506-543; F. Capatorti, ch. 1, n. 1 above, 
p. 131 at pp. 143-148, (1968); K. Das, United Nations 
Institutions And Procedures Founded On Conventions On 
Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms, in K. Vasak, 
(General Editor), P. Alston (Ed., English Edition), p. 303 
at pp. 343-348; P. R. Ghandhi, The Human Rights Committee 
And The Right Of Individual Communication, 57 BYIL 1986 
(1987) pp. 201-251; W. P. Gormley, ch. 1, n. 1 above; 
M. Lippman, Human Rights Revisited: The Protection Of 
Human Rights Under The ICCPR, XXVI NILR (1979), p. 221 at 
pp. 262-277; E. Mose and T. Opsahl, The Optional Protocol 
To The ICCPR, 21 Santa Clara Law Review (1981), 
pp. 271-331; M. Moscowitz, Human Rights And World Order, 
Chapters IX and X, (1958); M. Nowak, The Effectiveness Of 
The ICCPR-Stocktaking After The First Eleven Sessions Of 
The HRC, 1 HRLJ (1980), p. 136 at pp. 152-162,168-169; 
M. Nowak, Survey Of Decisions, 2 HRLJ (1.981), p. 168 at 
169-172; Ibid., 3 HRLJ (1982) p. 207 at pp. 210-218; 
(Footnote Continued) 
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Ibid., 5 HRLJ (1984) p. 199 at pp. 203-208; Ibid., 7 HRLJ 
(1986) p. 287 at pp. 292-306; Othan A. Prounis, The Human 
Rights Committee: Toward Resolving The Paradox Of Human 
Rights Law, 17 Col. HRLR (1985) pp. 103-119; Pathak, The 
Protection Of Human Rights, 18 Ind. JIL (1978) 
pp. 265-273; B. G. Ramcharan, Implementing The 
International Covenants On Human Rights, in 
B. G. Ramcharan, (Ed. ), Human Rights: Thirty Years After The 
Universal Declaration, p. 159 at pp. 187-195, (1979); 
B. G. Ramcharan, The Emerging Jurisprudence Of The Human 
Rights Committee, 6 Dalhousie L. J. (1980), p. 7 at 
pp. 33-40; A. H. Robertson, ch. 2, n. 1 above p. 332 at 
357-369, (1984); A. H. Robertson, Human Rights In The 
World, pp. 54-60, (2d, 1982); H. R. S. Ryan, Seeking Relief 
Under The United Nations ICCPR, 6 Queens L. J. (1980), 
pp. 389-407; E. Schwelb, Civil And Political Rights-The 
International Measures Of Implementation, 62 AJIL 
(1968), p. 827 at pp. 860-868; E. Schwelb, The 
International Measures Of Implementation Of The ICCPR 
and Of The O. P., 12 Tex. ILJ (1977), p. 141 at pp. 
- 
D. L. Shelton, Individual Complaint Machinery Under The 
United Nations 1503 Procedure and the O. P. to the ICCPR, 
in H. Hannum, (Ed. ), Guide To International Human Rights 
Practice, p. 59 at pp. 67-72, (1984); L. B. Sohn, ch. 1, n. 1 
above, p. 39 at 166-167 (1968); L. B. Sohn, Human 
Rights: Their Implementation And Supervision By The 
United Nations, in T. Meron, (Ed. ), Human Rights In 
International Law-Legal And Policy Issues, Vol. 2, p. 369 
at pp. 389-391; P. Sieghart, The International Law Of 
Human Rights, Parts II-III passim, pp. 387-389, (1983); 
R. Starr, International Protection Of Human Rights And 
The United Nations Covenants, (1967) Wisconsin L. R. 
p. 841 at pp. 875,881-883; ' M. Tardu, Human Rights - The 
International Petition System, vol. 1, pp. 2-25, vol. II, 
part I, (1979-86); C. Tomuschat, Evolving Procedural 
Rules: The United Nations Human Rights Committee's First 
Two Years Of Dealing With Individual Communications, 1 
HRLJ (1980), pp. 249-257; Ton J. M. Zuidjwick, Petitioning 
The United Nations- A Study In Human Rights, Ch. XIV at 
pp. 348-369 and Ch. XV, (1982); Ton J. M. Zuidjwick, The 
Right To Petition The United Nations Because Of Alleged 
Violations Of Human Rights, 59 Can. Bar Rev. (1981) 
pp. 103-123; A. De Zayas and J. Th. Moller, Optional 
Protocol Cases Concerning The Nordic States Before The 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, 4 Nordic Journal 
Of International Law (1986) pp. 384-400; A. De Zayas, 
J. Th. Moller, T. Opsahl, Application Of The International 
Covenant On Civil And Political Rights Under The 
Optional Protocol By The Human Rights Committee, 28 GYIL 
(1985) pp. 9-64; M. J. Cote, Le Recours Au Comite Des 
Droits De L'homme De L'ONU - Une Illusion?, 26 Cahier De 
Droit (1985) pp. 531-547; T. Meron, Human Rights 
Law-Making In 
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(communication) 2 to or against governments is of long 
historical standing both in national and international 
law. 3 Proposals to include such a right in the 
international bill of rights proved controversial. That 
controversy is briefly examined in section A. Section B 
concerns the structure and terms of the O. P. Section C 
deals with the status of the O. P. and of communications 
submitted under it. Section D examines in detail how the 
practices and procedures of the HRC have developed the 
structure of the O. P. These aspects are linked to 
section E which reviews how the HRC has approached and 
interpreted the terms of the O. P., the ICCPR, and its 
own provisional rules of procedure in the consideration 
of communications. The HRC's views on a series of 
substantive rights in the ICCPR are examined in the 
following chapters. Finally in this chapter, section F 
offers an appraisal of the work of the HRC under the 
O. P. 
It is important to be clear concerning the primary 
purpose of the chapter. That purpose is not to present a 
comprehensive analysis of the O. P. per se. Rather it is 
to examine how the practice of the HRC has developed the 
O. P. as an implementation technique. Through that 
examination it is possible to observe the role that the 
HRC perceives for itself under the O. P. Is it to fulfil 
the role of a judicial body in proceedings of an 
(Footnote Continued) 
The United Nations, ch. III, (1986); A. J. Glenn Mower, 
Jr., Organizing To Implement The UN Civil/Political 
Rights Covenant, 3 HRRev. (1978) pp. 122-131. 
2 See n. 39 below. 
3 See generally on the right to petition in 
international law Zuidjwick, n. l above, (1982); 
Gormley, n. 1 above; D. P. Parson, The Individual Right Of 
Petition: A Study Of Methods Used By International 
Organizations To Utilize The Individual As A Source Of 
Information On The Violation of Human Rights, 13 Wayne 
L. Rev. (1967), pp. 678-705. 
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adversarial or inquisitorial nature or a more dynamic 
role? How is it to be guided in matters concerning the 
burden and standard of proof, the admission and 
admissibility of evidence, and fact-finding generally? 
Will the practices and precedents of other international 
institutions, particularly human rights organs, be 
followed? How strictly will the conditions of 
admissibility be interpreted and applied? Are the powers 
of the HRC to be strictly construed from the express 
terms of the O. P. or will the HRC assume implied powers 
that it considers reasonably necessary for it to fulfil 
its functions effectively? On many of these matters the 
O. P. itself offers little or no guidance so the answers 
can only be sought in the practices and procedures of 
the HRC. 
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A. THE ORIGINS, DRAFTING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
(1PTTMAT. PRÖTÖC ÖT. TO THF. TrrPR 
-4 
4.2 It is impossible to comprehend the significance in 
international law of the inclusion of a right of 
petition for individuals in the O. P. without at least an 
outline of its drafting history. As we noted in chapter 
one, when the General Assembly approved the Universal 
Declaration Of Human Rights in 1948 it instructed the 
Human Rights Commission (HRCion) to continue with the 
drafting of the international covenants and to consider 
measures of implementation including 
,a 
right of 
individual petition. 
5 More specifically in 1950 the 
General Assembly called upon the ECOSOC to request the 
HRCion to proceed with the consideration of provisions, 
"to be inserted into the draft covenant or in separate 
protocols, for the receipt and examination of petitions 
from individuals and organizations with respect to 
alleged violations of the Covenant". 
3 
Such proposals were almost necessarily going to be 
controversial as already some States had indicated that 
they considered the draft proposals for an inter-State 
procedure to be contrary to national sovereignty, 
international law and article 2(7). of the United Nations 
Charter. 4 Various proposals were made which would have 
extended the right of petition to individuals, groups of 
individuals, all or selected ndn-governmental 
4 See n. 1 above. For summaries'of the drafting work 
on the right to petition see Doc. A/2929, ch. 1, n. 1 above 
at ch. VII, prs. 59-89 (1955), Doc. A/6546, prs. 568-612 (1966), ibid. This account is largely drawn from those 
two documents. 
5 Doc. A/2929, n. 4 above, ch. I, pr. 9. 
3 G. A. Resn. 421 (v), section F, cited in Doc. A/2929, 
n. 4 above, pr. 22. 
A Y See ch. 1, pr. 1.18 above. 
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organisations. 
5 Other proposals favoured empowering the 
Human Rights Committee to act of its own motion, merely 
granting the right to communicate but leaving the matter 
of any action thereafter to the initiative of the HRC or 
States parties. 
6 Yet another suggestion was to appoint a 
High Commissioner (Attorney-General) for Human Rights 
with jurisdiction to receive charges from any source and 
with authority to institute proceedings before the HRC. 
7 
In the event proposals to extend the right of 
petition beyond states parties were to seriously divide 
the HRCion. Ultimately all such proposals were either 
rejected or withdrawn and the final HRCion draft 
contained no provisions for petitions by individuals or 
organizations. 
8 
Opposition to these proposals on petitions were 
broadly based on three lines of argument. Firstly, the 
traditional argument that only States were subjects of 
international law. The right of individuals and groups 
to complain of violations of their rights at the 
national level and the duty of States parties to ensure 
remedies for such violations had been recognised in the 
draft article 2 of the ICCPR; 
9 
petitions in the case of 
Trust Territories and under the Minorities system of the 
League of Nations were said to be distinguishable; 
10 the 
5 See e. g. ECOSOC OR, 13th session, Supp. 9, pr. 84; 
Doc. A/2929, n. 4 above, pr. 75 et seq. 
6 See e. g. ECOSOC OR, 16th session, Supp. 8, Ax. 3, 
prs. 132-143; Doc. A/2929, n. 4 above, pr. 76. 
7 Doc. A/2929, n. 4 above, prs. 84-86. See Clark, 
ch. 1, n. 125 above. 
8 See ch. 1, pr. 1.6 above. 
9 See text to ch. 1, n. 38 above. On article 2 ICCPR 
see ch. 6 below. 
10 See ch. 1, pr. 1.1 above. See also Zuidjwick, n. l 
above chs. III. 
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State was the unit of international organisation and 
only States were subjects of international law; no 
theory of supra-national authority had been generally 
accepted; the obligations of States under the United 
Nations to co-operate on human rights matters implied, 
apart from the Trusteeship system, no automatic 
recognition of the right of petition of individuals and 
non-governmental organisations; responsibility for 
observation of the Covenants should rest with States; 
extending the right of petition might violate the 
sovereignty of States and the sovereign equality of 
States. 
Secondly, it was argued that the proposed system of 
inter-State complaints was sufficient to safeguard the 
provisions of the Covenant. There was no reason to doubt 
that States parties would fulfil their obligations; 
States parties would be free to take up cases of 
violations; most cases could be settled by direct 
diplomatic negotiations; charges brought before the 
Committee would be strictly confined to violations of 
the Covenant. 
The third line of argument was that the 
international responsibility for the promotion of human 
rights was a relatively recent development and so an 
extended petition system might be unacceptable to many 
countries. Some representatives accepted that, ideally, 
the right of individuals, or at least non governmental 
organizations, ought to be recognized internationally as 
they were nationally. They argued, however, that the 
international community was not sufficiently developed 
for the right of petition to be granted immediately 
without fear of its being abused. The result might be a 
mass of irresponsible and mischevious allegations 
submitted for political or propaganda purposes. It was 
feared that the whole implementation machinery could 
thus be paralysed and it was doubted whether adequate 
safeguards could be introduced. Moreover, the inclusion 
of a right of petition might prevent States from 
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ratifying the Covenant and thus delay or even prevent 
the Covenant from coming into force. 
4.2.1 Those in favour of extending the right of petition 
beyond States parties argued that the question of 
effective implementation had to be examined from the 
point of view of the individuals concerned as well as 
States. The traditional theory that only States were 
subjects of international law was said to be under 
challenge. Various precedents were cited including the 
United Nations Charter, the Minorities System of the 
League of Nations, the International Labour Organisation 
system, the Nuremberg trials, and the - European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
11 The views of several 
authors were cited as further support for this view. 
12 
Moreover, it was argued that under the very terms of the 
Covenant the individual was plainly a subject of 
international law and the purpose of the Covenant was to 
protect him against abuses of power by the State. The 
view was advanced that as each State was free to accept 
the Covenant or not, what was involved was not an 
invasion of sovereignty but rather a voluntary 
relinquishment of some national sovereignty. 
13 Fears of 
abuse were countered with the view that adequate 
safeguards could be provided to protect States. 
The advocates of an extended petition system argued 
strongly that an inter-State petition system alone was 
not sufficient to effectively implement the Covenants. 
Violations by one State would cause moral rather than 
11 Doc. A/2929, n. 4 above, pr. 68. On the ECHR see 
'European Convention On Human Rights: Collected Texts', 
(1986). 
12 E/CN. 4/SR. 434, p. 6 (Turkey). 
13 Doc. A/2929, n. 4 above, pr. 69. See the view of 
the HRC under the O. P. in Antonaccio v. Uruguay, pr. 4.11 
below. 
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immediate and direct injury to other States parties so 
intervention would be unlikely. Past experience of the 
League of Nations and the I. L. O. was cited to 
demonstrate that intervention by States to redress 
violations of human rights, even under treaty 
obligations, had been negligible and rarely fruitful. 
Political reality indicated that States would be 
unlikely to lay charges of violations against friendly 
States or States with which they had close political or 
economic ties. Conversely, allegations concerning a 
State with which the applicant State was not on friendly 
terms would be viewed as motivated by other than 
humanitarian purposes. 
14 
It was argued that the Covenant had to give the 
individual human being a basic right to protest when his 
dignity was impaired. A particular plea was made to 
allow non-governmental organisations having consultative 
status with ECOSOC to have the right to petition. These 
organisations had played an important part in promoting 
human rights nationally and internationally, would act 
with great caution because of the potential fear of 
criticism from their own members and from ECOSOC, and 
had the advantage over private citizens of owing no 
allegiance to any particular State and would therefore 
be free to defend the interests of humanity as a whole. 
4.3 The possibility of including an optional protocol on 
the right of petition was discussed in the HRCion as a 
potential solution to the objections of states opposed 
to the inclusion of of this right in the text of the 
Covenant. However, this too was opposed. Some States 
maintained their objections in principle to the right of 
petition. Even the advocates of the right of petition 
14 Doc. A/2929, n. 4 above, prs. 70-72. A proposal to 
insert a special article to the effect that States 
parties would not consider any steps taken by another 
party under the inter-State procedure as an unfriendly 
act was not received favourably, Ibid., pr. 71. 
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did not favour this course because they considered that 
inclusion of the right of petition was indispensable for 
the proper implementation of the Covenant. 
15 A draft 
protocol on petitions from individuals and 
non-governmental organisations was submitted by the 
United States but was subsequently withdrawn without 
there having been any detailed discussion. 16 
In the event then the final draft of the HRCion's 
text contained no provision for petitions from 
individuals or non-governmental organisations. During 
the consideration of the HRCion's draft in the Third 
Committee amendments were proposed to insert an article 
on the right of individual petition. 17 The debate on 
these proposals largely mirrored those in the HRCion. 
Those who supported a right of individual petition cited 
the precedents of the ECHR (1950) and the ICERD (1965) 
and argued that they had transformed the status of the 
individual in international law. In addition to pointing 
to the optional nature of the proposed right stress was 
laid on the safeguards within it that would prevent its 
being abused. As for the opponents of the right of 
petition particular concern was expressed in terms of 
the alleged infringement of State sovereignty involved, 
the dangers of abuse and undesirable publicity. 
Moreover, they argued that its inclusion might limit 
ratifications to the extent that the Covenant would not 
enter into force. 
A key question raised in the debate was whether if a 
right of individual petition was to be included it 
should be embodied in the draft covenant or provided for 
in a separate protocol annexed to the draft protocol. 
Those in favour of the former stressed the "organic 
15 See Doc. A/2929, n. 1 above, prs. 74-80. 
16 See ECOSOC OR, 14th session, Supp. 4, Ax. IIIA. 
17 See Doc. A/6546, n. 1 above, pr. 477. 
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unity" of the instrument; those in favour of the latter 
argued that the mere presence of such a provision in an 
instrument might of itself make it impossible, on 
grounds of principle, for many States to become parties. 
Eventually, the Third Committee narrowly adopted a 
proposal that the right of petition be included in a 
separate protocol annexed to the draft Covenant. 18 After 
further discussion and amendment the draft Protocol was 
approved by the Third Committee though with a 
substantial number of abstentions. 
19 The Optional 
Protocol was finally adopted by the General Assembly by 
a vote of 66 to 2, with 2 abstentions. 
20 After two 
decades of discussion and debate the "International Bill 
Of Rights" was complete. 21 Not until a decade later, 
however, were the two Covenants and the Optional 
Protocol to come into force. The rest of this chapter 
examines the first decade of practice under the O. P. The 
final appraisal includes an examination of the 
significance of the Optional Protocol in international 
law. 22 
18 Doc. A/6546, n. 1 above, pr. 485. 
19 The vote was 59 for, 2 against and 32 
abstentions, 
Doc. A/6546, n. 4 above, pr. 597. 
20 G. A. Resn. 2200 A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR (1496th 
meeting) pr. 60 at 6; A/PV 1496 (1966). 
21 See ch. 1, pr. 1.3 above. 
22 See pr. 4.119 below. 
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B. The Structure And Terms Of The O. P. to the ICCPR. 
4.4 According to the Preamble to the O. P. the HRC is 
given competence to consider communications from alleged 
victims, "in order to further achieve the purposes of 
the ICCPR". 
23 Under Article 1 of the O. P. a State party 
to the O. P. recognizes the competence of the HRC, "To 
receive and consider communications from individuals 
subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a 
violation by that State Party of any of the rights set 
forth in the Covenant". The competent body then is the 
HRC24 and only the HRC. 
25 A suggestion in the Third 
Committee that the States parties to the O. P. should 
establish a separate Committee for the consideration of 
communications was not taken up. 
26 
Communications are considered by all of the members 
of the HRC. Therefore, independent experts who are 
nationals of States which are not parties to the O. P., 
27 
and which may in fact oppose recognition of the right of 
23 The HRC referred to the preamble in its decision 
in Antonaccio v. Uruguay, A/37/40, p. 114. See pr. 4.11 
below. 
24 See pr. 4.120 below. 
25 There is no reference in the O. P. to any role in 
the implementation machinery of the O. P. for the ECOSOC 
or the Third Committee of the General Assembly. See the 
schemes of implementation machinery of the ECHR, the 
AMR, the ICESCR and the ESCh in Vasak/Alston, (Eds. ), n. 1 
above, pp. 684-685. 
26 See the statement of Mr. Kornyenko (Ukrainian 
SSR), Third Committee, A/C. 3/SR 1441, pr. 51, (1966). See 
Schwelb, Civil and Political Rights, n. 1 above, p. 861 and 
n. 152. 
27 So, for example, the two independent experts from 
the U. K. who have served on the HRC have taken part in 
the consideration of communications even though the U. K. 
is not a party to the O. P. 
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individual petition, 
28 
still participate fully in the 
consideration of communications. While there are obvious 
objections to this similar practices can be observed 
with respect to the ICJ, 
29 the EUCM, 30 the EUCT, 31 the 
CERD, 32 the IACM, 33 and the IACT. 34 Hopefully, through 
the participation of their nationals in the development 
of the O. P. procedure States which are not parties can 
be encouraged and induced to ratify the O. P. With the 
continuing involvement of the nationals in the O. P. 
procedures it may become increasingly difficult for the 
U. S. S. R. and the Eastern European States to maintain 
their position in opposition to the right of individual 
petition. 
35 
There is no provision in the O. P. for Ad hoc 
members to join the HRC. 36 Consequently a State party 
28 This would include members of the HRC of 
Russian, East German, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Polish and 
Yugoslavian nationality. 
29 All members of the United Nations are ipso facto 
parties to the Statute of the ICJ (article 93 of U. N. 
Charter). However, members of the ICJ are to be elected 
regardless of their nationality (article 2, Statute of 
ICJ). Judges may sit on the court even if they are a 
national of a State which has not accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the court under article 36(2) 
of the Statute. 
30 See Van Dijk and Van Hoof, pp. 18-23. 
31 Ibid., pp. 23-27. 
32 See Lerner, ch. 3, n. 1 above, pp. 82-86. 
33 See Buergenthal, Norris and Shelton, Protecting 
Human Rights In The Americas, ch. VI (2d, 1987). 
34 Ibid. 
35 See Mose and Opsahl, p. 330. 
36 Cf. Art 31 of the Statute of the ICJ; Art. 10 of 
the Statute of the IACT. Under the ECHR all Contracting 
parties have one member of the EUCM of their nationality (Footnote Continued) 
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may be a respondent before the HRC without one of its 
nationals or a person nominated by it being on the 
HRC. 37 We may also note here that the HRC does not 
possess any advisory jurisdiction. 38 
(Footnote Continued) 
or nominated by them, and all members of the Council of 
Europe have one judge of the EUCT of their nationality 
or nominated by them even if they have not accepted the 
right of individual petition (article 25) or the 
compulsory jurisdiction (article 46) of the EUCT. When a 
Chamber of the EUCM or the EUCT is formed they include 
the Commission member or judge respectively of the 
national States concerned. 
37 For example, most communications to date have 
concerned Uruguay which has never had one of its 
nationals or a person nominated by it serving as an 
independent on the HRC. 
38 Under Articles 96 of the U. N. Charter an 
advisory opinion of the ICJ can be sought by organs of 
the U. N. and specialized agencies if they have been 
authorized by the General Assembly to do so. The 
autonomous status of the HRC would place it outside 
article 96 despite its strong links with the U. N., see 
ch. 2 above. The General Assembly or the Security Council 
could obtain an advisory opinion concerning the ICCPR or 
the O. P. but such an opinion would not be binding on the 
States parties. See Sohn, ch. 1, n. 1 above, p. 149 citing 
a Report of the Secretary-General (1950). We have 
already noted that all references to the ICJ in the 
ICCPR were deleted, see ch. l, pr. 1.11 above. The EUCT 
has limited advisory jurisdiction under the 2nd Protocol 
to the ECHR which has never been invoked, see ECHR 
- (Footnote Continued) 
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Early draft versions of what emerged as the O. P. 
used the term "petition". 
39 This was changed to 
"communication" but this does not seem to have been 
intended as a substantive change. 40 The O. P. only 
provides for communications to be submitted by 
(Footnote Continued) 
Collected Texts, n. 11 above, pp. 27-30; Van Dijk and Van 
Hoof, pp. 158-160. The desirability of empowering the 
EUCT to give preliminary rulings at the request of a 
national court is being considered within the Council of 
Europe, see Information Sheet No. 18, Apx. XXIV, Council 
of Europe, (1986) and Information Sheet No. 19, pp. 21-22, (1986) The IACT has issued a number of important 
advisory opinions, for example on reservations and the 
death penalty. See T. Buergenthal, The Advisory 
Jurisdiction Of The Inter American court Of Human 
Rights, in T. Buergenthal (ed. ), Contemporary Issues In 
International Law, pp. 127-147 (1984). 
39 See the Netherlands proposal, A/C. 3/L. 1355, 
Report of the Third Committee, Doc. A/6546, pr. 474, (1966), 
and the ten power amendment, A/C. 3/L. 1402/Rev. 2 (draft 
article 41 bis), Ibid., pr. 477. For some of the 
different term inology used in some international 
instruments see Schwelb, Civil and Political Rights, n. 1 
above, p. 864. "The meaning of the term "petition" in 
international legal usage is somewhat different from its 
meaning within the common law systems. The aim of the 
right of petition is especially to inform the relevant 
authorities of a certain problem or situation, and does 
not automatically lead to subsequent proceedings", Van 
Dijk and Van Hoof, p. 35. 
40 The changes were suggested by France, 
A/C. 3/SR. 1418 pr. 8 (Mr. Paolini). See also 
(Footnote Continued) 
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"individuals". 41 As we have noted proposals to extend 
the right of petition to all or selected 
non-governmental organisations were not accepted. 
42 
4.5 The communication submitted to the HRC must be in 
"written" form (Article 2 O. P. ) and all available 
domestic remedies must have been exhausted. (Articles 2 
and 5(2) (b) O. P. ) There is no provision in the O. P. 
equivalent to that in Article 14 ICERD which provides 
that a State party must establish or indicate a body 
within its national legal order which shall be competent 
to receive and consider petitions from individuals who 
claim to be victims of any of the rights in the ICERD 
and have exhausted all other available domestic 
remedies. 
43 Presumably, however, a State party to the O. P. 
would not be precluded from establishing such a body and 
if it did so the individual would probably be required 
to have recourse to it in order to satisfy the domestic 
remedies requirement of the O. P. 
Article 3 of the O. P. provides that the HRC shall 
consider "inadmissible" any communication which is 
anonymous, 
44 
or which it considers to be an abuse of the 
(Footnote Continued) 
A/C. 3/L. 1394, later withdrawn. In the HRCion India 
proposed a "petition" system under which the Committee 
might undertake an enquiry on receipt of complaints from 
groups of individuals and non-governmental organizations 
if it so decided. The proposal was rejected. This would 
have been a petition system in strict international law 
usage, see HRCion, Report of 7th session, ECOSOC OR, 
13th session, Supp. 9, prs. 84-85. 
41 See prs. 4.64-4.81 below. Cf. ECHR art. 25; ICERD 
art. 14; AMR art. 44. 
42 See prs. 4.23-4.26 above. 
43 Article 14(2) ICERD. For the background to this 
unusual provision see Humphrey, ch. 1, n. 1 above, p. 333 
(1984); Lerner, ch. 3, n. 1 above, p. 84. See also Article 
14(3) 
- 
(6) ICERD. 
44 See pr. 4.117 below. 
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right of submission, 
45 
or incompatible with the 
provisions of the Covenant. 
46 Subject to the provisions 
of Article 3 O. P. communications are brought to the 
attention of the State party concerned (Article 4(1)) 
The State party then has six months to submit to the 
HRC, "Written explanations or statements clarifying the 
matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by 
that State". (Article 4(2)) 
Under Article 5(2) O. P. the HRC shall not consider 
any communication from an individual unless it has 
ascertained that: 
"(a) The same matter is not being examined under another 
procedure of international investigation or 
settlement; 
47 
(b) The individual has exhausted all available domestic 
remedies. 
48 
This shall not be the rule when the application of the 
remedies is unreasonably prolonged". 
49 
The examination of communications is to be 
conducted in closed meetings. (Article 5(3) O. P. ) On 
completing its "examination" the HRC "Shall forward its 
views to the State Party concerned and to the 
individual". (Article 5(4) O. P. ) There are no express 
provisions in the O. P. concerning a friendly 
45 See pr. 4.118 below. 
46 See prs. 4.49-4.86 below. 
47 See prs. 4.87-4.99 below. 
48 See prs. 4.100-4.116 below. 
49 This sentence has been the subject of important 
decision by the HRC as to whether it applies to Article 
5 (2) (a) O. P. as well as to Article 5 (2) (b) O. P. See 
pr. 4.97 below. 
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settlement50 or the exercise of good offices by the 
HRC. 51 
Article 6 O. P. instructs the HRC to include in its 
annual report under Article 45 ICCPR a summary of its 
activities under the O. P. 
52 Article 7 O. P. provides that 
pending the achievement of the objectives of the General 
Assembly's "Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
To Colonial Countries and Peoples" (1960), 53 the 
provisions of the O. P., "Shall in no way limit the right 
of petition granted to these people by the Charter of 
the United Nations and other international conventions 
and instruments under the United Nations- and its 
specialized agencies". 
54 
Articles 8-10 O. P. are noted below. 
55 Article 11 
deals with amendments; article 12 concerns 
denunciations; article 13 provides for States parties to 
be informed of certain matters concerning the O. P. by 
the Secretary- General of the United Nations; article 14 
provides that the Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish texts of the O. P. are equally authentic. 
56 
50 Cf. Articles 28 and 30 ECHR. See Van Dijk and Van 
Hoof, pp. 101-110. 
51 A good offices procedure is provided for in 
Article 41(1) (e) ICCPR for inter-State complaints. On 
good offices in a human rights context generally see 
B. Ramcharan, Humanitarian Good Offices In International 
Law (1983). 
52 For the importance of the HRC's Annual Report 
see Ch. 3, pr. 3.40 above. 
53 G. A. Resn. 1514(XV), (Dec. 14,1960), GAOR, 15th 
session, Supp. 16, p. 66. 
54 Cf. Article 15 ICERD. On the rights of petition 
of such peoples see Zuidjwick, n. 1 above. 
55 See pr. 4.6 below. 
56 A discrepancy in the texts has been identified 
concerning article 5 O. P., see pr. 4.87 below. 
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Like the provisions of the ECHR dealing with the 
right of individual petition the O. P. is notable for its 
brevity. This is partly accounted for by the haste in 
which the O. P. was drafted and adopted. 57 The 
consequence, however, is that the HRC was necessarily left 
with substantial scope and flexibility to establish the 
necessary procedural system to operate the O. P. This 
system is given detailed attention after a brief 
consideration of the status of the O. P. and the status 
of communications placed before the HRC. 
57 Mose and Opsahl, p. 276 argue that the speed of 
drafting has to be taken into account in interpreting 
and applying the O. P. 
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C. Status of the O. P.; Status of communications under 
the O. P. 
4.6 Although the ICCPR and the O. P. are substantially 
related, and the HRC is the implementation organ for 
both, they are separate international treaties. 58 The 
O. P. is open for signature by any State that has signed 
the ICCPR (Article 8(1) O. P. ). It can only be ratified 
by or acceded to by a State which has ratified or 
acceded to the ICCPR (Article 8 (2)(3) O. P. ). The O. P. 
provides that it shall enter into force three months 
after the date of deposit of the tenth instrument of 
ratification or accession (Article 9(1) O. P. ). However, 
the entry into force of the O. P. was "Subject to the 
entry into force of the ICCPR" (Article 9(l) O. P. ). In 
fact the O. P. entered into force on the same date as the 
ICCPR, 23 March 1976, because by that date there were 
already the necessary ten States Parties to the O. P. 
59 
For States subsequently ratifying or acceding to the 
O. P., the O. P. enters into force three months after the 
date of the deposit of the instrument of ratification or 
accession (Article 9(2) O. P. ) As with the ICCPR the 
provisions of the O. P. "Extend to all parts of federal 
58 In the Third Committee it was originally decided 
that the draft provisions on the right to individual 
petition would be included in a separate Protocol 
annexed to the Covenant. Subsequently the argument "that 
it was impossible to have a Protocol that was both 
separate and annexed", was accepted, see SR 
A/C. 3/SR/1451, pr. 62 (Saskena). See the comments at 
A/C. 3/SR. 1446 pr. 28 and SR 1451 pr. 54 (Schreiber, 
Director of the Human Rights Division). The ICCPR and 
the O. P. are listed as separate treaties by the 
Secretary-General of the U. N. Professor Robertson has 
suggested that there is even some advantage in the O. P. 
being a separate treaty in terms of publicity, 
Robertson, ch. 3, n. 1 above, p. 360 (1981). 
59 There were in fact twelve States parties as of 
that date. 
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States without any limitations or exceptions" (Article 
10 O. P. ). 60 
There is no provision in the O. P. concerning its 
territorial scope. 
61 
The Netherlands has declared the 
O. P. applicable to the Netherlands Antilles. 
62 There is 
also no provision concerning reservations to the O. p. 
63 
In practice a number of states have made reservations to 
the O. P. some of which have been considered by the 
HRC. 64 
Status of communications under the O. P. 
4.7 As of 1 April 1988 forty one of the eighty seven 
States which have ratified or acceded to the ICCPR have 
accepted the competence of the HRC to deal with 
individual communications by ratifying or acceding to 
the O. P. These States are Argentina, Austria, Barbados, 
Bolivia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, 
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, France, 
Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Luxembourg, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, 
Panama, Peru, Portugal, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, San Marino, Senegal, Spain, Suriname, 
Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Zaire, Zambia. 
65 
A number of West European 
60 See ch. 1, prs. 1.7,1.24 above. 
61 Article 29 V. C. L. T. (1969) provides that, 
"Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or 
is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each 
State party in respect of its entire territory". 
62 
'Human Rights 
- 
Status Of ]nternational 
Instruments' (1987) p. 94, Doc. ST/HR/5. 
63 See ch. 1, pr. 1.24 above. 
64 See n. 62 above, pp. 91-94. See prs. 4.92-4.96 
below. 
65 Doc. A/42/40 A x. I ti p p. 114. Information supplied 
by the UN Secretariat. 
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States are not parties. 
66 
The U. S. S. R. and the East 
European bloc are not parties. 
67 
A small number of 
African states are parties. No Asian State is a party. 
As the United States has not ratified the ICCPR it is 
precluded from ratifying the O. P. 
68 
At its very first session (March-April 1977) the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations informed the HRC 
that some communications had been submitted for 
consideration by the HRC. 
69 The HRC began its 
consideration of communications at its second session 
(August 1977). 
4.8 As of 1 April 1988 288 communications have been 
placed before the HRC for consideration, concerning 26 
States parties to the O. P. 70. The status of the 288 
communications is as follows: 
(a) Concluded by views under Article 5(4) O. P.: 83; 
(b) Concluded in another manner (inadmissible, 
discontinued, suspended or withdrawn): 115; 
(c) Declared admissible, not yet concluded: 22; 
66 Of the twenty one Contracting parties to the 
ECHR nine are also States parties to the O. P. The U. K. 
has not signed or ratified the O. P. on the ground that, 
"In some respects it compares unfavourably from the 
individual's standpoint with the procedure established 
by article 25 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, to which the United Kingdom has acceded", 
Hansard, H. C. Debs., vol. 962, Written Answers, col. 262, 
(8 Feb. 1979). See N. Grief, The International Protection 
Of Human Rights: Standard-Setting And Enforcement By The 
United Nations And The Council Of Europe, (1983) Bracton 
LJ pp. 41-65. 
67 These States do not recognize the standing of 
the individual in international law, see ch. 1, prs. 1.18 
- 
1.21,1.26 and ch. 4, pr. 4.2-4.3 above. 
68 See ch. 1, pr. 1.25 above. 
69 Doc. A/32/44 prs. 146-147. 
70 Information supplied by the U. N. Secretariat. 
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(d) Pending at pre-admissibility stage: 68. 
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D. THE PROCEDURAL FUNCTIONING OF THE O. P. 
1. The Receipt And Transmission Of Communications. 71 
4.9 Every year tens of thousands of communications 
concerning human rights matters are received by the 
United Nations. The task of channelling communications 
to the appropriate body is undertaken, on behalf of the 
Secretary-General of the U. N., by the Communications 
Unit of the Centre for Human Rights in Geneva. 72 The 
nature and extent of the Secretary-Generals' powers are 
of immense importance in determining which 
communications are directed to the HRC for consideration 
under the O. P. 
73 There are no express provisions in the 
O. P. dealing with this matter. There was general 
agreement within the HRC that the function should be a 
"purely administrative", 74 technical one rather than 
constituting a "preliminary screening procedure". 75 The 
exercise of any substantive discretion was to be 
71 See Rules 78-81; Doc. A/32/44, prs. 52-54. 
72 On behalf of the Secretary-General the Centre 
for Human Rights acts as the Secretariat to the HRC. The 
Secretariat staff for the work of the HRC under the O. P. 
is different from the staff which works with the HRC on 
the reporting process under article 40. The 
Communications Unit receives any submission, however 
addressed, provided it is intended for the U. N. and 
alleges some violation, Report of the Secretary-General, 
Doc. E/CN. 4/1317 (1979). The Human Rights Centre employs 
nearly 50 professionals to serve the HRCion and related 
organs. On the HRC and the Secretariat see ch. 2, 
prs. 2.16-2.17 above. 
73 The Secretariat refers as many communications as 
possible for consideration under the O. P. 
'? Doc. E/CN. 4/1317, n. 72 above, prs. 30-36 (1979). 
74 SR 11 pr. 19 (Lallah). 
75 SR 11 pr. 21 (Opsahl). 
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reserved to the HRC. 
76 Among the matters discussed were 
cases in which it was not clear whether a communication 
was intended as a formal complaint or not, 
77 the need 
for clarifications to assist the HRC and the author, 78 
and authors who had no knowledge of the provisions of 
the O. P. and no access to expert legal advice. 79 
Under the Rule adopted, 
"The Secretary-General shall bring to the attention 
of the Committee, in accordance with the present 
rules, communications which are or appear to be 
submitted for consideration Oby the Committee under 
article 1 of the Protocol". 
Inevitably the selection and channelling of 
communications within the U. N. involves an element of 
discretion on the part of the Secretary-General 
notwithstanding the various guidelines indicated by 
bodies like the HRC. 81 The rule adopted by the HRC would 
76 This point was consistently emphasised during 
the discussion and adoption of the HRC's Rules. The 
suggestion during the discussion by Mr. Mazaud, Deputy 
Director of the then Division of Human Rights, that the 
Secretariat could take a decision on whether a 
communicant was under the jurisdiction of a State party 
to the O. P. must, it is submitted, be wrong, (SR 11 
pr. 32). Such a decision would clearly be one of 
substance that should be decided by the HRC. 
77 SR 11 pr. 11 (Esperson). 
78 SR 11 pr. 16 (Esperson). 
79 SR 11 pr. 25 (Lallah). 
80 R. 78(1). For example in C. E. v. Canada, S. D., 
p. 16, C. E. 's letter was not explicitly addressed to the 
HRC but appeared to be submitted for consideration under 
the O. P. 
81 The CERD has adopted the same rule as the HRC 
but with the addition of the words, "and who are subject 
to the jurisdiction of a State party bound by a 
declaration under article 14". (R. 83(1)) Under the ECHR 
the Secretariat has the power to draw to the attention 
of potential applicants the possibility of rejection of 
the complaint in cases where the case law of the EUCM 
points in that direction, see Mikaelson, pp. 40-42; Van 
Dijk and Van Hoof, pp. 53-55. 
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appear to afford the Secretary-General sufficient 
latitude and flexibility to include borderline cases. 
82 
Before taking a decision on transmission the 
Secretary-General may request clarification from the 
author as to his wish to have the communication 
submitted to the HRC for consideration under the O. P. 
83 
If doubt as to the author's wish remains it is resolved 
in favour of the HRC being seized of the 
communication. 
84 
The only situation explicitly provided for in the 
Rules is that of a communication against a State which 
is not a party to the O. P. Such communications are not 
to be received by the HRC. 85 In practice the 
Secretary-General informs the author that the State 
concerned is not a party to the O. P. and that, 
therefore, the HRC has no jurisdiction. 86 The HRC 
considered it permissible for the Secretary-General to 
take such a decision because factually the matter would 
be clear. 
87 There may, however, be difficult cases and 
these should in principle be decided by the HRC. 88 
During the discussion of the Rules concerning these 
matters various members made a number of comments on the 
general policy to be adopted. It was stressed that a 
restrictive transmittal policy should be avoided since 
82 See Doc. A/39/40, pr. 561. 
83 R. 78(2). 
84 Ibid. 
85 R. 78(3). The CERD has adopted the same rule (R. 83(3)). A substantial number of applications to the 
EUCM have concerned States not a party to the ECHR. See 
EUCM, Survey Of Activities And Statistics, (1987) p. 8. 
86 See Doc. A/33/40 pr. 590. 
87 See the comments of Graefrath at SR 11 pr. 27. 
88 See Bossuyt, n. ] above, pp. 130-133; Mose and 
Opsahl, p. 281. 
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the O. P. procedure was new and unknown. It was suggested 
that the Secretary-General should point out to the 
authors of communications the existence of the O. P. 
procedure whenever appropriate and indicate the 
possibility of them addressing their communications to 
the HRC. It was also suggested that the Secretariat draw 
up a model communication and guidelines to assist 
communicants. A model communication has been prepared 
but communicants are not obliged to use it. 
89 
No Rule was adopted by the HRC concerning the 
language in which authors could submit their 
communications. The view was expressed, however, that 
authors should be able to write in the language of their 
choice. It was also suggested that the initial 
acknowledgement sent to authors should be drafted in the 
language in which the communication was submitted, and 
dispatched not later than ten to twenty days after the 
receipt of their communication. 
90 
As already noted there is no time limit in the. O. P. 
concerning the submission of communications. 
91 A draft 
Rule proposed by the Secretariat would have established 
a twenty four month deadline. 
92 This proposal raised an 
interesting discussion. 93 It was argued that the concept 
of a time limit was "Customary", 
94 
"A generally accepted 
principle and an important practical feature of domestic 
. 
89 The Secretariat model can be found in Apx. IV 
below. 
90 Doc. A/32/44, pr. 174. Cf. Rule 24 of the Rules of 
procedure of the EUCM, ECHR Collected Texts, n. 11 above, 
p. 120. 
91 Cf. article 14(2) ICERD (6 months) ; art. 26 ECHR 
(6 months); article 46 AMR (6 months). 
92 Draft Rule 91(1), CCPR/C/L. 2 and Add. 1 and 2, 
Yb. HRC, Vo1. II, p. 1 at 8. 
93 See SR 20 prs. 51-60; SR 21 prs. 1-16. 
94 SR 20 pr. 54 (Lallah) 
. 
CH. 4.211 
and international law", 
95 
and would protect the HRC from 
the consideration of claims relating to very old 
events. 
96 The precedent set by the ECHR was cited. 97 
However, the proposal met with strong 'opposition as 
being "Neither legally nor morally defensible"98 and as 
carrying the possibility of unfortunate consequences. 
99 
It was decided that there was no immediate need to adopt 
a Rule on the matter and that the HRC could revert to it 
if experience justified the consideration of such a 
provision. 
100 No subsequent discussion on a time limit 
has been held in any public session and there remains no 
Rule on the point. In the course of the discussion a 
number of members pointed to the possibility that the 
HRC could treat an unreasonable delay in the submission 
of a communication as an abuse of the right of 
submission (Article 3 O. P. ) and accordingly declare the 
communication inadmissible. 
101 
It should also be noted that no Rule deals with the 
matter of the withdrawal of a communication. 
102 Again 
the point was discussed during the drafting of the Rules 
but the HRC decided to revert to the question if the 
95 SR 20 pr. 55 (Vincent-Evans). 
96 SR 21 pr. 1 (Mr. Mazaud, Deputy Director, of the 
then Human Rights Division). 
97 Article 26 ECHR. 
98 SR 20 pr. 60 (Prado-Vallejo). 
99 SR 21 pr. 5 (Opsahl). 
100 SR 21 pr. 15 (Chairman). 
101 See SR 20 pr. 57 (Vincent-Evans), SR 21 pr. 6 
(Movchan), SR 21 pr. 8 (Esperson), SR 21 pr. 13 
(Mora-Rojas). To the same effect see Mose and Opsahl, 
p. 310. 
102 See Van Dijk and Van hoof, pp. 107-108; 
Mikaelson, pp. 50-51. 
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need arose on the basis of its further experience. 
103 No 
Rule has subsequently been adopted. In practice there 
have been withdrawals. 
104 
The Secretary-General prepares and circulates to 
HRC members at regular intervals lists of communications 
submitted to the HRC with a brief summary of their 
contents. 
105 This Rule is designed to avoid delay 
between the receipt of a" communication by the 
Secretary-General and its submission to the HRC. It also 
ensures that members have a working document for each 
communication submitted for consideration. The full text 
of any communication is available to any member on his 
request. 
106 A permanent register of every communication 
is maintained by the Secretary-General. 
107 For each 
registered communication the Secretary-General prepares 
and circulates a summary of the relevant information. 
108 
The HRC has given the Secretary-General authority 
to request clarifications from the author concerning the 
applicability of the O. P. to his communication. 
109 Such 
requests indicate a time limit with a view to avoiding 
103 For the HRC's discussion see SR 17 pr. 27-34, SR 
34 pr., 60-74; Doc. A/32/44, prs. 90-94. See Mose and Opsahl, 
p. 315. 
104 See prs. 4.19.4 below. 
105 R. 79(1). For the HRC's discussion see SR 11 
prs. 65-76. 
106 R. 79(2). 
107 R. 79(1). The numbering system used in the 
registration process was retrospectively changed at the 
HRC's eighteenth session, see Doc. A/37/40, note to 
pr. 381. 
108 R. 81. 
109 R. 80(1). 
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undue delays. 
110 Clarifications may be sought, in 
particular, regarding: 
(a) The name, address, age and occupation of the author 
and the verification of his identity; 
(b) The name of the State party against which the 
communication is directed; 
(c) The object of the communication; 
(d) The provision or provisions of the Covenant alleged 
to have been violated; 
(e) The facts of the claim; 
(f) Steps taken by the author to exhaust domestic 
remedies; 
(g) The extent to which the same matter is being 
examined under another procedure of international 
investigation or settlement. "' 
A request for clarification does not preclude the 
inclusion of the communication in the list prepared by 
the Secretary-General for circulation to the HRC. 112 
110 R. 80(2). 
111 R. 80(1) (a)-(g). Under R. 80(3) the HRC may 
approve a questionnaire for the purpose of requesting 
this information from the author. Such a questionnaire 
is presently under consideration. When R. 80 (draft R. 81) 
was being adopted Mr. Esperson stated that, "It was 
possible for the State party to have entered a 
reservation when ratifying the Covenant and, in such 
cases, the Secretary-General had to determine whether 
its reservations applied to the communication under 
consideration". (SR 12 pr. 26. ) It is submitted that this 
view is incorrect. The applicability of a reservation 
must be a substantive question that is reserved to the 
HRC. In fact the HRC has considered such a question in a 
number of cases. See, e. g., Fanali v. Italy, ch. 10, 
pr. 10.52 below. 
112 R. 80(4) 
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2. General Provisions Regarding The Consideration Of 
Communications. 113 
4.10 Article 5(3) O. P. directs that the HRC hold closed 
meetings when examining communications under the O. P. 
This is repeated in Rule 82 but with the important 
addition that, "Meetings during which the Committee may 
consider general issues such as procedures for the 
application of the Protocol may be public if the 
Committee so decides". 
114 The HRC has exercised this 
discretion on a number of occasions and thus allowed 
some useful insights to be gained into the workings of 
the O. P. 115 
All documents relating to the consideration of 
communications under the O. P. are confidential. 
116 Thus 
while a communication is being considered no substantive 
information is made available to the public or the 
press. This applies to both the admissibility and merits 
stages. 
117 A selection of decisions holding a 
communication inadmissible have been published in the 
HRC's annual report. 
118 The identity of the author or 
113 See Rules 82-86. 
114 For the HRC's discussion see SR 12 pr. 28-34. 
115 See, e. g., the summary of the HRC's discussion 
of the question of follow-up to final views in 
prs. 4.41-4.43 below. 
116 It is interesting to note, however, that a 
proposed rule referring to "-"confidential" was not 
adopted. 
117 If a communicant were to publicize this 
information the HRC might consider such action to be an 
abuse of the rights of submission and accordingly 
declare the communication inadmissible. See pr. 4.118 
below. 
118 These are published on the basis that they are 
"final" decisions. 
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alleged victim is not normally revealed. 
119 Decisions 
declaring a communication admissible are not published 
but their terms are sometimes revealed in the HRC's 
final views. The final views of the HRC under Article 
5(4) O. P. are made public. The text of these often 
includes the terms of earlier decisions on 
admissibility, requests for submissions, or other 
interim decisions. They are issued at the end of each 
session as press communiques and are included in the 
HRC's annual reports. A volume of selected decisions has 
been prepared by the Secretariat under the guidance of 
the HRC and has been published. 
120 As the O. P. contains 
no express reference to the publication of HRC decisions 
and views the decision to publicize them is to be 
applauded as it may add greatly to their force. 
121 
Members of the HRC considered that although the 
principle of confidentiality governed their 
considerations under the O. P. a minimum of information 
should be included in its annual reports. This was a 
reflection of the view that the general public had a 
legitimate interest in being informed of the approaches 
of the HRC. The annual reports now contains information 
on, for example, the status of communications, the 
issues considered, the rights concerned, and 
jurisdictional questions. The annual reports constitute 
119 The identity of the authors and the State party 
concerned have sometimes been revealed in literature 
from the State party concerned. See, e. g., the 
information published in Can. HRYB. 
120 
"Selected Decisions Under the Optional 
Protocol, (2nd-16th sessions)", Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1. A 
second volume is imminent. 
121 The degree of publicity afforded by the HRC to 
its O. P. decisions has surprised and pleased the 
Secretariat (personal communication). Nonetheless the 
HRC can still look to the Council of Europe as a model 
of how to produce regular and detailed information 
concerning individual petitions. 
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valuable accounts of developments in the HRC's 
consideration of communications. 
The Rules provide that a member shall not take part 
in the examination of a communication by the HRC if he 
has any personal interest in the case or has 
participated in any capacity in the making of any 
decision on the case covered by the communication. 122 If 
a question arises concerning these provisions it is 
dealt with by the HRC. 
123 A second Rule is of wider 
scope providing' for withdrawal if, "For any reason a 
member considers that he should not take part or 
continue to take part in the examination of a 
communication". 
124 In practice resort has been had to 
both of these rules. 
125 
A draft rule providing that the HRC or a Working 
Group "may at any time request the State party concerned 
to take interim measures in order to avoid irreparable 
damage to the victim of the alleged violation", while a 
matter involving it was before the HRC evoked an 
interesting discussion. 126 Views differed on whether the 
122 R. 84 (1) (a) and (b) 
. 
123 R. 84(2). 
124 R. 85. In some views members have participated 
but not voted. No explanation has been given for this 
practice. The explanation appears to lie in disagreement 
within the HRC on whether a member who is a national of 
the respondant State should take part in 
. 
the 
consideration of such communications. The disagrreement 
has not been resolved to date. 
125 For example, Mr. Lallah did not take part in 
the Mauritian Women case dealt with in pr. 4.75 below. 
Members who are nationals 
-of the respondent State are 
not automatically precluded from consideration of the 
case. For example Mr. Tarnopolsky took part in the 
decision in Mclsaac v. Canada, Doc. A/38/40 p. 111. 
126 Draft Rule 86, Doc. CCPR/C/L. 2 and Add. 1 and 2, 
in Yb HRC, Vol. II, p. 1 at p. 7. See SR 13 prs. 26-59; SR 17 
prs. 17-26; Mose and Opsahl, pp. 288-289. During the 
discussion it was debated whether the HRC could delegate 
to a working group any power concerning interim 
measures. In the result the power under R. 86 was 
reserved to the HRC. (Footnote Continued) 
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HRC had such "Implied powers" as were necessary to 
enable it to perform its functions in a reasonable 
manner or whether the absence of any express provision 
in the O. P. denied the HRC competence to request such 
measures. The compromise which emerged omitted the 
stronger term "request". It stated that, 
"The Committee may, prior to forwarding its final 
views on the communication to the State party 
concerned, inform the State of its views whether 
interim measures may be desirable to avoid 
irreparable damage to the victim of the alleged 
violation. In doing so, the Committee shall inform 
the State party concerned that such expression of 
its views on interim measures does not imply a 
determination 12. ßn the merits of the 
communication". 
The rule is clearly designed to deal with urgent, 
emergency situations. There can be no doubt that such 
views on interim measures are not binding on the State 
party. 
128 The terms of the rule leave open the question 
(Footnote Continued) 
Note also that there is no provision for interim 
measures in the inter-State procedure in the ICCPR nor 
has any such provision be made in the rules of procedure 
adopted by the HRC to deal with such complaints, Rules 
72-77E. Interestingly, the HRCions' final draft 
contained an express provision on serious and urgent 
cases in the inter-State procedure, see article 40(3) 
in Doc. A/2929, p. 81 and p. 86, prs. 96-98.16. Mower, n. 1 
above, comments, "For all practical purposes, the kind 
of approach this particular Committee takes to a State 
is irrelevant; what counts is that a Government has been 
made aware of an international concern for the fate and 
well-being of an individual, and of the feeling on the 
part of the international agency that interim measures 
are necessary and desirable. What happens then depends 
on the receptivity of a Government to international 
promptings, not the from in which they are conveyed", 
p. 125. Cf. P. Mahoney, Development In The Procedure Of 
The EUCT: The Revised Rules Of Procedure, 3 Yb. European 
Law (1983), p. 127 at 156-158; Van Dijk and Van Hoof, 
pp. 57-58; Article 48(2) AMR, Rule 26 of The Rules of 
Procedure of the IACM, in 'Handbook', p. 130. 
127 SR 17 pr. 25. 
128 Even final views of the HRC are not binding, 
see prs. 4.37-4.40 below. 
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of whether views on interim measures could be forwarded 
before a decision on admissibility has been taken. 
129 it 
is submitted that in principle this should be 
permissible. It appears that in practice this rule has 
been used on a number of occasions to useful effect, 
130 
The compromise on this rule set an important precedent 
in terms of the implied powers which the HRC considers 
necessary to enable it to function effectively. 
Subsequent debates on other suggested implied powers, 
for example, concerning follow up measures after the 
adoption of final views, have referred back to the 
l 
decision on interim measures as a precedent.. 
31 
129 During the HRC's debate it was suggested that 
this should be permissible to deal with urgent cases. 
The draft rule 86 had provided that interim measures 
could be requested "at any time". This was amended to 
"prior to forwarding its final views". 
130 
++.. he mentioned the case of an alleged victim 
of violations of human rights whose life had probably 
been saved by the fact that the Committee had asked for 
her' to be examined by a doctor. Another case, about 
eighteen months earlier, was that of a person who had 
eventually not been extradited to a country where she 
was in danger of being sentenced to death. Another 
victim of alleged violations of human rights would be - 
or had already been - released. These cases showed that 
action taken by the Committee was effective, even if it 
could not change political systems or situations from 
one day to the next", SR 179 pr. 3,5 (Chairman). See also 
SR 731 pr. 13 (Pocar) 
. 
At the HRC's most recent session 
(March-April 1988) the HRC requested a number of stays 
of execution in respect of a number of individuals from 
Jamaica. 
131 See below, prs. 4.41-4.43. 
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3. Access to the HRC. 
219 
4.11 The HRC has strongly asserted the importance of 
individuals being allowed access to it under the O. P. In 
Antonaccio v. Uruguay, 
132 A's wife (V. S. ) submitted the 
communication on behalf of A alleging, inter alia, that 
he had been arrested, tortured, denied medical attention 
and denied the right to a fair trial. The author 
requested the HRC to take appropriate action to secure 
A's right to submit the communication himself. 
133 After 
the the communication had been held admissible the 
author further submitted that A had the right to be 
informed of that decision and afforded an opportunity to 
supplement her submissions. 
134 In a subsequent Interim 
Decision the HRC decided, 
"That, as requested by Violeta Setelich, the State 
party should be requested to transmit all written 
material pertaining to the proceedings (submissions 
of the parties, decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee), to Raul Sendic Antonaccio, and that he 
should be given the opportunity to communicate 
directly with the Committee" 0 
135 
The State party objected to this decision. It 
argued that the HRC's competence was limited by Article 
5(4) O. P. to the sending of its observations to the 
State party concerned. 
136 The HRC had, therefore, 
132 Doc. A/37/40, p. 114. 
133 Ibid., pr. 2.6. 
134 Ibid., pr. 10. 
135 Ibid., pr. 11 at 3. 
p 
136 Ibid., pr. 14. 
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"Arrogated to itself competence which exceeded its 
powers". 
137 Moreover, 
"The Committee on Human Rights is applying a rule which 
does not exist in the text of the Covenant and the 
Protocol, whereas the function of the Committee is to 
fulfil and apply the provisions of those international 
instruments. It is inadmissible for a body such as the 
Committee to create rules flagrantly deviating from 
the texts emanating from the will of the ratifying 
States. Those were the circumstances in which the 
decision in question was taken. Paragraph 3 requests, 
with absolutely no legal basis, that a detainee under 
the jurisdiction of a State party- Uruguay 
-be given 
the opportunity to communicate directly with the 
Committee. The Government of Uruguay rejects that 
decision, since to accept it would be to create the 
dangerous precedent of receiving a decision which 
violates international instruments such as the 
Covenant and its Protocol. Moreover, the Uruguayan 
Government considers that the provisions in those 
international instruments extend to States parties as 
subjects of international law. Thus these 
international norms, like any agreement of such a 
nature, are applicable to States and not directly to 
individuals. Consequently, the Committee can hardly 
claim that this decision extends to any particular 
individual. For the reasons given, the Government of 
Uruguay rejects the present decision of the Committee, 
which violates elementary norms and principles and 
thus indicates that the committee is undermining its 
commitments in respect of the cause of promoting and 
defending human rights". 138 
This argument was emphatically rejected by the HRC, 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. 
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"The Human Rights Committee cannot accept the State 
party's contention that it exceeded its mandate when 
in its decision of 24 October 1980, it requested the 
State party to afford to Raul Sendic Antonaccio the 
opportunity to communicate directly with the 
Committee. 
The Committee rejects the State party's argument that 
a victim's right to contact the Committee directly is 
invalid in the case of persons imprisoned in Uruguay. 
If governments had the right to erect obstacles to 
contacts between victims and the Committee, the 
procedure established by the Optional Protocol would, 
in many instances, be rendered meaningless. It is a 
prerequisite for the'effective application of the 
Optional Protocol that detainees should be able to 
communicate directly with the Committee. The 
contention that the International Covenant and the 
Protocol apply only to States, as subjects of 
international law, and that, in consequence, these 
instruments are not directly applicable to individuals 
is devoid of legal foundation in cases where a state 
has recognized the competence of the Committee to 
receive and consider communications from individuals 
under the Optional Protocol. That being so, denying 
individuals who are victims of an alleged violation 
their rights to bring the matter before the Committee 
is tantamount to denying the mandatory nature of the 
Optional Protocol" 
. 
139 
It is submitted that this must be correct. 
Although there is no express provision in the ICCPR like 
139 Ibid., pr. 18. Antonaccio was still not 
permitted to communicate with the HRC. The HRC made a 
similar request in Bequio v. Uruguay, Doc. A/38/40 p. 180. 
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the undertaking in Article 25 ECHR "Not to hinder in any 
way the effective exercise", of the right of individual 
petition, 
140 
considerations of effectiveness demand that 
an alleged victim must be permitted to submit a 
communication to the HRC. 
141 It is important to note the 
limits of the HRC's statement. It is not a general 
proposition concerning the status of individuals in 
international law. 142 The HRC only goes so far as to say 
that if a State has recognized the competence of the HRC 
under the O. P. it cannot then deny or obstruct an 
individual's exercise of the right to communicate with 
the HRC. 
Similar considerations apply in the many cases when 
an alleged victim's communication to the HRC is assisted 
by having a legal representative. If States parties take 
action against or punish in any way those who represent 
alleged victims the effectiveness of the O. P. will be 
greatly reduced. The issue arose in Hamel V. 
Madagascar. 143 H had been expelled from Madagascar. He 
alleged, and the State party appeared to confirm, that 
this was due in part to his 
140 See Van Di k and Van Hoof 
, 
p. 43-46; , Mikaelson, 
pp. 24-33. See also the 'European Agreement Relating To 
Persons Participating In Proceedings of The European 
Commission And Court Of Human Rights', (1969), 
ECHR-Collected Texts, n. 11 above, pp. 100-109. 
141 On the principle of effective interpretation 
see McNair, Law of Treaties, ch. XXIII; Brownlie, 
Principles Of International Law, p. 628; Harris, Cases 
and Materials on International Law, (3rd ed., 1983), 
pp. 595-601. 
142 A general proposition that individuals had 
status under international law was rejected by opponents 
of an individual right of petition, see ch. 4, pr. 4.2 
above. Presumably such a proposition would still be 
objectionable to certain members of the HRC. 
143 Doc. A/42/40 p. 130. 
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having represented alleged victims submitting communications 
to the HRC. 144 The HRC expressed the view that, 
Were that to be the case, the Committee observes that 
it would be both untenable and incompatible with the 
spirit of the International Covenant On Civil and 
Political Rights and the Optional Protocol thereto, if 
States parties to these instruments were to take 
exception to anyone acting as legal counsel for persons 
placing their communications before the Committee for 
1 
consideration under the Optional Protocol" 
, 
45 
When the HRC adopts final views its general practice is 
to inform the State party concerned that it is "Obliged" to 
transmit a copy of the views to the individual concerned. 
The authority for this is presumably the provision in 
Article 5(4) O. P. that the HRC shall forward its views to 
the State party concerned and to the individual. 
144 Ibid., pr. 15. See e. g. Marais v. Madagascar, 
Doc. A/38/40 p. 141. 
145 Ibid., pr. 19.3. 
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4. Legal Representation And Legal Aid. 146 
4.12 There is no express reference to legal 
representation in the O. P. 
147 Rule 90(1)(b) of the HRC's 
Rules states that the communication may be submitted by 
the individual himself or by his representative. 148 The 
HRC must have evidence that the representative has been 
duly authorised. 
149 In practice alleged victims have 
been represented by lawyers, law professors, and 
146 See Clark, Legal Representation, in Ramcharan, 
(Ed. ), International Law And Fact-Finding In The Field 
Of Human Rights, pp. 104-136 (1982); Ryan, n. 1 above; 
Zuidjwick, n. 1 above. See also Hamel v. Madagascar, 
pr. 4.11 above. 
147Cf. R. 94(5) of CERD's Rules of Procedure which 
provides that "The Committee may invite the presence of 
the petitioner or his representative and the presence of 
representatives of the State party concerned in order to 
provide additional information or to answer questions on 
the merits of the communication", U. N. Doc. CERD/C/35/ 
Rev. 3, p. 28. There was some discussion in the CERD as to 
whether the Rule exceeded CERD's mandate and how the 
travel expenses of the petitioner would be defrayed if 
he was unable to pay them, see A/38/18, pr. 45, (1983). 
R. 30(l) of the revised rules of the EUCT (1982) allow an 
individual to play a much more significant role than 
hitherto in EUCT proceedings, see Mahoney, n. 126 above, 
pp. 127-141; P. T. Muchlinski, The Status Of The Individual 
Under The ECHR And Contemporary International Law, 34 
ICLQ (1985) pp. 376-382. 
148 See pr. 4.14 below. 
149 This rule is considerably relaxed in some 
cases, see prs. 4.70-4.74 below. 
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non-governmental organisations. 
150 Their role to date 
has been confined to drafting the original complaint, 
supplying further legal and factual information and 
observations, and responses to the submissions of the 
State party concerned. No oral hearings have been held 
to date. 151 If the HRC were to develop such a practice, 
with the consent of the State party, it is submitted 
that the alleged victim's legal representative, and the- 
alleged victim, should be permitted to address the HRC on 
whatever terms the State party is heard. 
152 This would 
seem to be demanded by the principle of "Equality of 
arms" which the HRC seeks to uphold. 
There is also no provision in the O. P. or in the 
HRC's Rules concerning the provision of legal aid to a 
communicant. Thus whether a communicant receives aid 
will presumably depend on its availability under the 
domestic legal aid provisions of the state 
-party 
concerned and in most cases this will be very unlikely. 
The present financial restrictions at the U. N. would 
suggest that it is also unlikely that any provision for 
legal aid will be made by the U. N. itself in the 
foreseeable future. 153 While the HRC's proceedings 
150 Ibid. 
151 See prs. 4.23-4.26 below. 
152 
"Bearing in mind the admixture of adversarial 
and inquisitorial elements usually found in fact-finding 
it may be valuable for fact-finding bodies to consider 
ways and means of drawing upon legal expertise in the 
examination of 'witnesses and in the marshalling of 
evidence", Clark, n. 146 above, p. 130. Clark also notes 
"the predilection to adopt civil law rather than common 
law modes of doing legal business", ibid., pp. 129-130. 
Further matters that would present themselves would be 
the possibility of submissions from interested third 
parties as has happened under the ECHR on a number of 
occasions, see Mahoney, n. 126 above, pp. 141-154; Van 
Dijk and Van Hoof, pp. 131-132. 
153 Under the ECHR provision for legal aid is dealt 
. 
(Footnote Continued) 
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remain wholly written the absence of legal aid to 
communicants will be less significant a hurdle than if 
oral procedures are developed. 
154 Assisting in the 
presentation of communications is an obvious avenue 
through which non-governmental organizations can 
contribute to the effective implementation of the 
O. P. 155 
(Footnote Continued) 
with on the basis of administrative measures devised by 
the Council of Europe. The provisions are set out in the 
Addendum to the EUCM's Rules of Procedure, see 
ECHR-Collected Texts, n. ll above, pp. 134-135; Van Dijk 
and Van Hoof, pp. 55-56. In 1987 35 applicants received 
legal aid from the EUCM. The total sum expended was 
approximately 235,000 French Francs, EUCM, Survey of 
Activities, (1987), p. 5. 
154 Zuidjwick, n. l above describes the present O. P. 
procedures as "inexpensive and simple", p. 121 (1981). 
155 On NGO's see ch. 1, pr. 1.15 above. A recent 
example of a body offering such assistance is 
INTERIGHTS, the International Centre For The Legal 
Protection Of Human Rights (London). 
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5. The Determination Of Admissibility: Procedures. 156 
4.13 The HRC took the view that the order of the 
articles as they appeared in the O. P. did not reflect a 
chronological order of procedures to be followed in the 
consideration of communications. The O. P. established 
the conditions of admissibility but not the procedures 
for the determination of admissibility. 
157 Accordingly, 
the rules of procedure establish those detailed 
procedures. The discussion of those rules was premised 
on the idea of making the procedures as flexible, 
practical, effective and efficient as possible while 
maintaining the basic principle of equality of arms. 
158 
The rules provide for the establishment of one or 
more working groups to examine communications and make 
recommendations concerning the fulfilment of the 
admissibility conditions in articles 1,2,3 and 5(2) 
O. P. 159 In practice only one working group on 
communications has existed. 
160 The group consists of no 
more than five members and its composition is intended 
to reflect the geographical groupings of the HRC 
members. The normal practice has been for the working 
156 See Rules 87-92. See in particular, Brar, n. 1 
above (1986). 
157 Doc. A/32/44, pr. 59; SR 20 prs. 3,5,6 and 8. 
158 Doc. A/32/44, pr. 58. 
159 R. 89(1). The rules of procedure of the HRC 
apply as far as possible to the Working Group, R. 89(2). 
160 This Working Group has been established since 
the HRC's third session. It did not meet prior to the 
HRC's 5th session because- no budgetary provision had 
been made for it. Instead one member (Vincent-Evans) 
examined communications a few days in advance of the 
session. As an economy measure the functions of the 
HRC's two Working Groups (one on Article 40, the other 
on the O. P. ) were temporarily combined for the HRC's 
28th session, March 1987). The practice has not been 
continued since. 
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group to meet for one week before each of the HRC's 
three week sessions. The working group continues to meet 
during HRC sessions. The working group plays a 
fundamental role in the consideration of communications 
under the O. P. 
4.14 The working group examines the initial 
communication together with the further material and 
information obtained by the Secretary-General. 161 Rule 
90 specifies a number of matters which shall be 
ascertained with a view to reaching a decision on 
admissibility: 
"1. (a) that the communication is not anonymous and that 
it emanates from an individual, or individuals, subject 
to the jurisdiction of a State party to the Protocol; 
(b) that the individual claims to be a victim of a 
violation by that State party of any of the rights set 
forth in the Covenant. Normally, the communication 
should be submitted by the individual himself or by his 
representative; the Committee may, however, accept to 
consider a communication submitted on behalf of an 
alleged victim when it appears that he is unable to 
submit the communication himself; 
(c) that the communication is not an abuse of the 
right to submit a communication under the Protocol; 
(d) that the communication is not incompatible with 
the provisions of the Covenant; 
(e) that the same matter is not being examined under 
another procedure of international investigation or 
settlement; 
(f) that the individual has exhausted all available 
domestic remedies. 
161 Rules 78(2) and 80. One or more communications 
may be merged for joint consideration, R. 88(2). 
See, e. g., Lanza and Perdoma v. Uruguay, S. D., p. 45, pr. 10. 
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2. The Committee shall consider a communication, which 
is otherwise admissible, whenever the circumstances 
referred to in article 5(2) of the Protocol apply". 
These matters are basically taken from the 
provisions in articles 1,2,3 and 5(2) O. P. There was 
considerable discussion on what became rule 90 (1) (b) 
.A 
literal construction which limited the competence of the 
HRC to receive communications only from the alleged 
victim would, in practice, be an enormous constraint. 
There was general agreement within the HRC that this 
construction should be rejected. However, it proved 
difficult to formulate an appropriate rule. A proposal 
that the HRC should receive communications from "Someone 
authorized" to act on the victims behalf proved 
unacceptable because it was thought to introduce 
complexity, rigidity and domestic law requirements. 162 
The HRC have taken a practical and relatively liberal 
view in the application of rule 90(1) (b) 
. 
That practice 
is examined in the consideration of article 1 O. P. 
below. 163 
4.15 During the drafting of rule 90(2) a difficult 
question arose as to the interpretation of article 5(2) 
O. P. 164 In the certified true English text article 5(2) 
O. P. provides that, 
"The Committee shall not consider any communication 
from an individual unless it is ascertained that: 
(a) the same matter is not being examined under another 
procedure of international investigation or settlement; 
(b) the individual has exhausted all available domestic 
remedies. This shall not be the rule where the 
162 For the discussion see SR 21 prs. 17-42, SR 22 
prs. 1-45. 
163 See prs. 4.70-4.74 below. 
164 See SR 22 prs. 46-64; SR 33 prs. 21-52; 
Doc. A/32/44, prs. 68-73. 
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application of the remedies is unreasonably 
prolonged". 
165 
The difficult question that arose was whether the 
last sentence of article 5(2) applied to the whole of 
paragraph 2 or only to sub-paragraph (b). On the former 
interpretation it would be permissible for the HRC to 
declare admissible a communication being examined under 
another procedure of international investigation or 
settlement if it took the view that that procedure had 
been unreasonably prolonged. After some discussion the 
matter was referred for the expert opinion of United 
Nations Legal Counsel. That opinion was to the effect 
that the last sentence applied to both sub-paragraphs 
(a) and (b). 166 Notwithstanding the clear opinion of 
U. N. Legal Counsel many of the HRC members were 
reluctant to accept the implications of the HRC having 
to pass judgement on another international body. Members 
pointed to the difficulty of establishing the correct 
interpretation before specific cases had been examined 
and the need to allow the HRC a certain amount of 
discretion. 167 Rule 90(2) as adopted merely repeats the 
terms of Article 5(2) O. P. without clarification. 
165 SR 33 pr. 23 (Mr. Mazaud, Assistant Director, 
Division Of Human Rights). The individual communications 
procedure in article 14 ICERD makes no reference to 
procedures of international investigation or settlement, 
see art. 14(7) ICERD. 
166 Ibid. 
167 It is interesting to note the comments of 
Mr. Movchan (USSR) "The Legal Counsel's interpretation, 
based on semantic and historical considerations, should 
obviously be taken into account, but that did not mean 
that other interpretations, which might give more weight 
to ethics, psychology or the law and be based on the 
practice of international bodies, should be dismissed", 
SR 33 pr. 27. See also Ibid., pr. 28. The comparable rule 
in the ICERD clearly only refers to domestic remedies, 
art. 14 (7) (a) ICERD. 
CH. 4.231 
The reluctance of the HRC to pass judgement on 
another international organ is understandable. However, 
the delays evident in international petition systems 
render such a situation a distinct possibility. 
168 
Though the HRC would need to proceed with great 
circumspection it is submitted that if the delay is 
unreasonable by comparison with the admittedly lengthy 
norm in international procedures then the HRC should 
proceed to consider the communication. 
169 
4.16 After examining the material placed before it by 
the Secretariat the working group will decide to, take 
one of a number of actions. It could decide to request 
from the author further additional written information 
or observations relevant to the question of 
admissibility. 
170 Alternatively, it could decide to 
transmit the communication to the state party as well or 
only to the State party with a similar request. 
171 Such 
requests must include a statement that the request does 
not imply that any decision has been reached on the 
question of admissibility. 
172 In practice the time limit 
established by the HRC for the submission of 
168 The Council Of Europe has recently adopted an 
eighth Protocol to the ECHR with a. view to speeding up 
the consideration of applications by the EUCM, see ECHR- 
Collected Texts, n. 11 above, pp. 57-62. See also Colloquy 
Report on Merger Of The EUCM and the EUCT in 8 HRLJ (1987) pp. 1-216. 
169 It is worth noting here that the reservations 
made by all of the Contracting parties to the ECHR, who 
have ratified the O. P. bar the Netherlands, would 
exclude such an eventuality by barring the HRC's jurisdiction ab initio, see pr. 4.93-4.96 below. See Van 
Dijk and Van Hoof, p. 52. 
170 See, e. g., A et al v. S, S. D., p. 3. 
171 See, e. g., Ramirez V. Uruguay,. Doc. A/35/40, 
p. 121; S. D., p. 3. 
172 R. 91(1) 
. 
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observations and information is eight weeks. 173 The 
parties have a further four week limit for the 
submission of comments on the information and 
observations if they choose to do so. 
174 
It was established at the HRC's fourth session that 
to assist expediting the consideration of communications 
the above decisions could be taken by the working group 
without being placed before the HRC for approval. 
175 In 
cases of doubt or disagreement within the working group 
the matter is decided by the HRC. A further option for 
the working group is to recommend to the HRC that the 
communication be declared inadmissible or be 
discontinued because of clear deficiencies that cannot 
be remedied by seeking further information from the 
author. 
4.17 An important provision is that in rule 91(2) which 
states that a communication may not be declared 
admissible unless the State party concerned has received 
the text of the communication and has been given an 
opportunity to furnish information or observations 
relevant to the question of admissibility. Members 
stressed the fundamental importance of this rule in 
terms of procedural equality. 
The decision on admissibility must be taken by the 
HRC as soon as possible. 176 The working group can only 
recommend what action the HRC should take although its 
recommendations are normally followed. 
173 Doc. A/32/44, p. 154; Doc. A/40/40 pr. 29. 
174 Ibid. There is no specific rule of procedure on 
this point, see Mose and Opsahl, p. 287; Bossuyt, p. 148. 
The time limits are often exceeded by both authors and 
States parties. 
175 Doc. A/33/40, pr. 588. 
176 R. 87. 
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4.18 During its first round of discussion the HRC 
considers the case documentation and the accompanying 
recommendations of the working group. It may adopt the 
W. G. recommendations or take a different course. It may 
also decide at this, or at a later stage, that the 
communication is of sufficient complexity to warrant the 
designation of a special rapporteur. 
177 This step has 
been taken on a number of occasions to date. 
Unless the communication is declared inadmissible 
by the HRC it is subject to further consideration at a 
subsequent session or sessions again based on the 
recommendations of the W. G. or the special rapporteur if 
one has been appointed. The HRC may adopt, change or 
reject any such recommendation. Unless further 
information, observations or comments are sought from 
the parties the HRC will take a decision on the question 
of admissibility at this point. The substantive 
determinations by the HRC on the grounds of 
admissibility are examined in detail below * 
178 
4.19 The five options that have been developed to date 
have been to declare the communication: 
4.19.1 Inadmissible, In Whole Or In Part. 
This decision is communicated to the author of the 
communication and, where the communication has been 
transmitted to the State party, to that State party. 
179 
If the decision is based on article 5(2) O. P. 
(non-exhaustion of domestic or international remedies) 
the HRC may review this decision at a later date upon 
the receipt of a written request by or on behalf of the 
177 It is clear, therefore, that a Special 
Rapporteur may be appointed before a decision as to 
admissibility is taken. The HRC's practice in this 
respect is similar to that of the EUCM, see Van Dijk and 
Van Hoof, p. 56-57. 
178 See prs. 4.49-4.118 below. 
- 
179 R. 92(1). 
6 
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individual concerned containing information to the 
effect that the reasons for inadmissibility referred to 
in article 5(2) no longer apply. 180 One member justified 
the limitation in this rule to the grounds in article 
5(2) on the basis that these were conditions of a 
"Temporary nature". 
181 Other members wanted the rule 
broadened because there could be grounds outside article 
5(2) in which review was necessary. 182 It appeared to be 
accepted that the adoption of the rule does not preclude 
the author from re-submitting a communication held 
inadmissible on grounds other than those in article 5(2) 
O. P. 183 The alternative course would be for the HRC to 
regard it as a new communication particularly as neither 
the O. P. nor the rules of procedure lay down any time 
limit for the submission of communications. 
184 In 
practice there have been requests for the HRC to 
reconsider decisions declaring a communication 
inadmissible but to date the HRC have found no reason to 
justify reconsideration in any such case. 185 
4.19.2 Discontinued. 
This option has been used in a number of 
circumstances. In one case the authors, despite repeated 
requests, failed to furnish the HRC with the necessary 
information without which the HRC was unable to arrive 
180 R. 92(2) 
. 
181 SR 33 pr. 9 (Opsahl). 
182 See SR 24 pr. 62 (Tomuschat), SR 33 pr. 8 
(Graefrath). 
183 SR 33 pr. 15 (Graefrath). 
184 See pr. 4.9 below. 
185 Doc. A/38/40, pr. 395. See pr. 4.41 below on 
reconsideration of communications. 
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at a decision on admissibility. 
186 In another case the 
HRC were informed that the authors wished to withdraw 
the case from consideration by the HRC on the ground 
that the same matter had been submitted to and was being 
considered under another procedure of international 
investigation or settlement. 
187 Such a case would have 
been declared inadmissible in any event under article 
5(2) O. P. 188 
It has already been noted that the O. P. does not 
contain any provision for the securing of a friendly 
settlement similar to that in article 28 ECHR. 
189 The 
procedure that the HRC should adopt if a settlement is 
reached is not spelt out in either the O. P. or the HRC's 
rules. In Waksman v. Uruguay190 the approach of the HRC 
was to declare the communication "Discontinued" after 
taking note that the state party had taken steps to 
remedy the matter complained of. 
It would appear reasonable to suggest that certain 
conditions which lead to a communication being declared 
"Discontinued" may be of a temporary nature. For 
example, if the authors of the first communication noted 
above191 were later to provide the requested information 
and provided a reasonable excuse for their earlier 
failure to do so, it should be open to the HRC to resume 
consideration of the communication. 
186 See V v. S, S. D., p. 35; B, C, D and E v. S, S. D., 
pp. 11-12. See also Doc. A/34/40, pr. 449. 
187 O. E. v. S, S. D., p. 35. 
188 At least until those proceedings have been 
completed, see prs. 4.87-4.99 below (on art. 5(2)). 
189 See pr. 4.5 above. 
190 Doc. A/35/40, p. 120; S. D., p. 36. 
191 V. v. S, n. 186 above. 
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4.19.3 Suspended. 
Consideration of a communication will be suspended 
if, for example, contact with the author has been lost 
because of the failure of the author to supply a return 
address. 
192 
4.19.4 Withdrawn. 193 
This has occurred, for example, when an individual 
has opted for another procedure of international 
investigation or settlement. 
194 
4.19.5. Wholly Or Partly Admissible. 195 
In this event the texts of the decision of 
admissibility any relevant documents are forwarded to 
the State party as soon as possible. 
196 The author of 
the communication is also informed,, 
197 
192 See A et al v. S, S. D., pp. 35-36. 
193 See text to notes 102-104'above. 
194 See, e. g., V v. S, S. D. p. 35. The communication 
was discontinued. 
195 For examples of communications held partly 
admissible see B, C, D and E v. S, S. D., pp. 11-12; 
Pinkey v. Canada, S. D., pp. 12-15. For examples of 
admissibility decisions see Waksman v. Uruguay, S. D., 
pp. 9-10; Lovelace v Canada, S. D., p. 10. 
196 R. 93(1). 
197 Ibid. 
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6. The Consideration Of Communications On The 
Merits: Procedures. 
198 
4.20 Any communication declared wholly or partly 
admissible is then subject to consideration on the 
merits. As already noted there is no intermediate stage 
between admissibility and merits for any attempt to 
reach a friendly settlement or for the exercise of good 
offices by the HRC. 
Under article 4(2) O. P. the State party concerned 
then has six months to submit written explanations or 
statements clarifying the matter under consideration and 
any remedy, if any, that it has afforded. 
199 This six 
month time limit is the only time limit expressly 
provided for in the O. P. The explanations or statements 
submitted by the State party are communicated to the 
author of the communication who may submit additional 
written information or observations within such time 
limits as the HRC directs. 200 The time limit commonly 
specified is six weeks. 
201 Although not expressly 
provided for in the rules the HRC will receive further 
additional information and observations from either 
party in the light of any additional information and 
observations received. 
202 This is in accordance with the 
general principle of procedural equality that the HRC 
seeks to apply to its considerations. The HRC may decide 
of its own motion to request specific additional 
information or replies to certain questions from either 
198 See Rules 93 and 94. 
199 R. 93(2). 
200 R. 93(3). See SR 34 prs. 2-13. They should also 
be communicated to the alleged victim if different, see 
pr. 4.11 above. 
201 Doc. A/36/40, pr. 397.6. 
202 SR 34 prs. 4-5. 
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party. 
203 It has done so on a number of occasions 
through the adoption of "Interim decisions" (sometimes 
referred to as "interlocutory decisions"). 204 
At its third session the HRC decided that it was 
necessary to amend its rules to make specific provision 
for the review of a decision declaring a communication 
admissible in the light of any additional information 
and observations submitted to it. 
205 The rules now make 
provision for this and the rule was applied for the 
first time at the HRC's twenty-fourth session (1985). 206 
Unless the decision that a communication is 
admissible is reversed the HRC proceeds to consider the 
communication in the light of all written information 
made available to it by the author and the State 
party. 
207 The final step is for the HRC to formulate its 
"Views" on the communication. 
208 The HRC may refer the 
communication to the W. G. on Communications for the 
consideration and formulation of views. 
209 The W. G. then 
makes recommendations to the HRC. The HRC may adopt, 
change or reverse any recommendation of the W. G. The 
203 Doc. A/36/40, pr. 397.7. 
204 See e. g., Massera and others v. Uruguay, 
S. D., p. 37; Lovelace v. Canada, S. D., pp. 37-39; B V. S, 
S. D., p. 39; Bleir V. Uruguay, Doc. A/37/40 p. 130, 
prs. 11.1-13.1; Hamel v. Madagascar, Doc. A/42/40 p. 130, 
prs. la and 13.1. 
205 See the discussion at SR 72 prs. 19-26. 
206 R. 93(4). See C. F. et al v. Canada, 
Doc. A/40/40, p. 217. Recourse to R. 93(4) was again made in 
J. M. v. Jamaica, Doc. A/41/40, p. 164. For a case where the 
HRC found no justification to review its decision 
declaring a communication inadmissible see Hamel v. 
Madagascar, Doc. A/42/40 p. 130, pr. 17. See Mose and 
Opsahl, pp. 316-317. 
207 Article 5(1) O. P.; R. 94(1). 
208 Article 5 (4) O. P.; R. 94 (1) 
. 
209 R. 94 (1) 
. 
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views of the HRC are then forwarded to the State party 
concerned and to the individual author. 
210 The HRC has 
also requested the State party concerned to forward the 
views to the alleged victim if he or she is not the 
author. 
211 
4.21 The HRC's views take the form of a collegiate 
view. 
212 There was detailed discussion within the HRC on 
whether to permit members to attach individual opinions 
to the views of the HRC. 
213 The main concern expressed 
was that these might undermine the moral authority of 
the HRC's views. It was stressed that the HRC's views 
were not legally binding and that it was therefore only 
through its "Moral and political impact" that the HRC's 
views could be enforced. The majority of members, 
however, took a different view. They argued that 
individual opinions could strengthen the HRC, that the 
minority should not be prevented from making its own 
views known, and that such a provision was in accordance 
with the freedom of expression established in article 19 
O. P. The rule adopted states that, 
"Any member of the Committee may request that a 
summary of his individual opinion shall be appended 
to the views of the Committee when they are 
210 Article 5(4) O. P.; R. 94(2). Both these 
provisions refer to the "individual" rather than to the 
victim or the author. 
211 The State party would seem to be under an 
obligation to allow the victim to receive the HRC's 
views, see pr. 4.11 above. 
212 The same is true of the EUCM, the EUCT, the 
European Court of Justice and the ICJ. The same used to 
be true of the Privy Council prior to 1966, see Lord 
Reid, The Judge as Law Maker, ' (1972) XII 
J. S. P. T. L. (n. s. ) p. 153. 
213 See SR 34 prs. 14-57; Bossuyt, pp. 152-153 
(1978-79). 
-P 
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communicated to the individual and to the state 
party concerned" 
. 
214 
This rule provides only for a "Summary" of an 
individual opinion so members may be restricted from 
appending lengthy, detailed explanations of their 
opinions. In practice individual opinions have been 
appended to the HRC's views on a number of occasions. 
215 
To date they have normally been very brief. It is 
submitted that the decision to permit individual 
opinions was sensible and constructive. Such opinions 
can contribute to the development of the HRC's 
jurisprudence by, for example, making the view of the 
HRC clearer by revealing a further step or an 
alternative interpretation that the majority of the HRC 
felt unable to adopt. 
216 The usefulness of individual 
opinions under the ECHR system and in the I. C. J. gives 
further support to this conclusion. 
217 
214 R. 94(3). 
215 In each case there has been only one individual 
opinion although more than one member may have 
associated themselves with that opinion. A number of 
individual opinions are noted at relevant points in this 
work. 
216 Professor Robertson has commented that they 
"should strengthen the quasi-judicial character of the 
HRC and should contribute to the development of its 
jurisprudence", in Henkin (Ed. ), n. 1 above, p. 363. 
Similarly, Bossuyt, n. 213 above. 
. 
217 See I. Hussain, Dissenting and Separate Opinions 
in the World Court, (1984). Note also Lauterpacht, The 
Development of International Law by the International 
Court, (1958), who quotes the following comment by 
Hughes C. J., "A dissent in a court of last resort is an 
appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the 
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may 
possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed", 
p. 66, pr. 23, n. 10. This passage was adopted by Judge 
Jessup in his dissenting judgement in the South West 
Africa cases and recalled by Judge Schwebel in his 
recent dissent in the Case Concerning Military And 
Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua, 
(Nicaragua v. U. S. ), I. C. J. Reports, 1986, p. 14 at p. 167. 
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7. Evidence. 218 
(1) Admissibility. 
4.22 It is difficult to determine any fixed rules that 
the HRC has applied. There has been no general statement 
on the types of evidence that the HRC will consider 
admissible. 
219 Moreover, no piece of evidence has been 
stated to be excluded from the HRC's considerations in 
any particular case as inadmissible. It is possible to 
note the particular sources of evidence that the HRC has 
taken account of. These include: 
(a) Testimonies from the authors; 
(b) Testimonies from the alleged victims; 
(c) Testimonies from alleged witnesses to the 
violations; 
(d) Medical Reports; 
(e) Psychiatric Reports; 
(f) The text of legal judgements; 
(g) The text of legislative, executive and 
administrative acts. 
(h) The texts of Codes of Practice or Guidelines 
connected with the texts in (g); 
218 See generally B. G. Ramcharan, Evidence, in 
Ramcharan (Ed. ), International Law And Fact-Finding in 
the Field Of Human Rights, p. 64 at pp. 68-83; H. Cohn, 
International Fact-Finding Processes, 18 I. C. J. 
Rev. (1977), p. 40; D. Sandifer, Evidence Before 
International Tribunals, (Rev. Edition), (1975). 
219 Cf. The statement of the EUCT that, "The Court 
is not bound, under the Convention or under general 
principles applicable to international tribunals, by 
strict rules of evidence. In order to satisfy itself, 
the Court is entitled to rely on evidence of every kind 
including, in so far as it deems them relevant, 
documents or statements emanating from Governments, be 
they respondent or applicant, or from their institutions 
or officials", Ireland v. United Kingdom, EUCT, Series 
A, Vol. 25, pr. 209. 
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(i) The statements of a representative of the State 
Party in proceedings before another United Nations body; 
(j) The submissions from the State party. 
One author has concluded after surveying 
international practice and relevant literature that, 
"Subject to any rules of admissibility which may be 
specified in its constitutive instrument, 
fact-finding bodies may apply flexible 
admissibility criteria". 
220 
This conclusion seems to hold good for the HRC where 
the only express exclusion would appear to be that in 
Article 3 O. P. providing for the exclusion of 
"Anonymous" communications. 
221 This exclusion also seems 
to accord with the international practice of 
fact-finding bodies. 222 Apart from-anonymous evidence 
then, it would appear open to the HRC to consider 
admissible evidence from whatever source and then decide 
as to its relevance and probative value. 
223 Such an 
approach would accord with the general practice of 
international tribunals in the admission of evidence of 
adopting the liberal system of procedure of civil law 
countries. 
224 
220 Ramcharan, n. 218 above, p. 72. 
221 See below pr. 4.118. 
222 Ramcharan, n. 218 above, p. 73. 
223 See Sandifer, n. 218 above, ch. IV. 
224 See Clark, n. 146 above. On the I. C. J. see 
G. Schwarzenberger, International Law, Vol. IV, pp. 636-640. 
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(2) Form. 
4.23 The O. P. refers only to a "Written" procedure. 
Individuals may submit a "Written communication" to the 
HRC for consideration. (Article 2 O. P. ) The State party 
must submit to the HRC "Written explanations or 
statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, 
that may have been taken by that State". (Article 4(2) 
O. P. ) The HRC is directed to consider communications in 
the light of all "Written information made available to 
it by the individual and by the State party 
concerned". (Article 5(1) O. P. ) 
The obvious question raised is whether it would be 
possible for the HRC to provide for a system of oral 
hearings through its rules of procedure or whether this 
possibility is excluded by the terms of the O. P. 
225 
The HRC has discussed this question in private 
session226 but no positive step has been taken in the 
direction of oral hearings and to date all 
communications have been considered on the basis of 
written information only. 
4.24 The present limitation to written procedure is 
unsatisfactory. 
227 It may be difficult for the HRC 
properly to resolve contradictions on the substance of 
225 For some comment on this question see Schwelb, 
n. 1 above, p. 867; Mose and Opsahl, pp. 279,289-290; 
Tomuschat, n. 1 above, p. 254; Robertson, n. 1 above in 
Henkin (Ed. ), p. 361; A. Dieye, Hearings, in Ramcharan 
(Ed. ), n. 218 above, ch. V. 
226 See SR 138 prs. 105-121 (Confidential Document), 
referred to by Tomuschat, n. 1 above. 
227 In 1980 Mr. Tomuschat commented that "Since it 
is confined to 'written information', the Human Rights 
Committee finds itself in an extremely delicate 
situation. To date, the procedure provided for in the 
Optional Protocol has not stood the test of viability. 
And it is difficult to see how this unsatisfactory state 
of affairs could be improved", n. 225 above, p. 254 (my 
emphasis). 
CH. 4.244 
the matter or to have a useful exchange of views when 
particular difficulties arise. Since the State party 
concerned in most communications to date, Uruguay, has 
not properly co-operated with the HRC, many of the HRC's 
views have effectively been judgements by default and so 
the full extent of these difficulties have not been 
exposed. They could only be resolved within a written 
procedure, if at all, by a lengthy process of submission 
and counter submission. As the proceedings of the HRC 
attain a greater degree of subtlety and complexity the 
deficiencies of a wholly written procedure are likely to 
become more acute. 
228 Provisions for oral proceedings 
would then provide an eminently sensible procedure to 
assist the HRC. 
If such provision were made other difficulties would 
then present themselves. How would the travel expenses 
of communicants be defrayed if they were unable to pay 
for them? 229 Would legal representation be permitted? 230 
Additional Secretariat staff and resources would almost 
certainly be necessary. Professor Tomuschat has pointed 
to another difficulty by posing the question, "Can the 
stage of taking evidence take place differently 
according to the greater or lesser degree of 
preparedness of the State party concerned to allow for 
additional methods of proof ? "231 It is submitted that 
the answer must be yes. If at least some State parties 
are willing co-operate in oral hearings the HRC should 
228 Members have indicated that matters raised in 
communications are becoming more complex and raising 
difficult questions of interpretation, see SR 731 pr. 14 
(Chairman). 
229 See pr. 4.12 above. The question has been raised 
by members of the ICERD with respect to the procedures 
recently adopted by them. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Tomuschat, n. 1 above, p. 254. 
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take advantage of that co-operation rather than reduce 
procedures to those dictated by States who do not wish 
to permit oral hearings. There should be no opposition 
to oral hearings as long as they only take place with 
the consent of the State party concerned. 
4.25 It is submitted that in principle it is open to the 
HRC to make provision for the possibility of oral 
hearings with the consent of the State party 
concerned. 
232 Such a procedure would parallel the 
successful practice under the Article 40 reporting 
procedure of inviting State representatives to attend 
the consideration of national reports. 233 It is further 
submitted that the HRC should in fact make provision for 
oral hearings with the consent of the State party. The 
written procedure should remain the primary mode of 
obtaining evidence but when the HRC felt that an oral 
investigation would substantially assist its 
considerations that possibility should be open to it. 
Experience would indicate whether such a practice would 
become the exception or the rule. 
Similar comments to the above can be made concerning 
the possibility of on site inspections by the HRC 
concerning communications under the O. P. Again there is 
nothing explicit in either the ICCPR or the O. P. As Mose 
and Opsahl comment, "Whether in the future this will be 
interpreted as a lacuna or a prohibition due to lack of 
competence remains to be seen". 234 Again it is submitted 
that in principle it is open to the HRC to develop such 
practices with the consent of the State party concerned. 
232 Mr. Dieye, a former member of the HRC, has 
argued that, "If it is not expressly provided for, it is 
submitted that as a general principle, fact-finding 
bodies possess inherent competence to conduct hearings", 
n. 225 above, p. 94. 
233 R. 68. See ch. 3, pr. 3.19 above. 
234 Mose and Opsahl, p. 290, n. 98. 
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The experience of the IACM, 
235 
the EUCM236 and the 
IL0237 suggests that on-site investigations can assist 
human rights organs in their determinations and they 
235 See Edmundo Vargas Carreno, Visits on the Spot 
- 
The Experience of the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights, in Ramcharan (Ed. ), n. 146 above, 
pp. 137-150; R. E. Norris, Observations In Loco - Practice 
and Procedure of the Inter-American Co mmission on Human 
Rights, 15 Texas I. L. J., pp. 46-95, (1980). 
236 See H. C. Kruger, Visits on the Spot - The 
Experience of the European Commission of Human Rights, 
in Ramcharan (Ed. ), n. 146 above, pp. 151-159; Van. Dijk 
and Van Hoof, pp. 94-96. Visits on the spot by the EUCM 
have generally concerned complaints under article 3 ECHR 
regarding the treatment of prisoners or other detained 
persons and the conditions of their detention. For 
example Commissioners have visited Broadmoor prison in 
the U. K. A delegation from the EUCM has recently 
(27/1/85-2/2/85) visited Turkey at the initiation of the 
Turkish Government to investigate violations of the ECHR 
alleged by Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden, A. 9940-9944/82. A friendly settlement has 
recently been agreed which involves continuing 
supervision by the EUCM of the human rights situation in 
Turkey, see EUCM, Report On The Applications Of Denmark, 
France, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden Against Turkey 
And The Conclusion Of A Friendly Settlement, XXV ILM 
(1986) pp. 308-318. 
237 See G. Von Potobsky, Visits on the Spot - the 
Experience of the I. L. O., in Ramcharan (Ed. ), n. 146 
above, pp. 160-175. 
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provide L3eful models for the HRC to follow and 
develop. 238 
A less radical proposal would be for the HRC to 
develop a "Direct contacts" approach similar to that 
used with some success by the ILO. 
239 This could provide 
the possibility of a more direct, informal, speedier 
process than a full scale on-site investigation. It 
would also almost certainly introduce the idea of 
friendly settlement into the O. P. proceedings. A similar 
direct contact approach has been developed to a limited 
extent under the Article 40 process with some 
240 
success. 
4.26 The basic submission behind each of these proposals 
is that the HRC has to have the flexibility to develop 
and adapt its procedures under the O. P. with the 
co-operation of the State parties concerned. In the 
long term it may well prove to have been sensible for 
the HRC to build up its practices and procedures 
carefully and cautiously. Over a period of time it can 
establish a bedrock of practice and allow States parties 
to acquire confidence in its impartiality and 
objectivity. With that confidence may come the degree of 
co-operation necessary for the implementation of the new 
practices suggested here. 
241 Their adoption, 
particularly oral hearings, could be immensely important 
steps in making the O. P. procedure more effective. 
238 See also Sandifer, n. 218 above, s. 80. 
239 See G. Von Potobsky, n. 146 above; F. Wolf, Human 
Rights and the International Labour Organisation, in 
Meron (Ed. ), p. 273 at pp. 285-286. 
240 See ch. 3, pr. 3.9 above. 
241 Cf. The development of practices under the ECHR 
on the status of the individual and submissions from 
third parties, see Mahoney, n. 126 above, pp. 141-154. 
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7. Evidence. 
(3) The Burden and Standard of Proof. 242 
4.27 The approach of the HRC to the matters of the 
burden and standard of proof are of immense practical 
importance to the effective functioning of the O. P. The 
initial burden of proof or persuasion would clearly seem 
to be on the alleged victim or the person acting on his 
behalf (both of whom will henceforth be referred to as 
the "author"). An author is not obliged to prove his 
case at the admissibility stage. The obligation is only 
to submit sufficient evidence in substantiation of the 
allegations as will constitute a prima facie case. 
243 
The HRC has declared a number of communications 
inadmissible on the ground of non-substantiation of 
allegations. 
244 In a clear case a decision to declare a 
communication inadmissible or otherwise to terminate or 
suspend consideration of it may be taken without 
referring the case to the State party for its 
observations. 
245 So, for example, if the author's 
evidence does not raise a prima facie case the 
communication will not be referred to the state party at 
all. Conversely, however, a communication may not be 
declared admissible unless the State party has received 
the text and has been afforded an opportunity to furnish 
information or observations. 
246 Thus it is open to the 
242 See generally Sandifer, n. 218 above, ss. 29-32. 
See also pr. 4.102 below on the burden of proof as 
regards the exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
243 Doc. A/39/40, pr. 588. 
244 See e. g., O. F. V. Norway, Doc. A/40/40, p. 204; 
M. F. v. Netherlands, Doc. A/40/40, p. 213; J. D. B. v. 
Netherlands, Doc. A/40/40, p. 226; K. L. V. Denmark, 
S. D., p. 24. 
245 See Doc. A/36/40 pr. 397.3 at (d). 
246 R. 91(2). Commentators regard this rule as of 
fundamental importance, see Cohn, n. 218 above. 
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state party to refute the allegations and reduce the 
sufficiency of the authors' evidence below the required 
level of a prima facie case. For example, in J. M. v. 
Jamaica247 J. M. alleged that article 12(4) (the right to 
enter his own country) had been violated because he had 
been unable to obtain a new passport and thus unable to 
return to Jamaica. The State party submitted no 
information. The HRC declared the communication 
admissible. That decision was set aside when the state 
party submitted evidence which rebutted J. M. s' evidence. 
The HRC concluded that J. M. had failed to establish that 
he was a Jamaican citizen and had failed to substantiate 
that he was a victim of violations of the provisions of 
the ICCPR. 
4.28 If a communication is declared admissible the state 
party is required to submit explanations or statements 
clarifying the matter under consideration. (Article 4(2) 
0. P. )248 The explanations or statements must primarily 
relate to the substance of the matter under 
consideration and in particular the specific violations 
of the Covenant alleged to have occurred. 
249 The HRC can 
also request further detailed information from the 
author or the state party and may specify particular 
questions and aspects of the communication as to which 
247 Doc. A/41/40, p. 164. 
248 In Fals Borda and Others v. Colombia, 
Doc. A/36/40, p. 153 and S. D., p. 139, the HRC stated that 
the State party was not under a duty to address new 
allegations introduced only after a communication had 
been held inadmissible, pr. 13.5. 
249 See e. g., De Bouton v. Uruguay, Doc. A/38/40, 
p. 143 and S. D., p. 72, pr. 5 at 3. See below on how this 
approach has developed. For a case in which the HRC did 
accept the submission of the State party see Scarrone v. 
Uruguay, Doc. A/39/40, p. 154. There the HRC found that in 
the light of information provided by the State party 
with regard to the treatment of Scarrone it could not justify a finding of a violation of article 10(1) of the 
Covenant, (pr, 10.3. ). 
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more information should be supplied. 
250 These requests 
by the HRC represent one of the few positive roles in 
the O. P. proceedings taken by the HRC. 
If the author fails to supply this information the 
HRC may hold that it can make no finding on all or part 
of the communication or that the allegations are 
unsubstantiated. 
251 The effect of failure on the part of 
the state party is examined below. 
252 
With regard to the consideration of communications 
on the merits the evidence supplied by the author has 
been sufficient when it has been of a specific, 
substantial, not insubstantial nature and of pertinent 
character. As for the obligations on the State party it 
is unfortunate that the HRC's approach can for the most 
part only be gleaned from cases in which the State party 
concerned has generally proved uncooperative. 
253 
Therefore, as noted earlier, many of the HRC's views 
effectively take the form of a judgement by default. 
This has been the situation since the HRC's very first 
expression of views in the Massera case. 
250 See pr. 4.14 above. Such requests are usually 
made either within the HRC's admissibility decisions or 
by means of Interim (Interlocutary) Decisions. See e. g., 
Lovelace v. Canada, Doc. A/36/40 p. 166, prs. 7-8. 
251 See e. g., Bequio v. Uruguay, Doc. A/38/40, p. 180, 
pr. 11.4; Montejo v. Colombia, Doc. A/37/40, p. 168 and 
S. D., p. 127, pr. 9.2; Cabriera v. Uruguay, Doc. A/38/40, 
p. 209, pr. 10.3; Vidal Martins v. Uruguay, Doc. A/37/40, 
p. 157, and S. D., p. 122, pr. 8. 
252 See prs. 4.29-4.36. 
253 The I. C. J. has faced the similar and related 
problem of non-appearance, see Fitzmaurice, The Problem 
Of The Non-Appearing Defendant Government, 51 BYIL 1981 
(1982) pp. 89-122; J. B. Elkind, Non-Appearance Before The 
International Court Of Justice: A Functional And 
Comparative. Analysis (1984); H. W. A. Thirlway, 
Non-Appearance Before The International Court Of Justice 
(1985). 
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4.29 In J. L. Massera and Others V. Uruguay254 the 
communication alleged multiple violations of the 
covenant to four victims. The explanations of the State 
party consisted of a, "Review of the rights of the 
accused in cases before a military criminal tribunal, 
and domestic remedies available to him for protecting 
and safeguarding his rights in the national courts of 
justice". 255 The HRC decided that the submission of the 
state party was not sufficient to comply with the 
requirements of the O. P. (Article 4(2)) since it 
contained, "No explanations on the merits of the 
case". 
256 A further request for observations met with no 
response. The HRC decided to base its views on the facts 
which had not been contradicted by the State party. 
257 
It expressed the view that there had been multiple 
violations to three of the alleged victims. 
4.30 A different approach was taken to the problem of 
non co-operation from a State party in the HRC's second 
views. In Santullo (Valcada) v. Uruguay258 S made 
specific allegations of ill treatment and named the 
senior officers responsible. In its submissions the 
State party referred to the domestic legal provisions 
prohibiting any physical maltreatment in Uruguay. The 
submission did not give any further details but claimed 
that the authors' allegations were, "Unfounded, 
irresponsible and unaccompanied by the least shred of 
evidence and that they accordingly did not deserve 
254 Doc. A/34/40, p. 124; S. D., p. 40. 
255 Ibid., pr. 6. 
256 Ibid., pr. 7. 
257 Ibid., pr. 9. Tomuschat, n. 1 above, p. 252, adds, 
"Nor discloses any prima facie appearance of being false 
or inaccurate". Note, however, that this sentence does 
not appear in the HRC's view. 
258 Doc. A/35/40, p. 107; S. D., p. 43. 
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further comment". 
259 The HRC decided to base its views 
on facts which had been, "Essentially confirmed by the 
State party or are unrepudiated or uncontested except 
for denials of a general character offering no 
particular information or explanations" 
. 
26 0 The HRC 
stated that, 
"The State party has adduced no evidence that his 
allegations of ill-treafirent have been duly 
investigated in accordance with the laws to which 
it drew attention in its submission... A refutation 
of these allegations in general terms is not 
enough. A State party should investigate the 
allegations in accordance with its laws". 
261 
Surprisingly, perhaps, the view that the majority of 
the HRC then went on to express was that, 
"As regards Article I of the Covenant262 the 
Committee cannot find that there has not been any 
violation of this provision. In this respect the 
Committee notes that the state party has failed to 
show that it had ensured to the person concerned 
the protection required in article 2263 of the 
Covenant. " 264 
Obviously this negative finding does not carry the 
weight of a positive finding of a violation and 
259 Ibid., pr. 8. 
260 Ibid., pr. 10. 
261 Ibid., pr. 11. 
262 Article 7 contains a prohibition on torture and 
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. See ch. 9 
below. 
263 Article 2 provides, inter alia, that States 
parties must respect and ensure to all individuals 
within their jurisdiction the rights in the ICCPR. See 
ch. 6 below. 
264 Doc. A/35/40, P. 107; S. D., p. 43. 
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represents a rather cautious and unsatisfactory 
jurisprudence. 265 Fortunately such a view has only ever 
been taken in the Santullo (Valcada) case. In all 
subsequent cases the HRC have either expressed no view 
because, for example, of the generality of the 
allegations, 
266 
or expressed a positive view when the 
state party has only refuted allegations in general 
terms. In its third view, Lanza and Perdoma 
v. Uruguay, 
267 the HRC reiterated its view in the Massera 
case that denials of a general character would not 
suffice and stated that, 
"Specific responses and pertinent evidence 
(including copies of the relevant decisions of the 
courts and findings of any investigations which 
have taken place into the validity of the 
complaints made) in reply to the contentions of the 
author of a communication are' required. The 
Government did not furnish the Committee with such 
information. Consequently, the Committee cannot but 
draw appropriate conclusions on the basis of the 
information before it". 268 
4.31 It is this approach to evidence which has since 
prevailed. The approach takes account of what may often 
be a factual inequality in evidential terms between the 
parties. The HRC's approach was further clarified in the 
case of Bleir v. Uruguay. 
269 The authors270 submitted 
detailed allegations that B had been arrested, detained 
265 See Mose and Opsahl, pp. 324-325; Anon, 23 
Rev. ICJ (1979) p. 26 at 29-30. 
266 See n. 251 above. 
267 Doc. A/35/40, p. 111; S. D., p. 45. 
268 Ibid., pr. 15. 
269 Doc. A/37,40, p. 130; S. D., p. 109. 
270 The alleged victims father and mother. 
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incommunicado and subjected to ill-treatment. These 
allegations were supported by the statements of family 
members and eyewitness testimonies. Uruguay submitted a 
brief categorical denial of B's detention. In the light 
of the "Overwhelming evidence" of the authors the HRC 
considered that the State party's submission was 
"Totally insufficient". 271 The HRC concluded in an 
Interim Decision, that, 
"13. The failure of the state party to address in 
substance the serious allegations brought against 
it and corroborated by unrefuted information, 
cannot but lead to the conclusion that Eduardo 
Bleir is either still detained, incommunicado, by 
the Uruguayan authorities or has died while in 
custody at the hands of the Uruguayan 
authorities". 
272 
The State party objected to this part of the HRC's 
Interim Decision, 
"The Government of Uruguay wishes to state that, in 
paragraph 13 of that document, the committee 
displays not only an ignorance of legal rules 
relating to the presumption of guilt, but a lack of 
ethics in carrying out the tasks entrusted to it, 
since it so rashly arrived at the conclusion that 
the Uruguayan authorities had put Eduardo Bleir to 
death. The Committee, whose purpose is to protect, 
promote and ensure respect for civil and political 
rights, should bear in mind that this task should 
always be carried out under the rule of law in 
accordance with its mandate and the universally 
accepted procedures concerning such matters as 
guilt and presumption of guilt". 
273 
271 Doc. A/37/40 p. 130, pr. 11.2 at 11. 
272 Ibid., pr. 11.2 at 13. 
273 Ibid., pr. 12. 
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The HRC replied decisively, 
"The Human Rights Committee cannot accept the State 
party's criticism that it has displayed an 
ignorance of legal rules and a lack of ethics in 
carrying out the tasks entrusted to it or the 
insinuation that it has failed to carry out its 
task under the rule of law. 
On the contrary, in accordance with its mandate 
under article 5(1) of the Optional Protocol, the 
Committee has considered the communication in the 
light of the information made available to it by 
the authors of the communication and by the State 
party concerned. In this connection the Committee 
has adhered strictly to the principle audiatur et 
altera pars and has given the State party every 
opportunity to furnish information to refute the 
evidence presented by the authors. 
The Committee notes that the State party has 
ignored the Committee's repeated requests for a 
thorough inquiry into the authors' allegations. 
With regard to the burden of proof, this cannot 
rest alone on the author of the communication, 
especially considering that the author and the 
State party do not always have equal access to the 
evidence and that frequently the State party alone 
has access to the relevant information. It is 
implicit in article 4(2) of the Optional Protocol 
that the State party has the duty to investigate in 
good faith all allegations of violation of the 
Covenant made against it and its authorities, 
especially when such allegations are corroborated 
by evidence submitted by the author of the 
communication, and to furnish to the Committee the 
information available to it. In cases where the 
author has submitted to the Committee allegations 
supported by substantial witness testimony, as in 
this case, and where further clarification of the 
case depends on information exclusively in the 
CH. 4.256 
hands of the State party, the Committee may 
consider such allegations as substantiated in the 
absence of satisfactory evidence and explanations 
to the contrary submitted by the State party". 
274 
4.32 This approach to the burden of proof has now 
become established as part of the HRC's standard 
jurisprudence. The statement above is the major 
precedent on this matter and the HRC frequently refers 
back to it. 275 In some subsequent decisions the HRC has 
indicated to the State party the appropriate evidence 
required, for example medical reports, inquiry reports, 
details of alleged charges, copies of court proceedings, 
and reports on the questioning of officials. 
276 
4.33 In summary the HRC has interpreted article 4(2) 
O. P. as explicitly providing that the State party has 
the duty to contribute to clarification of the matter 
and an implicit duty to investigate in good faith all 
allegations of violations of the Covenant made against 
the State and its authorities, especially when 
corroborated by evidence, and to furnish to the HRC the 
information available to it. This represents a very 
positive interpretation of the O. P. by the HRC and 
prevents the lack of co-operation by a State party 
destroying the effective functioning of the O. P. The 
effect is that no State party can benefit from its 
failure to co-operate fully with the HRC. 
277 
274 Ibid., prs. 13.1-13.3. 
275 See e. g., Romero v. Uruguay, Doc. A/39/40, p. 159, 
pr. 12.3. 
276 See e. g., Solorzano v. Uruguay, Doc. A/41/40, 
p. 134; Vasilskis V. Uruguay, Doc. A/38/40, p. 173, 
prs. 10.3 and 10.4; Pietraroia v. Uruguay, Doc. A/36/40, 
p. 153 and S. D., p. 76, pr. 15. 
277 See Tomuschat n. 1 above, pp. 252-253; Nowak, 
n. 1 above, pp. 159-160. See also the comments of the HRC 
in Scarrone v. Uruguay, Doc. A/39/40, p. 154, pr. 10.2. 
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4.34 There have, however, been occasions when it might 
have been expected that the HRC would go further in 
attempting to obtain substantiation or corroboration of 
the allegations. For example, in Vasilskis V. 
Uruguay, 278 the author (V's brother) based his 
statements on the testimony of ex-prisoners who were in 
the same prison as his sister, who were then in Europe 
as refugees, and who allegedly witnessed the torture and 
maltreatment at first hand and would have been prepared 
to testify to it, if necessary, to the HRC. The HRC 
could perhaps have requested the author to provide 
signed testimonies from these ex-prisoners. This would 
only impose a minimal burden on the author. Similarly, 
in Quinteros and Quinteros v. Uruguay, 
279 it had been 
alleged, inter alia, that E. Q. had been arrested in the 
grounds of the Venezuelan embassy 'in Montevideo. Uruguay 
denied that the Government had any part in the episode. 
Again it would seem to impose a minimal burden on the 
authors to submit signed testimonies from the witnesses 
in the Venezuelan embassy or at least to request such. 
4.35 If the State party raises a defence under the 
particular limitation provisions of an article or under 
the general derogation provisions in article 4 the 
burden would seem to be on the State party to justify 
its limitation or derogation under the terms of the 
ICCPR. 
280 For example, in Hammel v. Madagascar, 
281 the 
HRC expressed the view that the State party had not 
shown that there were compelling reasons of national 
278 Doc. A/38/40, p. 173. 
279 Doc. A/38/40, p. 216. 
280 See e. g., on limitations, Hertzberg and Others 
v. Finland, Doc. A/37/40 p. 161, dealt with in ch. 11, 
prs. 11.19-11.19.2 below, and on derogations, Silva v. 
Uruguay, Doc. A/36/40 p. 130, dealt with in ch. 7, pr. 7.37 
- 
7.41 below. 
281 Doc. A/42/40 p. 130. 
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security requiring that H be deprived of his remedy to 
challenge an expulsion order. 
282 It should also be noted 
that the HRC will consider, ex officio, whether acts or 
omissions which are prima facie not in conformity with 
the Covenant could for any reasons be justified under 
the Covenant in the circumstances. The Committee then 
notes whether it would have been permissible to derogate 
from the rights concerned under article 4 O. P., and, if 
so, whether the Government has made any submissions of 
fact or law to justify such derogations. 283 
4.36 The HRC have not made any general comment on the 
matter of the appropriate standard of proof other than 
that of a prima facie requirement at the admissibility 
stage. 
284 The general non co-operation of and the 
failure to comply with the HRC's requests by Uruguay, 
the State party concerned in most communications to 
date, has rendered the consideration of most 
communications a largely one sided affair. However, the 
general approach of the HRC would suggest that it is 
applying something approximating to proof on a "balance 
of probabilities" rather than a "beyond reasonable 
doubt" standard. There may be some flexibility within 
this standard depending on the seriousness of the 
allegations involved. 285 
282 Ibid., pr. 19.2. 
283 See e. g., Lanza and Perdoma v. Uruguay, 
Doc. A/35/40 p. 111, pr. 15. 
284 See text to n. 243 above. 
285 In Ireland v. United Kingdom, the EUCT adopted 
a standard of beyond reasonable doubt in relation to 
allegations of violations of article 3 ECHR, EUCT, 
Series A, Vol. 25, prs. 160-161. See Cross On Evidence, 
pp. 141-148 (6d, 1985). 
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8. Final Views Under The O. P. 286 
4.37 After consideration and examination of the 
communication the HRC is directed to, "Forward its 
views to the State party concerned and to the 
individual". (Article 5(4)) The term "Views" was 
preferred in the Third Committee to the stronger terms 
"Suggestions" and "Recommendations". 
287 A number of 
commentators have regretted the weakness of the term 
views and argued that the the stronger terms rejected by 
the Third Committee would have been more precise and 
accorded greater authority to the HRC. 
288 Professor 
Schwelb has noted that the French expression used 
"Contestations" would suggest that the HRC would have 
stronger powers than are suggested by the term views. 
289 
M. Tardu has argued that, "It seems that the HRC would 
have discretion as to the substance of its "views" which 
might include judgements as to the conformity of conduct 
of the state with the Covenant". 
290 
286 See Pathak, The Protection of Human Rights, 18 
Ind. JIL, (1978), pp. 165-173; C. Tomuschat, International 
Courts And Tribunals With Regionally Restricted And/Or 
Specialized Jurisdiction, in Mosler and Bernhardt 
(Eds. ), Judicial Settlement Of International Disputes, 
p. 285 at pp. 305-306, (1974); Schwelb, (Civil and 
Political Rights), n. l above, pp. 857-859,867-868; 
Capatorti, n. 1 above, p. 144; Saskena, Ch. 1, n. 144 above, 
p. 596 at p. 610; Brar, n. 1 above, pp. 538-541; Mose and 
Opsahl, pp. 317-331; Tardu, n. 650 below, p. 781. 
287 Cf. U. N. Doc. A/C. 3/L. 1402/Rev. 2 ('suggestions') 
with the revised text A/C. 3/L. 1411/Rev. 2 ('views'). See 
A/C. 3. /SR 1440, pr. 9 and SR 1441 pr. 40. 
288 See n. 268 above. The Chairman of the CERD has 
suggested that the power of the CERD to make 
"suggestions" and "recommendations" under the petition 
procedure in article 14 ICERD gives the CERD greater 
competence than article 5(4) O. P. gives the HRC, see 
Report of the CERD, Doc. A/38/18, pr. 25, (1983). 
289 
n. 268 above. 
290 
n. 268 above. 
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4.38 It was, therefore, very important to note how much 
authority the HRC considered that the term "views" 
accorded to it. The practice of the HRC has been clear 
from its very first views. The HRC's views follow a 
judicial pattern and are effectively decisions on the 
merits. 
291 The initial communication, allegations of the 
author, the submissions of the State party, the decision 
on admissibility and any interim decisions are recited 
in some detail. The facts upon which the HRC bases its 
views are set out. If the State party has not been 
co-operative the facts upon which the views are based 
are those which have been either essentially -confirmed 
by the State party or are or appear to be uncontested 
except for denials of a general character offering no 
particular information or explanation. 
292 The views 
often contain an indication of certain "Considerations" 
which the HRC has taken into account in formulating its 
views. These considerations have included, for example, 
the failure of either party to submit information 
requested by the HRC, particular matters arising during 
the consideration of the communication, the burden of 
proof, the obligations of either party under the 
Covenant or the general comments adopted by the HRC 
under article 40(4). 293 Many of the HRC's views contain 
291 
"The HRC has managed to make it "views" under 
article 5(4) an efficient tool of its evaluation. None 
of the decisions hitherto handed down reads like a 
diplomatic communique. Obviously, they have all-been 
drafted on the pattern of a judicial decision", 
Tomuschat, n. 1 above, p. 255. See also Nowak, n. l above, 
(1980), p. 54; B. Graefrath, Trends Emerging In The 
Practice Of The HRC. 3/80 Bulletin Of The G. D. R. 
Committee For Human Rights, pp. 3-32. 
292 See prs. 4.27-4.36 above. 
293 Ibid. For example, in Hammel v. Madagascar, 
Doc. A/42/40 p. 130, pr. 19.2, the HRC took account of its 
general comment under article 40 (4) on the position of 
aliens. 
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substantive interpretations of the provisions of the 
Covenant and the O. P. 
294 The views then state whether in 
the HRC's view the facts as found disclose violations of 
the Covenant and why. However, the linkage between the 
facts and the violations found has not always been 
clearly spelt out by the HRC, particularly in its early 
views, with a consequent lack of clarity and legal 
precision. 
295 
4.39 It is clear from the drafting work that the views 
of the HRC do not constitute a legally binding decision 
as regards the State party concerned. 
296 In this respect 
the O. P. parallels the reports of the European 
Commission on Human Rights, 297 and the supervision 
systems of the International Labour Organization 298 and 
under the European Social Charter. 299 It contrasts 
markedly with the decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights and the recommendations of the Committee of 
Ministers under the ECHR which are legally binding. 
300 
There is no higher organ expressly authorised to review 
or supervise the implementation of the HRC's views so 
these remain the last word on the communication. 
301 
294 See chs. 5-12 below. 
295 See e. g., ch. 9 below (on articles 7 and 10(1)). 
296 See n. l above. 
297 See Van Dijk and Van Hoof, ch. II. 
298 See N. Valticos, The International Labour 
Organization (1979). 
299 See D. Harris, The European Social 
Charter, (19 8 4) 
. 
300 See Van Dijk and Van Hoof, chs. III and IV. 
301 It is uncertain whether the General Assembly or 
the ECOSOC could play any role in communications under 
their general jurisdictional powers. Brar n. 1 above (1986) comments, "It is hoped that the Third committee 
of the General Assembly will be increasingly used as a (Footnote Continued) 
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Again this contrasts with the implementation systems 
under the ECHR, 
302 
the I. L. O. 303 and the European Social 
Charter. 304 
It is submitted that the HRC's views would obviously 
carry greater authority if they were legally binding on 
the State party. A legally non-binding view and the 
absence of any mechanisms of enforcement or execution 
afford a victim the most minimal degree of protection 
and relief. The strongest argument to support the O. P. 
system has been put by Professor Tomuschat, 
"Legally, the views formulated by the Human Rights 
Committee are not binding on the State party 
concerned which remains free to criticize them. 
Nonetheless, any State party will find it hard to 
reject such findings in so far as they are based on 
orderly proceedings during which the defendant 
party had ample opportunity to present its 
submissions. The views of the Human Rights 
Committee gain their authority from their inner 
qualities of impartiality, objectiveness and 
soberness. If such requirements are met, the views 
of the Human Rights Committee can have a 
far-reaching impact, at least vis-a-vis such 
Governments which have not outrightly broken with 
the international community and ceased to care 
anymore for concern expressed by international 
bodies. If such a situation arose, however, even a 
(Footnote Continued) 
forum to bring pressure to bear upon States parties to 
comply with the final views adopted by the Human rights 
Committee", p. 541. 
302 See n. 297 above. 
303 See n. 298 above. 
304 See n. 299 above. 
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legally binding decision would not be likely to be 
respected ". 
305 
Much of this chapter on the O. P. has been directed 
to showing how the development of practices and 
procedures by the HRC enhance these very qualities of 
impartiality, objectiveness and fairness. Many of these 
matters have been commented upon favourably and thus 
help to invest the HRC's views with greater authority 
and a legal rather than merely a "political value". 
306 
4.40 It is arguable that the ambiguity of the term views 
and the fact that they are non-binding has allowed the 
HRC to go further in those views than might have been 
expected. The views do not end with the HRC's findings 
on the question of violations. Each view continues with 
a statement of the view of the HRC on the "Obligation" 
of the State party in the light of the HRC's findings. 
Among the general and particular obligations indicated 
by the HRC have been: 
(a) To take immediate steps to ensure strict observance 
of the provisions of the Covenant; 
307 
(b) To provide immediate and effective remedies to the 
victims (Article 2(3) ICCPR); 308 
305 Tomuschat, n. 1 above, p. 255. Unfortunately, 
this was perhaps the case with Uruguay prior to the new 
Government in March 1985. 
306 Capatorti, n. 1 above, p. 144. 
307 See e. g., Ambrosini, Massera and Massera v. 
Uruguay, Doc. A/34/40, p. 124, pr. 10 at (iii). 
308 See e. g., Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Doc. A/36/49, 
p. 176, pr. 14. In Carballal v. Uruguay, Doc. A/36/40, 
p. 125, pr. 14 the obligation specified was to provide 
effective remedies, "If applied for". There is no 
explanation of why this requirement only appears in that 
view. 
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(c) To provide adequate or appropriate remedies to the 
victims; 
309 
(d) To provide compensation to the victims; 310 
(e) To immediately release the victims; 311 
(f) To take steps, with a view to enabling the victims 
to participate again in the political life of the 
nation; 
312 
(g) To adjust the provisions of legislation, sometimes 
specified, in order to implement its obligations under 
the Covenant; 313 
(h) To give the victim permission to leave the 
country; 
314 
309 See e. g., De Montejo v. Uruguay, Doc. A/37/40, 
p. 168, pr. 12; Broeks v. Netherlands, Doc. A/42/40 p. 139, 
pr. 16. 
310 See e. g., Carballal v. Uruguay, Doc. A/36/40 
p. 125. In a number of cases the HRC has specifically 
referred to "compensation in accordance with article 
9(5) of the Covenant". See e. g. Santullo (Valcada) v. 
Uruguay, Doc. A/35/40 p. 107, pr. 13. Mose and Opsahl, 
comment that, "The specific provision referred to here 
does not exclude other remedies, but since neither the 
Protocol nor the Covenant prescribe what kind of 
measures are required in the various situations of 
violations, the Committee apparently felt it could not 
be more precise", p. 324. 
311 See e. g., Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Doc. A/36/40 
p. 176. 
312 See e. q., Silva and others v. 
Doc. A/36/40, p. 130, pr. 10. 
313 See e. g., Aumeeruddy-Cziffra 
Mauritius, Doc. A/36/40, p. 134, pr. 11; 
Colombia, Doc. A/37/40, p. 193, pr. 15. 
141A 
Uruguay, 
and Others v. 
Fals Borda V. 
v-' See e. g., Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Doc. A/36/40 
p. 176. 
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(i) To extend (to the victims) the treatment and rights 
of detained persons laid in articles 7,9 and 10 of the 
Covenant; 315 
(j) To ensure that the victim receives and continues to 
receive all necessary medical care; 
316 
(k) To establish what has happened to the alleged 
victim, to bring to justice any persons found to be 
responsible for his death, disappearance or 
ill-treatment, and to pay compensation to him or his 
family for any injury which he has suffered; 317 
(1) To ensure that the right to life is duly protected 
by amending the law; 
318 
(m) To give the victim a trial or a fresh trial with 
all the procedural guarantees in Article 14; 
319 
(n) To provide the victim with effective remedies which 
would give her the possibility of enjoying the rights 
under Article 12 of the Covenant (freedom of movement 
and residence) including a passport valid for travel 
abroad; 
320 
315 See e. g., Schweizer v. Uruguay, Doc. A/38/40, 
p. 117, pr. 11. 
316 See e. g., Antonaccio v. Uruguay, A/37/40, 
p. 114, pr. 21. 
317 See e. g., Bleir v. Uruguay, Doc. A/37/40, p. 130, 
pr. 15; Barbato v. Uruguay, Doc. A/38/40, p. 124, pr. 11. 
318 See e. g., De Guerrero v. Uruguay, Doc. A/37/40, 
p. 137, pr. 15. 
319 See e. g., Antonaccio v. Uruguay, Doc. A/37/40 
p. 114, pr. 21. 
320 See e. g., Vidal Martins v. Uruguay, 
Doc. A/37/40, p. 157, pr. 10. In three parallel cases 
concerning passports the HRC referred only to an 
obligation to provide effective remedies pursuant to 
article 2(3) of the Covenant, Lichtensztejn v. Uruguay, 
Doc. A/38/40 p. 166, pr. 10; Montero v. Uruguay, 
Doc. A/38/40 p. 186, pr. 11; Nunez v. Uruguay, Doc. A/38/40 
p. 225, pr. 11. 
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(o) To investigate the allegations of torture; 321 
(p) To return property to the victim; 322 
(q) To take steps to ensure that similar violations do 
not occur in the future; 
323 
(r) To transmit a copy of the views to the victim. 324 
It is interesting to note the specific nature and 
directness of some of these obligations, for example, to 
pay compensation or amend particular pieces of 
legislation. 325 This approach is very positive compared, 
for example, with that of the EUCT which simply states 
whether or not there has been a violation of the ECHR, 
though it has power under Article 50 ECHR to award 
damages and costs in certain circumstances. 
326 
4.41 Having declared a communication inadmissible or 
expressed its view as to the alleged violations and any 
321 See e. g., Muteba v. Uruguay, Doc. A/39/40, 
p. 182, pr. 13. In Baritussio v. Uruguay, Doc. A/37/40, 
p. 187, pr. 14, the HRC urged the State party "to 
investigate the allegations of torture made against 
named persons in this case". 
322 See e. g., Ex-Philibert v. Zaire, Doc. A/38/40, 
p. 197, pr. 9. 
323 See e. g., Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Doc. A/36/40 
p. 176. This obligation has been expressed in the 
majority of views to date. 
324 See e. g., Barbato v. Uruguay, Doc. A/38/40 
p. 124, pr. 11. 
325 Note that in Marais v. Madagascar, Doc. A/38/40, 
p. 141, pr. 20, the HRC's views included the statement 
that, "The Committee would welcome a decision by the 
State party to release Mr. Marais, prior to completion 
of his sentence, in response to his petition for 
clemency". Mr. Marais was not released until the 
completion of his sentence. 
326 Cf. The powers of the EUCT under article 50 
ECHR as to which see Van Dijk and Van Hoof pp. 146-156, 
and R. 53 of the EUCT's Rules of Procedure. There is now 
a substantial jurisprudence on article 50 ECHR. See 
also article 32 ECHR for the role of the Committee of 
Ministers when a case is not referred to the EUCT. 
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resulting obligations the question remains whether the 
HRC has any competence to reconsider its views at the 
request of either party or follow up in any way its 
expression of views to ensure that they are respected by 
the State party. 
327 These important matters have been 
considered by the Working Group on Communications and 
the plenary HRC. The extensive debate is well summarized 
in the HRC's annual report, 
"Some members were of the opinion that nothing in 
the Covenant and the Optional Protocol, which were 
the legal basis of the Committee's functions and 
limits, empowered the Committee to reconsider its 
views on communications or to ensure their 
implementation; that the Committee could have no 
inherent powers that had not been given to it 
explicitly by States parties and that it therefore 
had no competence to initiate the review of a case 
already concluded; that there was nothing in the 
Optional Protocol to prevent an individual from 
submitting a further communication if he was not 
satisfied with the Committee's views, or if he 
considered that there were facts or evidence to 
which attention should be drawn, and the question 
would then become one of admissibility of the new 
communication; that the Committee was a sui generis 
body, with no judicial powers and that the 
implementation of its views was left to the 
goodwill of the State party concerned; that the 
question of monitoring of the implementation of 
those views in the absence of a clear legal mandate 
327 In two cases the HRC has had recourse to 
R. 93(4) of its rules which provides for a review of a 
decision declaring a communication admissible in the 
light of any explanations or statements submitted by the 
State party. See C. F. et. al. v. Canada, Doc. A/40/40 
p. 217; J. M. v. Jamaica, Doc. A/41/40 p. 164. In both 
cases the authors made no comments on the information 
subsequently provided by the State party. 
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to that effect, might even be contrary to Article 
2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United 
Nations relating to the internal affairs of states; 
that States parties could, if they so wish, use the 
amendment procedure under Article 11 of the 
Protocol, an easy matter at the current stage, when 
there were only 28 States parties to the Protocol; 
that if the Committee took it upon itself to change 
procedures for which explicit ratification was 
required, its action could be taken as a warning to 
States to think twice before ratifying the optional 
Protocol, since there was no prediction what 
additional obligations and procedures the Committee 
would attach to that instrument; and that no 
useful progress could be made in trying to press 
States to do what they were no obliged to do. 
The majority of members, however, pointed out that 
the Committee could not let its work under the 
Optional Protocol degenerate into an exercise of 
futility; that due consideration had to be paid to 
both the letter and the spirit of the Covenant, and 
that whereas the Committee believed that certain 
appropriate action was reasonably open to it, or 
was not expressly prohibited, the Committee should 
take it and that the Optional Protocol allowed 
considerable latitude for interpretation since many 
issues were not specifically covered by its 
provisions. Several such issues were cited, as well 
as decisions and steps taken previously by the 
Committee, but which could not be traced directly 
back to the Covenant or the Optional Protocol. 
328 
Considering that the Optional Protocol did not 
provide for the principle of res judicata as far as 
328 See, e. g., pr. 4.10 above on interim measures 
under the O. P. 
%ýn. q Lby 
the Committee's decisions were concerned, and that 
the Committee's rules of procedure allowed for a 
review of a decision on admissibility, 
reconsideration of a communication should be 
possible, but only as an exception, not as a rule; 
that it should primarily be based on new facts, 
although legal arguments adduced at a later stage 
could not be entirely excluded; that a new rule to 
that effect may not be desirable at the present 
stage, but that if one was ultimately to be drawn 
up it should be an enabling rule whose effect would 
be to impose limitations and to discourage abuses. 
As to the question of whether the Committee was 
entitled to monitor the implementation of its 
decisions under the Optional Protocol, it was 
pointed out that, whereas the Committee had no 
executive powers enabling it to enforce its views, 
it could nevertheless do something to bring 
redress, or end continued violations, of the 
victim's rights after transmission of its views to 
the State party concerned. Moreover, it was clear 
from the preamble of the Protocol329 and Article 
2(3) of the Covenant330 that the States parties 
intended the Covenant to be implemented. When a 
victim was clearly within the jurisdiction of a 
State and not in direct communication with the 
Committee, the Committee should indicate in its 
views that he might avail himself of certain 
remedies and the Committee should request the State 
party to communicate the entire decision to him and 
should also be requested to inform the Committee of 
3 
any developments" 
. 
31 
329 For the text of the Preamble see Apx. 'II below. 
330 See ch. 6 below. 
331 Doc. A/38/40, pr. 394. 
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The HRC have been pressed on the questions of 
reconsideration and follow up of communications because 
in a number of cases authors have asked the Committee to 
take additional steps to persuade the States parties 
concerned to act in conformity with the views of the 
HRC. Similarly the HRC have been requested by authors to 
review a number of inadmissibility decisions. 
332 The HRC 
has now expressed the opinion that, 
"Its role in the examination of any given case 
comes to an end by the adoption of views or by the 
adoption of another decision of a final nature. 
Only in exceptional circumstances may the Committee 
agree to reconsider an earlier final decision. 
Basically, this would only occur when the Committee 
is satisfied that new facts are placed before it by 
a party claiming that these facts were not 
available to it at the time of the consideration of 
the case and that these facts would have altered 
the decision of the Committee. The Committee, 
however, takes an interest in any action by the 
State party as a consequence of the Committee's 
views under the Optional Protocol, or in any action 
taken by the State party which concerns either the 
legal issues involved or the situation of the 
person concerned. Thus, when forwarding its views 
to a State party, the Committee invites the State 
party to inform it of any action pursuant to the 
views". 
333 
The decision is clearly a compromise between the 
opposing views on these matters outlined above. Its sets 
another important precedent of the HRC applying an 
interpretation of the O. P. which allows it some 
flexibility to take appropriate action, albeit modest, 
332 Doc. A/39/40, pr. 621. 
333 Ibid. (My emphasis). 
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which is reasonably open to it , which is not expressly 
prohibited by the terms of the O. P. 
4.42 Since the HRC's fifteenth session (March-April 
1982) the letter of transmittal accompanying the 
Committee's views invites the State party to inform the 
HRC of any action pursuant to its views. A number of 
responses had been received by States parties. Three 
responses were received in 1983 from Canada, 
334 
Finland335 and Mauritius336 informing the HRC of 
legislative or other measures that had been or were 
being taken in response to the HRC's views. Madagascar 
also informed the HRC that an individual whose case the 
HRC had considered had been released from imprisonment 
upon completion of his sentence and had left Malagasy 
territory. 337 In 1984 the Government of Uruguay 
requested that a list of persons released from 
imprisonment in 1983 and 1984 which had been furnished 
to the Secretary-General, be brought to the attention of 
the HRC. Included in the list were two persons whose 
cases had been considered by the HRC. 
338 The HRC learned 
from other sources of the release of three other 
individuals whose cases it had considered. 
339 Similar 
334 Doc. A/38/40, pr. 394 and Appx. XXXI. 
335 Ibid., Appx. XXXII. 
336 Ibid., Appx. XXXIII. 
337 Doc. A/39/40, pr. 624. 
338 Doc. A/39/40, pr. 623. 
339 Ibid. The three individuals were J. L. Massera, 
Doc. A/34/40 p. 124; L. Celiberti de Casariego, Doc. A/36/40 
p. 185; R. Pietraroia, Doc. A/36/40 p. 153. Professor Tolley 
has noted that J. L. Massera, a distinguished 
mathematician, was released three days before the 
situation in Uruguay was to be subject to a private 
discussion in the Human Rights Commission. He comments 
that, "a procedure fashioned to redress patterns of 
gross violations thus produced an isolated individual (Footnote Continued) 
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lists were provided by the Uruguayan Government in 
October 1984 and in February and March 1985.340 Those 
lists included a number of persons whose cases were 
pending before the or had been considered by it. 
341 
4.43 In 1985 Canada informed the HRC that amending 
legislation had been passed to bring the Indian Act into 
conformity with the HRC's decision in the Lovelace 
case. 
342 Finally Madagascar provided 'detailed comments 
and information concerning the decision in Monja Jaona 
v. Madagascar. 
343 Madagascar maintained that the 
communication was inadmissible and in any event no 
violations of the Covenant had occurred. The State party 
expressed its regret at not having made the information 
available to the HRC at an earlier stage and affirmed 
its intention to co-operate more fully with the HRC in 
the future. 344 
In response the HRC expressed its satisfaction at 
all measures taken by the States parties towards the 
(Footnote Continued) 
remedy granted for symbolic effect", The Concealed Crack 
In The Citadel: The United Nations Commission On Human 
Rights' Response To Confidential Communications, 6 HRQ 
(1984), p. 420 at p. 457. 
340 Doc. A/40/40, pr. 703. The newly elected 
Government came to power on 1st March 1985. The new 
Government provided the HRC with part of the text of a 
general amnesty law of 8 March 1985 under which all 
political prisoners had been released and all forms of 
political banishment had been lifted. In Conteris v. 
Uruguay, Doc. A/40/40, p. 196, pr. 9.2, the HRC noted that 
Conteris had been released pursuant to this general 
amnesty. 
341 Ibid. The individuals concerned have included 
Antonaccio, Izquierdo, Bequio, Vasilskis, Nieto, 
Machado, Scarrone and Romero, cited in Nowak, n. 1 above, 
(1986) p. 305, n. 74. 
342 Doc. A/40/40, pr. 704. Lovelace v. Canada, 
Doc. A/36/40, p. 166; S. D., p. 83. 
343 Monja Jaona v. Madagascar, Doc. A/40/40, p. 179. 
344 Doc. A/40/40, pr. 705. 
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observance of the Covenant and welcomed the positive 
responses and the co-operation of the States parties 
concerned. 
345 
345 Doc. A. 39/40, pr. 625; Doc. A/40/40, pr. 706. 
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E. THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE O. P. 
1. The Function Of The HRC Under The O. P. 
4.44 There are no provisions in the ICCPR or the O. P. 
which expressly address this matter. However, the HRC 
has had a number of occasions on which to make clear its 
view of its function in relation to national courts and 
tribunals. In Hertzberg et al. v. Finland346 the 
Committee pointed out that it was, 
"not called upon to review the interpretation of 
paragraph 9(2) of chapter 20 of the Finnish Penal 
Code. The authors have advanced no valid argument 
which could indicate that the construction placed 
upon this provision by the Finnish tribunals was 
not made bona fide. Accordingly, the Committee's 
task is confined to clarifying whether the 
restrictions applied against the alleged victims, 
irrespective of the scope of the penal prohibitions 
under Finish penal law, disclose a breach of any of 
the rights under the Covenant". 
347 
Similarly, in Pinkey v. Canada348 the Committee 
observed, 
"that allegations that a domestic court has 
committed errors of fact or law do not in 
themselves raise questions of violation of the 
Covenant unless it is also appears that some of the 
requirements of article 14 have not been complied 
with". 
349 
346 Doc. A/37/40 p. 161; S. D. p. 24. 
347 Ibid., pr. 9.2. 
348 Doc. A/37/40 p. 101; S. D. p. 12. 
349 Ibid., pr. l1. See also the arguments raised by 
both the State party and the author in M. A. v. Italy, 
Doc. A/39/40 p. 190. 
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Again in Maroufidou v. Sweden 
350 
F 
"M claims that the decision to expel her was in 
violation of article 13 of the Covenant because it 
was not "in accordance with the law". In her 
submission it was based on an incorrect 
interpretation of the Swedish Aliens Act. The 
Committee takes the view that the interpretation of 
domestic law is essentially a matter for the courts 
and authorities of the State party concerned. It is 
not within the powers or functions of the Committee 
to evaluate whether the competent authorities of 
the State party in question have interpreted and 
applied the domestic law correctly in the case 
before it under the Optional Protocol, unless it is 
established that they have not interpreted and 
applied it in good faith or that it is evident that 
there has been an abuse of power". 
351 
In the light of the information before it the HRC was, 
"satisfied that in reaching the decision to expel 
Anna Maroufidou the Swedish authorities did 
interpret and apply the relevant provisions of 
Swedish law in good faith and in a reasonable 
manner and consequently that the decision was made 
"in accordance with law" as required by article 13 
of the Covenant". 
352 
And again in J. K. v. Canada353 the Committee observed 
that it was 
350 Doc. A/36/40 p. 160; S. D. p. 80. 
351 Ibid., pr. 10.1. 
352 Ibid., pr. 10.2. The Committee had established 
that article 13 requires compliance with both the 
substantive and the procedural requirements of the law, 
ibid., pr. 9.3. For article 13 see apx. I. On the 
interpretation of "in accordance with the law" under the 
ECHR see Van Dijk and Van Hoof, pp. 424-427. 
353 Doc. A/40/40 p. 215. 
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"beyond its competence to review findings of fact 
made by national tribunals or to determine whether 
national tribunals properly evaluated new evidence 
submitted on appeal". 
354 
The Committee, "does not deal with questions of 
constitutionality, but with the question whether a law 
is in conformity with the Covenant, as applied in the 
circumstances of the case... ". 
355 Therefore, the 
application of a legal provision may violate the 
Covenant event though it has been held constitutional in 
the national courts of the State concerned. 356 
A related aspect is that the Committee, 
"has only been entrusted with the mandate of 
examining whether an individual has suffered an 
actual violation of his rights. It cannot review in 
the abstract whether national legislation 
contravenes the Covenant, although such legislation 
may, in particular circumstances, produce adverse 
effects which directly affect the individual, 
making him thus a victim in the sense contemplated 
by article 2 of the Optional Protocol". 357 
The "victim" requirement is dealt with in detail 
below. 358 
4.45 It is notable that the views which the Committee 
has taken of its function under the O. P. closely 
354 Ibid., pr. 7.2. Similarly in Muhonen v. Finland, 
Doc. A/40/40 p. 164, pr. ll. l, as regards the evaluation by 
Finnish authorities of an application for exemption from 
armed or unarmed service in the Finnish Armed Forces. 
355 Fals Borda v. Colombia, Doc. A/37/40 p. 193, 
pr. 13.3. 
356 An example is the Fals Borda Case, ibid. 
357 Hertzberg and others v. Finland, Doc. A/37/40 
p. 161; S. D. p. 124, pr. 9.3. See also Mclsaac v. Canada, 
Doc. A/38/40 p. 111, pr. 10. 
358 See prs. 4.75-4.4.81 below. 
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parallels those taken by the EUCM and the EUCT under the 
ECHR. 359 Like those organs the HRC has also engaged in 
limited ex officio tasks, for example, raising of its 
own motion certain issues during the consideration of 
communications. However, there has as yet been no 
indication whether the HRC takes any view similar to 
that established under the ECHR of protecting the 
objective character of the obligations under the 
3 European Convention and "fordre public de 1'Europe". 
60 
359 See Fawcett, pp. 323-329. 
360 See Fawcett, pp. 330-335. Cf. The 2nd Advisory 
Opinion Of The IACT On The Entry Into Force Of The 
American Convention For A State Ratifying Or Adhering 
With A Reservation, 3 HRLJ (1982) p. 153-165. "In 
concluding these human rights treaties, the States can 
be deemed to submit themselves to a legal order within 
which they, for the common good, assume various legal 
obligations, not in relation to other States, but 
towards all individuals within their jurisdiction", 
ibid., pr. 29. 
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2. The Interpretation Of The ICCPR And The O. P. 361 
4.46 The most important view of the HRC concerning the 
interpretation of the ICCPR and the O. P. is that in Van 
Duzen v. Canada. 
362 The facts of the case raised complex 
issues concerning whether the provision in Article 15(1) 
ICCPR for the retroactivity of a "Lighter Penalty" was 
applicable to a law amending the rules concerning the 
forfeiture of parole. The author raised the matter of 
the applicable principles of interpretation. He 
submitted that in a case of doubt a presumption of 
liberty of the individual should be applied to Article 
15(1). He further argued that the meaning of Article 
15(1) he was advancing was assumed in reservations made 
by certain other States Parties when they ratified the 
Covenant and was supported in the proceedings of the 
Third Committee in 1960 in which Canada had 
participated. 
363 The State party agreed with the 
principle of interpretation advanced but submitted that 
there was no ambiguity in Article 15(1). Therefore the 
author could not benefit from the presumption in favour 
of liberty. 
364 
Unfortunately, the HRC made no comment or 
observation on such an alleged general principle of 
361 See P. Hassan, The International Covenants On 
Human Rights: An Approach To Interpretation, 19 Buffalo 
LR (1969) pp. 35-50; Ibid., The International Covenant On 
Civil And Political Rights: Background And' Perspective 
On Article 9(1), 3 Denver. JILP (1973) pp. 153-183. See 
generally, articles 31-32 V. C. L. T. (1969). 
362 Doc. A/37/40 p. 150. See T. Opsahl and A. De Zayas, 
The Uncertain Scope Of Article 15(1) Of The 
International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, 
1983 Can HRYB pp. 237-254. 
363 Ibid., pr. 6.2. 
364 Ibid., pr. 8.6. 
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interpretation. 365 It did, however, make an important 
statement on the interpretation of the terms and 
concepts of the ICCPR and the O. P., 
"The Committee further notes that its 
interpretation and application of the ICCPR has to 
be based on the principle that the terms and 
concepts of the Covenant are independent of any 
particular national system of law and of all 
dictionary definitions. Although the terms of the 
Covenant are derived from long traditions within 
many nations, the Committee must now regard them as 
having an autonomous meaning. The parties have made 
extensive submissions, in particular as regards the 
meaning of the word "Penalty" and as regards 
Canadian law and practice. The Committee 
appreciates their relevance for the light they shed 
on the nature of the issue in dispute. On the other 
hand, the meaning of the word "Penalty" in Canadian 
law is not, as such, decisive. Whether the word 
"Penalty" in Article 15(1) should be interpreted 
narrowly or widely, and whether it applies to 
different kinds of penalties, "Criminal" and 
"Administrative", under the Covenant, must depend 
on other factors. Apart from the text of Article 
15(1) regard must be had, inter alia, to its object 
and purpose". 
366 
It in interesting to note, first, that the HRC will 
regard at least some of the terms and concepts of the 
365 See Brownlie, Principles Of Public 
International Law, pp. 288-289,623-630 (3d, 1979). 
366 Doc. A/37/40 p. 150, pr. 10.2 (my emphasis). See 
also Maroufidou v. Sweden, Doc. A/36/40 p. 160, on article 
13 ICCPR, "The reference to "law" in this context is to 
the domestic law of the State concerned, which in the 
present case is Swedish law, though of course the 
relevant provisions of domestic law must themselves be 
compatible with the provisions of the Covenant", ibid., 
pr. 9.3. 
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Covenant as having an "Autonomous", "Independent" 
meaning. A similar approach has been developed under 
the ECHR. 367 A clear example of the HRC adopting an 
autonomous interpretation of a provision of the Covenant 
is the case of Lovelace v. Canada. 
368 At the time of 
submitting the communication L no longer qualified as an 
Indian under Canadian legislation. However, the HRC took 
the view that, 
"Persons who are born and brought up on a reserve, 
who have kept ties with their community and wish to 
maintain these ties must normally be considered as 
belonging to that minority within the meaning of 
the Covenant". 369 
The HRC decided on the facts that L was entitled to 
be regarded as "Belonging" to the minority concerned and 
thus to claim the benefits of Article 27 of the 
Covenant. 370 
4.47 Secondly, we can note the direct reference to the 
text of the treaty and to its object and purpose mirrors 
the general rule of treaty interpretation in Article 31 
367 See e. g. the decision of the EUCT in the Engel 
Case, (1978) on the concept of "criminal charge" in 
article 6(1) ECHR. The equivalent of article 15(1) ICCPR 
can be found in article 7 ECHR. The EUCM has deemed 
itself competent to review the interpretation and 
application of the provisions of municipal law by the 
national court, A. 1852/63, X. v. Austria, Yearbook VIII (1965) p. 190 at p. 198. See Van Dijk and Van Hoof, 
pp. 273-282, who comment, "As a matter of fact the case 
law of the Commission shows that the national 
authorities hardly have to fear an autonomous 
interpretation of that municipal law by the Commission", 
p. 274. 
368 Doc. A/36/40 p. 166; S. D. p. 83. 
369 Ibid., pr. 14. 
370 Ibid. 
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V. C. L. T. (1969). 371 Under ' the ECHR a teleological 
interpretation has increasingly been adopted and is now 
highly developed. 372 There has as yet been no parallel 
in the HRC's jurisprudence to the "dynamic approach" to 
interpretation under the ECHR in accordance with which 
the institutions have identified their role as a 
protector of human rights in accordance with the 
changing perceptions of them in Western Europe as social 
values and attitudes evolve. 
373 Clearly the HRC's 
comment does not rule out reference to the preparatory 
work on the Covenant and the O. P., and indeed resort has 
been had to the preparatory work in a number of views. 
Notable example were three Dutch cases concerning the 
scope of article 26 ICCPR. 
374 In each, case the HRC 
stated that it had "perused" the travaux preparatoires 
of the ICCPR which provide a "supplementary means of 
interpretation" (article 32 of the V. C. L. T. ). 375 The HRC 
concluded that, "The discussions, at the time of the 
drafting, concerning whether the scope of article 26 
extended to rights not otherwise guaranteed by the 
Covenant, were inconclusive and cannot alter the 
conclusion arrived at by the ordinary means of 
371 
"A Treaty shall be interpreted in-good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose", Article 31(1) V. C. L. T. (1969). 
372 See e. g. Wemhoff v. FRG, EUCT, vol. 7,1968), 
Golder v. U. K., EUCT, vol. 18, (1981); Airey v. Ireland, 
EUCT, vol. 32, (1979); Young, James and Webster v. U. K., 
EUCT, vol. 44, (1981). 
373 See e. g. Dudgeon v. U. K., EUCT, vol. 45, (1981); 
Marcxx v. Belgium, EUCT, vol. 31, (1979); Weeks v. U. K., 
EUCT, vol. 114, (1987). See generally C. C. Morrisson, The 
Dynamics Of Development In The European Human Rights 
Convention System (1981). 
374 Broeks v. Netherlands, Doc. A/42/40 p. 139; 
Danning v. Netherlands, ibid., p. 151; Zwaan-de Vries v. 
Nethe53gnds, ibid., p. 160. See prs. 4.55-4.58 below. 
Ibid., pr. 12.2 of each view. 
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P 
376 The "ordinary means" means inter retation... 
. 
referred to by the HRC were those in article 31 
V. C. L. T. 377 
Finally, in Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, 378 the HRC 
stated that it would not adopt an interpretation of the 
Covenant which was "Unconscionable". 379 
4.48 It is convenient to note here that the "Margin Of 
Appreciation" (or "Discretion") doctrine which has 
formed an important part of the jurisprudence under the 
ECHR has been introduced by the HRC. In Hertzberg and 
Others v. Finland, 
380 the authors argued that the Finish 
authorities including the organs of the State controlled 
Finish Broadcasting Corporation had interfered with 
their right to freedom of expression and information 
(Article 19) by imposing sanctions against participants 
in, or censoring, radio and television programmes 
dealing with homosexuality. 381 In its final views the 
HRC stated hat, 
"It has to be noted, first, that public morals 
differ widely. There is no universally applicable 
common standard. Consequently, in this respect, a 
certain margin of discretion must be accorded to 
the responsible national authorities". 
382 
It is as yet too early to know how widely the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation will be 
interpreted in the HRC's jurisprudence. An unduly wide 
376 Ibid., pr. 12.3 of each view. 
377 See n. 371 above. 
378 Doc. A/36/40 p. 176. 
379 Ibid., pr. 12.3. 
380 Doc. A/37/40 p. 161; S. D. p. 124. 
381 Ibid., pr. 2.1. 
382 Ibid., pr. 10.3. For the HRC's view see ch. 11 
below. 
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interpretation inevitably lowers the level of protection 
offered to alleged victims by reducing the level of 
international supervision. Though firmly established 
under the ECHR, and indeed of increasing significance, 
the doctrine has not been without its critics. 383 
383 See C. Morrisson, Margin Of'Appreciation In 
European Human Rights Law, 4 HRR/RDH (1973) pp. 263-286; 
T. O'Donnell, The Margin Of Appreciation Doctrine: 
Standards In The Jurisprudence Of The European Court Of 
Human Rights, 4 HRQ (1982) pp. 474-496; Van Dijk and Van 
Hoof, pp. 427-449; C. Feingold, The Little Red Schoolbook 
And The European Convention On Human Rights, 3 HRRev. 
(1978) pp. 263-286. 
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3. Incompatibility With The Provisions Of The 
Covenant. 384 
(a) Ratione Temporis. 385 
4.49 The HRC has clearly stated that with respect to the 
original States Parties to the O. P. it is only competent 
to consider alleged violations occurring on or after the 
date of the entry into force of the O. P. on 23 March 
1976.386 Similarly with respect to States which have 
later acceded to the O. P. the HRC is only competent to 
consider alleged violations occurring on or after the 
date of the entry into force of the O. P. for that State 
party. 
387 Moreover, in A. R. S. v. Canada388 the HRC 
expressed the view that, 
"No action taken before the entry into force of the 
Covenant for the State party concerned can, as 
such, be judged in the light of the obligations 
deriving from the Covenant". 389 
4.50 However, alleged violations occurring before the 
date of the entry into force of the State concerned can 
be considered by the HRC if the violations continue or 
have continuing effects after that date which themselves 
384 See Brar, n. 1 above, pp. 507-531; Mose and 
Opsahl, pp. 295-302. 
385 Generally see article 28 of the Vienna 
Convention On The Law Of Treaties, (1969). For the 
practice under the ECHR see Van Dijk and Van Hoof, 
pp. 8-10. For recent decisions see Baggetta v. Italy, 
EUCT, vol. 119, (1987); Milasi v. Italy, EUCT, Ibid. 
386 See, e. g., Sequeira v. Uruguay, Doc. A/35/40, 
p. 127; De Touron v. Uruguay, Doc. A/36/40, p. 120. 
387 See, e. g., C. E. v. Canada, S. D., p. 16. 
388 S. D., p. 29. 
389 Ibid., pr. 5.1. The communication concerned 
certain provisions of the Parole Act 1970 and article 15 
Ln. q4 OJ 
constitute a violation of the Covenant. 
390 
This approach 
has been consistently applied in a number of cases in 
which the HRC has declared communications or parts of 
communications inadmissible ratione temporis. 
391 
The 
HRC's final views in such cases commonly take the form 
that the facts as found by the HRC, "In so far as they 
continued or occurred after the date of entry into force 
of the ICCPR and the O. P. " disclose certain violations 
or not. 
392 In Altesor v. Uruguay393 the HRC held that it 
could not establish with certainty what facts had 
occurred after the entry into force of the ICCPR and the 
O. P. They would, therefore, make no finding as regards 
those allegations. 
394 
The question of continuing violations has been 
raised in a number of communications. In Carballal v. 
Uruguay395 the HRC concluded that although the date of 
C's arrest was prior to the entry into force of the 
ICCPR and the O. P. the alleged violations of Articles 
7,9,10 and 14 continued after that date. 
396 In Cabreira 
v. Uruguay397 it was argued that although the alleged 
torture of C took place before the entry into force of 
the ICCPR and the O. P. in Uruguay it had effects up to 
390 Doc. A/33/40, pr. 581. See, e. g., A et al. v. S, 
S. D., p. 3 and p. 17. Cf. the decision of the EUCM in De 
Becker v. Belgium, 2 Y. B. E. C. H. R. (1958-59), p. 214 at 
pp. 233-234. 
391 See, e. g., De Bazzano v. Uruguay, S. D., p. 40; 
L. P. v. Canada, S. D., p. 21. 
392 See, e. g., De Bazzano v. Uruguay, Ibid., pr. 10. 
393 Doc. A/37/40, p. 122. 
394 Ibid., prs. 8(2), 9(2). See also Acosta v. 
Uruguay, Doc. A/39/40, p. 169, pr. 14. 
395 Doc. A/36/40, p. 125. 
396 Ibid., pr. 5(a). 
397 Doc. A/38/40, p. 209. 
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the date of the communication because it was on the 
basis of the confessions made under torture that C was 
sentenced to twelve years imprisonment which he 
continued to serve. 
398 Unfortunately, the HRC did not 
reply to this argument but it would appear to have 
rejected it. 
4.51 This question of the continuing effects of 
violations has been more directly considered in other 
cases. In M. A. v. Italy399 the communication raised 
various possible violations of the ICCPR including the 
fair trial guarantee under Article 14. Italy argued that 
the alleged violations occurred prior to the entry into 
force of the ICCPR and the O. P. in Italy on 15 December 
1978 and that, therefore, the communication should be 
declared inadmissible ratione temporis. 
400 M. A. raised 
the same point as in the Cabreira case. 
401 He argued 
that, 
"The violations did not come to an end prior to 15 
December 1978, which is obvious since he is 
currently serving the sentence for which he was 
tried. Thus, the law applied is still in force and 
the sentence against M. A. is being carried out". 
402 
The reply of the HRC was that, 
"It must be shown that there were consequences 
which could themselves have constituted a violation 
of the Covenant. In the opinion of the Committee 
there were no such consequences in the 
circumstances in the present case". 
403 
398 Ibid., pr. 2.3. 
399 Doc. A/39/40, p. 190. 
400 Ibid., pr. 7.2. 
401 See Doc. A/38/40, p. 209. 
402 Doc. A/39/40, p. 190, pr. 9. 
403 Ibid., pr. 13.2. 
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The HRC's view seems to be a clear rejection of the 
argument advanced by M. A. It is submitted that the HRC's 
view was correct. The prison sentence was clearly a 
consequence of the alleged violations but that is a 
necessary rather than a sufficient condition. The 
consequence itself, that is, the sentence, had to 
constitute a violation of the Covenant and on the facts 
it did not. 
4.52 Other consequences of a prison sentence were raised 
in J. K. v. Canada404. J. K. was convicted of arson prior 
to the entry into force of the ICCPR and the O. P. for 
Canada. He argued, 
"That the stigma of an allegedly unjust conviction 
and the social and legal consequences thereof, 
including the general prejudice in society against 
convicted persons, make him a victim today of 
Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 3 (a) to (c), and 
article 25 of the Covenant 
- 
of article 14 because 
he was allegedly denied a fair trial and of article 
25, because his conviction bars him from equal 
access to public service and from running for 
public office and because his criminal record puts 
him at a disadvantage, in particular in the field 
of employment". 
405 
Again the HRC took the view, correctly it is submitted, 
that, "the consequences as described by the author do 
not themselves raise issues under the International 
covenant On Civil And Political Rights". 
406 
404 Doc. A/40/40, p. 215. 
405 Ibid., pr. 4. 
406 Ibid., pr. 7.3. 
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(b). Ratione Materiae. 
4.53 The HRC is only competent to consider 
communications alleging violations of the rights "Set 
forth" in the ICCPR (Article 1 O. P. ). 407 The HRC has 
declared inadmissible ratione materiae communications 
alleging violations of rights or matters not contained 
in the ICCPR. 408 In K. B. V. Denmark 
409 the 
communication was declared inadmissible, inter alia, on 
the ground that, "The right to dispose of property, as 
such, is not protected by any provisions of the 
ICCPR". 410 In C. E. v. Canada411 the communication 
related to C. E. 's claim for workman's compensation. It 
was declared inadmissible, inter alia, because the claim 
did not concern any of the rights referred to in the 
407 Cf. the practice under the parallel article 25 
ECHR as to which see Van Dijk and Van Hoof, pp. 69-70; 
Digest of Strasbourg Case Law Relating To The ECHR, 
Vol. 1, (articles 1-5), pp. 22-73, Council Of Europe, (1984). By contrast the inter State procedure under 
article 24 ECHR covers alleged violations of any of the 
provisions of the ECHR, not just its Section I. The 
position would probably be the same under the 
inter-State procedure in article 41 ICCPR. 
408 Doc. A/39/40, pr. 587. See, e. g., J. J. v. 
Denmark, S. D., p. 26, in which the author's complaint 
concerned the refusal of the ombudsman to censure a 
decision of the Ministry of Justice. 
409 S. D., p. 24. 
410 Ibid. The HRC also found no facts to 
substantiate the author's claims that she was a victim 
of a breach of articles 2(1), 3 or 26 or of any other 
rights protected by the Covenant. A right to property 
was proposed in both the HRCion and the Third Committee 
of the General Assembly, see ch. 1, n. 200 above. 
411 S. D., p. 16. 
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Covenant. In I. M. v. Norway412 I. M. alleged that he had 
been overtaxed as a result of various acts and omissions 
of the Tax Office in Oslo allegedly based on racial 
discrimination against him and that the Oslo authorities 
had failed to provide him with low rent accommodation 
which failure contributed to his paying higher taxes. 
413 
The HRC stated that the communication did not reveal any 
evidence of violation of any of the rights in the 
ICCPR. 414 In particular the HRC pointed out that, 
"The assessment of taxable income and allocation of 
houses are not in themselves matters to which the 
Covenant applies; nor is there any evidence in 
substantiation of the author's claim, to be a victim 
of racial discrimination" 
. 
415 
Accordingly, the HRC held the communication 
inadmissible as incompatible with the provisions of the 
ICCPR (Article 3 O. P. ). In Stella Costa v. Uruguay416 
Uruguay argued that the communication should be declared 
412 Doc. A/38/40, p. 241. 
413 Ibid., prs. 1 and 2. 
414 Ibid., pr. 5. 
415 Ibid. The reference to racial discrimination 
raises the important of whether the ICCPR contains a 
prohibition on certain forms of discrimination or only a 
prohibition on certain forms of discrimination with 
respect to the rights contained in the ICCPR. See now 
the important decisions of the HRC noted in 
prs. 4.55-4.58 below. 
Under article 14 ECHR there is only the more limited 
protection as regards the rights in section I. Cf. The 
admissibility decision of the EUCM in the East African 
Asians Cases, 13 YBECHR 928 at 994, (1970), where the 
EUCM stated that, "Quite apart from any consideration of 
article 14, discrimination base on race could, in 
certain circumstances, of itself amount to degrading 
treatment within the meaning of article 3 of the 
Convention". See C. C. Morrisson, The Dynamics Of 
Development In The European Human Rights Convention 
System, (1981). 
416 Doc. A/42/40 p. 170. 
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inadmissible, "on the ground that the author had no 
subjective right in law to be appointed to a public 
post, but only the legitimate aspiration to be 
soemployed". 
417 The HRC decided that the question 
whether the author's claim was well-founded should be 
examined on the merits as he had made a reasonable 
effort to substantiate his claim and had invoked 
specific provisions of the Covenant in that. respect. 
418 
4.54 In L. T. K. v. Finland419 the author claimed to be a 
victim of a violation of Articles 18 and 19 ICCPR 
because his status as a conscientious objector to 
military service had not been recognised in Finland and 
he had been prosecuted because of his refusal to perform 
military service. The HRC expressed the view that, 
"The Covenant does not provide for the right to 
conscientious objection; neither Article 18 nor 19 
of the Covenant, especially taking into account 
paragraph 3(c) (ii) of Article 8, can be construed 
as implying that right" 
. 
420 
Accordingly the claim was held inadmissible. More 
generally the HRC stated in K. L. v. Denmark421 that it 
had no competence to examine allegations of violations 
of other international instruments. In J. D. B. v. 
Netherlands422 the 
417 Ibid., pr. 7.3. See ibid., prs. 4 and 6.1. 
418 ibid. 
419 Doc. A/40/40, p. 240. 
420 Ibid., pr. 5.2. See also M. J. G. V. Netherlands, 
C/32/D/267/1987 (To be published in Doc. A/43/40, (1988). 
For the provisions of the Covenant see Appx. I. For a 
recent report see Eide and Mubanga- Chipoya, 
Conscientious Objection To Military Service, U. N. Doc. 
E/CN. 4/ Sub. 2/1983/30/Rev. l, (1985). See also 
Recommendation No. R (87) 8 of the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe, (April, 1987). 
421 S. D. 
. 
24. The P position is the same under the 
ECHR. 
(Footnote Continued) 
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communication referred to the right to work in Article 6 
ICESCR. 423 The communication was declared inadmissible. 
4.55 More difficult questions concerning the scope of 
the ICCPR and its relationship to other human rights 
instruments, in particular the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, were raised in 
three cases concerning the Netherlands. Those decisions 
concerned the scope of article 26 ICCPR which provides 
that, 
"All persons are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law 
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to 
all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status". 
424 
4.56 The three views, all issued on the same day, 
concerned various aspects of social security legislation 
in the Netherlands. In S. W. M. Broeks v. Netherlands425 
and in F. H. Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands426 the authors 
complained that the Dutch Unemployment Benefit Act of 
1976 violated article 26 of the Covenant. They argued 
that it was discriminatory in that, under it, benefits 
were discontinued to them because they had not proved 
(Footnote Continued) 
422 3 S. D. 24. The author had occasionally worked 
as a television repair man without the required licence 
from the Chamber of Commerce. He claimed that he was 
"discriminated against by Dutch legislation which 
prevents him from gainful employment and which punishes 
him for seeking an alternative to being unemployed". 
423 On the right to work see D. Harris, The European 
Social Charter, pp. 21-37, (1985). 
424 On the drafting of article 26 see Bossuyt, 
'Guide', pp. 479-492. For academic views on the 
interpretation of article 26 see Ramcharan and 
Tomuschat, in ch. 6, n. 1 below. 
425 Doc. A/42/40 p. 139. See also P. P. C. V. 
Netherlands, Doc. CCPR/C/32/D/212/1986, (To be published 
in Doc. A/43/40 (1988). 
426 Doc. A/42/40 p. 160. 
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complained that the Dutch Unemployment Benefit Act of 
1976 violated article 26 of the Covenant. They argued 
that it was discriminatory in that, under it, benefits 
were discontinued to them because they had not proved 
that they were the "breadwinners" of their respective 
families. This condition applied to them as married 
women but did not apply to married men. In L. G. Danning 
v. Netherlands427 the author alleged a violation of 
article 26 in conjunction with article 2(1) on the basis 
that Dutch legislation on disability benefits was 
discriminatory in that it provided for higher benefits 
for married beneficiaries than for single, but 
cohabiting, beneficiaries. In each of these cases the 
Netherlands raised a number of similar arguments, some 
of which are considered elsewhere. 
With respect to the scope of article 26 the 
Netherlands argued, firstly, that this article could 
only be invoked under the O. P. in the sphere of civil 
and political rights though not necessarily limited to 
the civil and political rights in the ICCPR. The example 
given by the Netherlands was that it could envisage the 
admissibility of a complaint concerning discrimination 
in the field of taxation. 
428 Therefore, the Netherlands 
could not accept the admissibility of a complaint 
concerning the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights. The State party referred to the rights 
concerning social security in the ICESCR, namely, 
articles 2,3 and 9 and noted that the ICESCR had its 
own specific system and its own specific organ for the 
international monitoring of how States parties met their 
obligations and that it deliberately did not provide for 
an individual complaints procedure. "The contracting 
427 Doc. A/42/40 p. 151. 
428 Broeks v. Netherlands, Doc. A/42/40 p. 139, 
pr. 8.3. 
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parties deliberately chose to make this difference in 
international monitoring systems, because the nature and 
substance of social, economic and cultural rights make 
them unsuitable for judicial review of a complaint 
lodged by a State party or an individual". 
429 It was, 
therefore, incompatible with the aims of both the ICESCR 
and the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol that an 
complaint with respect to social security as referred to 
in article 9 ICESCR to be dealt with by way of 
individual complaint under the O. P. based on article 26 
ICCPR. 
The view of the HRC was that, 
"the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights would still apply even if a particular 
subject matter is referred to or covered in other 
international instruments, e. g., the International 
convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All forms Of Discrimination Against 
Women, or, as in the present case, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. Notwithstanding the interrelated 
drafting history of the two Covenants, it remains 
necessary for the Committee to fully apply the 
terms of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. The Committee observes in this 
connection that the provisions of article 2 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights do not detract from the full 
application of article 26 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
... 
The discussions, at the time of the drafting, 
concerning the question whether the scope of 
article 26 extended to rights not otherwise 
429 Ibid., pr. 8.5. See ch. 1, prs. 1.8-1.12, 
1.18-1.21 above. 
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guaranteed by the Covenant, were inconclusive and 
cannot alter the conclusion arrived at by the 
ordinary means of interpretation... 
The Committee begins by noting that article 26 does 
not merely duplicate the guarantees already 
provided for in article 2. Its basis stems from the 
principle of equal protection without 
discrimination, as contained in article 7 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
prohibited discrimination in law or in practice in 
any field regulated by public authorities. Article 
26 is thus concerned with with the obligations 
imposed on States in regard to their legislation 
and the application thereof. 
Although article 26 requires that legislation 
should prohibit discrimination, it does not of 
itself contain any obligation with respect to 
matters that may be provided for by legislation. 
Thus it does not, for example, require any State to 
enact legislation to provide for social security. 
However, when such legislation is adopted in the 
exercise of a State's sovereign power, then such 
legislation must comply with article 26 of the 
Covenant. 
The Committee observes in this connection that what 
is at issue is not whether or not social security 
should be progressively established in the 
Netherlands but whether the legislation providing 
for social security violates the prohibition 
against discrimination contained in article 26 of 
the International covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the guarantee given therein to all 
persons regarding equal and effective protection 
against discrimination. 
The right to equality before the law and to equal 
protection of the law without any discrimination 
does not make all differences of treatment 
discriminatory. A differentiation based on 
CH. 4 295 
reasonable and objective criteria does not amount 
to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of 
article 26" 
. 
430 
Having established that article 26 applied the HRC 
expressed the view that there was a violation of article 
26 in the Broeks431 and Zwaan-de Vries432 cases on the 
basis that the differentiation between married men and 
married women was not reasonable and therefore was 
discriminatory. By contrast in the Danning case433 the 
HRC declared the communication inadmissible on the basis 
that it was, "persuaded that the differentiation 
complained of by Mr. Danning is based on objective and 
reasonable criteria... By choosing not to enter into 
marriage, Mr. Danning and his cohabitant have not, in 
law, assumed the full extent of the duties and 
responsibilities incumbent on married couples. 
Consequently, Mr. Danning does not receive the full 
benefits provided for in Dutch law for married couples. 
The Committee concludes that the differentiation 
complained of by Mr. Danning does not constitute 
discrimination in the sense of article 26 of the 
Covenant". 434 
4.58 The decision concerning the scope of article 26 is 
of great significance and resolves, to at least some 
extent, academic disagreements concerning prohibited 
discrimination. 435 As article 26 is stated to be 
"concerned with the obligations imposed on States in 
regard to their legislation and the application 
430 Ibid., prs. 12.1-13. 
431 Ibid., prs. 14-15. 
432 Doc. A/42/40 p. 160, prs. 14-15. 
433 Doc. A/42/40 p. 151. 
434 Ibid., pr. 14. 
435 See n. 424 above. 
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thereof", "in any field regulated and protected by 
public authorities", its scope is potentially extremely 
wide. It may cover, for example, taxation, 
436 the whole 
range of social security and welfare legislation, 
437 
and 
immigration. 438 In all such areas the legislation will 
apparently be tested by reference to the test of whether 
the differentiations made are based on "reasonable and 
objective criteria". This may well pose severe problems 
for States. As the Netherlands argued in the above 
cases, "Years of work are required in order to examine 
the whole complex of national legislation in search of 
discriminatory elements. The search can never be 
completed, either, as distinctions in legislation which 
are justifiable in the light of social views and 
conditions prevailing when they are first made may 
become disputable as changes occur in the views held in 
society". 
439 Although the 
-HRC did not specifically 
respond to this point, presumably the answer to the 
latter part of it would lie in the concept of the 
"margin of appreciation" (or discretion) under which a 
State party makes an initial assessment of the 
conditions obtaining in its national system and the 
consequent need to restrict or limit rights. 
440 The 
criterion of "reasonable and objective" differentiations 
436 See I. M. v. Norway, pr. 4.53 above. 
437 The EUCT has recently dealt with social 
security cases in terms of article 6 ECHR, see 
Feldbrugge Case, EUCT, (1987); Deumeland Case, EUCT, 
(1986). 
438 It is often alleged that U. K. immigration 
legislation and practice is discriminatory though this 
is rejected by the present Government. 
439 Broeks v. Netherlands, Doc. A/42/40 p. 139, 
pr. 8.3. 
440 The HRC have applied the concept under the O. P. 
see ch. 11 below. On the margin of appreciation see n. 383 
above. 
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is that applied by the EUCT but it is clear that the 
prohibition on discrimination under the only applies 
with respect to the application of the rights in the 
ECHR. 441 American jurisprudence in the area of 
discrimination and equal protection is immensely 
sophisticated. 
442 Finally, we can note the express 
application of the provisions of the Vienna Convention 
On The Law On Treaties (1969) on the interpretation of 
treaties. 443 
4.59 In decisions on admissibility the HRC inevitably 
considers the parameters of the relevant articles in the 
ICCPR. For example, in A. S. V. Canada 
444 the 
communication concerned the authors' unsuccessful 
efforts to obtain permission from the Canadian 
authorities for her daughter and grandson to enter 
Canada to join her from Poland. ' The communication was 
declared inadmissible ratione materiae on the basis that 
Articles 12,17 and 23 ICCPR were not applicable on the 
facts and with respect to Article 26 there was no 
question in the circumstances of the case of any 
discrimination on any of the grounds referred to in the 
ICCPR. 445 
4.60 A more controversial decision was that in J. B. 
et. al. v. Canada. 
446 The authors claimed that the 
general prohibition on strikes by public employees in 
the Alberta Public Employee Relations Act of 1977 
441 See the Belgian Linguistics Case, EUCT, (1968); 
Van Dijk and Van Hoof, pp. 386-398. 
442 See Rotunda, Nowak and Young, Treatise On 
Constitutional Law: Substance And Procedure, vol. 2, 
ch. 18 (1986). 
443 See prs. 4.46-4.48 above on the interpretation 
of the Covenant and the Optional Protocol. 
444 S. D., p. 27. 
445 For these provisions see Apx. I below. 
446 Doc. A/41/40, p. 151. 
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Moreover, it would appear to the Committee that the 
acts of which M. A. was convicted (reorganizing the 
dissolved fascist party) were of a kind which are 
removed from the protection of the Covenant by 
Article 5 thereof and which were in any event 
justifiably prohibited by Italian law having regard 
to the limitations and restrictions applicable to 
the rights in question under the provisions of 
Articles 18(3), 19(3), 22(2) and 25 of the 
Covenant. In these respects therefore the 
communication is inadmissible under Article 3 of 
the Optional Protocol, as incompatible with the 
provisions of the Covenant, ratione materiae". 
449 
Article 5 ICCPR to which the HRC refers provides 
that, 
"1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be 
interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of 
the rights and freedoms herein recognized herein or 
at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the present Covenant". 
The decision of the HRC parallels a controversial 
and much criticised early decision of the EUCM under the 
equivalent of Article 5 ICCPR (Article 17 ECHR) which 
declared inadmissible an application from the West 
German Communist Party alleging that government action 
banning it was contrary to Articles 9,10 and 11 
ECHR. 450 It is submitted that the scope of Article 5 
should have been considered only at the merits stage. 
Similarly, it is submitted that the scope and 
application of permissible restrictions and limitation 
449 Doc. A/39/40, p. 190, pr. 13.3. 
450 A. 250/57,1 YBECHR 222 (1955-57). On article 17 
ECHR see Van Dijk and Van Hoof, pp. 410-415. 
CH. 4 300 
clauses under the ICCPR should normally be reserved for 
consideration at the merits stage. 
4.62 Finally, in M. A. v. Italy451 the HRC stated that, 
"M. A. 's additional claim that extradition 
proceedings, initiated by Italy while he was living 
in France, constitute a violation of the Covenant, 
is without foundation. There is no provision of the 
Covenant making it unlawful for a State party to 
seek extradition of a person from another country. 
The claim is therefore inadmissible under Article 3 
of the Optional Protocol, as incompatible with the 
provisions of the Covenant, ratione materiae". 
452 
M. A. 's claim with respect to a State seeking 
extradition is a novel one. There have been a number of 
applications under the ECHR concerning the sending 
state. 
453 If on the facts of this case M. A. might have 
faced some danger on his return to Italy it would have 
been more appropriate to submit a communication 
concerning the sending State, France. The HRC would then 
have faced the question of whether to follow the 
jurisprudence under the ECHR concerning extradition. 454 
4.63 It remains to note that, like the EUCM, 
455 the HRC 
does not require the communicant to specify accurately, 
or indeed at all, the particular rights in the ICCPR 
which he alleges have been violated. The HRC will 
conduct an examination, ex officio, of the articles of 
451 Doc. A/39/40, p. 190. 
452 Ibid., pr. 13.4. 
453 See Fawcett, pp. 51-53,119-120. 
454 On the facts, however, this would not have 
assisted M. A. because the O. P. did not enter into force 
with respect to France until 17 May 1984. 
455 See Van Dijk and Van Hoof, pp. 70-71. 
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the ICCPR that appear to be relevant from the 
submissions of the parties. 
456 
456 See, e. g., the approach of the HRC in the case 
of A. S. v. Canada, S. D., p. 27, pr. 4. 
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3. (c) Ratione Personae. 457 
4.64 The matters to be considered here are the two basic 
questions of against whom and by whom may a 
communication be brought. The separate but related 
requirement that the communicant be a "Victim"458 is 
also considered here for convenience. 
(i) Against whom may a communication be brought.? 
4.65 The HRC is only competent to consider alleged 
violations be a State party to the ICCPR that has also 
become a party to the O. P. (Article 1 O. P. )459 So, for 
example, if a State validly denounces, terminates, 
suspends or withdraws from the ICCPR or the O. P. the HRC 
would lose its competence in respect of that State under 
the O. P. 460 Communications have been submitted 
concerning States that have not been party to the ICCPR 
or the O. P. Under the HRC's Rules of Procedure the HRC 
do not receive such communications. 
461 
4.66 Inevitably the HRC will have to deal with questions 
concerning the extent of the responsibility of a State 
party for acts or omissions committed "Within its 
jurisdiction" (Article 1 O. P. ) but committed by 
individuals, companies, corporations, or other 
457 See Mose 
above, pp. 100-106; 
practice under the 
pp. 66-69. 
and Opsahl, pp. 298-302; Meron, n. 1 
Brar, n. 1 above pp. 509-515. On the 
ECHR see Van Dijk and Van Hoof, 
458 Article 1 O. P. 
459 See ch. 1, pr. 1.33. 
460 There is no denunciation clause in the ICCPR, 
although one was considered, see ch. l, n. 210 above. 
There is a denunciation clause in the O. P. (article 12). 
Generally see articles 42-72 of the Vienna Convention On 
The Law Of Treaties, (1969). 
461 See ch. 4, pr. 4.9 above. 
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bodies. 462 The question was raised in the case of 
Hertzberg and Others v. Finland. 
463 The authors argued 
that the Finnish authorities, including organs of the 
State controlled Finnish Broadcasting Corporation (FBC) 
had interfered with their right to freedom of 
information and expression in Article 19 ICCPR by, 
"Imposing sanctions against participants in, or 
censuring, radio and television programmes dealing with 
homosexuality". 464 Criminal charges under the Finnish 
Penal Code had been brought against the editor of a 
programme dealing with homosexuality. 
465 In its final 
views the HRC stated that it started from, "The premise 
that the State party is responsible for actions of the 
Finish Broadcasting Company (FBC), in which the State 
holds a dominant stake (90 per cent) and which is placed 
under specific government control" 
. 
466 On these facts 
the finding of State responsibility was not too 
difficult a decision for the HRC. An alternative 
approach would have been to rest the responsibility of 
Finland on the legislative acts on which prosecutions 
had been brought. That was the approach taken by the 
EUCT in the Young, James and Webster Cases. 
467 More 
462 
For the practice under 
and Van Hoof, pp. 66-69. On the 
responsibility see I. Brownlie, 
Nations 
- 
State Responsibility, 
VIII, (1983). 
463 Doc. A/37/40 
, 
p. 161. The 
ch. 11 prs. 11.19-11.19.2 below. 
464 Ibid., pr. 2.1. 
the ECHR see Van Dijk 
general rules of State 
Systems Of The Law of 
(Part 1), chs. VII and 
case is discussed in 
465 Ibid., pr. 2.2. 
466 Ibid., pr. 9.1. 
467 Young, James and Webster v. U. K., EUCT, Vol. 44, 
prs. 48-49, (1981). Accordingly, the EUCT did not examine 
whether, as the applicants had argued, the State might 
also be responsible on the ground that it should be (Footnote Continued) 
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difficult cases are sure to arise. For example, would 
the United Kingdom government be responsible for the 
activities of the British Broadcasting Corporation or 
Independent Television. 468 If in a particular case it 
proves impossible to hold the State party responsible 
for the acts concerned the possibility remains that the 
State parties responsibility can be based on its failure 
to secure the rights in the ICCPR (Article 2(1) ICCPR) 
or to provide an effective remedy for the violation of 
rights (Article 2(3) ICCPR). 469 The stated approach of 
the EUCT is to apply the general international law rules 
of State responsibility. 
470 A similar approach from the 
HRC would seem sensible and desirable. 
(ii) By whom may a communication be brought. 
4.67 The HRC is only competent to receive and consider 
communications from "Individuals" who claim to be a 
victim of a violation by a State party of any of the 
rights set forth in the ICCPR (Article 1 O. P. )471 This 
clearly covers communications from one or more 
(Footnote Continued) 
regarded as employer or that British Rail was under its 
control. 
468 See A. 4515/70, X and Association of Z v. U. K., 
Coll. 38, p. 86, (1972). The application concerned 
complaints about the BBC. The EUCM expressly left the 
question of State responsibility open. See also 
A. 6586/74, X v. Ireland, (unpublished). 
469 F. Jacobs, The European Convention On Human 
Rights, (1975) made this suggestion with respect to the 
ECHR. However, the EUCT has decided that article 1 ECHR 
is not capable of independent violation, Ireland v. 
United Kingdom, EUCT, Series A, Vol. (1978) pr. 13. The 
precise effect of article 13 ECHR has not yet been fully 
resolved, see Van Dijk and Van hoof, pp. 379-386, 
Fawcett, pp. 289-294, who comments that, "The fact is 
that there is basic confusion of thought as to the real 
purpose and function of the Article", ibid., p. 294. 
470 See A. 852/60, X v. FRG, 4 YBECHR (1961), p. 346 
at pp. 350-352. 
471 Cf. article 21(1) ECHR. 
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individuals. 472 It is also clear that the right to submit 
communications is not confined to the nationals of the 
State party concerned, nor only to the nationals of any 
State party. It is open to all "Individuals" whether 
nationals, aliens or stateless persons provided they are 
"Subject to the jurisdiction" of the State party 
concerned. 
473 
4.68 The HRC has held that an organization as such 
cannot submit a communication. In Cmn. No. 163/1984474 the 
communication was submitted by a group of associations 
for the defence of the rights of the disabled and 
handicapped persons in Italy (a non-governmental 
organization referred to as "Coordinamento") and the 
representatives of those associations. The 
representatives claimed that they themselves were 
disabled or handicapped or that there children were. The 
representatives acted primarily on behalf of 
"Coordinamento" but also claimed to be acting on their 
own behalf. 
475 The HRC held that, 
"According to Article 1 of the Optional Protocol, 
only individuals have the right to submit a 
472 For example, in the Mauritian Women Case the 
communication was submitted by twenty Mauritian women, 
Doc. A/38/40,145; S. D., p. 67. Initially the authors 
requested that their identity should not be disclosed to 
the State party. Sub: =. equently, one of the authors agreed 
to the disclosure of her name. Such requests could cause 
difficulties if acceded to because it may not be 
possible for the State party to properly defend itself 
unless it knows the particular circumstances of the 
individual or individuals concerned. 
473 For example, in Marais V. Madagascar, 
Doc. A/38/40, p. 141, M was a South African national. 
South Africa is not a party to the ICCPR. On the 
requirement that the individual be "subject to the jurisdiction" of the State party (article 1) see 
prs. 4.82-4.86 below. 
474 Doc. A/39/40, p. 197. 
475 Ibid., pr. 1. 
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communication. To the extent, therefore, that the 
communication originates from the "Coordinamento", 
it has to be declared inadmissible because of lack 
of personal standing". 
476 
In as far, however, as the communication was 
submitted on their own behalf by the representatives of 
the different associations forming the "Coordinamento", 
those representatives did have personal standing under 
Article 1 O. P. The communication was, however, declared 
inadmissible on other grounds which are examined 
below. 477 
4.69 Similarly, in J. R. T. and W. G. Party v. Canada478 
the HRC held the communication inadmissible in so far as 
it concerned the W. G. Party (an unincorporated political 
party under the leadership of J. R. T) because the W. G. 
Party was an association and not an individual. 
479 As an 
individual J. R. T. had standing to submit the 
communication. The communication was declared 
inadmissible on other grounds. 
480 
The O. P. 's limitation of locus standi to individuals 
obliges organizations to hide behind the name of ä 
person who does have the standing to submit a 
communication even when the alleged violations concern 
restrictions on the rights of groups or associations, 
for example, on the rights of assembly and association 
476 Ibid., pr. 5. 
477 See pr. 4.78 below Cf. the decision of the EUCM 
in the case of A. 3798/68, Church of Scientology v. U. K., 
12 YBECHR p. 306. The decision is criticized by Jacobs, 
n. 470 above, p. 148. 
478 Doc. A/38/40, p. 231. 
479 Ibid., pr. 8. 
480 These are examined in ch. 12 below. 
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(Articles 21 and 22 ICCPR). 481 That individual, or 
individuals, will also have to satisfy the O. P. 's other 
requirements, for example, that he or they be "Victims" 
(Article 1 O. P. ) That requirement is dealt with 
below. 482 
4.70 The basic rule then under the O. P. is that a 
communication may only be submitted by one or more 
individuals. The HRC has stated its view that this does 
not mean that the individual must necessarily sign the 
communication himself. 
483 We have already noted that 
during the drafting of its Rules the HRC recognized that 
provision would have to be made for situations in which 
the alleged victim was unable to act. 
484 The Rules 
provide then that, 
"Normally, the communication may be submitted by 
the individual himself or by his representative; 
the Committee may, however, accept to consiCer a 
communication submitted on behalf of an alleged 
victim when it appears that he is unable to submit 
the communication himself". 485 
Communications from duly authorized representatives 
have been accepted on a number of occasions but in 
481 Mose and Opsahl, p. 302. "It may be noted that 
the Committee has not been authorized to receive 
communications from organizations. In a world where 
individuals can generally act effectively only through 
organi.: ations, this omission is significant", Pathak, 
n. 1 above, p. 270. Professor Buergenthal has suggested 
that measures taken against a juridical person may 
amount to a violation of the ICCPR if they infringe upon 
rights of individuals, for example, the right of 
association, Buergenthal in Henkin (Ed. ), n. l above, 
p. 73. 
482 See prs. 4.75-4.81 below. 
483 Doc. A/35/40, pr. 393. 
484 See pr. 4.14 above. 
485 R. 90(1) (b) 
. 
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practice the HRC has had to exercise its discretion 
under the above rule in a considerable number of cases. 
The person submitting the communication is identified in 
the HRC's jurisprudence as the "author". 486 The HRC 
regards a close family connection as sufficient to 
justify an author acting on behalf of an alleged 
victim. 
487 Communications have been accepted on this 
basis, for example, from the alleged victims' father, 
488 
husband, 489 wife, 
490 brother, 491 son-in-law, 
492 
niece, 
493 daughter, 494 brother-in-law. 495 Generally, the 
HRC appears to have taken a fairly liberal approach as 
regards close family members For example, in-Lanza and 
486 So, for example, in Guerrero v. Colombia, 
Doc. A/37/40, p. 137, the communication was submitted by a 
Professor of International Law from Colombia; in 
Hertzberg v. Finland, Doc. A/37/40, p. 161, the five 
authors and alleged victims were represented by SETA (Organization For Sexual Equality); in Nunez v. Uruguay, 
Doc. A/38/40, p. 225, the communication was submitted by 
the author with the assistance of the International 
League For Human Rights. On the concept of the "author" 
see Mose and Opsahl, p. 300. 
487 Doc. A/33/40, pr. 580. An objection to this 
approach was made in the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly be the representative of Argentina, 
U. N. Doc. A/C. 3/32/SR. 30 at 13, pr. 59, (1977). 
488 Bleir v. Uruguay, Doc. A/37/40, p. 130. 
489 Ibid. 
490 Touron v. Uruguay, Doc. A/36/40, p. 120. 
491 Mbenge v. Zaire, Doc. A/38/40, p. 134. 
492 Ibid. 
493 Lanza and Perdoma v. Uruguay, Doc. A/35/40, 
p. 111. 
(Footnote Continued) 
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Perdoma v. Uruguay496 N submitted the communication on 
behalf of her aunt (L) and her uncle (P) concerning 
their detention and the conditions in which they were 
held. The HRC requested detailed information from N on 
the grounds and circumstances justifying her acting on 
behalf of L and P. N explained that the alleged victims 
were unable to act on their own behalf and that she was 
acting on their behalf as a close relative, believing, 
on the basis of her personal acquaintance with them that 
the alleged victims would agree to lodging a 
complaint. 
497 The HRC decided that N was justified by 
reason of close family connection in acting on behalf of 
L and P. 
498 If during the ccnsideration of a 
communication by the HRC it becomes possible for the 
alleged victim to communicate with the HRC, for example, 
because they have been released, they are asked by the 
HRC whether they wish consideration of the communication 
to continue. 
4.71 According to the HRC a communication submitted by a 
third party can only be considered if the author 
justifies his authority to submit the communication. 499 
The onus of proof is on the author to establish that 
there is a sufficient link with the alleged victim or 
that he has justification to act. 500 As indicated above, 
(Footjqýe Continued) 
Bleir v. Uruguay, Doc. A/37/40,130. 
495 A member of the HRC has indicated that the 
status of a brother-in-law as a relative raised some 
discussion in the HRC, see V. Dimitrijevic, The Roles Of 
The Human Rights Committee, p. 22, (1985). 
496 Doc. A/35/40, p. 111. 
497 Ibid., prs. 3 and 4. 
498 Ibid., pr. 6. 
499 Doc. A/39/40, pr. 571. 
500 See, e. g., Hartikainen v. Finland, Doc. A/36/40 
p. 147; S. D., p. 74, prs. 3-4. 
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in the case of close family iliembers this burden may not 
be too difficult to discharge. 501 Generally though, to 
justify their acting on behalf of alleged victims who 
are not signatories, the authors must provide their 
reasons for believing that the alleged victims would 
approve of the authors acting on their behalf and the 
authors reasons for believing that they are unable to 
act on their own behalf. 
502 For example, in Massioti and 
Baritussio v. Uruguay503 M originally submitted the 
communication on behalf of herself and B. They had both 
been detained in the same prison. M submitted to the HRC 
that she had been informed by B's former defence counsel 
that B approved of M acting for her. 
504 M claimed that B 
was not able to act on her own since that was impossible 
for someone detained under the "prompt. securities 
measures regime". 
505 She further claimed that B had no 
defence counsel at the time of the submission of the 
communication. 
506 The HRC decided that M was acting on 
B's behalf. 507 It might be suggested that the HRC could 
have checked with B's former defence counsel that B did 
in fact approve of M acting for her. Presumably also the 
State party could have objected to the admissibility of 
the communication on this point or have produced 
evidence to show that B could have acted on her own 
behalf. In fact the State party raised neither of these 
issues. 
501 See pr. 4.70 above. 
502 See A et al. v. S, S. D., pp. 3 and 17-18. 
503 Doc. A/37/40, p. 187; S. D., p. 136. 
504 Ibid., pr. 2.1. 
505 Ibid. 
506 Ibid. 
507 Ibid., pr. 4. 
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4.72 However, a number of corrsiunications have been 
declared inadmissible for failure to satisfy this onus 
of proof. In Mbenge v. Zaire508 the HRC decided that M 
could act for his brothers and father-in-law but not for 
an unrelated pharmacist or the family driver because he 
had not established any grounds justifying his authority 
to act on their behalf. 
509 In L. A. on behalf of U. R. v. 
Uruguay. 510 L. A. submitted the communication on behalf 
of U. R., a medical student detained in Libertad prison 
in Uruguay. L. A. informed the HRC that as a member of 
the Swedish branch of Amnesty International he had been 
working on the case of U. R. for almost two years with 
no success. L. A. claimed to have authority to act 
because he believed, " that every prisoner unjustly 
treated would appreciate further investigation of his 
case by the Human Rights Committee". 
511 The HRC decided 
that on the basis of this information it could not 
accept that the author had any authority to submit the 
communication on behalf of the alleged victim. 
512 
4.73 In S. G. F. v. Uruquay513 the communication was 
submitted by X (a non-governmental organization). X 
submitted that the request for it to act on behalf of 
508 Doc. A/38/40, p. 134. Note that at the time of 
the submission M was resident in Belgium. The alleged 
violations occurred after M had left Zaire in 1974. See 
also A. S. v. Canada, pr. 4.59 above, in which the author 
was resident in Canada and the communication concerned 
the failure by A. S. to obtain permission from the 
Canadian authorities for her daughter and grandson, who 
were resident in Poland, to enter Canada to join her. 
509 Ibid., pr. 5. 
510 Doc. A/38/40, p. 239. 
511 Ibid., pr. 2. 
512 Ibid., pr. 4. Similarly in D. F. v. Sweden, 
Doc. A/40/40, 
- 
p. 228, concerning alleged discrimination 
and abuse of Arabs in Sweden. 
513 Doc. A/38/40, p. 245. 
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S. G. F., a Uruguayan national living in Sweden, was made 
through close friends living in France whose identity it 
felt unable to disclose. 
514 The HRC specifically pointed 
out that, "No written evidence with regard to the 
authority of the organization (X) to act on behalf of 
the alleged victim has been provided". 
515 The HRC held 
that it could not accept, on the basis of the 
information before it that X had the necessary authority 
to submit the communication on behalf of S. G. F. 
516 In 
J. F. v. Uruguay517 a parallel communication was received 
from X concerning J. F., the husband of S. G. F. J. F. was a 
Uruguayan national detained at Libertad prison in 
Uruguay. X claimed that the communication was submitted 
at the request of S. G. F. and that this request had been 
made through close friends whose names it felt unable to 
reveal. 
518 Again the HRC pointed out that there was no 
written evidence with regard to the authority of X to 
act at the request of S. G. F. on behalf of J. F. 
519 
Accordingly, the communication was held inadmissible 
because the HRC could not accept that the author (X) had 
the necessary authority to act. 
520 
4.74 These two decisions clearly indicate that if there 
were appropriate evidence of authority to act the 
non-governmental organization could have acted on behalf 
of the alleged victims. In this way non-governmental 
organizations can play an important, though limited, 
514 Ibid., pr. 1. 
515 Ibid. 
516 Ibid., pr. 3. 
517 Doc. A/38/40, p. 247. 
518 Ibid., pr. 1. 
519 Ibid. 
520 Ibid., pr. 3. 
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role under the O. P. procedure. 
521 The greater resources 
and experience of non-governmental organizations could 
assist communicants who might otherwise find it 
immensely difficult to utilize the O. P. machinery 
effectively. 
4.74.1 Finally, we can note that the HRC has expressed 
an important view on who may bring a claim of a 
violation of article 1 of the Covenant 
(self-determination). 522 
521 See Mose and 0 sahl p, p. 301-302. On NGO's see 
ch. 1, pr. 1.15 above. 
522 See ch. 5 pr. 5.22 below. 
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(iii). The Requirement That The Individual Has Been A 
Victim. 
4.75 Under Article 1 O. P. the "individuals" submitting 
the communication or on whose behalf the communication 
is submitted must claim to be "victims" of a violation 
by a State party. The HRC's most important pronouncement 
on the concept of a victim came in the case of Shirin 
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra And Nineteen Other Mauritian Women v. 
Mauritius523 (hereinafter the Mauritian Women Case). The 
women claimed that the enactment of two legislative 
acts524 on immigration and deportation, "Constituted 
discrimination based on sex against Mauritian women, 
violated the right to found a family and home, and 
removed the protection of the courts of law, in breach 
of articles 2,3,4,17,23,25 and 26 of the ICCPR". 
525 
They claimed that, 
"Prior to the enactment of the laws in question, 
alien men and women married to Mauritian nationals 
enjoyed the same residence status, that is to say, 
by virtue of their marriage, foreign spouses of 
both sexes had the right, protected by law, to 
reside in the country with their Mauritian husbands 
or wives. The authors contend that, under the new 
laws, alien husbands of Mauritian women lost their 
residence status in Mauritius and must now apply 
for a "residence permit" which may be refused or 
removed at any time by the Minister of Interior. 
The new laws, however, do not affect the status of 
alien women married to Mauritian husbands who 
523 The victim requirement also appears in article 
25 ECHR as to which see Van Dijk and Van Hoof, pp. 34-46. 
524 Doc. A/36/40, p. 134; S. D., p. 67. 
525 The Immigration (Amendment) Act 1977 and the 
Deportation (Amendment) Act 1977. 
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retain their legal right to residence in the 
country. The authors further contend that under the 
new laws alien husbands of Mauritian women may be 
deported under a ministerial order which is not 
subject to judicial review". 526 
When the communication was submitted to the HRC 
seventeen of the co-authors were unmarried and three of 
the co-authors were married to foreign husbands. 527 
The State party argued, inter alia, that the authors 
of the communication did not allege that any particular 
individual had in fact been the victim of any specific 
act in breach of the provisions of the ICCPR. 
528 The 
State party further argued that the communication was 
aimed at obtaining a declaration by the HRC that the two 
legislative acts complained of were capable of being 
administered in a discriminatory manner in violation of 
various provisions of the ICCPR. 529 
Before giving its views the HRC indicated the 
considerations upon which it based those views. The HRC 
stated that, 
"A person can only claim to be a victim in the 
sense of article 1 of the Optional Protocol if he 
or she is actually affected. It is a matter of 
degree how concretely this requirement is taken. 
However, no individual can in the abstract, by way 
of an actio popularis, challenge a law or practice 
claimed to be contrary to the Covenant. If the law 
or practice has not been concretely applied to the 
detriment of that individual, it must in any event 
be applicable in such a way that the alleged 
526 Doc. A/36/40, p. 134, pr. 1.1. 
527 Ibid., pr. 1.2. 
528 Ibid., pr. 7.3. 
529 Ibid., pr. 5.5. 
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victim's risk is more than a theoretical 
possibility". 
530 
Applying this approach the HRC sought to distinguish 
between the two groups of co-authors. The HRC noted that 
in the case of the seventeen unmarried co-authors there 
is, 
"No question of actual interference with, or 
failure to ensure equal protection by the law to 
any family. Furthermore there is no evidence that 
any of them is actually facing a personal risk of 
being thus affected in the enjoyment of this or any 
other rights set forth in the Covenant by the laws 
complained against. In particular it cannot be said 
that their right to marry under article 23(2) or 
the right to equality of spouses under article 
23(4) are affected by such laws". 531 
Accordingly, the seventeen unmarried co-authors 
could not claim to be "victims" of any breach of the 
rights under the ICCPR. 532 
As for the three married co-authors there is, 
"No doubt that they are actually affected by these 
laws, even in the absence of any individual 
measures of implementation (for instance, by way of 
a denial of residence, or an order of deportation, 
concerning one of the husbands). Their claim to be 
530 Ibid., pr. 9.2. In the South West Africa Cases 
the ICJ stated that "actio popularis", although known to 
certain legal systems, was not a general principle of 
law, ICJ Reports, (1966), p. 6. 
531 Ibid., pr. 9.2(a). 
532 Ibid., pr. 10.3. Meron, n. 1 above comments that, 
"This conclusion was not inevitable. The Committee could 
have reasoned that the statutes affected the right of 
the women to marry persons of their choice and that, 
therefore, these women could claim to be affected by a 
violation of article 23 when considered in conjunction 
with the provisions of the Political Covenant 
prohibiting discrimination", p. 105. 
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"victims" within the meaning of the Optional 
Protocol has to be examined". 
533 
The reasons given by the HRC as to why the three 
married co-authors were "actually affected by these 
laws" included the precarious and uncertain residence 
situation of their foreign husbands, the years of delay 
with respect to one of the co-authors in the 
consideration of an application for residence permit 
upon which also the granting of a work permit was 
dependant, and the possibility of deportation without 
judicial review at any time". 534 The HRC then proceeded 
to examine the substance of their claims 
* 
535 
4.76 The HRC's statement on the concept of a victim in 
the Mauritian Women case clearly indicated its general 
approach while leaving it sufficient flexibility to 
assess whether the victim requirement has been satisfied 
on a case to case basis. In a number of subsequent cases 
the HRC has had the opportunity to shed further light on 
the concept of the victim. In Hertzberg v. Finland, 
536 
H, a lawyer, asserted in a radio interview that there 
was job discrimination in Finland on the ground of 
sexual orientation, and more particularly, to the 
detriment of homosexuals. Criminal charges were brought 
against the editor of the programme under the Finnish 
Penal Code. The editor was acquitted but H claimed that 
through those penal proceedings his right to seek, 
533 Ibid., pr. 9.2(b)2. 
534 Ibid., pr. 9.2(b)2(i)3. 
535 The HRC expressed the view that the facts 
disclosed violations of articles 2(1) and 3 in 
conjunction with articles 17, and of articles 2(1), 3 and 
26 in conjuncticn with article 23, ibid., prs. 9.2(b)2(i)8 
and 9.2(b)(2)(ii)4. Note that pr. 10.1 of the HRC's view 
is misleading in this respect. The case is considered in 
ch. 6 below. 
536 Doc. A/37/40, p. 161. 
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receive and impart information under article 19 ICCPR 
was curtailed. 
537 
The HRC concluded that H could not validly claim to 
be a victim on the grounds that the programme was 
actually broadcast, no sanctions were imposed against 
him, and H had not claimed that the programme 
restrictions applied would in any way personally affect 
him. The HRC added that, 
"The sole fact that the author takes a personal 
interest in the dissemination of information about 
homosexuality does not make him a victim in the 
sense required by the Optional Protocol". 538 
The HRC preceded its decision on H's claim to be a 
victim with a reference back to its decision in the 
Mauritian Women Case. 539 The HRC stressed that it had, 
"Only been entrusted with the mandate of examining 
whether an individual has suffered an actual 
violation of his rights. It cannot review in the 
abstract whether national legislation contravenes 
the Covenant, although such legislation may, in 
particular circumstances, produce adverse effects 
which directly affect the individual, making him 
thus a victim in the sense contemplated by articles 
1 and 2 of the Optional Protocol". 
540 
4.77 With respect to H's co-authors the HRC held that 
they did satisfy the victim requirement on the basis 
that their programmes had actually been censored by the 
Finnish Broadcasting Company. 541 It is interesting to 
537 Ibid., pr. 2.2. 
538 Ibid., pr. 10.1. 
539 See pr. 4.75 above. Note that the question of 
whether H was a victim was decided at the merits stage. 
The communication had been held admissible, ibid., pr. 5. 
540 Doc. A/37/40, p. 161, pr. 9.3. 
541 Ibid., pr. 10.2. 
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note where the HRC drew the line in this case concerning 
the requirement of the individual claiming to be a 
victim. The provisions in the Finnish Penal Code had not 
been directly applied to any of the alleged authors. As 
Mr. Opsahl pointed out in an individual opinion in the 
case, "The question remains whether they have been more 
indirectly affected by it in a way which can be said to 
interfere with their freedom of expression". 
542 H's 
co-authors satisfied the victim requirement because 
their programmes had actually been censored. H did not 
because the programme with which he was involved had 
actually been broadcast and no sanctions had been 
imposed on him. It is important that the HRC noted that 
H had not claimed that the programme restrictions 
applied would in any way personally affect him. If H had 
so claimed, for example, on the basis that he was a 
journalist rather than a lawyer, he might then have 
satisfied the victim requirement on the bases of 
continuing interference with his right to freedom of 
expression, that prosecutions had taken place and thus 
inevitably the threat of prosecution would hang over his 
work in that field, and that he would be faced with the 
options of refraining from that area of work or becoming 
liable to criminal prosecution. In analogous 
circumstances the EUCT found the victim requirement 
satisfied in the case of Dudgeon. 
543 
4.78 In Group Of Associations For The Disabled v. 
Italy 544 the HRC gave some indication that the concept 
of the victim extended beyond persons actually and 
directly affected. The HRC stated that, 
"It is not the task of the Human Rights Committee, 
acting under the Optional Protocol, to review in 
542 Ibid., Appendix. 
543 EUCT, Series A, Vol. 45 (1982). 
544 Doc. A/39/40, p. 197. 
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abstracto national legislation as to its compliance 
with obligations imposed by the Covenant. It is 
true that in some circumstances, a domestic law may 
by its mere existence directly violate the rights 
of individuals under the Covenant". 
545 
The communication was declared inadmissible because 
the authors had not demonstrated that they themselves 
were "actually and personally affected" by the law 
concerned. 
546 The obvious question is in what 
circumstances could a domestic law violate the Covenant 
by its very existence. The HRC may simply be referring 
to situations like that in the Mauritian Women Case 
where some actual effects of the laws concerned could be 
discerned even in the absence of actual implementation. 
The Klass Case547 under the ECHR, concerning secret 
surveillance techniques, might suggest another situation 
where the HRC might find the victim requirement 
satisfied even in the absence of evidence of actual 
implementation. 
4.79 To date, however, the HRC have stressed the need 
for the alleged victim to have been actually and 
personally affected. In A. R. S. v. Canada548 the HRC 
referred to the requirement of an "actual grievance". 
The HRC stated that, 
"The mandatory supervision system is therefore not 
yet applicable to him. The possibility of the 
remission he has earned being cancelled after his 
release is still more hypothetical. In the present 
situation, therefore, he has no actual grievance 
such as is required for the admissibility of a 
545 Ibid., pr. 6.2. 
546 Ibid. 
547 EUCT, Series A, Vol. 28, (1978). 
548 S. D., p. 29. 
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communication by an individual under articles 1 and 
2 of the Optional Protocol". 549 
The alleged violations must relate to specific 
individuals at a specific time. So in J. H. v. Canada550 
the HRC stated that, 
"An allegation to the effect that past or present 
promotion policies are generally, to the detriment 
of English-speaking members of the Canadian Armed 
Forces is not sufficient in this respect". 
551 
And in Lovelace v. Canada552 the HRC stated that, 
"In the case of a particular individual claiming to 
be a victim of a violation, it cannot express a 
view on the law in the abstract, without regard to 
the date on which the law was applied to the 
alleged victim". 
553 
4.80 The HRC have made it clear that the onus of proving 
in a substantiated manner that an individual has been a 
victim lies with the author. 
554 The HRC will not engage 
in hypothetical or speculative assessments of potential 
violations. A person will not be a victim if they have 
in fact substantially obtained the benefit claimed. Two 
communications against Canada are instructive in this 
regard. Both of them raised very complex issues 
concerning the interpretation and application of Article 
15(1) ICCPR in relation to the effects of the Canadian 
549 Ibid., pr. 5.2. 
550 Doc. A/40/40, p. 230. 
551 Ibid., pr. 4.2. 
552 Doc. A/36/40, p. 166; S. D., p. 83. 
553 Ibid., pr. 10. 
554 See Group Of Associations For The Disabled v. 
Italy, pr. 4.78 
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Criminal Law Amendment Act 1977555. That Act removed the 
automatic forfeiture of parole for offences committed 
while on parole. The two authors claimed that by not 
making the Act retrospective Canada had contravened the 
last sentence of Article 15 ICCPR. 
In the first of these communications, Van Duzen v. 
Canada, 556 the HRC expressed the view that, 
"... regard must be had to the fact that the author 
has subsequently been released, and that this 
happened even before the date when he claims he 
should be free. Whether or nor this claim should be 
regarded as justified under the Covenant, the 
Committee considers that, although his release is 
subject to some conditions, for practical purposes 
and without prejudice to the correct interpretation 
of article 15(1), he has in fact obtained the 
benefit he has claimed. It is true that he has 
maintained his complaint and that his status upon 
release is not identical in law to the one he has 
claimed. However, in the view of the Committee, 
since the potential risk of re-imprisonment depends 
upon his own behaviour, this risk cannot, in the 
circumstances, represent any actual violation of 
the right invoked by him". 557 
Accordingly, the HRC expressed the view that the 
case did not disclose a violation of the Covenant. As 
the HRC commented in the second case, Mclsaac v. 
Canada558, Van Duzen had failed to "... clearly establish 
555 Article 15(1) ICCPR provides, inter alia, that, 
"If subsequent to the commission of the offence, 
provision is made for the imposition of a lighter 
penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby". 
556 Doc. A/37/40, p. 150. 
557 Ibid., pr. 10.3. 
558 Doc. A/38/40, p. 111. 
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that his position in the end was substantially affected 
by the applicability or non-applicability of the new 
provision, and that therefore there was no violation of 
the Covenant". 559 A similar result obtained in the 
Mclsaac Case itself. There the HRC, in the absence of 
precise submissions from the author, attempted to 
examine in what way, if any, the alleged victim was 
affected by the situation of which he was in substance 
complaining. The HRC concluded that, 
"Mr. Mclsaac had not established the hypothesis 
that if parole had not been forfeited, the judge 
would have. imposed the same sentence of fourteen 
months and that he would therefore have been 
released prior to May of 1979. The HRC was? not in 
a position to know, nor was it called upon to 
speculate how the fact that his earlier parole was 
forfeited may have influenced the penalty meted out 
for the offence committed while on parole. The 
burden of proving that in 1977 he has been denied 
an advantage under the new law and that he is 
therefore a "victim" lies with the author. It is 
not the Committee's function to make a hypothetical 
assessment of what would have happened if the new 
Act had been applicable to him". 
560 
4.81 The HRC's jurisprudence with respect to the concept 
of the victim has now been examined. In summary, the HRC 
have stressed the requirement of the individual being 
"actually and personally affected", or suffering an 
"actual grievance". While the review of the 
559 Ibid., pr. 10. 
560 Ibid., pr. 11. (My emphasis) "These 
considerations led to the conclusion that it cannot be 
established that in fact or law (as to which see 
paragraph 12) the alleged victim was denied the benefit 
of a "lighter" penalty to which he would have been 
entitled under the Covenant", Ibid., pr. 13. See also A. D. 
v. Canada, Doc. A/39/40, p. 200, pr. 8.2. 
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compatibility of legislation with the ICCPR in abstracto 
has been ruled out it is a "matter of degree" how 
concretely the requirement of being personally affected 
is taken. There is clearly some degree of flexibility 
open to the HRC as they have recognised that there may 
be circumstances when the mere existence of a domestic 
law may violate the ICCPR. Again this is an area of the 
HRC's work where the experience with respect to the ECHR 
may be instructive. 
4.81.1 Finally we can note that the HRC has issued an 
important view concerning article 1 (self-determination) 
which is relevant in this context. 
561 
561 See ch. 5, pr. 5.22 below. 
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(d). Ratione Loci. 562 
4.82 A communication can only be submitted by 
"individuals subject to {the} jurisdiction" of the State 
party (Article 1 O. P. ). Uruguay has argued in a series 
of cases that once an individual had left Uruguay he 
was, "outside the jurisdiction of the Uruguayan State". 
Therefore, "To consider the communication further would 
be incompatible with the purpose for which the Covenant 
and its Protocol were established, namely to ensure the 
effective protection of human rights and to bring to an 
, end any situation in which these rights were being 
violated. The State party concluded that in this case no 
de facto situation existed to warrant findings by the 
Committee and that consequently, by intervening, the 
Committee would not only be exceeding its competence but 
would also be departing from normally established legal 
procedures". 
563 
The Hi. C has rejected the contentions of Uruguay on 
the ground that in each case the victims were under the 
jurisdiction of Uruguay while the alleged violations 
took place, 
"The Committee recalled that by virtue of article 
2(1) of the Covenant, each State party undertakes 
to respect and to ensure to "all individuals 
subject to the jurisdiction" of the State party 
concerned at the time of the alleged violation of 
the Covenant, irrespective of their nationality. 
562 See Meron, n. 1 above, pp. 106-109; T. Meron, 
Human Rights In Internal Strife: Their International 
Protection, pp. 40-43 (1987); K. Widdows, The Application 
Of A Treaty To Nationals Of A Party Outside Its 
Territory, 35 ICLQ (1986) pp. 724-730. 
563 See Massioti and Baritussio v. Uruguay, 
Doc. A/37/40 p. 187; S. D. p. 136, pr. 7.1 (M had left for 
the Netherlands, B for Sweden); Estrella v. Uruguay, 
Doc. A/38/40 p. 150 (E had left for France). 
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This was manifestly the object and purpose of 
article 1". 
564 
The argument advanced by Uruguay accorded with that 
of Professor Schwelb565 and noted by others. 566 
Professor Schwelb has argued that the words "within its 
territory" in article 2(1) ICCPR amount to a "limitation 
of the substantive scope of the Covenant". 567 Therefore, 
"The conclusion seems inescapable that the scope of the 
procedural protection afforded by the Protocol cannot be 
wider than that of the substantive protection of the 
Covenant". 568 Mose and Opsahl argue in response that the 
result of Professor Schwelb's view is not always 
convincing, 
"As an illustration, if a citizen's publications 
are seized or his passport annulled while he is 
abroad, he ought to be able to submit a 
communication invoking his freedom of expression or 
movement under the Covenant; and, the travaux 
preparatoires to the Covenant suggest that the 
564 Massioti and Baritussio, Ibid., pr. 7.2; 
Estrella, Ibid., pr. 4.1. 
565 Schwelb, 'Civil and Political Rights', n. 1 
above, p. 862-863 (1968). See also Schindler, Human 
Rights And Humanitarian Law, 31 Am. ULR (1982) pp. 935 at 
p. 939. 
566 See Lippman, n. 1 above, p. 226. 
567 See n. 1 above (1968). Although concern was 
expressed about this limitation in both the HRCion and 
the Third committee the words were retained in a 
separate vote in the Third Committee. It was suggested 
that the words be deleted and the term "jurisdiction" be 
qualified to show that the guarantee extended to 
individuals subject-to the territorial and personal 
jurisdiction of the State, Doc. A/5655, prs. 18 and 29 (1965). 
568 Ibid. 
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drafters in adopting the clause "within its 
territory" did not have such cases in mind". 
569 
The approach of the HRC as noted above570 and 
below571 has been to clearly reject the argument that 
once an individual has left the territory he had left 
the jurisdiction and therefore could not submit a 
communication. It is submitted that the HRC's approach 
is correct. It represents the most sensible 
interpretation from a human rights perspective and 
corresponds with the approach taken to the ECHR. 
572 
4.82.1 It would, however, be premature to assume that 
the HRC have rejected altogether the view that the O. P. 
must be interpreted subject to the territorial 
limitation in article 2(1) ICCPR. The point can be 
illustrated by reference to the HRC's views in the case 
of E. Quinteros and M. C. Almeida De Quinteros V. 
Uruguay. 573 A. Q. alleged that her daughter, E. Q., had 
been arrested by military personnel and systematically 
tortured. A. Q. also claimed that she was a victim of 
violations of article 7 (psychological torture because 
she did not know where her daughter was) and of article 
17 because of interference with her private and family 
life. 574 A. Q. was a Uruguayan national who was living in 
Sweden at*the time she submitted the communication. The 
HRC specifically noted that the communication raised the 
matter of whether A. Q. was "subject to the jurisdiction" 
569 Mose and Opsahl, pp. 298-299. 
570 See pr. 4.82 above. 
571 See pr. 4.82.1-4.86 below. 
572 See Van Dijk and Van Hoof, pp. 6-8. 
573 Doc. A/38/40 p. 216. The decision is considered 
in ch. 9, pr. 9.23 below. 
574 Ibid., pr. 1.9. 
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at the time of the alleged violations. 
575 The State 
party made no submissions on the point. In its final 
views the HRC noted that the statement of A. Q. that she 
was living in Uruguay at the time of the incident 
regarding her daughter was not contradicted by the State 
party. The HRC expressed the view that A. Q. had been a 
victim. It must therefore have accepted that she was 
within the jurisdiction. 576 
On the facts this decision follows those in the 
cases noted above. 
577 It is interesting to consider, 
however, what approach the HRC would have taken if A. Q. 
had been temporarily resident outside Uruguay at the 
relevant time. It is submitted that the result should be 
the same as the violations would be the same and it is 
hoped that the HRC would take this approach. 
4.83 More difficult might be the situation where the 
alleged victim lived permanently abroad, for example, if 
in the example given A. Q. had been permanently resident 
in Sweden at the time of the alleged violations. Here 
the HRC might be more willing to accept the argument of 
Professor Schwelb concerning territorial limitation. In 
most cases there would be no problem because the alleged 
victim would not normally be subject to the State's 
jurisdiction at the time of the alleged violations in 
any event. 
This situation of an alleged victim who is resident 
permanently or semi-permanently abroad has been 
considered by the HRC in a series of cases concerning 
the issuance of passports. 578 In Lichtensztejn v. 
575 Ibid., pr. 2. 
576 Ibid., pr. 14. 
577 See pr. 4.82 above. 
578 Lichtensztejn v. Uruguay, Doc. A/38/40 p. 166; 
Nunez V. Uruguay, ibid., p. 225; Montero v. Uruguay, (Footnote Continued) 
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Uruguay579, L, a Uruguayan citizen resident in Mexico 
since 1974 was refused issuance of a new passport when 
his passport expired on 23 October 1978. Uruguay argued 
that L failed to fulfil the minimum requirement of being 
"subject to its {the State party's} jurisdiction", 
because he was outside the jurisdiction of the Uruguayan 
State when his petition was submitted. "It is therefore 
inadmissible that the Committee should deal with 
communications of this kind, which run counter to its 
terms of reference and violate provisions of 
international instruments" 580 
The HRC rejected Uruguay's argument that it was not 
competent under article 1 O. P. to consider the 
communication, 
"The issue of a passport is clearly within the 
jurisdiction of the Uruguayan authorities and he is 
"subject to the jurisdiction" of Uruguay for that 
purpose. Moreover, a passport is a means of 
enabling him "to leave any country, including his 
own", as required by article 12(2) of the Covenant. 
Consequently, the Committee found that it followed 
from the very nature of that right that, in the 
case of a citizen resident abroad, article 12(2) 
imposed obligations both on the State of residence 
and on the State of nationality and that, 
(Footnote Continued) 
ibid., p. 186; Martins v. Uruguay, Doc. A/3740 p. 157. See 
Anon., Rev. ICJ (1983) p. 42 at pp. 47-48; Meron, n. 1 
above, p. 109; H. Hannum, The Right To Leave And Return In 
International Law and Practice, pp. 20-21 (1987). See 
also Mbenge v. Zaire, Doc. A/38/40 p. 134, where the 
alleged victims were resident in Belgium and all the 
alleged violation occured after they had left the 
territory of Zaire. The requirment of M being within the 
territory and subject to the jurisdiction of Zaire was 
not discussed by the HRC. On the case see ch. 8 below and 
ch. 10 below. 
579 Ibid. 
580 Ibid., pr. 4. 
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therefore, article 2(1) could not be interpreted as 
limiting the obligations of Uruguay under article 
12(2) to citizens within its own territory". 581 
The difficult question which this decision raises is 
just which of the articles in the ICCPR are not of such 
a "nature" that the HRC could interpret them as subject 
to the territorial limitation in article 2(1) ICCPR. 582 
The examples drawn from the Quinteros Case583 above 
might suggest that article 7 ICCPR (prohibition of 
torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment) should be subject to the territorial 
limitation in certain cases. On that basis A. Q. could 
not have claimed to be a victim if she had been 
permanently resident abroad. More directly, in Lopez 
Burgos v. Uruguay584 the HRC had to consider its 
competence under article 1 O. P. to express its views on 
communications alleging violations of the Covenant by 
governments agents but carried out in foreign 
territory. 585 
4.84 In Lopez Burgos the author alleged that on 13 July 
1976 her husband, L. B., was kidnapped in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, by members of the "Uruguayan security and 
intelligence forces", who were aided by Argentinian 
para-military groups, and secretly detained in Buenos 
Aires for two weeks. "L. B. was then illegally and 
clandestinely transported to Uruguay. He was then 
officially arrested on 23 October 1976 and the Press was 
informed that, "subversives has been surprised while 
581 Ibid., pr. 6.1. 
582 Article 13, concerning the expulsion of aliens, 
might be an example. For text see Apx. I. 
583 See pr. 4.82.1 above. 
584 Doc. A/36/40 p. 176; S. D. p. 88. 
585 See generally I. Brownlie, Systems Of The Law Of 
Nations 
- 
State Responsibility (Part. I), ch. X, (1983). 
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conspiring". He was detained incommunicado by the 
special security forces at a secret prison for three 
months. During approximately four months of detention in 
Argentina and Uruguay he was continuously subjected to 
physical and mental torture. 
586 
In response to requests from the HRC the State party 
claimed that it had no information as to L. B. 's 
whereabouts between July and October 1976.587 In its 
final views the HRC observed that, 
"although the arrest and initial detention and 
mistreatment of Lopez Burgos allegedly took place 
on foreign territory, the Committee is not barred 
either by virtue of article 1 of the optional 
Protocol ("... individuals subject to its 
jurisdiction"... ) or by virtue of article 2(1) of 
the Covenant ("... individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction"... ) from 
considering these allegations, together with the 
claim of subsequent abduction into Uruguayan 
territory, inasmuch as these were acts perpetrated 
by Uruguayan agents on foreign soil. 
The reference in article 1 of the Optional Protocol 
to "individuals subject to its jurisdiction" does 
not affect the above conclusion because the 
reference in that article is not to the place where 
the violation occurred, but rather to the 
relationship between the individual and the State 
in relation to a violation of any of the rights set 
forth in the Covenant, wherever they occurred. 
Article 2(1) of the Covenant places an obligation 
upon a State party to respect and to ensure rights 
"to all 
586 Doc. A/36/40 p. 176, prs. 2.2-2.3. 
587 Ibid., pr. 7.3. 
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individuals within its territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction", but it does not imply 
that the State party concerned cannot be held 
accountable for violations of rights under the 
Covenant which its agents commit upon the 
territory of another State, whether with the 
acquiescence of the Government of the State or 
in opposition to it. According to article 5(1) 
of the Covenant, 
'Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted 
as implying for any State, group or person any 
right to engage in any activity or perform any act 
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation 
to a greater extent than is provided for in the 
present Covenant'. 
In line with this, it would be unconscionable to so 
interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the 
Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate 
violations of the Covenant on the territory of 
another State, which violations it could not 
perpetrate on its own territory". 
588 
The interpretation of article 1 O. P. as referring 
"not to the place where the violation occurred, but 
rather to the relationship between the individual and 
the State in relation to a violation of any of the 
rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they 
occurred", and the view that article 2 does not exclude 
accountability for violations by agents committed upon 
the foreign territory of another State, lend further 
weight to the argument against the incorporation of the 
territorial limitation of article 2(1) of the Covenant 
into article 1 O. P. 589 More generally, an approach to 
588 Ibid., prs. 12.1-12.3. 
589 See prs. 4.82-83 above. 
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jurisdiction based on the individual-State relationship 
significantly extends the ambit of the protection 
offered by the O. P. 
4.85 One member of the HRC, Professor. Tomuschat, 
thought that the views of the HRC needed to be clarified 
and expanded and so appended an individual opinion. 
590 
He argued that the statement in the HRC's views that 
article 2(1) of the ICCPR does not imply that a State 
party cannot be held accountable for violations of the 
Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of 
another State "was too broadly framed and might 
therefore give rise to misleading conclusions". 
591 He 
argued, moreover, that, 
"In principle the scope of application of the 
Covenant is not susceptible to being extended by 
reference to article 5, a provision designed to 
cover instances where formally rules under the 
Covenant seem to legitimize actions which 
substantially run counter to its purposes and 
general spirit". 
592 
On this point it is submitted that Professor 
Tomuschat is correct. However, it is worth noting that 
the HRC made reference to article 5(1) only to support 
an interpretation they would have adopted in any event. 
It does not constitute the basis of that interpretation. 
4.86 Professor Tomuschat continued with his view of the 
proper interpretation of article 2(1) ICCPR, 
"To construe the words "within its territory" 
pursuant to their strict literal meaning as 
excluding any responsibility for conduct occurring 
beyond the national boundaries would, however, lead 
to utterly absurd results. The formula was intended 
590 Doc. A/36/40 p. 184. 
591 Ibid., first para. 
592 Ibid. See also M. A. v. Italy, pr. 4.61 above 
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to take care of objective difficulties which might 
impede the implementation of the Covenant in 
specific situations. Thus, a State party is 
normally unable to ensure the effective enjoyment 
of the rights under the Covenant to its citizens 
abroad, having at its disposal only the tools of 
diplomatic protection with their limited potential. 
Instances of occupation of foreign territory offer 
another example of situations which the drafters of 
the Covenant had in mind when they confined the 
obligation of States parties to their own 
territory. All these factual patterns have in 
common, however, that they provide plausible 
grounds for denying the protection of the Covenant. 
It may be concluded, therefore, that it was the 
intention of the drafters, whose sovereign decision 
cannot be challenged, to restrict the territorial 
scope of the Covenant in view of such situations 
where enforcing the Covenant would be likely to 
encounter exceptional obstacles. Never was it 
envisaged, however, to grant States parties 
unfettered discretionary power to carry out wilful 
and deliberate attacks against the freedom and 
personal integrity against (sic) their citizens 
living abroad. Consequently, despite the wording of 
article 2(1), the events which took place outside 
Uruguay come within the purview of the 
Covenant". 593 
Here Professor Tomuschat's analysis is less 
convincing. The problem raised is not so much when 
protection should be denied as when there should be 
responsibility for violations. The "tools of diplomatic 
protection" do limit the protection the national State 
can offer when a citizen is abroad but that does not 
593 Ibid. 
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bear on the question where the national State is itself 
the alleged violater. Similarly, with respect to the 
example of occupation of foreign territory, there is 
persuasive authority under the ECHR for holding"a State 
responsible in such a situation for matters under its 
"actual authority and control" 
. 
594 
594 Cyprus v. Turkey, EUCM, 2 D. & R. p. 125 at p. 136 
(1975). See also A. 8007/77, Cyprus v. Turkey, EUCM, 13 
D. & R. p. 85 at pp. 148-149 (1979). More generally see 
T. Meron, Applicablity Of Multilateral Conventions To 
Occupied Territories, 72 AJIL (1978) pp. 542-557; 
E. R. Cohen, Human Rights In The Israeli Occupied 
Territories, (1985). 
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4. The Same Matter Is Not Being Examined Under Another 
Procedure Of International Investigation Or Settlement. 
(Art. 5 (2) (a) O. P. ) 595 
4.87 Under article 5(2) (a) O. P. the HRC is precluded 
from considering a communication only if the same matter 
is simultaneously being examined under another procedure 
of international investigation or settlement. 
596 This is 
a notable departure from 
petitions procedures which 
matters that have already 
comparable international 
preclude consideration of 
been dealt with by other 
595 Mose and 0 sahl p, pp. 305-309; Lippman, n. l 
above; Schwelb, n. 1 above, pp. 866-867; Brar, n. 1 
above, pp. 520- 524; Tardu, n. 650 below. Article 5 (2) (a) 
O. P. only deals with the effects of consideration by 
another international procedure. It does not address the 
question of whether the HRC could reconsider a 
communication which it has already considered, and if 
so, in what circumstances. This question is dealt with 
in pr. 4.41 above. Cf. Article 27(1)(b) ECHR as to which 
see Mikaelson, pp. 144-152. There is no co-ordination 
rule in respect of the inter-State procedures under the 
ICCPR. Note though article 44 ICCPR, text in Apx. I 
below. 
596 While considering communication under the O. P. 
the HRC became aware of a language discrepancy in the 
text of article 5(2)(a) O. P. The Chinese, English, 
French and Russian texts provide that the HRC shall not 
consider any communication from an individual unless it 
has ascertained that the same matter "is not being 
examined" under another procedure of international 
investigation or settlement". However, the Spanish text 
refers to any communication which "has not been 
examined". The HRC ascertained that the discrepancy was 
due to an oversight in the preparation of the Spanish 
text of the O. P. The HRC decided to base its work on the 
other language versions. See Doc. A/35/40 pr. 385, n. 8. 
The HRC's decision was clearly correct in the light of 
the travaux preparatoires. In the Third Committee of the (Footnote Continued) 
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international procedures. 
597 Obviously article 5(2)(a) 
will increase in importance as the number of States 
parties to the ICCPR and O. P. increases and the number 
of international procedures of investigation and 
settlement in operation expands. A number of the HRC 
decisions have given some content to the prohibition in 
article 5 (2) (a) O. P. 
4.88 On a number of occasions the HRC has had to 
consider the situation of communications submitted to 
another procedure of international investigation or 
settlement by a third party. In Antonaccio v. Uruguay 
598 
the HRC took the view that it was not precluded from 
consideration of the communication as the third party 
had, at the authors request, asked the IACM to 
discontinue consideration of the case. 
599 A similar 
approach was taken in Altesor v. Uruguay600 even though 
the authors had made repeated efforts to conceal the 
fact that they were also the authors of the complaint to 
the IACM. When they withdrew their complaint to the IACM 
the HRC proceeded with its consideration. 
601 In Altesor 
v. Uruguay, 
602 in addition to the authors, an unrelated 
third party had also submitted a new complaint to the 
IACM. On this point the HRC concluded that, 
(Footnote Continued) 
General Assembly the principle una via electa had been 
abandoned in favour of a system of adjournment of 
proceedings pendante lite. See Lipmann, n. l above; 
Tardu, n. 650 below; and the discussion in A/C. 3/SR. 1432 
and 1433. 
597 See, e. g., article 27 ECHR. 
598 Doc. A/37/40, p. 114; S. D., p. 101. 
599 Ibid., prs. 5-8. 
600 Doc. A/37/40, p. 122; S. D., p. 105. 
601 Ibid., prs. 7.1-7.2. 
602 Doc. A/37/40, p. 122; S. D., p. 105. 
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"It was not prevented from considering the 
communication submitted to it by the authors... by 
reason of the subsequent complaint made by an 
unrelated third party under the procedures of the 
{IACM}". 603 
This view was further explained in Estrella v. 
Uruguay. 604 There the HRC observed that article 5(2)(a) 
O. P. could not be so, 
"... interpreted as to imply that an unrelated third 
party, acting without the knowledge and consent of 
the alleged victim, can preclude the latter from 
having access to the HRC. It therefore concluded 
that it was not prevented from considering the 
communication submitted to it by the alleged victim 
himself, by reason of a submission by an unrelated 
third party to the IACM. Such a submission did not 
constitute "the same matter", within the meaning of 
article 5(2)(a) of the Optional Protocol". 605 
In Cmn. No. 75/1980606 the HRC further explained that, 
"... the concept of the 'same matter' within the 
meaning of article 5(2)(a) of the Optional Protocol 
must be understood as including the same claim 
concerning the same individual, submitted by him or 
someone else who has standing to act on his behalf 
before the other international body ". 
607 
Similarly in V. O. v. Norway608 the HRC stated that 
in its view the phrase "the same matter" refers, "With 
603 Ibid., pr. 5. 
604 Doc. A/38/40, p. 150. 
605 Ibid., pr. 4.3. 
606 Referred to in Doc. A/39/40 pr. 580. 
607 Ibid. 
608 Doc. A/40/40, p. 232. 
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regard to identical parties, to the complaints advanced 
and facts adduced in support of them". 
609 
4.89 In Sequeira v. Uruguay610 the HRC decided that a 
communication submitted to the IACM before the date of 
the entry into force of the ICCPR and the O. P. could not 
relate to events alleged to have taken place after that 
date. 611 Although the HRC did not explain the decision 
in these terms it seems reasonable to interpret its 
decision as stating that the complaints to the IACM were 
not the "same matter" within the meaning of article 
5(2) (a) O. P. as the complaints submitted to the HRC. 
Also in Sequeira the HRC decided that a two line 
reference to the person concerned in a case before the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which listed 
in a similar manner the names of hundreds of other 
persons allegedly detained in the State party, "did not 
constitute the same matter as that described in detail 
by the author in his communication to the HRC". 
612 
4.90 In three cases concerning the Netherlands published 
on the same date the HRC observed that the examination 
of State reports, submitted under article 16 of the 
ICESCR, does not, within the meaning of article 5(2)(a) 
O. P., constitute an examination of the "same matter" as 
a claim by an individual submitted to the HRC under the 
O. P. 613 
4.91 The prohibition in article 5(2)(a) O. P. only covers 
"procedures of international investigation or 
609 Ibid., pr. 4.4. 
610 Doc. A/35/40, p. 127; S. D., p. 52. 
611 Ibid., pr. 6(a). 
612 Ibid., pr. 9(a). 
613 Broeks v. Netherlands, Doc. A/42/40 p. 139; 
Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, Ibid., p. 160; Danning v. 
Netherlands, Ibid., p. 151. The cases are considered in 
prs. 4.55-4.58 above 
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settlement". HRC decisions have helped to clarify the 
kind of procedures covered. Of particular importance was 
the HRC's approach to the examination of a particular 
human rights situation in a given country under Economic 
And Social Council Resolution 1503 (XIVIII) which 
governs the procedures for the examination (by HRCion 
And Sub-Cion) of communications which appear to reveal 
"a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms". 
614 
The HRC determined that the Resolution 1503 procedure 
does not constitute a procedure of international 
investigation or settlement within the meaning of 
article 5(2)(a) O. P. because it is concerned with the 
examination of situations which appear to reveal a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights 
and a situation is not "the same matter" as an 
individual complaint. 
615 The HRC stated that, "The 
Protocol was not intended to deal with situations as 
such, but with individual complaints". 
616 Therefore, the 
Resolution 1503 procedure does not bar the HRC from 
consideration of an individual communication. The HRC's 
decision strengthens the argument of those who argue 
614 A et al. v. S, S. D., p. 17. The State party also 
argued that the HRC could not consider the communication 
with respect to one alleged victim, D, because his case 
had already been submitted to UNESCO. The HRC found, 
however, that, "UNESCO has at present no procedure of 
international investigation or settlement, as referred 
to in article 5(2)(a) of the Protocol, relevant to this 
case", ibid., p. 17-18. On HRCion procedures see Bossuyt, 
The Development Of Special Procedures Of The United 
Nations Commission On Human Rights, 6 HRLJ (1985) 
pp. 179-210. On UNESCO procedures see S. Marks, The 
Complaint Procedure Of UNESCO, in H. Hannum, (ed. ), A 
Guide To International Human Rights Practices, 
pp. 94-107, (1984). 
615 Ibid. 
616 Ibid. 
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that there are good legal grounds for the co-existence 
of the Resolution 1503 procedure and the O. P. 617 
In an early decision the HRC decided that a 
procedure established by a non-governmental 
organization, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Council of 
The Inter-Parliamentary Union, does not constitute a 
procedure of international investigation or settlement 
within the meaning of article 5(2) (a) O. P. 618 This 
decision was based on the HRC's determination that 
article 5(2)(a) O. P. can only relate to procedures 
implemented by Inter State or intergovernmental 
organizations on the basis of inter State agreements or 
arrangements. 
619 Subsequently the HRC explicitly stated 
that procedures established by non-governmental 
organizations such as Amnesty International, the 
International Commission Of Jurists or the International 
Committee Of The Red Cross, irrespective of the, latter's 
standing in international law, do not constitute 
procedures of international investigation or settlement 
within the meaning of article 5(2)(a) O. P. 620 
In 1984 the HRC declared admissible a number of 
similar and related cases concerning the same country. 
The HRC observed that, 
"... a study by an intergovernmental organization 
either of the human rights situation in a given 
617 The Sub-Commission for the Prevention of 
Discrimination and the Protection Of Minorities has 
debated whether Resolution 1503 should be reviewed by 
ECOSOC in the light of the entry into force of the O. P., 
see Zuidjwick, n. l above (1982). 
618 Doc. A/33/40, pr. 582. 
619 Ibid. This would presumably cover proceedings 
by, for example, the Russell Tribunal or Permanent 
Peoples Tribunals as to which see M. Dixon, (ed. ), on 
Trial: Reagan's War Against Nicaragua 
- 
Testimony Of The 
Permanent Peoples' Tribunal, (1985). 
620 Doc. A/39/40, pr. 582. 
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country (such as that by the IACHR) 621 or a study 
of the trade union rights situation in a given 
country (such as the issues examined by the 
Committee on Freedom of Association of the 'ILO), or 
of a human rights problem of a more global 
character (such as that of the Special Rapporteur 
of the Commission on Human Rights on summary or 
arbitrary executions), although such studies might 
refer to or draw on information concerning 
individuals cannot be seen as being the same matter 
as the examination of individual cases within the 
meaning of article 5(2)(a) of the - Optional 
Protocol". 622 
4.92 It may be open to States that are parties to 
various international procedures of investigation or 
settlement to determine which of those procedures to 
preclude reconsideration of a case by the HRC by making 
a reservation to article 5(2)(a) O. P. This has been done 
by eight of the nine contacting parties to the ECHR that 
have also ratified the O. P. 
623 Those reservations have 
been to the effect the the HRC shall not have competence 
if the same matter has been examined under another 
procedure of international investigation or 
621 See T. Buergenthal, R. Norris and D. Shelton, 
Protecting Human Rights In The Americas, (2d, 1987). 
622 Doc. A/39/40, pr. 582. The communication 
concerned was Baboeram and Others V. Suriname, 
Doc. A/40/40 p. 187, pr. 9.1. 
623 Reservations of Denmark, France, Iceland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain and Sweden, in Human 
Rights 
- 
Status Of International Instruments, pp. 90-94 
(1987). The exception is Netherlands whose position is 
explained in Van Dijk and Van Hoof p. 52. Thus the HRC 
could consider the case of H. v. D. P. V. Netherlands, 
Doc. A/42/40 p. 185, which had been declared inadmissible 
ratione materiae by the EUCM, ibid., pr. 2.2. The 
reservations are in accordance with a resolution of the 
Committee Of Ministers Of The Council Of Europe, see 3 
YBECHR XII (1970) pp. 74-76. 
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settlement. 
624 The validity and application of these 
reservations have been raised in communications before 
the HRC. 
4.93 In A. M. V. Denmark625 A. M. alleged violations of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which the HRC 
said corresponded in substance to articles 7,14 and 26 
ICCPR. 626 A. M. had submitted the same matter to the 
EUCM. That application had been declared inadmissible as 
manifestly ill-founded under article 27(2) ECHR. 
627 The 
HRC decided that in the light of Denmark's reservation 
to article 5(2)(a) O. P. the communication was 
inadmissible because the same matter had already been 
considered by the EUCM and therefore the HRC was not 
competent to consider it. 
628 
4.94 One member of the HRC, Mr. Graefrath, appended an 
individual opinion to the HRC's decision. 
629 He argued 
that the reservation did not refer to matters the 
consideration of which had been denied under any other 
procedure by a decision of inadmissibility. An 
application which had been declared inadmissible had 
not, in the meaning of the reservation, been 
"considered" in such a way that the HRC was precluded 
from considering it. His argument continued by noting 
that the conditions of admissibility and the substance 
624 Ibid. 
625 Doc. A/37/40, p. 212; S. D., p. 32. 
626 Ibid., pr. 3.2. 
627 Ibid., prs. 2.2-3.2. The expression "manifestly 
ill-founded" does not appear in the O. P. although it was 
present in early draft versions in the Third Committee, 
see e. g. Doc. A/6546, n. 1 above, pr. 474. On a number of 
occasions States parties have argued that communications 
should be rejected as "ill-founded". 
628 Ibid., prs. 6-7. 
629 
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of the rights in other instruments were different from 
those in the O. P. so that although a communication under 
the O. P. might lead to a similar result as under, for 
example, the ECHR this was not necessarily so. 
Mr. Graefrath's view was based on his opinion that, 
"The reservation aims at preventing the HRC from 
reviewing cases that have been considered by 
another international organ of investigation. It 
does not seek to limit the competence of the HRC to 
deal with communications merely on the ground that 
the rights of the Covenant allegedly violated may 
also be covered by the European Convention and its 
procedural requirements. If that had been the aim 
of the reservation, it would, in my opinion, have 
been incompatible with the Optional Protocol". 630 
On the facts of the case it appears that the 
difference of opinion between the HRC's view and 
Mr. Graefrath's turns on the question of whether the EUCM 
had "considered" the application by A. M. It is submitted 
that the reservations should be interpreted as 
precluding consideration by the HRC only when the matter 
has been subject to substantive consideration under 
another procedure of international investigation or 
settlement. That consideration may have taken place at 
either the admissibility or merits stage. Though this 
submission seems clear it may in practice call for a 
degree of sophisticated analysis by the HRC. 
631 
4.95 The HRC's approach to such reservations can be 
illustrated by reference to two other communications. In 
V. O. v. Norway632 Norway argued that the communication 
was inadmissible because the inadmissibility decision of 
630 Ibid., fourth paragraph. 
631 See Mikaelson, who takes a similar view 
concerning article 27 ECHR. See the four examples he 
gives, pp. 144-150. 
632 Doc. A. 40/40, p. 232. 
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the EUCM on the basis of the application being 
manifestly ill-founded had involved an examination of 
the substance of the application. 
633 The author of the 
application had argued, inter alia, that the provisions 
of the ICCPR differed in several respects from those of 
the ECHR. 634 The HRC declared the communication 
inadmissible because the same matter had been examined 
by the EUCM. 635 In O. F. v. Norway636 the author had been 
informed by the EUCM that he was too late to submit an 
application. 
637 The State party, however, informed the 
HRC that it would not object to the admissibility of the 
communication on the basis of its reservation because 
the case had not been examined by the EUCM. 
638 It is 
submitted that on the basis of the argument above the 
HRC could have taken the view that it was competent to 
consider the matter notwithstanding the reservation 
because the matter had not received any substantive 
consideration by the EUCM. 
4.96 Finally on this matter, it is interesting to note 
Mr. Graefrath's view that if the reservation had sought 
to limit the competence of the HRC in certain respects 
he considered that it would have been "incompatible" 
with the O. P. 
639 
and thus presumably invalid. 
640 In no 
decision to date has the HRC expressed the view that a 
reservation was incompatible with the O. P. although 
633 Ibid., pr. 4.2. 
634 Ibid., pr. 2.5-2.6. 
635 Ibid., pr. 4.4. 
636 Doc. A/40/40, p. 204; Doc. A/39/40, pr. 583. 
637 Ibid., pr. 1.4. 
638 Ibid., pr. 3.3. 
639 Doc. A/40/40, p. 232, Appendix. 
640 See article 19 V. C. L. T. (1969). 
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doubts have been expressed during the reporting 
procedure under article 40 
concerning certain reservations. 
641 
4.97 A difficult question of interpretation concerning 
article 5(2)(a) O. P. arose during the HRC's 
considerations of its draft Rules of procedure 
concerning the O. P. 
642 After the text of the rules on 
international remedies (art. 5(2)(a)) and domestic 
remedies (art. 5(2)(b)) the provision continues, 
"This shall not be the rule where the application 
of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged". 
The question that arose was whether this provision 
applied to both article 5 (2) (a) and (b), or only to (b). 
On the former interpretation it would be permissible for 
the HRC to declare admissible a communication being 
examined under another procedure of international 
investigation or settlement if it took the view that 
that procedure had been unreasonably prolonged. After 
some discussion the matter was referred for the expert 
opinion of United Nations Legal Counsel. That opinion, 
based mainly on the clarifications given by the sponsors 
of article 5(2. ) O. P. in the Third Committee, 643 was to 
the effect that the provision applied to both 
sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). 644 Notwithstanding this 
clear opinion many of the HRC members were reluctant to 
accept its implications in terms of the HRC having to 
pass judgement on other international bodies. Members 
pointed to the difficulty"of establishing the correct 
641 See ch. 6 below. 
642 See SR. 21, prs. 46-64; SR. 33, prs. 21-52; 
Doc. A/32/44, prs. 68-73. 
643 See Doc. A/C. 3/L. 1411/Rev. 2 in Doc. A/6546, n. 1 
above, pr. 568 (1966). Cf. Article 14(7) ICERD which 
clearly only covers domestic remedies. 
644 SR 33 pr. 23. 
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interpretation before specific cases had been examined 
and the need to allow the HRC a certain amount of 
discretion. 645 The Rule adopted by the HRC merely 
repeats the terms of article 5(2) without 
clarification. 
646 
The reluctance of the HRC to pass judgement on 
another international body is understandable. However, 
the delays evident in international petition systems 
renders such a situation a distinct possibility. If 
faced with this problem the HRC should proceed with 
great circumspection and would clearly need to identify 
the source of the delay. It appears that no such 
situation has arisen to date. 
647 
4.98 The decisions of the HRC noted above are very 
important. They have given clear indications of both the 
general and specific approach of the HRC to the 
considerations 
- 
of other international procedures. 
Article 5(2)(a) O. P. could have been interpreted by the 
HPC in a way that would have greatly limited its 
competence. It could have taken the view that it was 
precluded from consideration of any matter that had been 
submitted to any other human rights institution or 
general investigation. It could similarly have taken a 
645 It is interesting to note the comments of 
Mr. Movchan (USSR national), "The Legal Counsel's 
interpretation, based on semantic and historical 
considerations should obviously be taken into account, 
but that did not mean that other interpretations, which 
might give more weight to ethics, psychology or the law 
and be based on the practice of international bodies, 
should (not} be discussed", SR 33, pr. 27. See also his 
comments at SR. 33, pr. 28. 
646 R. 90(2). Mose and Opsahl, p. 309, comment, "The 
intention was clearly to leave the scope of the 
prolongation clause still open to discussion". 
647 An Eighth Protocol to the ECHR has recently 
been adopted with a view to speeding up the procedures 
of the EUCM., see ECHR 
- 
Collected Texts, pp. 57-62 (1986). 
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very expansive view of what constitutes "the same 
matter" and which procedures qualify as "procedures of 
international investigation or settlement". 
On the contrary, however, the general approach of 
the HRC has evinced a great reluctance to relinquish its 
competence. Restrictive interpretations have been 
applied to the expressions "the same matter" and 
"procedures of international investigation and 
settlement". 
648 The HRC has affirmed the principle of 
adjournment pendente lite a the expense of the principle 
una via electa. 
649 This interpretation of the O. P. makes 
it likely that at some stage the HRC will- have to 
consider a communication which has already been the 
subject of a substantive consideration by another 
international body. This eventuality will raise acutely 
the difficulties concerning the co-existence of several 
procedures of international investigation or settlement. 
The reluctance of the HRC to follow the opinion of 
United Nations Legal Counsel when the application of the 
procedures of international investigation or settlement 
have been unduly prolonged bears testimony to the 
caution of the HRC concerning such co-existence and its 
desire to retain its flexibility while it gained further 
experience. 
4.99 Certain aspects and- problems of co-existence have 
been identified and analysed by commentators and 
suggestions have been made for their resolution. 
650 No 
648 See pr. 4.88-4.96 above. 
649 See pr. 4.97 above. 
650 Anon, 31 Rev. ICJ. 
, 
pp. 43-44, (1983); T. 
Buergenthal, International And Regional Human Rights Law 
And Institutions: Some Examples Of Their Interaction, 12 
Tex. ILJ., pp. 321-330, (1977); Council of. Europe, Report 
Of The Committee of Experts To The Committee Of 
Ministers On The Problem Of The Co-existence Of The Two 
Systems Of Control, Doc. CM (68) 39, (February, 1968); 
(Footnote Continued) 
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formal co-ordination procedures have been adopted by the 
HRC or other international institutions although 
procedures have been established for the exchange of 
information. It is very difficult to ascertain and 
provide solutions in the abstract for problems of 
co-existence. It would seem better not to establish any 
formal rules or procedures but to await the hopefully 
judicious resolution of particular difficulties as and 
when they arise. There is no reason to believe that the 
HRC cannot take a practical and flexible approach to 
each problem and accord to it the most appropriate 
solution. 
Where States have made reservations aimed at 
preventing repeated consideration it has been submitted 
that these should be restrictively interpreted so as 
(Footnote Continued) 
Council of Europe, Report of the Committee of Experts to 
the Committee of Ministers, Human Rights: Problems 
Arising From The Co-existence Of The United Nations 
Covenants On Human Rights And The ECHR, Doc. CE/H 
70(7), (1970); J. De Meyer, International Control 
Machinery In The ECHR In Relation To Other International 
Instruments For The Protection Of Human Rights, Colloquy 
On Human Rights, Athens, (Sept., 1978), Doc. H/Coll. 78(5), 
pp. 45-58; A. Eissen, The ECHR and the U. N. Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights: Problems Of Co-existence, 22 
Buffalo L. R., pp. 181-216, (1972); Lippman, n. l above, 
who suggests that, "The solution to the problem of 
priority among competing international procedures would 
seem to lie in standardization of international 
organizational practices", p. 268; A. H. Robertson, The 
U. N. Covenant On Civil And Political Rights And The 
ECHR, 1968-69 BYIL, pp. 21-48, (1970); A. H. Robertson, 
Human Rights In The World, pp. 114-117, (1982); 
E. Schwelb, The ICERD, 15 ICLQ p. 996 at pp. 1046-1048; 
Sieglerschmidt, Report to the Consultative Assembly of 
the Council Of Europe, On The Protection Of Human Rights 
In The U. N. Covenant On Civil And Political Rights And 
Its Optional Protocol And In The ECHR, Council of 
Europe, Consultative Assembly, Doc. 3773,28th Ordinary 
Session, (1976); L. Sohn, Human Rights: Their 
Implementation And Supervision By The U. N., in T. Meron, 
(ed. ), Human Rights In International Law-Legal And 
Policy Issues, Vol. II, pp. 390-394, who suggests that, 
"The Optional Protocol, however, may be interpreted as 
giving precedence to regional 
(Footnote Continued) 
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only to preclude reconsideration of the substantive 
determination of another international body. 651 
(Footnote Continued) 
procedures", p. 394; L. Sohn, A Short History of U. N. 
Documents On Human Rights, in 18th Report Of The 
Commission To Study The Organization Of Peace, 
pp. 174-179, (1968); M. Tardu, The Protocol To The U. N. 
Covenant On Civil And Political Rights And The 
Inter-American System: A Study In Co-existing Procedures, 
70 Am. JIL. (1976) pp. 778-800; A. A. C. Trindade, The 
Domestic Jurisdiction Of States In The Practice Of The 
United Nations And Regional Organizations, 25 ICLQ 
(1976) pp. 715-765,; Van Dijk and Van Hoof, Theory and 
Practice of the ECHR, pp. 46-52; see also 62 U. N. ESCOR., 
Supp. (No. 6), 15-16, U. N. Doc. E/5927, E/CN. 4/1257, (1977). 
651 See prs. 4.92-4.96 above. 
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5. The Individual Has Exhausted All Available Domestic 
Remedies. (Articles 2 and 5(2) (b) O. P. )652 
Introduction. 
4.100 The domestic remedies rule is an important feature 
of the international law concerning State responsibility 
for the treatment of aliens. 
653 The rationale, purpose 
and application of the rule were the subject of 
extensive debate during the drafting-of both the ICCPR 
and the O. P. in relation to both inter-State and 
individual communications. 
654 That debate has continued 
in the HRC. 655 
4.101 Before examining the HRC's practice some important 
matters must be noted. Firstly, the O. P. does not 
expressly state that the domestic remedies rule shall be 
applied according to generally recognized rules of 
international law. 656 However, the HRC has stated that 
it, "considers that this provision should be interpreted 
and applied in accordance with the generally accepted 
principles of international law with regard to the 
exhaustion of local remedies as applied in the field of 
652 See C. Cancado Trindade, The Application Of The 
Rule Of Exhaustion Of Local Remedies In International 
Law (1983); C. Cancado Trindade, Exhaustion Of Local 
Remedies Under The UN Covenant On Civil And Political 
Rights And Its Optional Protocol, 28 ICLQ 734-765 
(1979); Mose and Opsahl, pp. 302-305; Brar, n. 1 above, 
pp. 524-527. 
653 See generally Trindade, n. 653 above (1983). In 
the Interhandel Case, (U. S. v. Switzerland), 1959 
I. C. J., p. 6 the Court stated that, "The domestic 
remedies rule is a fixture of international law". 
654 See article 41(1)(c) ICCPR. On the drafting see 
Bossuyt, 'Guide', pp. 666-669. 
655 See Trindade, n. 652 above (1979), pp. 757-759. 
656 Cf. article 41(l) (c) ICCPR and article 26 ECHR 
where this reference to international law does appear. 
On the practice under the ECHR see Mikaelsen, 
pp. 105-140; Van Dijk and Van Hoof, pp. 72-88. 
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human rights". 
657 It is therefore important to note 
that most highly developed jurisprudence concerning 
domestic remedies is that under the ECHR, which does 
refer to public international law. 
658 In one case the 
HRC has expressly referred to the "generally recognized 
rules of international law" concerning domestic 
remedies. 
659 
Secondly, the O. P. does not contain any time limit 
within which a communication must be submitted after 
exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
660 Such a time limit 
was debated during the drafting but was not adopted. The 
657 Doc. A/33/40 pr. 586. 
658 Note Mikaelsen's comment that, "Especially in 
the earlier practice of the Commission frequent 
references are found to generally recognized rules of 
international law as defined in the various decisions by 
various tribunals. However, as the practice of the 
Commission on this rule developed rapidly, the reference 
in article 26 to generally 
- 
recognized rules of 
international law became almost futile as the most 
important contribution to the international evolution of 
the exhaustion doctrine came from the Commission 
itself", p. 107. 
659 X v. ' Canada S. D., p. 19. Referred to by 
Trindade (1979), n. 652 above, p. 763. The HRC referred to 
special circumstances which according to "generally 
recognized rules of international law" absolved an 
author from exhausting the domestic remedies 
requirement. See pr. 4.105-4.114 below. 
660 See Trindade (1983), n. 652 above, ch. 5; 
Trindade, The Time Factor In The Application Of The Rule 
Of Exhaustion Of Local Remedies In International Law, 61 
Rivista Di Diritto Internazionale (1978) pp. 232-257. 
Mose and Opsahl suggest that, "The term "available" in 
the Protocol may be used to soften some of the harsher 
effects of the strict application of non-exhaustion as a 
ground of inadmissibility", p. 304. 
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HRC also debated whether to include a time limit in its 
Rules of procedure but no such rule was adopted. 661 
Thirdly, the experience under the ECHR suggests that 
the approach taken by the institution concerned to the 
question of domestic remedies can be of enormous 
importance in determining the impact of that 
institution. 662 The rule has already been the subject of 
a considerable body of jurisprudence in the HRC's views 
under the O. P. and a number of communications have been 
declared inadmissible on this ground. That jurisprudence 
will now be examined. 
(a) The Burden Of Proof As To Exhaustion. 663 
4.102 In a series of cases Uruguay argued that the 
authors had failed to exhaust domestic remedies and 
, 
moreover, that the burden of proof with regard to 
exhaustion was entirely upon the authors of the 
communication. 
664 This argument was based on the 
submission that according to criminal law, dating back 
to the time of Roman law, the burden of proof "in all 
cases" rested upon the plaintiff; for the party against 
which a charge was made, a reversal of the burden of 
proof would mean "a probatio diabolica". 
665 The HRC 
stated that it did not accept Uruguay's objection to 
admissibility, "in the absence of specific information 
on local remedies available to the complainants in the 
661 See pr. 4.9 above. 
662 See Mikaelsen n. 656 above. 
663 See Trindade (1983) n. 652 above, ch. 3; Trindade (1979) n. 652 above, pp. 761-762; Trindade, The Burden of 
Proof With regard To The Exhaustion Of Local Remedies In 
International Law, 9 RDH/HRJ (1976) pp. 81-121. On the 
practice under the ECHR see Mikaelsen, pp. 108-111. 
664 See e. g. Lanza and Perdoma v. Uruguay, 
Doc. A/35/40, p. 111, prs. 8,13. 
665 Citetc in Trindade (1979), n. 652 above, p. 761. 
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particular circumstances of their cases". 
666 The general 
approach of the HRC has been that a communication would 
not be considered inadmissible for failure to exhaust 
domestic remedies unless the State party gave details of 
the particular remedies available in the circumstances 
of the case together with a reasonable prospect that 
667 
"It is incumbent on such measures would be effective. 
the State party to prove the effectiveness of remedies 
the non-exhaustion of which it claims", and the 
availability of the alleged remedy must be "reasonably 
evident". 
668 
It seems clear then that there is a burden on the 
State party to prove that local remedies are available 
and effective. However, there is also a burden on the 
author to show that he has exhausted any allegedly 
available remedies, that the alleged remedies are not 
effective or that there were special circumstances which 
absolved him from exhausting domestic remedies. 
It is difficult to establish whether the initial 
burden is on the author to provide evidence that he has 
satisfied the domestic remedies rule or on the State 
party to prove that domestic remedies are available and 
effective. It is submitted that in principle the initial 
burden must rest with the author. However, the burden 
may not be very heavy. 
669 If satisfied the onus of proof 
then moves to the State party. If the State party then 
provides evidence of available an effective remedies the 
666 Ramirez v. Uruguay, Doc. A/35/40 
, 
p. 121; S. D., 
p. 49. 
667 Ibid. 
668 C. F. et al. v. Canada, Doc. A/40/40, p. 217, 
prs. 6.2,10.1. 
669 Under the ECHR the applicant has only to 
provide prima facie evidence (commencement de preuve) 
that the requirement has been complied with, Trindade 
(1983), n. 652 above, ch. 3, p. 145. 
onus may then 
unavailability, 
circumstances. 
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(b) The Remedies To Be Exhausted. 
4.103 The O. P. refers to the exhaustion of "available" 
domestic remedies. (Arts. 2,5 O. P. )670 The HRC has 
clarified this requirement. Firstly, the HRC has 
established that the 
"The Covenant provides that a remedy shall be 
granted whenever a violation of one of the rights 
guaranteed by it has occurred; consequently, it 
does not generally prescribe preventative 
protection, but confines itself to requiring 
effective redress ex post facto". 
671 
It is important to understand the precise context of 
these words. On the facts of the case concerned the HRC 
expressed the view that, "... a subsequent judgement 
could nevertheless in principle have been an effective 
remedy in the meaning contemplated by article 2, 
paragraph 3, of the Covenant and article 5, paragraph 
2(b), of the Optional Protocol". 672 More generally, 
however, the 
670 In the HRCion it was explained with regard to 
the expression "available domestic remedies" in the 
draft inter-State provisions that, "The absence of a 
specific reference to 'domestic, judicial and 
administrative remedies' was to take account of the fact 
that there might be remedies other than judicial and 
administrative ones just as there were cases where no 
available remedies existed", A/2929, ch. VII, pr. 99. Note 
that under article 2(3) ICCPR each State party 
undertakes to "develop the possibilities of judicial 
remedy". On article 2 see ch. 6 below. 
671 C. F. et al. v. Canada, Doc. A/40/40, p. 217, 
pr. 6.2. 
672 Ibid. "The Committee has stressed in other 
cases that remedies the availability of which is not 
reasonably evident cannot be invoked to the detriment of 
the authoz in proceedings under the Optional Protocol. 
According to the detailed legal 
explanations...., however, the legal position appears to 
be sufficiently clear in that the specific remedy of a 
declaratory judgement was available, and if granted, 
would have been an effective remedy against the 
authorities concerned. In drawing this conclusion, the (Footnote Continued) 
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undertaking in article 2(1) ICCPR to "respect and 
ensure" the rights in the ICCPR may well prescribe some 
degree of "preventative protection" for individuals. 673 
The HRC has expressed the view that, "Exhaustion of 
domestic remedies can be required only to the extent 
that these remedies are effective and available". 
674 In 
a number of communication Uruguay has supplied a list of 
the local remedies allegedly available and. submitted 
that the authors had failed to exhaust those 
remiedies. 
675 The typical response of the HRC has been to 
inform Uruguay that, 
"... the communication would... not be considered 
inadmissible in so far as the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies was concerned, unless the State 
party gave details of the remedies which it 
submitted had been available to the author in the 
circumstances of his case, together with evidence 
that there would be a reasonable prospect that such 
measures would be effective". 
676 
In reply Uruguay has submitted general descriptions 
of the remedies provided without, however, specifying 
which remedies were available in the particular 
(Footnote Continued) 
committee also takes note of the fact that the authors 
were represented by legal counsel", ibid., pr. 10.1. 
673 On article 2 see ch. 6 below. 
674 Doc. A/39/40, pr. 584. This notion of 
effectiveness was apparently stressed in the HRC's 
private discussions on the domestic remedies rule, see 
Trindade (1979), n. 652 above, pp. 757-759. 
675 Ramirez V, Uruguay, Doc. A/35/40, p. 121; 
Sequeira V. Uruguay, Doc. A/35/40, p. 127. For this list 
see Trindade (1979), n. 652 above, p. 760, n. 155. 
676 See e. g. Ramirez v. Uruguay, Doc. A/35/40 p. 121, 
pr. 5. 
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circumstances. 
677 The HRC has rejected such submissions 
as insufficient. It concluded, for example, 
"... that article 5(2) (b) of the Protocol did not 
preclude the Committee from considering a 
communication received under the Optional Protocol 
where the allegations themselves raise issues 
concerning the availability or effectiveness of 
domestic remedies and the State party when 
expressly requested to do so by the Committee did 
not provide details on the availability or 
effectiveness of domestic remedies in the 
particular case under consideration". 
678 
4.104 The approach of the HRC is not that the domestic 
remedies rule does not apply as a condition of 
admissibility when the allegations themselves raise 
issues concerning the availability and effectiveness of 
those remedies. The decision is limited to the effects 
of the failure of a State party to provide details of 
the availability and effectiveness of domestic remedies 
in a particular case. Professor Trindade has applauded 
this approach of concentrating on, "... the element of 
actual redress over a mechanistic process of exhausting 
local remedies". 
679 
677 The authors of one communication submitted that 
the list of remedies was, "A mimeographic reproduction 
in every single case, regardless of the completely 
different situations involved... In practice the legal 
remedies fail to operate because of the restrictive 
interpretations they receive... that contention cannot be 
defeated by a series of quotations from legal codes. All 
this does is to deprive the argument of any reality", 
U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/FS/R. 8/Add. 5 prs. 3 and 4. Cited by 
Trindade (1979), n. 652 above, p. 760. 
678 Ramirez v. Uruguay, Doc. A/35/40 
, 
p. 121, pr. 9; 
S. D., pp. 4,49. 
679 Trindade (1979), n. 652 above, p. 761. The HRC's 
subsequent practice has maintained this approach of 
concentrating on the availability and effectiveness of 
local remedies. 
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If a matter is being actively considered within the 
domestic system then domestic remedies will not have 
been exhausted. For example, in J. S. v Canada680 J. S. 
had successfully applied to the Supreme Court of Ontario 
for judicial review of the decision of the Ontario Legal 
Aid Plan (OLAP), the legal aid authority in Ontario. The 
Supreme Court had set aside the decision and ordered 
that J. S. 's application be reconsidered. The OLAP had 
indicated that it was applying for leave to appeal to 
the Court of Appeal. The HRC noted that the matter was 
still sub judice and that, therefore, domestic remedies 
had not been exhausted. 
681 
Conversely, if the domestic remedies are no longer 
open to the alleged victim, for example, because he has 
been refused leave to appeal, 
682 the domestic remedies 
rule will be satisfied. It seems to be sufficient that 
the domestic remedies have been exhausted while the 
communication has been considered by the HRC. 683 
It is too early to determine the HRC's approach to 
extraordinary remedies. In one case the HRC stated that, 
".. an extraordinary remedy, such as seeking the 
annulment of decisions of the Ministry of Justice, does 
not constitute an effective remedy within the meaning of 
article 5(2)(b) of the Optional Protocol". 84 There are 6 
680 Doc. A/38/40, p. 243. 
681 Similarly in F. G. G. v. Netherlands, Doc. A/42/40 
p. 180 
682 As for example in Z. Z. v. Canada, S. D., p. 19. 
The communication was declared inadmissible on the basis 
that, "A thorough examination by the Committee of the 
dossier submitted by the author has not revealed any 
facts in substantiation of his allegations, and the 
communication is thus found to be manifestly devoid of 
any facts requiring further consideration". 
683 Pietraroia v. Uruguay, Doc. A/36/40, p. 153. 
684 Doc. A/39/40, pr. 584. See Pietraroia v. Uruguay, (Footnote Continued) 
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conflicting decisions of the EUCM and in customary 
international law concerning the need to exhaust 
extraordinary remedies. 
685 It might therefore be unwise 
to take the HRC's statement as a general practice. It 
simply represents the view of the HRC on the question of 
exhaustion of an extraordinary domestic remedy in the 
particular circumstances of one case. There may prove to 
be "extraordinary remedies" in other legal systems of 
which the HRC will take the view that exhaustion is 
required. 
686 
(Footnote Continued) 
n. 686 below. By implication all ordinary judicial, 
administrative and arbitral remedies must be exhausted. 
685 See Mikaelsen, pp. 118-121, particularly on the 
decisions in the Nielsen Case, A. 343/57,2 YBECHR 
(1958-59) p. 412 AT 438-442), and X V. Denmark, 
A. 4311/69,14 YBECHR (1971) p. 280 at pp. 316-320. Cf. The 
decision in the Salem Case, (Egypt v. U. S. ), 2 R. I. A. A., 
p. 1161, (1932). See Trindade (1983), n. 652 above, 
pp. 89-94. 
686 See Pietraroia v. Uruguay, Doc. A/36/40, p. 153, 
pr. 12 concerning two exceptional remedies. 
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(c) Relief From The Duty Of Execution. 687 
4.105 Customary international law placed great 
importance on an exception to the domestic remedies rule 
for an injured party who proves the futility of 
exhausting domestic remedies. 
688 The HRC has had a 
number of occasions on which to consider whether this 
exception should apply. Indeed, in the HRC's first 
published admissibility decision the authors argued that 
in the situation prevailing in Uruguay no local remedies 
existed. The HRC accepted that there were no effective 
local remedies and further indicated that in a 
communication complaining both of the prevailing 
situation and of an alleged violation of an individuals 
rights only the latter would be considered. 
689 
4.106 The HRC has accepted that special security regimes 
may render a local remedy ineffective. For example, in 
Santullo (Valcada) v. Uruguay690 Uruguay informed the 
HRC that the remedy of habeas corpus was not applicable 
under the regime of "prompt security measures" then in 
operation. 
691 Similarly the HRC may accept that the 
alleged remedy was factually unavailable in the 
particular case of the alleged victim. In Bleir v. 
Uruguay 692 the HRC accepted the submission that, "All of 
the guarantees that could be invoked in penal 
687 See generally Trindade (1983), n. 652 above, 
ch. 2, B and ch. 4, II. 
688 See Manke, n. 652 above, p. 645; The Ambatielos 
Case (Greece v. U. K. ) 12 RIAA p. 83. 
689 R. 1/1, (1976-78), Doc. CCPR/C/FS/R. 1/Add. 1,2-3, 
(unpublished), cited in Trindade, n. 652 above (1979), 
p. 762. 
690 Doc. A/35/40 p. 107; S. D. p. 43. 
691 Ibid., pr. 8. Similarly see Lanza and Perdoma v. 
Uruguay, Doc. A/35/40 p. lll, pr. 13; Sequeira v. Uruguay, 
Doc. A/35/40 p. 127, pr. 3. 
692 Doc. A/34/40 p. 130; S. D. p. 109. 
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proceedings were irrelevant, because he never appeared 
before any court; nor was he ever formally informed of 
the reasons for his arrest". 693 In G. Barbato v. 
Uruguay694 Uruguay submitted that G had not exhausted 
the domestic remedies available to him. However, no 
details were given of the remedies which could have been 
invoked in the particular circumstances of the case and 
it was not specified as to which of the violations could 
have been effectively remedied within the established 
military judicial process. The HRC expressed the view 
that it was unable to conclude that there were remedies 
available to G which he should have pursued. 695 Thus the 
communication was held admissible. Subsequently, the 
State party reiterated its submission and listed seven 
remedies allegedly available. 696 
The author, G's cousin, rejected the State party's 
assertions. His submission dealt with each of the 
alleged remedies and showed that each of them were 
either "inapplicable", "entirely theoretical and totally 
ineffective" or "inappropriate". The author then 
addressed the argument that as certain of the remedies 
might be applicable at a later stage they could be 
regarded as remedies which had not been exhausted. The 
author argued' that it was essential to look at the 
entire procedure and noted that G had been detained for 
twenty months and that it would be a long time before a 
first instance decision would be made, 
"Accordingly, to claim that the proceedings must be 
completed in order to apply for 
-and exhaust- the 
remedies that are theoretically available would 
693 Ibid., pr. 2.5. 
694 Doc. A/38/40 p. 124. 
695 Ibid., pr. 5.2. 
696 Ibid., pr. 6.2. 
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mean postponing action by the Committee for an 
unacceptable amount of time, particularly since 
failure to make a decision within a reasonable time 
is one of the violations that have been reported 
and one of the most obvious causes of what has 
happened. In other words, the possibility of 
instituting unacceptably lengthy proceedings, which 
is in itself a violation of the Covenant, would 
make the Government think that it was not subject 
to the Coamittee's jurisdiction. That could hardly 
be the intention of the Covenant". 697 
In its decision the HRC expressed the view that, 
"... the remedies listed by the State party as 
unexhausted cannot be considered available to the 
alleged victim in the circumstances of his case. 
They are either inapplicable de jure or de facto 
and do not constitute an effective remedy, within 
the meaning of article 2(3) of the Covenant, for 
the matters complained of. There are, therefore, no- 
grounds to alter the conclusion reached in the 
Committee's decision... that the communication is 
not inadmissible under article 5(2)(b) of the 
Optional Protocol 698 
The decision is of particular interest because of 
the direct reference to the obligations of the States 
parties to the ICCPR to provide an 'effective remedy' to 
any person who claims that his rights or freedoms under 
the ICCPR have been violated (article 2(3) ICCPR). 699 
Professor Trindade has argued at length that the 
drafters of the Covenant envisaged the local remedies 
697 Ibid., pr. 7.4. 
698 Ibid., pr. 9.4. 
699 On article 2 see ch. 6 below. 
CH. 4 364 
rule as directly related to the State's duty to provide 
effective local remedies as in article 2(3) ICCPR. 700 
4.107 An example of the legal, as distinct from the 
factual, unavailability of remedies is the case of 
Guerrero v. Uruguay. 
701 Under the provisions of a 
legislative act it was not possible to institute a civil 
action for damages in conjunction with military criminal 
proceedings. An alternative action for compensation for 
persons injured by a police operation depended first on 
determining the criminal liability of the accused. As 
the accused had been acquitted no civil or 
administrative suit could be filed to obtain 
compensation. The HRC was unable to conclude that there 
were still effective remedies available that could be 
invoked on G's behalf. 
702 
4.108 For remedies to be effective an alleged victim may 
need legal assistance. In Lanza and Perdoma v. 
Uruguay703 the HRC noted that habeas corpus was not 
applicable and the State party had not shown the 
remedies available in the particular circumstances of 
the case. 
704 The HRC then added that, 
"Moreover, B. W. (L) and A. L. (P) have explained that 
they had no effective contact with lawyers to 
700 See Trindade (1983), n. 652 above; Ibid., 
(1979). See also Trindade, Exhaustion Of Local Remedies 
In International Law And The Role Of National Courts, 
Archiv Des Volkerrechts (1977-78) pp. 333-370. See also 
pr. 4.116 below. 
701 Doc. A/37/40 p. 137. 
702 Ibid., prs. 4.2,6.2,6.3,7.2,7.3,8.2,9 and 
11.8. 
703 Doc. A/35/40 p. 111; S. D. p. 45. 
704 Ibid., pr. 13. 
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advise them of their rights or to assist them in 
exercising them". 
705 
This suggests that the HRC might take the view that 
when failure to exhaust the remedies available can be 
ascribed to the failure of the state party to permit, or 
provide if necessary, legal assistance that will 
constitute a "special circumstance" which excuses the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
706 This argument might 
extend to failure to satisfy other requirements of the 
fair trial guarantee in article 14 ICCPR. Indeed the HRC 
has expressed the view on the facts of one case that the 
requirement of effective and available domestic remedies 
entails that the procedural guarantees for a fair and 
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal must be scrupulously observed. 
707 It is 
submitted that this should not be read so widely as to 
suggest that all domestic remedies must conform with the 
requirements of article 14. Article 2(3) ICCPR clearly 
contemplates administrative and other non-judicial 
remedies. 
708 
705 Ibid. 
706 See also Simones v. Uruguay, Doc. A/37/40 p. 174 
concerning the failure of a court appointed counsel to 
make alleged exceptional domestic remedies known to the 
alleged victim. The HRC noted that they were 
"exceptional in character" and that, "the officially 
appointed defence counsel had not invoked them on behalf 
of (S) although more than a year has passed since the 
Supreme military court rendered judgement against her. 
They could not therefore be regarded as having, in 
effect, been "available" within the meaning of article 
5(2) (b) of the Optional Protocol". Cf. Fawcett, p. 360, 
"the failure of the lawyer may, if proved, be a special 
circumstance excusing compliance with the rule in 
article 26 (ECHR) provided he has sought and failed to 
obtain restitutio in integrum", (1987) See also the 
Artico Case, EUCT, (1980). 
707 Gilboa v. Uruguay, Doc. A/41/40 p. 128, pr. 7.2. 
708 On article 2 see ch. 6 below. 
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4.109 A State party may be estopped from raising the 
domestic remedies requirement in certain cases. 
709 Thus 
in Y. L v. Canada710 the alleged victim had not been 
informed of the alleged remedy in the original decision 
complained of, or by his State appointed lawyer. 
711 The 
HRC took the rather strict view that, "The fact that the 
author was not advised that he could have resorted to 
judicial review is irrelevant in determining whether the 
claim of the author was of a kind subject to judicial 
control and supervision". 
712 However, in a joint 
individual opinion three members of the HRC took the 
view that Canada was "estopped from asserting that 
either, procedurally, the author has failed to exhaust 
local remedies or that, substantively, the requisite 
guarantees under article 14 (1) of the Covenant have 
been complied with". 
713 
Another interesting point concerning domestic 
remedies is suggested by the facts of C. A. v. Italy. 
714 
C. A. had opted for an exceptional administrative 
procedure rather than the normal court process. That 
option excluded the latter as a matter of law. It is 
709 Cf. Foti, EUCT, (1982); Corigliano, EUCT, 
(1982); Van Oosterwijk Case, EUCT, (1980). Van Dijk and 
Van Hoof, p. 128. 
710 Doc. A/41/40 p. 145. 
711 Ibid., prs. 3.1,7. 
712 Ibid., pr. 9.4. In the view of the HRC the 
provisions in the Federal Court Act did contain 
provisions to ensure to the author the right to a fair 
hearing in the situation. Therefore, the communication 
was inadmissible because the basic allegations did not 
reveal the possibility of any breach of the Covenant", 
ibid., prs. 9.5,10. 
713 Doc. A/41/40 p. 150 (Graefrath, Fausto Pocar and 
Tomuschat). 
714 Doc. A/38/40 p. 237. 
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submitted that on these facts the State party could not 
have relied on the domestic remedies rule. 
715 
4.10 The effect of conditions attached to the exercise 
of remedies was raised in Montero v. Uruguay. 
716 M was a 
Uruguayan citizen resident in West Berlin. She alleged 
that the ICCPR had been violated because the Uruguayan 
authorities had refused, without explanation, to renew 
her passport. 
717 M was informed that there was a 
recourse by way of appeal against the Government 
decision but that this had to be done in Uruguay. As M 
had no relatives in Uruguay to represent her the 
Uruguayan authorities offered her a safe-conduct to 
travel to Uruguay. M declined the offer because she did 
not have the financial means to undertake the journey 
and because her studies would have been unduly 
interrupted. 718 
The HRC expressed the view that it was unable to 
conclude that in the circumstances there were effective 
domestic remedies available to M which she had failed to 
exhaust. 
719 The State party repeated its submission that 
M was free to return to Uruguay even without a valid 
passport. M replied that it was the normal procedure for 
Uruguayan citizens residing abroad to have their 
passport renewed by Uruguayan consulates, that she had 
applied to all the appropriate consular posts, and that 
715 The decision in C. A. v. Italy is considered in 
ch. 10, pr. 10. below. 
716 Doc. A/38/40 p. 186. 
717 Ibid., pr. 1.2. 
718 Ibid., pr. 2.10. Cf. Under the ECHR lack of 
financial means is not regarded, per se, as a special 
circumstance which absolves the applicant from 
exhaustion of domestic remedies, see A. 181/56 (1957), 1 
YBECHR (1955-57) pp. 139-141; A. 2257/64, Soltikow v. FRG 
(1968), 27 C. D. p. 1 at pp. 27-28. 
719 Ibid., pr. 6.1. 
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the suggestion of the Uruguayan authorities that she 
travel to Uruguay was "abnormal ". 720 
The HRC made no further comment on the matter of the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies. Again the HRC seems to 
have avoided a "mechanistic application" of the rule. 
Presumably the approach of the HRC was that although a 
possible remedy existed the conditions attached to its 
use were so onerous, unreasonable and unnecessary in the 
particular circumstances of M's case that it did not 
constitute an effective and available remedy. If this is 
the correct interpretation then it is submitted that it 
is to be commended. 
4.111 The HRC would appear to have adopted the rule that 
the available domestic remedies must be properly 
exhausted. 
721 This is particularly important because the 
result in such cases is not merely suspensory but 
precludes the admissibility of the communication. 722 In 
N. S. v. Canada723 the communication concerned N. S. 's 
dismissal from work allegedly because of his race and 
religion. N. S. wished to appeal from a decision of the 
Adjudicator of the Public Service Staff Relations Board 
to the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal. However, the 
time limit for filing an appeal had passed. N. S. 
applied to the court for an extension but this was 
refused. N. S. submitted that he had exhausted all 
domestic remedies. The HRC rejected this submission. The 
HRC noted that N. S. had failed to avail himself of the 
remedy of appeal in time. Moreover, the communication 
did ".. not disclose the existence of any special 
circumstances which might have absolved the author, 
720 Ibid., prs. 8.3,8.4. 
721 Cf. Mikaelson pp. 131-2; The Ambatielos Case, 
n. 688 above. 
722 See R. 92(2) discussed in pr. 4.19.1 above. 
723 S. D. p. 19. See also S. H. B. V. Canada, 
Doc. A/42/40 p. 174, pr. 7.2 in which the HRC took the view 
that the author's doubts about the effectiveness of the 
particular domestic remedies were not warranted and did 
not absolve him from exhausting them under article 
5 (2) (b) O. P. 
according to generally recognized rules of international 
law, from exhausting the domestic remedies at his 
disposal". 724 Therefore, N. S. could not be considered to 
have exhausted the remedies available to him under 
Canadian law and the communication was declared 
inadmissible. In J. R. T v. Western Guard Party725 the HRC 
took the view that, "It appears, however, in view of the 
ambiguity ensuing from the conflicting time limits laid 
down in the laws in question, that a reasonable effort 
was indeed made to exhaust domestic remedies in this 
respect and, therefore, the Committee does not consider 
that, as to this claim, the communication should be 
declared inadmissible under article 5 (2) (b ) of the 
Optional Protocol". 
726 
4.112 If the HRC do follow this approach the author must 
ensure that he has properly exhausted available domestic 
remedies. This will demand, for example, observance of 
time limits and the correct procedures and formalities 
of national law, making full use and advantage of the 
remedies available by pleading the important 
allegations, calling the necessary witnesses, and making 
appropriate objections. 
4.113 Is is open to the HRC to reverse a decision on 
non-exhaustion in the light of subsequent 
information. 727 4.114 Finally, it is important to note 
that article 5(2) (b) contains an exception to the rule 
of exhaustion of domestic remedies, "... where the 
application of the remedies is unreasonably 
724 Ibid., (my emphasis). 
725 Doc. A/38/40 p. 231. 
726 Ibid., pr. 8'(b). The communication was declared 
inadmissible on other grounds which are examined in 
ch. 12 below. 
727 See C. F. et al v. Canada, Doc. A/40/40 p. 217. 
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prolonged". 
728 The HRC could have expressly relied on 
this exception in the case of G. Barbato v. Uruguay 
729 it 
was expressly relied upon in Pietroroia v. Uruguay730 
Referring to two remedies of an exceptional nature the 
HRC commented that it was, "... not satisfied that they 
are applicable in the present case and, in any event, to 
require resort to them would unreasonably prolong the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies". 
731 In Hammel v. 
Madagascar, 732 a judicial decision on HIS case was 
rendered while the HRC was considering the communication 
on the merits. The HRC expressed the view that as the 
applications had taken over four years the remedy had 
been unreasonable prolonged in the sense of article 
5(2) (b) of the O. P. 733 The HRC considered and rejected 
the application of the exception in H. S. v. France734. 
The case concerned a delay of six and a half years in 
the decision depriving H. S. of his french nationality. 
The HRC expressed the view that, 
"... the delays in the proceedings in 1984 and 1985 
were caused by the author himself. For that reason 
the Committee is unable to conclude that domestic 
remedies, which according to both parties, are in 
progress, have been unduly prolonged in a manner 
728 See pr. 4.15 above for HRC's discussion on this. 
729 See pr. 4.106 above. 
730 Doc. A/39/40 p. 153. 
731 Ibid., pr. 12. See also Weinberger v. Uruguay, 
Doc. A/36/40 p. 114, pr. 11 and Solorzano v. Uruguay, 
Doc. A/41/40 p. 134, pr. 5.6. 
732 Doc. A/42/40 p. 130. 
733 Ibid., pr. 17. 
734 Doc. A/41/40 p. 169. 
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that would exempt the author from exhausting them 
under article 5(2) (b) of the Optional Protocol". 735 
Accordingly, the requirement of exhaustion of 
domestic remedies had not been met by the author at the 
time of the submission and had still not been met. The 
communication was, therefore, inadmissible. 
735 Ibid., pr. 9.4. 
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(d) Does The Exhaustion Rule Apply Where An Application 
Is Directed Against Legislative Measures Or An 
Administrative Practice.? 
736 
4.115 This question is raised simply because of 
comparable international practice. 
737 As we have already 
noted the HRC have stated that an individual cannot 
challenge in abstracto the compatibility of national 
legislation with the ICCPR. The individual must allege 
that the legislation has been applied in such a manner, 
or has produced "adverse effects which directly affect" 
him, that he has actually been a "victim" of a violation 
of the ICCPR. 
738 An interesting point to note is that on 
some occasions the HRC have concluded that the questions 
of violation and of effective remedies can only be 
properly examined at the merits stage. 
739 
A more difficult question for the HRC will be the 
application of the domestic remedies rule where the 
communication alleges the existence of an 
"administrative practice"'. Many of the communications 
736 See Trindade (1983), n. 652 above, pp. 157-158, 
187-212; Mikaelson, pp. 122-131. 
737 Ibid. Mikaelsen suggests the following summary 
of the EUCM's approach, "If an individual application is 
directed against the governing rules of a country in 
from of legislation or administartive practice tolerated 
at a high level, the exhaustion rule does not apply 
unless the legal system of the country concerned offers 
a possibility to test the legal provisions or the 
administrative practice concerned against the 
Constitution of the country, including the Convention if 
this is incorporated as Constitutional law. If an 
individual application is directed against an 
administrative practice tolerated at lower level the 
Commission will ascertain whether or not the domestic 
remedies available are effective", p. 129. 
738 See prs. 4.64-4.81.1 above, in particular 
Hertzberg v. Finland, pr. 4.76. 
739 See e. g. Fals Borda v. Colombia, Doc. A/37/40 
p. 193, pr. 7.2. This approach parallels that under the 
ECHR. 
CH. 4 373 
concerning Uruguay have alleged that the violations 
concerned result from systematic practices and in 
response the HRC expressed the view that a "practice" of 
inhuman treatment existed at La Libertad prison in 
Uruguay. 740 In none of these views though has the HRC 
made any comment on the effect of such a practice on the 
rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies. The question 
has been considered in the ECHR system most notably in 
the cases of Donnelly and Others v. United Kingdom 741 
and Ireland v. United Kingdom. 742 The jurisprudence 
which has emerged is rather sophisticated, and has been 
criticised, but may at least provide some instructive 
points of reference for the HRC. 
743 
740 See ch. 9, prs. 9.18-9.18.1 below. 
741 A. 5577-5583/72,16 YBECHR p. 212 at 262 (1973), 
19 YBECHR p. 84 (1975). See K. Boyle and H. Hannum, 
Individual Applications Under The ECHR And The Concept 
Of An Administrative Practice: The Donnelly Case, 68 
AJIL (1974) pp. 440-453; ibid., The Donnelly Case, 
Administrative Practice And Domestic Remedies Under The 
European Convention: One Step Forward And Two Steps 
Back, 71 AJIL (1977) pp. 316-321. 
742 EUCT, Series A, vol. 27 (1978). 
743 See the literature in notes 736,737 and 741 
above. 
CH. 4 374 
(e) Domestic Remedies: An Appraisal. 
4.116 The placing of the burden of proof as regards the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies is a matter of great 
importance to the effectiveness of individual petition 
systems. It poses the choice between a strict 
application of the domestic remedies rule accompanied by 
an onerous burden of proof on the individual concerned 
or a shared burden of proof which takes account of the 
factual procedural equality of the individual. Professor 
Trindade has argued that, "General international law 
(arbitral and judicial practice) provides ample and 
strong evidence in support of the sharing or 
distribution of the burden of proof between contending 
parties in inter-State litigation". 
744 A fortiori this 
approach should apply in respect. of individual 
applications, "since the local remedies rule per se 
already favours the much stronger party the Sovereign 
State". 745 This sharing of the burden of proof has been 
the practice of the EUCM since the early 1960's. 746 
The relatively small amount of practice of the HRC 
has been noted above. With the proviso that the matter 
is a very difficult one, that all its aspects have not 
yet been considered, and that early approaches must 
necessarily be treated with some caution, it seems fair 
to comment that the HRC has taken an individual 
orientated approach, or at least not a State centred 
approach. It has avoided placing a heavy onus on the 
individual and placed the burden of showing that 
remedies are "available and effective" squarely on the 
respondent State. 
747 This approach is, in general terms, 
744 Trindade (1983), n. 652 above, p. 169. 
745 Ibid. 
746 Ibid. 
747 See prs. 4.102-4.103 above. 
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very much in line with that of the EUCM and the EUCT, 
748 
the IACM, 749 and the United Nations Sub-Commission On 
The Prevention Of Discrimination And Protection Of 
Minorities. 
750 It represents a sensible, practical 
approach which recognises the factual procedural 
inequality which will normally exist between the 
individual and the State party concerned and takes 
account of the complimentary undertaking on States 
parties under article 2(3) ICCPR to provide "effective 
remedies". 
751 
More generally, the practice of the HRC in relation 
to the exhaustion of domestic remedies may provide some 
important international law precedents. However, as 
Professor Bowett has pointed out there is a danger in 
extrapolating from human rights claims to general 
international law claims. 
752 In particular he notes 
Professor Trindade's argument that there may well be a 
duty on State parties to provide local remedies for 
violations of human rights on the basis of, for example, 
article 2(3) ICCPR, 753 and comments that, 
"It is doubtful, however, that this can be extended 
to a more general proposition that a State is under 
a legal duty to provide local remedies for any 
748 See Trindade (1983), n. 652 above; and the 
literature cited in. 656 above. 
749 See Trindade, Exhaustion Of Local Remedies In 
The Inter American System, 18 Ind. JIL (1978) pp. 345-351. 
750 See Manke, n. 652 above; Trindade (1983), n. 652 
above, pp. 163-168; See also Trindade, Exhaustion Of 
Local Remedies Under ICERD, 22 Germ. YIL (1979) 
pp. 374-383. 
751 On article 2 see ch. 6 below. 
752 Bowett, Book Review of Trindade (1983), n. 652 
above, 55 BYIL 1984 (1985) pp. 268 at p. 269. 
753 See Trindade (1979) and (1983), n. 652 above. 
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breach of international law in relation to an 
alien". 
754 
754 Bowett, n. 752 above. 
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Abuse of the Right Of Submission (Article 3 O. P. ). 755 
4.117 Although raised by States parties on a number of 
occasions this ground has rarely operated to render a 
communication inadmissible. 
756 It did so operate in K. L. 
v. Denmark. 
757 There the HRC took into account that a 
similar complaint from the author had previously been 
declared inadmissible under the O. P. as devoid of any 
substantiation; 
758 that the second complaint was 
similarly devoid of any substantiation in facts or law; 
and that the author had himself indicated that he still 
intended to pursue further domestic remedies. The HRC 
concluded that in these circumstances, the submission of 
the communication must be regarded as an abuse of the 
right of submission under article 3 O. P. 
Anonymous Communications (Article 3 O. P. ). 759 
4.118 No communication has been declared inadmissible on 
this ground. In Carballal v. Uruguay760 the HRC received 
no further correspondence from the author subsequent to 
his original communication. Letters addressed to him by 
the UN Secretariat were returned as unclaimed. The HRC 
based its final view on the information in the original 
communication. 
761 
755 See Mose and Opsahl, pp. 294-295. On the ECHR 
see Van Dijk and Van Hoof, pp. 60-62. 
756 For submissions of States parties see L. P. v. 
Canada, S. D. p. 21 at p. 22 (a); Pinkey v. Canada, D. S. 
p. 95 pr. 24-25. 
757 S. D. p. 26-27. 
758 For that decision see K. L. v. Denmark, S. D. 
p. 24. 
759 See Brar, n. 1 above, pp. 530-531. On practice 
under ECHR see Mikaelsen, p. 72; Van Dijk and Van Hoof, 
pp. 59-60. 
760 Doc. A/36/40 p. 125, pr. 8. 
761 Ibid., pr. 8. 
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F. THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL: SIGNIFICANCE, APPRAISAL AND 
PROSPECTS. 
(i) THE STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL. 762 
4.119 Although the International Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination 1965 contained a 
provision on communications 
763 the O. P. is perhaps of 
greater significance because it recognises a right of 
individual petition in a universal instrument covering a 
wide range of civil and political rights. Commentators 
have described the O. P. as being revolutionary in terms 
of international law. 
764 Over a decade of practice under 
the O. P. has demonstrated the feasibility of individual 
petition systems at the international level as the ECHR 
has at the regional level. 
765 In this respect the O. P. 
represents a signal contribution to the recognition of 
the individual as a proper subject of international 
law. 766 Indeed, in theory at least, the O. P. represents 
an advance on the ECHR because the ECHR was intended 
primarily as a more general 'public ordre' guarantee 
than as providing individual remedies. 
767 
762 See ch. 1, pr. 1.1 above. 
763 See article 14, ICERD. The provision did not 
enter into force until 3 Dec., 1982. See Reports Of The 
CERD Doc. A/38/40 p. 7-13 (1983), Doc. A/42/40 P. 159 
(1987). 
764 Mose and Opsahl, text to n. 813 below. 
765 See F. Jacobs, The European Convention On Human 
Rights, p. 272. 
766 See n. 262 above. 
767 See generally, A. H. Robertson, Human Rights In 
Europe, ch. 2 (2d, 1977). 
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(ii) THE HRC UNDER THE O. P. 
4.120 If the examination of communications by the HRC 
was to have credibility and be potentially effective 
then this task had to be carried out with objectivity, 
fairness and 'procedural due process. There are a number 
of features of the O. P. that can be identified as 
affording credibility to the HRC in its work under the 
O. P. 768 Firstly, the members of the HRC are "independent 
experts", rather than governmental representatives. 
769 
Practice has shown this to be a fundamental prerequisite 
for effective human rights organs. 
770 Secondly, the HRC 
has a more secure existence in that it was established 
by a Treaty rather than a Resolution. 
77' Thirdly, the 
HRC's mandate is defined by the O. P. and the legal norms 
it is to interpret and apply are established by the 
ICCPR. A major problem for United Nations human rights 
bodies conducting inquiries has been the lack of a 
defined set of legal norms against which to evaluate the 
768 See generally, Ramcharan, (ed. ), n. 218 above; 
Cohn, ibid.; F. Ermacora, International Enquiry 
Commissions In The Field Of Human Rights, I HRJ (1968) 
pp. 180-218; Ibid., United Nations And Human Rights In 
Chile, I HRR/RDH (1976) pp. 145-156; T. F. Franck and 
H. S. Fairley, Procedural Due Process In Human Rights 
Fact-finding By International Agencies, 74 AJIL (1980) 
pp. 308-345; Theo. C. Van Boven, Fact-Finding In The Field 
Of Human Rights, 3 Isr. YBHR (1973) pp. 93-117; W. Miller, 
United Nations Fact-finding Missions In The Field Of 
Human Rights, Australian YBIL (1970-73) pp. 40-50. 
769 See ch. 2 above. 
770 Cf. The EUCT, EUCM, IACM, IACT, CERD, CESCR, 
Committee Against Torture, Sub-Commission On The 
Prevention Of Discrimination And the Protection Of 
Minorities, are all composed if independent experts. THe 
HRCion, the most controversial and criticized 
international human rights body, is composed of 
governmental representatives. See Tolley, The UN Human 
Rights Commission, (1987). 
771 Cf. the new Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights which is solely based on an ECOSOC 
Resolution. See Alston, and Alston and Simma in ch. 1, 
n. 108 above. 
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facts as determined by them. 
772 Fourthly, the O. P. is 
not open to the criticism of being a "pre-judging" 
resolution which often establish international fact 
finding bodies. 773 Fifthly, the optional nature of the 
O. P. should protect the HRC from charges of political 
selectivity and "ad-hocery" and thus avoid the 
development of alleged "double standards" in the 
selection of cases to consider. 
774 Sixthly, although the 
HRC's consideration and examination of communications is 
conducted in private its final "views" are published. 
775 
Thus the damaging secrecy and excessive confidentiality 
of procedures like that under ECOSOC Resolution 1503 
(XLVIII) are avoided. 776 
Thus the HRC has many distinct advantages in terms 
of the treaty status of the O. P. and in terms of the 
nature of the HRC as a body, its mandate and the defined 
norms with which it is to operate. Other elements of 
the HRC's work examined above, for example, matters of 
access, admissibility and form of evidence, the burden 
and standard of proof, the approach. to the 
772 See the literature in n. 768 above. 
773 Ibid. 
774 This is one of the principal criticisms 
levelled at the United Nations and at the HRCion in 
particular, see Tolley, n. 770 above, ch. 9; Franck, Of 
Gnats And Camels: Is There A Double Standard At the 
United Nations? 78 AJIL (1984) pp. 811-833, which also 
appears in Franck's book, Nation Against Nation: What 
Happened To the UN Dream And What The U. S. Can Do About 
It, (1985). 
775 The admissibility decisions and views are 
initially notified in press releases which are issued 
simultaneously in Geneva and New York. They are 
available on request. The decisions and views are 
included as appendices in the HRC's Annual Reports. A 
volume of selected decisions has been published and 
another is under preparation. See pr. 4.124 below. 
776 See Tolley, n. 770 above, ch. 4; Bossuyt, n. 614 
above. 
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non-cooperation of some States parties, legal 
representation and legal aid, the nature and scope of 
the HRC's views, also have an important bearing on the 
credibility of the O. P. process. In general terms the 
HRC has proceeded cautiously on the basis of consensus. 
It has stressed the fundamental importance of 
individuals having access to it under the O. P. It 
appears to have taken a liberal approach to the 
admissibility of evidence. It has recognised the factual 
inequality in evidential terms between the author and 
the State and adopted an approach to the burden of proof 
which has taken account of this. It has refused to allow 
the non co-operation of a State party to defeat the 
object and purpose of the O. P. by effectively having an 
expression of views by default in such cases. Above all 
the HRC has consistently stated that it operates in 
accordance with the principle of "equality of arms". 
4.121 The HRC has effectively understood 'views' as 
meaning a decision (or determination) on the merits. 777 
Those views, both at admissibility and merits stages, 
have incorporated substantive interpretations of the 
provisions of the ICCPR and the O. P. As the following 
chapters will illustrate the clarity and legal precision 
of some of the HRC's views has been open to criticism 
but to some extent this may be due to the initial 
caution of the HRC under a new procedure and its 
practice of operating on a consensus basis. The 
necessity for consensus inevitably reduces clarity and 
precision even if provision exists for the appending of 
individual opinions. Perhaps the most surprising aspect 
of the HRC's final views has been the clear and specific 
obligations spelt out in them for the State party 
concerned. 
778 A State party is left in little or no 
777 See prs. 4.37-4.43 above. 
778 See pr. 4.40 above. 
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doubt as to the necessary remedial action which may 
include, for example, amending legislation. The 
experience of the HRC in its consideration of 
communications under the O. P. can and has assisted it in 
its formulation of general comments under article 40(4) 
ICCPR. Such assistance can be gained both from the 
interpretation of the ICCPR in specific, concrete 
situations and in the revealing the absence of 
procedural safeguards necessary to prevent human rights 
violations. 
4.122 As noted when the HRC discussed the issue a 
majority of the HRC indicated that they do not interpret 
the HRC's role as necessarily ending with its expression 
of views. 
779 The HRC accepted the possibility of 
reconsideration of communications in exceptional 
circumstances and have now taken such action in respect 
of decisions on admissibility. 
780 The HRC also stated 
that they have a continuing interest in any action taken 
by the State party in consequence of the HRC's 
expression of views. This decision is not only important 
in itself in the absence of any higher body to supervise 
implementation of the obligations on a State party, but 
also because of the approach to interpretation on which 
its is based. That approach to interpretation follows 
the precedent of other decisions of the HRC that were 
not expressly authorised by the ICCPR or the O. P., for 
example, that on interim measures. 
781 Such decisions 
have been taken on the basis that the HRC believed that, 
certain appropriate action reasonably open to it, or was 
7 
not expressly prohibited. 
82 Such an approach to 
779 See pr. 4.41 above. 
780 Ibid. 
781 See pr. 4.10 above. 
782 See Mose and Opsahl, pp. 276-280. 
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interpretation allows the HRC to develop practices and 
procedures designed to secure the object and purposes of 
the ICCPR and the O. P. 
4.123 It has been argued by Mose and Opsahl that it is 
open to the HRC to adopt an active, conciliatory or 
mediatory function to bring about some kind of friendly 
settlement between the State party and the alleged 
victim. 
783 They argue that the O. P. itself envisages 
some kind of settlement after admissibility because 
article 4(2) O. P. refers to the obligation of the State 
party to clarify, "the remedy, if any, that may have 
been taken by the State". Their view is that "remedy" 
cannot refer to existing domestic remedies because they 
must already have been exhausted under articles 2 and 
5(2) (b) O. P. "It rather suggests that a State party 
which has been faced with an admissible claim, and 
perhaps has conceded some justification for it, may 
already have taken action to resolve it by way of 
remedying the situation". 
784 They further argue that it 
"would be preferable and not contrary to the Protocol 
for the Committee to show some initiative at the stage 
of the merits... It should not be seen as incompatible 
with the Committee functions to suggest, formally or 
informally, that it is at the disposal of the pärties in 
order to reach a friendly settlement". 
785 
The authors' argument that "remedy" in article 4(2) 
O. P. cannot mean domestic remedies is questionable 
bearing in mind Rule 93(4) of the HRC's Rules which 
allow it to review a decision declaring a communication 
admissible in the light of further explanations or 
statements from the State party under article 4(2) 
783 Ibid., pp. 321-322. 
784 Ibid., p. 321. 
785 Ibid., pp. 321-322. 
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0. P. 786 Nonetheless, their general argument that the HRC 
could develop practices and procedures directed to the 
securing of friendly settlements is sound and sensible. 
Whether members of the HRC would be willing to take such 
steps will depend on their approach to the 
interpretation of the O. P. The present consensus 
practice would prevent such a development if there is 
opposition to it within the HRC. However, even those 
members who are opposed to any follow-up action by the 
HRC after its expression of views might accept that 
attempts to secure friendly settlements comes within 
their conception of the proper role of the HRC under the 
O. P. Unfortunately, it appears that no proposals on 
these lines have been made and no public discussion of 
this matter has taken place in HRC meetings. 
4.124 As there are no enforcement or supervisory 
mechanisms expressly envisaged by the O. P. - and none 
have been developed in practice 
- 
the pressure to 
observe the HRC's views must primarily come from their 
inherent authority as emanating from an independent 
body's objective assessment and from the accompanying 
publicity. Unfortunately, effective publicity for the 
HRC's work has been sadly lacking. 787 In part this no 
doubt stems from the fact that the work itself is 
carried out confidentially, in camera and without oral 
hearings. It must also be observed that, ironically, the 
absence of overt politicization in the HRC renders it 
less likely to attract national and international 
publicity. 
788 As a matter of practice it seems fair to 
note that the absence of United States participation 
786 See pr. 4.20 above. 
787 The Council of Europe has a highly developed 
publicity system for the work of the EUCM and the EUCT. 
788 By contrast the HRCion  gets a great deal of 
national and international publicity. 
ý- n. g 
-j dS 
deprives the HRC of the national and international 
publicity that inevitably seems to focus on any U. S. 
involvement at the international level. Even within 
legal circles relatively scant attention has been paid 
to the actual practice of the HRC under the O. P. 
although this is now increasing. 
4.125 The members of the HRC have consistently 
emphasised the need for greater publicity for all 
aspects of its work. 
789 The Bureau of the HRC have met 
with the Director of the Information Service at Geneva 
to discuss ways of ensuring better publicity for the HRC 
and for the O. P. Press conferences have been held for 
these purposes. An essential element of publicity at the 
international level is the availability of published 
material. Even within a confidential procedure the EUCM 
has shown that it is possible to publish a limited 
amount of information concerning communications. The 
greater the availability of published information the 
more likely the procedures concerned are to attract 
academic, professional, non-governmental, national and 
international attention. The situation as regards the 
O. P. is improving in this respect particularly with the 
publication of a volume of selected decisions in 
1985.790 A second volume is in preparation. 
791 Recent 
academic publications are increasingly referring to 
decisions under the O. P. 792 Similarly there is some 
evidence that some of the HRC's views have been 
789 See ch. 2, pr. 2.9 above. 
790 See n. 1 above. 
791 This will cover the HRC's work up to its 28th 
session. 
792 See e. g., B. G. Ramcharan, The Right To life In 
International Law (1985); N. Rodley, The Treatment of 
Prisoners In International Law (1987); H. Hannum, The 
Right to Leave And Return In International Law And 
Practice (1987). 
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influential in the States concerned and have attracted 
national publicity. 
793 
There can be no doubt, however, that unless steps 
are taken to afford much greater publicity to the work 
of the HRC under the O. P. within the United Nations 
system, in national and international media, in national 
and international governmental and non-governmental 
institutions, then no matter how objective and 
authoritative the HRC's views the dearth of publicity 
for them will render them ineffective except as regards 
the most co-operative and committed of States 
parties. 
794 It is a defect of the O. P. that there is no 
specific obligation on States parties to give publicity 
to it. Finally, as regards publicity, the best publicity 
for the O. P. would of course would be its ratification 
by an increasing number of States parties to the ICCPR. 
Recommendations of the Human Rights Commission and the 
General Assembly along these lines must be accompanied 
by concerted pressure from national and international 
human rights bodies. 
795 
4.126 In general terms this chapter has asserted that 
whatever the features of an international petition 
system its fate will ultimately be determined firstly, 
by the approach and attitude of the implementation body 
and secondly, by the co-operation of the States parties 
concerned. With respect to the first determinant, though 
the work under the O. P. is still at a relatively early 
793 See A. Bayefsky, The Human Rights Committee And 
The Case Of Sandra Lovelace, 20 Can. YIL (1982) 
pp. 244-266. Views of the HRC also appear to have 
attracted national publicity in Uruguay and Colombia. 
794 A number of States have' not co-operated with 
the HRC under the O. P. 
795 See e. g., HRCion Resn. 1986/17, HRCion, Report 
of the 42nd session, ECOSOC OR, 1986, Supp. 2, p. 59; 
G. A. Resns. 41/32 (3 Nov. 1986), 41/119,41/120 and 41/121 (4 Dec. 1986). 
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stage, it is submitted that on the basis of the 
foregoing examination the HRC can be commended for 
having adopted a positive approach and have fashioned a 
practicable and functional procedure. Though there are 
undoubted limitations in adopting a consensus approach 
the degree of consensus apparent in the HRC is 
remarkable in a universal body. 
796 With time, patience, 
the continued cautious development of practices and 
procedures, continued consensus, and increased 
publicity, there can be at least some hope that the O. P. 
can develop into an effective counterpart on the 
universal level to the established regional systems. 
(iii) THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE O. P. FOR INDIVIDUALS. 
4.127 The ultimate concern of an alleged victim is of 
course with the observance of the HRC's views in an 
individual case rather than with the procedural merits 
of the O. P. system. It must be frankly admitted that 
compliance with the HRC's views by States parties has 
been disappointing. However, to make an informed 
appraisal it is important to put the situation into 
proper perspective. 
4.128 As regards interim measures there have been some 
occasions on which States parties have complied with the 
HRC's views. This has had direct results for the 
individual concerned in terms of them being accorded 
medical treatment or not being tortured or executed. 
797 
The interim measures indicated by the HRC are 
non-binding as a matter of law and depend totally on the 
co-operation and good faith of the State party 
concerned. Publicity might well add to their 
796 On concensus see ch. 2, pr. 2.7 above. A more 
cynical view might note that the co-operation of experts 
from Eastern Europe is risk free in terms of Eastern 
European states who are not parties to the O. P. 
797 See pr. 4.10 above. 
CH. 4 388 
effectiveness although HRC might think it could achieve 
more on a confidential basis. As a matter of contrast it 
is interesting to note that the record of compliance by 
Contracting parties under the ECHR is notably good798 
while the record of the ICJ has been rather poor. 799 
4.129 The State party concerned in the vast majority of 
the HRC's final views has been Uruguay. The degree of 
co-operation afforded by-the Uruguayan government has 
varied from minimal to non-existent, 
800 
although there 
was full cooperation by the new democratic government in 
Uruguay in the HRC's most recent decision. 801 Moreover, 
there is no evidence that any of the HRC's final views 
were observed prior to the installation of the new 
democratic Government in March 1985. Representatives of 
the new Government appeared before the HRC and promised 
co-operation both with respect to the reporting process 
and the O. P. procedure. The, new Government released many 
political prisoners including persons found by the HRC 
to be victims of human rights violations. The situation 
in Uruguay prior to March 1985 was characterized by a 
total breakdown of law and order. On that basis it can 
be argued that it gives a false and distorted impression 
of the effectiveness of the final views of the HRC. 
802 
It would be a gesture of faith in the HRC, and probably 
798 See Van Di k and Van Hoof, j pp. 57-58,130. See 
N. Price, Human Rights, 'Death Row', And Administrative 
Remedies, 34 ICLQ (1985) pp. 162-167. 
799 See Schwarzenberger, International Law 
- 
International Courts, vol. IV, pp. 527-554. See also 
G. Naldi, Case Concerning The Frontier Dispute Between 
Burkina Faso And Mali: Provisional Measures Of 
Protection, 35 ICLQ (1986) pp. 970-975. 
800 See prs. 4.27-4.36 for the approach of the HRC. 
801 Stella Costa v. Uruguay, Doc. A/42/40 p. 170. 
802 Similar comments might apply with respect to 
the situation in Colombia. 
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a matter of obligation under the O. P., for the new 
Uruguayan government to comply with the HRC's final 
views, or at least those expressed after March 1985 but 
concerning events before that time. 
803 There has to date 
been no evidence from Uruguay that it has taken such 
steps. 
4.130 If the disappointing compliance record of Uruguay 
can perhaps partly be explained by the abnormal 
situation there the same cannot be said of other States 
that have either not co-operated with the. HRC or have 
not complied with the HRC's final views. These States 
include Madagascar, Zaire, Suriname. 
4.131 There is, however, some evidence that States 
parties are willing to co-operate with the HRC in its 
examination of communications and to observe its final 
views. States which have co-operated in the examination 
of communications include Canada, France, Italy, Norway, 
Mauritius, Finland, Jamaica, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Sweden. 
4.132 Three views in particular are important in showing 
that the HRC's final views can be influential and given 
effect to. Firstly, in Lovelace v. Canada, 
804 
the HRC 
expressed the view that Canada had violated article 27 
ICCPR in denying Lovelace the right to reside on an 
Indian reservation. Subsequently Canada informed the HRC 
that it had taken substantial steps towards amending the 
relevant legislation' 
805 Although a Canadian commentator 
had expressed doubts as to whether the steps taken by 
the Canadian government were sufficient there is at 
803 Cf. the recent decision of the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal in Short v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran (1987), noted in 82 AJIL (1988) pp. 140-143. 
804 Doc. A/36/40 p. 166. 
805 Doc. A/38/40, Apx. XXXi. 
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least a strong element of respect and co-operation with 
the HRC. 806 Secondly, the Mauritian Women case provides 
the clearest example of a State party taking measures in 
consequence of the HRC's final views. 
807 The response of 
Mauritius was to amend the two pieces of legislation 
concerned so as to remove the discriminatory effect of 
80 
those laws on the grounds of sex. 
8 Thirdly, it is 
important to note the response of the Government of 
Finland in Hartikainen v. Finland809 Although the HRC 
did not find a violation of article 18(4)810 of the 
Covenant in the application of the relevant Finnish 
legislation it did note that certain difficulties had 
arisen in giving effect to those provisions but hat it 
believed that appropriate action was being taken to 
resolve the difficulties. 
811 The Finnish government 
subsequently informed the HRC of an amendment to the 
relevant Statute and further measures taken to solve the 
problems noted by the HRC. 
812 Such a response is to be 
highly commended. 
806 See Bayefsky, n. 793 above. 
807 See pr. 4.75 above and ch. 6 below. 
808 Doc. A/38/40 Apx. XXXII. Cf. the response of the 
U. R. to the judgement of the EUCT in Abdulaziz, Cabales 
and Balkandales Case (1985) which was to remove the 
advantages enjoyed by foreign wives and fiancees, see 
Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules, Parliamentary 
Papers, 1985, HC, Paper 503. 
809 Doc. A/36/40 p. 147. 
810 Article 18 (4) provides, "The States parties to 
the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the 
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians 
to ensure the religious and moral education of their 
children in conformity with their own convictions". 
811 Doc. A/36/40 p. 147 pr. 10.5. 
812 Doc. A/38/40 Apx. XXXIII. 
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4.133 The most authoritative review of the O. P. to date 
concluded that, 
"In principle it is revolutionary. In practice so 
far, it has had only limited, nearly negligible 
effects. The Covenant is a great document. Yet the 
committee is a very modest entity for its 
implementation, and the Protocol does not give it 
much additional power. Despite all polite official 
comments about its importance, which reflect the 
overwhelmingly persuasive strength of the ideas of 
the Covenant rather than the realities which the 
Committee is facing, the Committee lacks support, 
publicity, and resources. Public opinion is hardly 
aware of it. The Protocol will only become 
effective if the Committee does. Both depend on 
being used, and being given means to work with, 
including assistance by a permanent Secretariat. 
.. 
The fact that only few countries have accepted 
it, usually the ones with a record which gives them 
relatively little fear from individual complaints, 
is sometimes mentioned as a reason to be cautious. 
The countries with the most real problems are, 
however, likely to remain outside the reach of the 
Protocol in the all-foreseeable future. The 
Committee should not look to them, or what is 
acceptable to them, when establishing its own 
patterns and standards... The procedures under the 
Protocol can no doubt be developed and improved. 
But the measure of its success should be the degree 
to which the Committee is able to convince and 
influence States, rather than condemn and expose 
them". 813 
To an extent it is important that optional Protocol is 
being kept alive as in the final analysis, though it is 
813 Mose and Opsahl, pp. 329-331. 
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of little comfort to victims of human rights violations, 
progress in the international protection of human rights 
is likely to be identified over decades rather then 
years. 
814 The broader significance of the Protocol in 
terms of the status of the individual in international 
law should also not be overlooked. As Prounis has 
commented, 
"The Human Rights Committee has not yet ushered in 
a new era in the observance of human rights. It 
neither provides an efficient forum for the 
vindication of individuals' human rights, nor 
addresses the remedial paradox of human rights 
violations. It does, however, stand as a historic 
first step towards providing a greater role for the 
individual in promoting protection of his or her 
rights. With a little initiative by the committee 
members, the system created under the Optional 
815 Protocol could develop further". 
814 An assessment of the first decade of experience 
under the ECHR would not have suggested its present 
success. 
815 Prounis, n. 1 above, p. 118. 
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5.1 ARTICLE 1.1 
393 
1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By 
virtue of that right they freely determine their 
1 Cf. Arts. l, 55 U. N. Charter; ICESCR Art. 1; AFR 
Arts. 19 and 20. For summaries of the drafting history of 
article 1 see ch. 1, n. 134 above; Bossuyt, 'Guide', 
pp. 19-48. There is an extensive literature on the right 
to self determination. Particularly useful are 
Y. Alexander and R. A. Friedlander, (eds. ), 
Self-Determination: National, Regional and Global 
Dimensions, (1980); A. K. Ahmed, Analysis Of The Decisions 
Of The Committee On Human Rights, pp. 10-13, (LLM. thesis, 
London); K. N. Blay, Self-Determination Versus Territorial 
Integrity In Decolonization Revisited, 25 Ind. JIL 
(1985), pp. 386-410; L. C. Buchheit, Secession: The 
Legitimacy of Self-Determination, (1978); A. Cassese, The 
Self- Determination of Peoples, in Henkin, (ed. ), The 
International Bill Of Rights 
- 
The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pp. 92-113, 
(1981); L. Chen, Self- Determination' As A Human Right, in 
M. Reisman and B. Weston (Eds. ), Towards World Order And 
Human Dignity, pp. 198-261, (1976); J. Crawford, The 
Creation Of States In International Law, pp. 84-118, 
219-27,257-68,335-83, (1979); A. Cristescu, The Right 
to Self-Determination: Historical and Current 
Development on the basis of United Nations Instruments, 
U. N. Doc. No. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/404/Rev. 1, (1981), U. N. Sales 
No. E. 80. XIV. 3; J. Fawcett, The Role Of The United Nations 
In The Protection Of Human Rights 
- 
Is It Misconceived?, 
in A. Eide and A. Schou (eds. ), International Protection 
Of Human Rights, pp. 95-101 and 282-288, (1968); T. M. 
Franck and P. Hoffman, The Right Of Self-Determination In 
Very Small Places, 8 N. Y. U. J. I. L. P. (1975-76) pp. 331- 
386; H. Gros Espiell, The Right To Self-Determination: 
Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, (1980), 
U. N. Sales No. E. 79. XIV. 5; A. Kiss, The Peoples' Right To 
Self-Determination, 7 HRLJ (1986) pp. 165-175; S. Morphet, 
The Development of Article 1 of the Human Rights 
Covenants, Paper presented to Conference on Foreign 
Policy And Human Rights, (Southampton Univ., March, 
1987); K. J. Partsch, Fundamental Principles of Human 
Rights, Self-Determination, Equality and 
Non-Discrimination, in K. Vasak, - (ed. ), P. Alston, 
(rev. ed. ), The International Dimensions Of Human Rights, 
Vol. I, pp. 61-68, (1982); M. Pomerance, Self-Determination 
In Law and Practice, (1982); M. N. Shaw, Title To 
Territory In Africa: International Legal Issues, (1986); 
M. Rafiqul Islam, Use Of Force In Self-Determination 
Claims, 25 Ind. JIL (1985-86), pp. 424-447; A. Rigo Sureda, 
The Evolution of the Right of Self- Determination: A (Footnote Continued) 
V/Z 
political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose 
of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice 
to any obligations arising out of international economic 
co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, 
and international law. In no case may a people be 
deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including 
those having responsibility for the administration of 
Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote 
the realization of the right of self-determination, and 
shall respect that right, in conformity with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Introduction. 
5.2 The concept of self-determination has been one of 
the dominant political forces of the twentieth century. 
(Footnote Continued) 
Study of United Nations Practice (1973)'; E. Suzuki, 
Self-Determination And World Public Order, 16 Va. JIL 
(1976), pp. 781-862; U. O. Umozurike, Self-Determination in 
International Law, (1972); United Nations Action In The 
Field Of Human Rights, Ch. III, (1984); V. Van Dyke, Human 
Rights, The U. S., And The World Community, ch. 5, (1970); 
R. C. A. White, Self-Determination: A Time For 
Re-Assessment, 28 NILR (1981), pp. 147-170; M. Whiteman, 
Digest Of International Law, vol. 5, pp. 38-87, vol. 13, 
pp. 701-768. 
The principal international instruments on 
political and economic self-determination are The 
Declaration On The Granting Of Independence To Colonial 
Territories And Peoples, G. A. Resn. 1514 (XV), 15 UN GAOR 
Supp. 66, p. 66, Doc. A/4684, (1960); G. A. Resn. 1541,15 UN 
GAOR, Supp. 16, p. 29, Doc. A/4684, (1960); The Resolution 
On Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 
G. A. Resn. 1803 (XVII), 17 UN GAOR Supp. 17, P. 15, 
Doc. A/5217, (1962); The Declaration On Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-Operation Amongst States In Accordance With The 
Charter Of The United Nations, G. A. Resn. 2625 
(XXV), (1970); The Charter Of Economic Rights And Duties 
Of States, G. A. Resn. 3281,29 UN GAOR Supp. No. 31, p. 50, 
Doc. A/9631, (1974). 
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It did not expressly appear in the Covenant of the 
League of Nations (1919) but by 1945 the pressure for 
the inclusion of the "principle" of self-determination 
in the United Nations Charter proved irresistible. As we 
noted in chapter one the inclusion of a "right" of 
self-determination in the international covenants was 
the subject of prolonged controversy. 2 
Article 1 is not covered by the non-derogation 
provision in Article 4(2). 3 It has been the subject of a 
General Comment under Article 40.4 A small number of 
States have made reservations to Article 1.5 Article-'1 
has generally been considered separately but on 
2 See ch. 1 pr. 1.22-1.23 above. 
3 Nicaragua is the only State to have derogated 
from article 1. See Human Rights 
- 
Status Of 
International Instruments, p. 64, (1987). A number of HRC 
members commented on the derogation, see SR 422 pr. 17 
(Al Douri), pr. 38 (Dimitrijevic). The State 
representative explained that the decree relating to the 
state of emergency, instead of listing the.. rights and 
guarantees that had been suspended because of the state 
of emergency, had included all the provisions of the 
Covenant except those relating to guarantees which were 
not subject to suspension. He acknowledged that the 
procedure was mistaken and was due to his Governments 
inexperience in such matters, SR 429 pr. 33. Revised 
Declarations did not include derogation from article 1, 
Human Rights 
- 
Status, above, pp. 65-68. Notwithstanding 
that Article 1 is derogable under the terms of the 
Covenant it would be impermissible to derogate from the 
right of self-determination if self-determination is jus 
cogens. See H. Gros Espiell, Self-Determination and Jus 
Cogens, in A. Cassese, (ed. ), n. 1 above; Pomerance, n. 1 
above, Ch. IX. 
4 G. C. 12(21), U. N. Doc. A/39/40, Ax. VI. Also in Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Add. 3. For the HRC's discussions see SR 476, 
478,503,504,513,514,516,537. The English version 
of the G. C. was adopted at the HRC's 516th meeting. The 
other language versions were adopted at the 537th 
meeting. 
5 See Human Rights 
- 
Status, n. 3 above. States 
making reservations or interpretative declarations have 
included the U. K. and India. 
occasions it has been linked with Article 25 which deals 
with certain political rights of citizens and Article 19 
concerning freedom of opinion and expression. 
6 
5.3 The HRC have stressed the importance of Article 1 in 
a General Comment, 
"In accordance with the principles and purposes of 
the Charter of the United Nations, article 1 of the 
International. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
recognises that all peoples have the right to 
self-determination. The right of self-determination is 
of particular importance because its realization is an 
essential condition for the effective guarantee and 
observance of individual human rights and for the 
promotion and strengthening of those rights. It is for 
that reason that States set forth the right of 
self-determination in a provision of positive law in 
both Covenants and placed this provision as article 1 
apart from and before all of the other rights in the two 
Covenants". 7 
6 See e. g., SR 128 pr. 19 (Tomuschat on Chile). For 
the text of Article 25 see Ax. I. 
7 G. C. 12(21), pr. l. (my emphasis). Mr. Ndiaye was 
concerned at the attribution of the importance of 
article 1 to its place in the Covenant. For comments by 
individual members on the importance of Article 1 see, 
e. g., SR 294 pr. 4 (Bouziri on Portugal). During the 
preparation of the G. C. there were discussions on 
whether to include a reference to the U. N. Charter, 
whether self-determination was a principle or a purpose 
of the Charter, and whether it was an individual or a 
collective right. Note the U. K. declaration in respect 
of article 1, "[T]he Government of the United Kingdom 
declare their understanding that, by virtue of article 
103 of the Charter of the United Nations, in the event 
of any conflict between their obligations under article 
1 of the Covenant and their obligations under the 
Charter (in particular, under articles 1,2 and 73 
thereof) their obligations under the charter shall 
prevail", Human Rights - Status, n. 3 above, p. 46. In 
response to questioning from HRC members, SR 594 
prs. 34-46, the U. K. representative commented that, "[H]e (Footnote Continued) 
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The importance attached here by the HRC contrasts 
markedly with the minimal information provided by States 
parties in their national reports. 
8 As the HRC 
commented, 
"Although the reporting obligations of all States 
parties include Article 1, only some reports give 
detailed explanations regarding each of its 
paragraphs. The Committee has noted that many of 
them completely ignore Article- 1, provide 
inadequate information in regard to it or confine 
themselves to a reference to election laws.. The 
Committee considers it highly desirable that States 
parties' reports should contain information on each 
paragraph of Article 1". 
9 
5.4 The HRC's approach to each paragraph of Article 1 is 
outlined below. A few general issues concerning 
self-determination raised by the HRC members must 
briefly be noted first. Members have questioned State 
representatives on the relationship between 
self-determination and the proposed New International 
Economic Order10 and the Right to Development. 
11 Similar 
(Footnote Continued) 
would, however, note unofficially that the reservation 
seemed to do no more than what was already provided in 
the Charter, namely, that in any conflict between 
obligations under the Charter and any other 
international obligations, those under the Charter would 
in any event take priority", SR 594 pr. 50. 
8 Many of the early national reports included no 
information on article 1. 
9 G. C. 12(21), pr. 3. For critical comments by 
individual members see, e. g., SR 294 pr. 4 (Bouziri on 
Portugal). 
10 See, e. g., SR 214 pr. 54 (Graefrath on Senegal), 
reply at SR 217 pr. 46; SR 476 pr. 17 (Hanga on Iran). On 
the New International Economic order see K. Hossain, 
(ed. ), Legal Aspects Of The New International Economic 
Order (1980); A. Cassese, International Law In A Divided 
World, ch. 13 (1986). 
(Footnote Continued) 
%.. n. j 398 
questions have related to the relationship between 
self-determination and certain general principles of 
international law, for example, non-intervention, 
non-interference, and the prohibition on the use of 
force. 12 For instance, the Iranian representative was 
asked how the advocacy of the export of revolution could 
be reconciled with article 1 and the principle of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of States. 
13 
5.5 In its General Comment the HRC referred to, "Other 
international instruments concerning the right-"of all 
(Footygte Continued) 
See, e. g., SR 440 pr. 9 (Prado-Vallejo on 
France). See the Declaration On The Right To 
Development, G. A. Resn. 41/128 (4 Dec, 1986) noted in 38 
Rev. ICJ (1987) pp. 53-56; Report of the Secretary-General 
on The Realization In All Countries Of Economic And 
Social Rights And On A Human Right To Development In 
Relation To Peace And The Requirements Of A New 
International Economic Order, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1334 
(1979); S. K. Baruah, (Rapporteur), The Right To 
Development And Its Implications For Development 
Strategy, Human Rights And Development Working Papers 
NQ. 3, (1979); C. G. Weermantry, The Right To Development, 
25 Ind. JIL (1985-6), pp. 482-505; G. Abi-Saab, Analytical 
Study On Progressive Development Of The Principles And 
Norms Of International Law Relating To The New 
International Economic Order, Doc. A/39/504, Add. 1 (23 
Oct. 1984); F. Snyder & P. Slinn, International Law Of 
Development: Comparative Perspectives (1987). "In the 
post-colonial era the rights to self-determination 
manifests itself as the right to development", 
Graefrath, ch. 6, n. 1 below, p. 13. 
12 See, e. g., SR 98 pr. 23 (Mora-Rojas on 
Yugoslavia), reply at SR 102 pr. 28; SR 214 pr. 11 
(Vincent-Evans on Senegal); SR 282 pr. 9 (Sadi on 
Tanzania); SR 468 pr. 25 (Prado-Vallejo on El Salvador), 
reply at Ibid., pr. 36; SR 421 pr. 1 (Hanga on Nicaragua). 
See Military And Paramilitary Activities In And Against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U. S. ), Merits, 1986 I. C. J. Rep. 
p. 14. 
13 See SR 365 pr. 46 (Al Douri on Iran). There was 
no direct response from the State representatives, SR 
368. See also in the context of self-determination and 
revolution SR 472 pr-2 (Movchan on El Salvador) ; SR (Tarnopolsky on Suriname); SR 366 prs. 24-27 (Graefrath 
on Iran). 
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peoples to self-determination in particular the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Amongst 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations". 14 This in an interesting reference because it 
has been argued that the concept of self-determination 
in the 1970 Declaration is much narrower than that in 
the Covenant. 15 However, the mere reference by the HRC 
in its General Comment to the 1970 Declaration could not 
sensibly be taken to suggest either that the two 
instruments are of the same scope or that the scope of 
the ICCPR has been narrowed by the 1970 Declaration. A 
narrower view that the right of self-determination does 
not apply to a sovereign independent State or to a 
section of the people or nation but only to a people 
under foreign or alien domination has been argued for by 
India and Sri Lanka who have made reservations or 
interpreted article 1 to this effect. 16 These views were 
criticised by some HRC members as being too 
restrictive17 and formal objections were made by France, 
14 G. C. 12(21), pr. 7. See G. Arangio-Ruiz, The United 
Nations Declaration On Friendly Relations And The System 
Of The Sources Of International Law, pp. 131-141, (1979). 
15 See Cassese in Henkin (ed. ), n. 1 above, who 
suggests that the 1970 Declaration indicates to the HRC 
how article 1(3) should be interpreted, p. 110, and 
Cassese, Political Self-Determination 
- 
Old Concepts and 
New Developments, in A. Cassese, (ed. ), U. N. Law/ 
Fundamental Rights, pp. 137-165, (1979). 
16 Human Rights 
-Status, n. 3 above, p. 9 (India); 
Doc. CCPR/C/14/Add. 6, pr. 2. 
17 See SR 472 prs. 32 (Bouziri) and 38 (as 
corrected) (Graefrath), SR 477 pr. 67 (Bouziri on Sri 
Lanka); reply at SR 477 prs. 51,71; Doc. A/39/40, pr. 269 (India). Cf. the comments of the Indian representative 
in 1952 to the effect that the field of application of 
the the draft self-determination article was wider than 
the colonial situation, Doc. E/CN. 4/SR 399 pr. 4. Note (Footnote Continued) 
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F. R. G. and the Netherlands. 
'8 When faced with such 
interpretations or reservations it would be particularly 
helpful in determining the scope of the ICCPR if the HRC 
was to express a Committee view on its validity rather 
than individual members simply expressing isolated views 
that other members may or may not agree with. 
19 
Finally, we must note that the HRC has stated that 
it, 
"Considers that history has proved that the 
realization of and respect for the right of 
self-determination of peoples contributes to the 
establishment of friendly relations and 
co-operation between States and to strengthening 
international peace and security 
20 
Article l, paragraph 1. 
5.6 The questions most consistently put to State 
representatives have concerned how the right of peoples 
to self-determination was understood, promoted and given 
effect. 
21 Was self-determination seen as a continuing 
right or did a people achieve self-determination once 
(Footnote Continued) 
also the view expressed by Professor Graefrath in an 
article that self- determination keeps the way open for 
the next step of the emancipation of mankind, i. e., the 
prohibition of exploitation by capital, ch. 6, n. 1 below, 
p. 12. 
18 See Doc. CCPR/C/2/Add. 1, pp. 37-39. 
19 For an example of the view of an individual 
member note the following comment by Sir Vincent-Evans 
during consideration of the report of Sri Lanka, 
"Article 1 of the Covenant clearly stated that all 
peoples had the right of self-determination. He took the 
view that reference to "peoples" meant the whole of the 
people within the independent sovereign people, 
including minority sections of the population. The right 
of self-determination was a right of a continuing 
character... ", SR 477 pr. 68. 
20 G. C. 12(21), pr. 8. 
21 See, e. g., SR 392 pr. 15 (Bouziri on Iceland); SR 
222 pr. 4 (Sadi on Colombia). 
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and for all upon attaining independence or with the 
uniting of the constituent political entities of the 
State? 22 Was it possible to argue for changes in the 
present constitutional structures and political 
processes of the State? For example, the representatives 
of the German Democratic Republic and the Democratic 
Republic of Korea were questioned as to the possible 
reunification of Germany23 and Korea respectively. 
24 
Another matter frequently raised has been the 
possibility of advocating and achieving secession. 
25 For 
example, the representatives of the USSR,, the 
Byleorussian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR were all asked 
similar questions concerning the right to secession 
guaranteed in their respective constitutions. 
26 In reply 
the representative of the U. S. S. R, for example, stated 
that, 
"In the first place, it should be realized that it 
was absolutely inconceivable that a Republic would 
want to secede, since there was a solid and 
22 See SR 532 pr. 23 (Ermacora on G. D. R. ). Cassese, 
n. 1 above, argues that internal self-determination is a 
continuing right that cannot be considered as 
implemented once and for all, p. 98. 
23 92 pr. 50 (Graefrath on FRG); SR 532 pr. 23 
(Ermacora on GDR). 
24 Sie SR 509,510 and 516; Doc. A/39/40 pr. 370; 
reply at pr. 388. See K. L. Kow, The Korean Unification 
Question And The United Nations, in T. Buergenthal, 
(ed. ), Contemporary Issues In International Law, 
pp. 541-558. 
25 See e. g., SR 99 pr. 20 (Tarnopolsky on 
Yugoslavia); SR 136 pr. 57 (Tomuschat on Rumania). On 
secession see Buchheit, n. 1 above, ch. 2. 
26 See SR 109 pr. 51 (Tomuschat on USSR); reply at 
SR 112 pr. 7-8; SR 117 pr. 27 (Lallah on Byleorussian 
SSR); reply at SR 119 PR. 64; SR 154 pr. 37 (Tarnopoisky) 
and SR 155 pr. 29 (Opsahl on Ukrainian SSR); reply at SR 
159 pr. ll. See generally Buchheit, n. 1 above, pp. 121-127 
on 'Soviet policy and practice'. The U. S. S. R. faces 
increased demands for autonomy from is nationalities. On 
12 July 1988 the Parliament of Nagorny Karabakh voted 
for secession of the region from Azerbaijan and its 
transfer to Armenia. 
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unshakeable bond uniting all the peoples and 
nations of the state, which attributed their 
well-being to the fact that they formed part of 
the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the right to secede 
did exist and could be exercised". 
27 
5.7 A number of questions put by the HRC have concerned 
the beneficiaries of Article 1. Who was entitled to the 
right of self-determination? What criteria were applied 
in making that decision? 
28 During consideration of the 
report of Canada29 one member asked whether the word 
"peoples" in Article 35 of the Canada Charter of Rights 
And Freedoms 198230 (concerning the 'aboriginal 
peoples') cast a light on the application of Article 1 
of the Covenant. 
31 The representative of the USSR was 
asked, 
"Whether, under the Soviet system, there was any 
difference between nations and nationalities as 
such and the concept of the Soviet people. Who had 
the right to self-determination: nations and 
nationalities, or only the Soviet peoples within the 
meaning of the Constitution? "32 
Similarly members have asked whether the people had 
been consulted concerning the present constitutional 
structure or any changes in that structure and whether a 
people had the right to choose another political 
27 SR 112 pr. 8. 
28 See e. g., SR 206 pr. 26 (Graefrath on Canada); SR 
472 pr. 20 (Dimitrijevic on El Salvador); SR 109 pr. 51 
(Tomuschat on USSR). 
29 U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/1/Add. 43. 
30 The Constitution Act 1980, Part B, 
31 SR 559 pr. 46 (Ermacora); reply at SR 562 pr. 8. 
32 SR 565 pr. 10 (Ermacora). 
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system. 
33 Related questions have concerned the relevance 
of self-determination to minorities in States parties. 
34 
What was the status of those minorities? 
35 How did the 
State party view the relationship between Article 1 and 
Article 27 concerning the rights of minorities? 36 Was 
33 See Doc. A/39/40 pr. 323 (on the Gambia). 
34 Minorities dealt with have included the Tamils 
in Sri Lanka, Aborigines in Australia, Amerindians in 
Colombia, Macedonians in Bulgaria. A number of States 
parties have argued that they do not have any minorities 
at all. France made a reservation that, [I]n the light 
of Article 2 of the Constitution of the French Republic, 
the French Government declares that article 27 is not 
applicable so far as the Republic is concerned", Human 
Rights 
- 
Status, n. 3 above, p. 35. The F. R. G. declared 
that it interpreted this, "[d]eclaration as meaning that 
the Constitution of the French Republic already fully 
guarantees the individual rights protected by article 
27", ibid., p. 88. In response to questioning from HRC 
members the French representative commented, inter alia, 
that, "[T]he concept of a "minority" had come from 
Central Europe, where the interplay of different 
languages, ethnic groups and cultures had caused it to 
be developed in certain well-defined geographical and 
historical circumstances. In France, however, the 
concept had always seemed dangerous, since the 
establishment of a minority could lead to its isolation, 
to the establishment of ghettos, and to persecution... If 
the issue were analysed in depth, the provisions of 
article 27 of the covenant would be seen to run counter 
to the provisions of article 26, since the concept of a 
"minority" was closely connected with the concept of 
discrimination. France was opposed to all forms of 
discrimination and therefore could not accept the 
concept of a legal "minority", since it intended to 
grant to everybody the same degree of freedom in 
conditions of equality and fraternity... Liberty and 
equality did not imply uniformity, and it was by virtue 
of the concepts of liberty and equality, and not of the 
concept of legally organized minorities, that the rights 
of citizens to live in their different ways were 
recognized", SR 455 prs. 80-82. It is a defect in the 
HRC's procedures that the HRC does not respond as a 
whole to such fundamental arguments concerning the 
interpretation and implementation of the Covenant. 
36 See, e. g., SR 109 pr. 12 (Opsahl on USSR); SR 206 
pr. 3 (Hanga on Canada). 
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the aim to assimilate indigenous populations or to 
assist them in preserving their identity? 
37 We have 
already noted that the travaux preparatoires would 
suggest that minorities, as such, do not have a right of 
self-determination. 
38 The language of article 1 though 
is not clear and literally would not preclude a right of 
self-determination for a minority if that minority 
constituted a "people". A central issue then is what 
constitutes a "people" and on that, issue the HRC have 
not even attempted to provide a definition. or any 
governing criteria. Although it must be recognised that 
the drafters deliberately did not define a "people, 
39 
the HRC is open to criticism for its failure to address 
this central. The HRC is in a unique position to provide 
some guidance to States on this issue. While the central 
issues of self-determination remain undefined and 
without guiding criteria the dangers of explosive 
self-determination claims arising will continue. 
5.8 In a General Comment the HRC stated that, 
"Article 1 enshrines an inalienable right of all 
peoples as described in its paragraphs 1 and 2. By 
virtue of that right they 'freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development'. The 
37 See, e. g., SR 206 pr. 26 (Graefrath on Canada). 
On Indigenous Peoples see R. L. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: 
An Emerging Object Of International-Law, 80 AJIL (1986) 
pp. 369-385. The Sub-Commission On The Prevention Of 
Discrimination And. The Protection Of Minorities is 
drafting A Declaration on the Rights Of Indigenous 
Populations, see 39 Rev. ICJ (1987) p. 28. 
38 See ch. 1, pr. 1.22 above. 
39 See Doc. A/2929, ch. iv, prs. 9,15 (1954); 
Doc. A/3077, pr. 31 (1955). Many of the works in n. 1 above 
attempt to define self-determination or aspects of it. 
During the drafting of the G. C. on article 1 the 
Chairman commented that, "The difficulties in the field 
could not be avoided indefinitely", SR 476 pr. 34. 
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article imposes on all States parties corresponding 
obligations. This right and the corresponding 
obligations concerning its implementation are 
interrelated with other provisions of the Covenant 
and rules of international law". 
40 
The General Comment does not specify the 
"corresponding obligations" or identify the "other 
provisions of the Covenant"or the "rules of 
international law' referred to. 
41 The HRC's General 
Comment also stated that States parties, "ft]hould 
describe the constitutional and political processes 
which in practice allow the exercise of this right". 
42 
Article 1, paragraph 2. 
5.9 Article 1 (2) has been the subject of relatively 
minimal consideration by the HRC. Occasionally questions 
have been raised concerning the distribution of 
property, 
43 limitations on the right to use property, 
44 
and Government measures affecting property and natural 
resources, for example, agrarian reform, 
45 
40 G. C. 12(21), pr. 2. 
41 See the international instruments cited in n. 1 
above. 
42 G. C. 12(21), pr. 4. Cassese, n. 1 above, comments 
that, "[S]elf-determination presupposes freedom of opinion 
and expression (article 19), the right of peaceful 
assembly (article 21), the freedom of association (article 
22), the right to vote (article 25(b)), and more generally 
the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives (article 
25(a)). Whenever these rights are recognized for 
individuals, the people as a whole enjoy the right of 
internal (political) self-determination; whenever those 
rights are trampled upon, the right of the people to self- 
determination is infringed", p. 97. 
43 See, e. g., SR 129 pr. 14 (Bouziri on Chile). 
44 We have already noted that there is no right to 
property in the ICCPR, ch. l, n. 200 above. 
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nationalization and expropriation measures. 
46 Members 
have also requested information on the State's view of 
the new international economic order, the extent and 
influence of multinational companies in the economy 
generally and more specifically concerning the 
exploitation of natural resources. 
47 
5.10 During consideration of the report of France48 one 
member suggested that Article 1(2) implied the right to 
protect a State's natural resources from pollution. In 
that respect he asked the French representative how 
France reconciled the right of the peoples of its 
Territories in the South Pacific to protect themselves 
from atmospheric pollution with the carrying out of 
atomic weapons tests in the Muraroa Atoll. 
49 The French 
representative did not reply. 
5.11 Commenting on Article 1(2) the HRC has stated that, 
"Paragraph 2 affirms a particular aspect of the 
economic content of the right of self- 
determination; namely the right of peoples, for 
their own ends, freely to "dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources without prejudice to any 
obligations arising out of international economic 
co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual 
benefit, and international law. In no case may a 
people be deprived of its own means of 
46 See, e. g., SR 386 pr. 28 (Graefrath) and SR 387 
pr. 41 (Hanga on Colombia). 
47 See, e. g., SR 199 pr. 10 (Hanga on Iraq); SR 422 
pr. 4 (Hanga on Nicaragua). See n. 10 above. 
48 U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/22/Add. 2. 
49 SR 440 pr. 10 (Prado-Vallejo). The International 
Court Of Justice declined to consider the legality of 
French nuclear testing in the Nuclear Tests Cases 
(Australia v. France), I. C. J. Reps. 1974, p. 253; (New 
Zealand v. France) I. C. J. Reps., p. 457. See N. Grief, 
Nuclear Tests And International Law, in I. Pogany, 
Nuclear Weapons And International Law, pp. 217-244, 
(1987). 
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subsistence". This right 
-entails corresponding 
obligations for all States and the international 
community. States should indicate any factors or 
difficulties which prevent the free disposal of 
their natural wealth and resources contrary to the 
provisions of this paragraph and to what extent 
that affects the enjo0ent of other rights set 
forth in the Covenant". 
Again the HRC does not indicate the specific nature 
of the "corresponding dgtlies" on other States and the 
international community. That the arguments for a new 
economic order and a right to development are often 
couched in terms of the obligations on developed States 
and the international communýt2y might suggest that the 
HRC had such matters in mind. 
5.12 It remains to note that no member of the HRC has 
yet commented on the relationship between Article 1(2) 
and Article 47, nor does the HRC's General Comment 
address this issue. As we have noted some commentators 
have g ggested that Article 47 radically affects Article 
1(2). 
50 G. C. 12(21), pr. 5. 
51 Cf. The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. I. A. A. 
1905 (1941).. Ahmed, n. 1 above, suggests that in the 
light of the question asked by Mr. Prado- Vallejo, n. 46 
above, "the right of a country to freely dispose of its 
natural wealth entails the corresponding duty of 
protection to all peoples, both citizens of its own 
territories and others", p. 12. 
52 See M. G. K. Nayar, Human Rights and Economic 
Development: The Legal- Foundations, 2 Univ. HR (1980) 
pp. 55-81. A number of HRC members had reservations about 
making an express reference to a new international 
economic order in the general comment, see e. g., SR 476 
pr. 21 (Vincent-Evans), SR 478 pr. 11 (Bouziri). 
53 See Ch. 1, n. 144. Cf. E. N. Luttwak, Intervention 
And Access To Natural Resources, in H. Bull, (ed. ), 
Intervention In World Politics, pp. 79-94 (1984). 
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Article l, paragraph 3. 
5.13 The most consistent request to State 
representatives on Article 1(3) has been for a clear 
statement on the international application of 
self-determination. 
54 
Three members of the HRC in 
particular, Mr. Al Douri, Mr. Bouziri and Mr. Graefrath 
have taken the lead concerning Article 1(3). States have 
been asked what practical and concrete steps they had 
taken to help peoples to achieve self-determination. 
55 
Particular attention has been given to the Palestinian56 
and Namibian peoples. 
57 The matters raised by HRC 
members have included support for and diplomatic 
relations with Israel58 and South Africa; 
59 
maintaining 
an embassy in Jerusalem; 
60 
the economic or military 
assistance given to national liberation movements and to 
the peoples concerned; 
61 
support for and application of 
54 See, e. g., SR 528 pr. 39 (Prado-Vallejo on 
Chile). 
55 See, e. g., SR 392 pr. 15 (Bouziri on Iceland). 
56 See, e. g., SR 257 pr. 27 (Graefrath on Italy); SR 
331 pr. 40 (Tarnopolsky on Jordan). See S. Morphet, The 
Palestinians And Their Right To Self- Determination, in 
R. J. Vincent (Ed. ), Foreign Policy And Human Rights, 
pp. 85-103, (1986); M. C. Bassiouni, Self-Determination And 
The Palestinians, ASIL Proc. (1971), pp. 31-40; 
L. C. Green, Self 
- 
Determination And The Settlement Of 
The Arab- Israeli Conflict, ASIL Proc. (1971) pp. 40-48. 
57 See, e. g., SR 469 pr. 8 (Bouziri on El Salvador). 
See I. I. Dore, Self-Determination Of Namibia: Paradigm Of 
A Paradox, 27 Harv. ILJ (1986) pp. 159-191. 
58 See, e. g., SR 356 pr. 41 (Al Douri on Uruguay). 
59 See, e. g., SR 322 pr. 62 (Sadi on Netherlands). 
60 See, e. g., SR 222 pr. 12 (Bouziri on Colombia). 
61 See, e. g., SR 257 pr-67 (Sadi on Italy); SR 291 
pr. 12 (Hanga on Jamaica). See pr. 5.19, n. 83 below. 
ýýA 0ýqý; F 
economic and military sanctions against South Africa; 62 
ratification of International Conventions against 
Apartheid; 
63 the promotion of self-determination in 
overseas territories, dependencies and departments and 
the situation if such territories desired independence 
but did not have the economic resources to sustain it. 
64 
5.14 Mr. Graefrath has regularly asked State 
representatives whether individuals or companies subject 
to the State's authority were permitted to contribute by 
their trade, co-operation and activities to the support 
of the South African regime or the occupation of 
Namibia. 65 He has argued that States parties could not 
62 See, e. g., SR 257 pr. 26 (Graefrath on Italy), 
reply at SR 261 prs. 35-37; SR 440 pr. 12 (Prado-Vallejo 
on France). 
63 See, e. g., SR 293 prs. 25-26 (Movchan on 
Portugal); SR 482 pr. 38 (Graefrath on N. Z. ). The 
principal Convention is the International Convention On 
The Suppression And Punishment Of the Crime Of 
Apartheid, 1973. The Swedish representative replied 
that, "[a]lthough his Government considered Apartheid to 
be a serious violation of human rights and' fundamental 
freedoms, it took the view that defining Apartheid as an 
international crime entailed international legal 
obligations which could not be fully understood or 
implemented", SR 635 pr. 40. 
64 See, e. g., SR 439 pr. 27 (Bouziri on France); SR 
440 pr-9 (Prado-Vallejo on France); SR 69 pr. 28 
(Tarnopolsky), pr. 43 (Prado-Vallejo on U. K. ); reply at 
SR 70 prs. 20-21. 
65 See, e. g., SR 441, pr. 34 (on France); SR 594 
pr. 37 (on U. K. ). See A. M. Khalifa, Adverse Consequences 
For The Enjoyment Of Human Rights Of Political, Economic 
And Other Forms Of Assistance Given To The Racist And 
Colonialist Regime Of South Africa, (1985), U. N. Doc. 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1984/8/Rev. 1; U. N. Sales No. E. 85. XIV. 4; 
referred to by Graefrath at SR 594 pr. 37 (On U. K. ). See 
also Implementation of Decree No. 1 For The Protection Of 
The Natural Resources Of Namibia, 80 AJIL (1986) 
pp. 442-491; M. C. Gosiger, Strategies For Disinvestment 
From United States Companies And Financial Institutions 
Doing Business In South Africa, 8 HRQ (1986), 
pp. 517-539; Transnational Corporations In South Africa (Footnote Continued) 
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evade their obligations under Article 1(3) in this 
manner. 
66 It is submitted that Mr. Graefrath is correct 
in terms of article 1(3) with respect to the 
responsibility of States parties for individuals and 
companies "within their jurisdiction" (article 2(1)). 
There is, however, considerable disagreement between 
States concerning the effectiveness of, for example, 
politicafand economic sanctions against South Africa. 
67 
It is doubtful, therefore, that article 1(3) could 
oblige States to impose sanctions or other measures 
against South Africa or other States as 'the only way to 
promote the realization of the right of self- 
determination. 
5.15 Many of the major current international disputes 
have arisen before the HRC. While often expressing great 
concern members have generally been very restrained in 
their comments. Among the conflicts adverted to have 
been those in the Lebanon, 68 Sri Lanka, 69 the Western 
(Footnote Continued) 
And Namibia: U. N. Public Hearings, vol. 1, Reports Of The 
Panel Of Eminent Persons And Of The Secretary-General 
(1986). 
66 See e. g., SR 635 pr. 38 (Graefrath on Austria). 
67 For important recent developments see the U. S. 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 1986 and other measures 
in, 26 ILM (1987) pp. 77-133; Mission to South Africa: 
The Commonwealth Report (1986);, U. N. Hearings, n. 65 
above. Cf. P. J. Kuyper, The Implementation Of 
International Sanctions: The Netherlands And Rhodesia, 
(1978). 
68 See SR 365 pr. 35 and 366 pr. 3 (Bouziri on Iran); 
SR 442 pr. 12 (Al Douri on Lebanon), reply at SR 446 
pr. 13. See 'Lebanon -A Conflict of Minorities', (1983), 
Minority Rights Group, report no. 61; Report Of Amnesty 
International Mission To Sri Lanka, 31 Jan-9 Feb, 1982, 
(1983) and Updating Statement, July 
- 
September 1983, 
(1983); J. P. Gasser, Internationalized Non-International 
Armed Conflicts: Case Studies Of Afghanistan, Kampuchea 
and Lebanon, 33 Am. ULR (1983) p. 145. 
69 See SR 473 pr. 8 (Opsahi on Sri Lanka); SR 472 
pr. 20 (Dimitrijevic on Sri Lanka). See 'The Tamils Of (Footnote Continued) 
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Sahara, 70 New Caledonia, 71 the Falkland Islands, 72 
Northern Ireland 73 and Afghanistan. 74 Though restrained 
members have often made very clear the importance of the 
(Footnote Continued) 
Sri Lanka', Minority Rights Group, report n. 25, (revised, 1983); P. Hyndman, Human Rights, The Rule Of 
Law And The Situation In Sri Lanka, 8 Univ. NSWLJ (1985) 
pp. 337-361. India-Sri Lanka, Agreement To Establish 
Peace And Normalcy In Sri Lanka, XXVI ILM (1987) 
pp. 1175-1185. 
70 See SR 327 pr. 13 (Ermacora on Morocco); See 
G. J. Naldi, The Statehood Of The Saharan Arab Democratic 
Republic, 25 Ind. JIL (1985-6), pp. 448-481; M. Shaw, The 
Western Sahara Case 49 BYIL 1978 (1979) pp. 118-154; 
T. Franck, The Stealing Of The Sahara, 70 Am. JIL (1976), 
pp. 694-721; The Western Sahara Case, Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 12. A UN Team has recently visited 
the Western Sahara, (Times, Dec. 1987). 
71 See SR 441 pr. 43 (Al Douri on France). 
72 See SR 594 pr. 40 (Prado-Vallejo) and pr. 45 
(Pocar) on U. K.; reply at pr. 54. On self-determination 
with respect to the Falkland Islands see D. Dunnett, 
Self- Determination And The Falklands, 59 International 
Affairs (1983), pp. 415-428; M. Pomerance, n. 1 above, 
pp. 16,21-22,27,29,44; A. R. Coll and A. C. Arendt, The 
Falklands War 
- 
Lessons For Strategy, Diplomacy And 
International Law, pp. 19,25,29-30,82-3,94,99; 
H. E. Chebabi, Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity 
And The Falkland Islands, 100 PSQ (1985) pp. 215-225. 
73 See SR 594 pr. 42*(Wako on U. K. ); reply at pr. 53. 
See C. Townshend, Northern Ireland, in R. J. Vincent (ed. ), 
n. 56 above, pp. 119-140; A. Guelke, International 
Legitimacy, Self-Determination, And Northern Ireland, 11 
Rev. Int. St. (1985) pp. 37-52; 'The Two Irelands- The 
Problem Of The Double Minority- A Dual Study Of 
Inter-Group Tensions', Minority Rights Group, Report 
no. 2 (Revd. ed, 1982). The most important recent 
constitutional development in respect of Northern 
Ireland was the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which was 
unsuccessfully challenged in Ex. p. Molyneaux, [1986] 1 
W. L. R. p. 331. 
74 See SR 565 pr. 8 (Opsahl on USSR); SR 608 pr. 26 
(Afghan State representative). See Ermacora's report, 
n. 77 below and Higgins, pr. 5.19 below. See A. G. Noorani, 
Afghanistan And The Rule Of Law, 24 Rev. ICJ (1980) 
pp. 37-52; Gasser, n. 68 above. An agreement for, inter 
alia, withdrawal of Soviet troops was signed on 14th 
April 1988, see Times, 15th April 1988 p. 8. 
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application of self-determination to these situations 
and it would seem clear, therefore, that members of the 
HRC view article 1 as having an application outside the 
colonial situation. 
75 The comments of Professor Higgins 
concerning Afghanistan are not untypical, 
5.16 "Her second question concerned the underlying and 
preliminary question of self-determination, in 
which connection the Committee relied heavily on 
information from United Nations institutions. 76 The 
Commission on Human Rights adopted an annual 
resolution speaking of the denial of the right to 
self-determination in Afghanistan. The presence of 
100,000 occupying troops and the participation of 
foreign advisors in various ministries and in the 
Khad, the security apparatus, had been verified by 
Professor Ermacora's report (E/CN. 4/1985/21). 77 It 
was difficult to see how that situation or the fact 
that 4 million refugees had chosen to flee the 
country after the 1979 events, were compatible with 
self-determination. She had listened with interest 
to the Afghan representative's remarks on the 
Loya-Jirgah. 78 In her view, however, it was 
questionable whether any system short of election 
on the basis of the "one-person, one vote" principle 
could be a 'satisfactory expression of 
self-determination, and in that connection she 
75 See pr. 5.5 above on India and Sri Lanka. 
76 See ch. 3, 
information'. 
77 See Report On 
HRLJ (1985), pp. 29-76. 
70 
prs. 3.12-3.18 on 'Sources of 
The Situation In Afghanistan 6 
'U The Loya Jirgah is a, "[S]upreme council 
composed of the most respected representatives of the 
people", SR 603 pr. 14 (State representative) The Loya 
jirgah has recently held only its second national 
assembly (Times 30 Nov. 1987). 
%-"_"-J 4J. J 
referred to her own country's experience in 
Southern Rhodesia. Furthermore, according to her 
information, one quarter of the representatives in 
the Loya-Jirgah in fact consisted of party 
officials and persons sympathetic to the Government 
and there was little discussion beyond the 
ratification of Government policies" 
. 
79 
5.17 In its General Comment on Article 1 the HRC stated 
that, 
"Paragraph 3, in the Committee's opinion, is 
particularly important in that it imposes specific 
obligations on States parties, not only in relation 
to their own peoples but vis-a-vis all peoples 
which have not been able to exercise or have been 
deprived of the possibility of exercising their 
right to self-determination. The general nature of 
this paragraph is confirmed by its drafting 
history. It stipulates that 'The States Parties to 
the present Covenant, including those having 
responsibility for the administration of 
Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall 
promote the realization of the right of 
self-determination, and shall respect that right, 
in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of 
the United Nations'. The obligations exist 
irrespective of whether a people entitled to 
self-determination depends on a State party to the 
Covenant or not. 
80 It follows that all States 
79 SR 604 pr. 44. 
80 G. C. 12(21), pr. 4. Cassese, n. 1 above, comments 
that, "[S]elf-determination presupposes freedom of opinion 
and expression (article 19), the right of peaceful 
assembly (article 21), the freedom of association (article 
22), the right to vote (article 25(b)), and more generally 
the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives (article 
25(a)). Whenever these rights are recognized for (Footnote Continued) 
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parties to the Covenant should take positive action 
to facilitate realization of and respect for the 
right of peoples to self-determination. Such 
positive action must be consistent with the States' 
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations 
and under international law: in particular, States 
must refrain from interfering in the internal 
affairs of other States and thereby adversely 
affecting the exercise of the right of 
self-determination. The reports should "dontain 
information on the performance of these obligations 
and the measures taken to that end". 
81 
5.18 Again the HRC does not attempt to spell out the 
"specific obligations" on States parties. It seems clear 
though that the HRC takes the view that those 
obligations exist whenever r-a people (though that term is 
not defined) are being deprived of their right to 
self-determination and are not dependant on the people 
concerned being under the jurisdiction of another State 
party to the Covenant. 
82 The HRC's view seems to go 
further than the undertaking on States parties in 
Article 2 of the Covenant, "To respect and ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant". As interpreted by the HRC article 1 calls for 
positive action to support the right of self- 
determination of individuals who are not within its 
territory or subject to its jurisdiction. The obligation 
to take action though is limited to measures over 
(Footnote Continued) 
individuals, the people as a whole enjoy the right of 
internal (political) self-determination; whenever those 
rights are trampled upon, the right of the people to self- 
determination is infringed", p. 97. 
81 G. C. 12(21), pr. 6. 
82 For the HRC's discussion on this see SR 537. On 
article 2 see ch. 6 below. 
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individuals within its territory or subject to its 
jurisdiction. 
5.19 Although the general comment calls for "positive 
action", that action must be consistent with the United 
Nations Charter and international law. That of course 
hides the differences of opinion among States as to the 
legitimacy of, for example, the use of force to achieve 
self-determination, and of the kinds of assistance that 
it is permissible to afford to national liberation 
movements. 
83 The particular reference to "Interference 
in the internal affairs" of States reflects the concern 
of many States at such interference and the continuing 
debate as to what constitutes purely internal affairs. 
84 
Finally, it is interesting to note the express reference 
to the drafting history of Article 1. Such references 
have been relatively rare in the practice of the HRC. 
The preparatory work appears to have been of greater 
relevance to the preparation of general comments, and 
views under article 5(4) O. P., 85 than within the context 
of the reporting procedure under article 40(1) ICCPR. 
83 See Crawford, n. l above; Akehurst, A Modern 
Introduction to International Law, pp. 299-302 (6d, 
1987); Pomerance, n. 1 above, ch. VIII; Blay, n. 1 above; 
Cassese, n. 1 above, p. 100; P. Rubino, Colonialism And The 
Use Of Force By States, in A. Cassese, (ed), The Current 
Legal Regulation Of The Use Of Force, pp. 133-145 (1986); 
R. Higgins, The Attitude Of Western States Towards Legal 
Aspects Of The Use Of Force, in Cassese, (ed), ibid., 
p. 435 at pp. 448-450; H. Bokor-Szego, The Attitude Of 
Socialist States Toward The International Regulation Of 
The Use of Force, in Cassese, (ed), ibid., p. 453 at 
pp. 476-469; M. Räfiqul Islam, Use Of Force In 
Self-Determination Claims, 25 Ind. JIL (1985) pp. 424-477; 
R. A. Falk, Intervention And National Liberation Claims, 
in H. Bull, (ed. ), n. 52 above, pp. 119-134. 
84 Ibid., and see ch. 1, prs. 1.18-1.21. 
85 See Ch. 4, prs. 4.46-4.48 above. 
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Article 1 under the Optional Protocol. 
5.20 Article 1 has been raised in a small number of 
communications under the O. P. In A. D. v. Canada86 the 
author, a Grand Captain of the Mikmaq tribal society, 
claimed that the Mikmaqs had been denied and were 
continuing to be denied the right of self-determination 
by the Government of Canada. It was further submitted 
that Canada had deprived the alleged victims of their 
means of subsistence and had enacted and enforced laws 
and policies destructive of the family life of the 
Mikmaqs and inimical to the proper education of their 
children. 
87 The stated objective of the communication 
was that the traditional Government of the Mikmaq tribal 
society be recognized as such and that the Mikmaq nation 
be recognized as a State. 
88 
The HRC declared the communication inadmissible 
because the author had not proved that he was authorized 
to act as a representative on behalf of the Mikmaq 
tribal society and had failed to support his claim that 
he personally was a victim of a violation of any rights 
contained in the Covenant. 
89 
5.21 Mr. Errera appended an interesting individual 
opinion to the HRC's views. 
90 He argued that the 
86 Doc. A/39/40, pp. 200-204. 
87 Ibid., pr. 2.1. The territory concerned was the 
lands allegedly possessed and governed by the Mikmaq's 
when they entered into a protection treaty with Great 
Britain in 1952 (sic) and which were known today as Nova 
Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and parts of Newfoundland, 
New Brunswick and the Gaspe peninsula of Quebec, ibid., 
pr. l. 
88 Ibid., pr. 2.2. 
89 Ibid., pr. 8.2. The specific allegations made by 
A. D. related to self-government, education, 
enfranchising of aboriginal peoples, property rights and 
subsistence, Ibid., pr. 3. 
90 Doc. A/39/40 p. 200 at p. 204. 
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examination on admissibility raised three questions that 
were fundamental to the interpretation of article 1(1) 
and to the HRC's jurisprudence relating to individual 
communications alleging violations of article 1(1). The 
three questions were: 
(1) Does the right of "all peoples" to "self- 
determination", as enunciated in article 1, paragraph 1, 
of the Covenant, constitute one "of the rights set forth 
in the Covenant" in accordance with the terms of article 
1 of the Optional Protocol? 
(2) If it does, may its violation by a State party which 
has acceded to the Optional Protocol be the subject of a 
communication from individuals? 
(3) Do the Mikmaq constitute a "people" within the 
meaning of the above-mentioned provisions of article 1, 
paragraph 1, of the Covenant? 
As the HRC's decision did not answer any of these 
questions he could not endorse it. 
As for the HRC's view it is normal practice for 
judicial or administrative rulings to avoid answering 
substantive questions and even procedural questions if 
the matter can be dismissed by reference to other 
procedural requirements. 
91 As to the three questions 
raised, comments by individual HRC members during the 
drafting of the general comment on article 1 might 
suggest that the first two should be answered in the 
affirmative. 
92 The HRC's decision itself would suggest 
91 Famous examples are the the judgements of the 
ICJ in the Nuclear Tests Cases, n. 49 above, and the 
South West Africa Cases ICJ Reps. 1966, p. 6. 
92 
"... the expression "collective right" seemed to 
him to be poorly chosen, since it gave the impression 
that an individual alone could not invoke a violation of 
article 1 of the Covenant", SR 476 pr. 36 (Graefrath). In 
response Mr. Bouziri commented, "In the Working Group 
that expression had caused no difficulty. It implied 
that a people could take advantage of that right but did 
(Footnote Continued) 
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that the second 
-question should be answered in the 
affirmative as it would appear that the communication 
would not have been declared inadmissible if A. D. had 
been properly authorized to act as a representative of 
the Mikmags. 93 The more interesting questions perhaps 
was not whether individuals could bring a communication 
in a representative capacity but whether an individual 
could bring a self-determination claim qua individual. 
It is interesting to speculate how an individual could 
show that he personally was a victim of a violation of 
the right of a people to self-determination. 
94. Would 
simple denial of the right to vote be sufficient 
95 
or 
would a more general denial of civil and political 
(Footnote Continued) 
not thereby prevent an individual from invoking it in a 
communication under the Optional Protocol", SR 478 pr. 9. 
93 On the facts the HRC took the view that A. D. had 
merely authorized himself. It appears that the only body 
which could properly have authorized A. D. was the "Grand 
Council" of the Mikmaqs, the traditional Government of 
the Mikinags. A communication is pending before the HRC 
from the Lubicon Lake Band but this is now being 
considered under article 27 rather than article 1. For 
the domestic Canadian decision see Lubicon Lake Band et 
al. v. The Queen In Right Of Canada et al., 117 D. L. R. (3d) 247. 
94 The HRC's view appears to assume that it is open 
to an individual to advance evidence to show that he 
personally was a victim of a violation of the right to 
self- determination. It is interesting to note that the 
State party argued, inter alia, that the author could 
not claim because self-determination is a collective 
right; that the communication was inadmissible, ratione 
materiae, on the basis that article 1 could not affect 
the territorial integrity of a State (reference was made 
to the Declarations of 1960 and 1970 in n. 1 above); and 
because the remedy sought, namely the recognition of 
Statehood, goes beyond the competence of the HRC. 
Unfortunately, the HRC view did not address these 
arguments. 
95 Note that article 25 (b) ICCPR contains a right 
to for citizens to take part, inter alia, in the conduct 
of public affairs and to vote. For text see Apx. I below. 
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rights be necessary? 
96 The case of Mpaka-Nsusu V. 
Zaire97 below might have suggested another possibility 
in terms of restrictions on the establishment of 
political parties. 
5.22 The HRC view is now clearer after two recent 
admissibility decisions. In the first of these the HRC 
stated that, 
"... the 
-author, as an individual, cannot claim to 
be a victim of a violation of the right of 
self-determination enshrined in article 1 of the 
Covenant. Whereas the Optional Protocol provides: a 
recourse procedure for individuals claiming that 
their rights have been violated, article 1 of the 
Covenant deals with rights conferred upon peoples, 
as such". 
98 
Similarly, in the second admissibility decision 
concerning a communication submitted by an individual 
acting on his own behalf and claiming to act on behalf 
of others, the HRC observed, 
"... that the Covenant recognizes and protects in 
most resolute terms a people's... right to 
self-determination and its right to dispose of its 
natural resources, as an essential condition for 
the effective guarantee and observance of 
individual human rights and for the promotion and 
strengthening of those rights. However, the 
Committee observes-that the author, as an 
individual, cannot claim under the Optional 
Protocol to be a victim of a violation of the right 
to self 
- 
determination enshrined in article 1 of 
96 See Cassese, ch. 5, n. 42 above. 
97 Doc. A/41/40 p. 142. See pr. 5.23 below. 
98 Doc. A/42/40 pr. 401. 
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the Covenant, which deals with rights conferred 
upon peoples as such". 
99 
The view of the HRC then appears to be that an 
individual can only bring a self-determination claim in 
a representative capacity and only for violation of the 
peoples' right to self-determination though no 
indication is given of what that right includes. 
100 
As for Mr. Errera's third question this is clearly a 
substantive matter that could only be determined on a 
full consideration. We have noted above that the HRC 
have not attempted to define or establish criteria for a 
"people" under the article 40 reporting procedure or in 
its general comment on article 40.101 
5.23 The second communication alleging a violation of 
article 1 is Mpaka-Nsusu v. Zaire. 
102 The author, again 
an individual communicant, alleged that although the 
people of Zaire had declared themselves in favour of a 
bipartisan constitutional system he had been prevented 
from establishing a second political party. 
103 The HRC 
declared the communication inadmissible. They observed 
99 Doc. A/42/40 p. 106. "[T]he Committee decided, 
however, that the communication could be considered, in 
so far as it might raise issues under article 27 and 
other articles of the Covenant", ibid. The first 
sentence quoted in the text is almost taken directly 
from the HRC's general comment on article 1, see pr. 5.3 
above. 
100 Note the criteria in the 1970 Declaration, n. l 
above, which refers under the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination to, "[i]ndependent States 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as 
described above and thus possessed of a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory 
without distinction as to race, creed or colour". See 
also Brar, ch. 4, n. 1 above, p. 515. 
101 See pr. 5.7 above. 
102 Doc. A/41/40, p. 142. 
103 Ibid., pr. 9.2. 
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that the information before it did not justify a finding 
as to the alleged violation of article 1.104 The 
observation is not very helpful. It could be interpreted 
simply as there being insufficient evidence on the facts 
or that the allegations did not even raise an issue of 
self-determination. The latter interpretation would be 
of particular significance bearing in mind the large 
number of one party States and the question of the 
compatibility of such regimes with the ICCPR. 
105 In the 
light of the importance of this issue it is submitted 
that the latter interpretation should not necessarily be 
assumed to be the correct one. 
104 Ibid., pr. 9.2. 
105 See ch. 6 below on article 2 ICCPR. 
CH. 5 422 
Article 1: Appraisal. 
5.24 On reflection the practice of the HRC under article 
1 seems somewhat disappointing. Many national reports 
have contained little if any information. Questions have 
been spasmodic and often there has been no reply from 
the State representative in any event, although the 
situation is often better during consideration of second 
periodic reports. The General Comment adopted by the HRC 
on article 1 was vague, uninformative and went little 
beyond a bare call for more information from States 
parties rather than an attempt at interpretation. The 
adoption of general comments affords the' HRC an 
important opportunity to give some content to the right 
to self- determination. The HRC is open to criticism for 
not using that opportunity to attempt to provide some 
definitions and criteria in terms, for example, of the 
meaning of "peoples", the relationship between 
self-determination and the preservation of territorial 
integrity, and the relationship between article 1 and 
article 27 of the ICCPR on minority rights. It is 
instructive to consider why the HRC appears to have made 
little constructive progress with respect to article 1. 
5.25 Firstly, the criticisms of those who argued that 
self-determination should not have been in the ICCPR 
because it was a political principle rather than a legal 
right may have proved to have been correct. 
106 In this 
regard it is interesting to note the comment of 
Mr. Opsahl during consideration of the Report of Sri 
Lanka, "In article 1, the Covenaft had given a legal 
aspect to self-determination, but it was primarily a 
political ideal that needed to be adjusted to the 
realities of the situation. The Covenant was not helpful 
in suggesting how the indispensable political solution 
106 See ch. 1, prs. 1.22-1.23. 
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might be achieved". 
107 Of course, it is that adjustment 
to reality that causes the greatest controversy between 
protagonists. Mindful of the difficult political 
conflicts that are usually associated with calls for 
self-determination the HRC has generally treaded very 
warily in this area. Similarly, as was noted by the 
United Kingdom representative before the HRC, 
self-determination issues are generally addressed in a 
number of other, and arguably more appropriate, 
international forums. 108 
5.26 Secondly, since the proposal to include self- 
determination in the Covenants was made by the General 
Assembly (1952) most trust and non-self-governing 
territories have achieved independence. 109 The 
decolonization era is now largely complete. The 
attentions of those newly independent States have now 
turned to other matters, for example, a New 
International Economic Order110 and the Right To 
Development and other "Third Generation" rights. 
ill 
While self-determination remains a cardinal principle 
for these States in the external sense of independence 
from colonial, alien or foreign domination there is 
distinctly less enthusiasm for the internal aspects of 
self-determination in terms of the free choice of 
domestic political institutions and authorities and 
107 SR 473 pr. 8. 
108 See SR 594 pr. 34. 
109 The major exceptions is South West Africa/ 
Namibia. 
110 See n. 10 above. 
111 See n. ll above; P. Alston, Conjuring Up New 
Human Rights: Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AJIL 
(1984) pp. 607-621; S. Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New 
Generation For The 1980's?, in R. Falk et al, (eds. ), 
International Law: A Contemporary Perspective, pp. 501- 
513 (1985). 
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respect for the international human rights of the people 
of the State. 
112 Similarly, the fears of claims for 
secession based on self-determination for minority and 
other groups remains an overriding concern for many 
States. 113 
5.27 Thirdly, the very concept of self-determination 
remains a controversial one. The central difficulties of 
reconciling the right to self-determination with the 
preservation of the "territorial integrity" of the 
State, of identifying the beneficiaries and content of 
the right, and the consequences of the international 
recognition of the right of self-determination in terms 
of international support remain. 
114 The practice of the 
HRC to date has done little or nothing to shed light on 
these fundamental problems and appears unlikely to do 
112 A number of members stressed the non-limitation 
of article 1 to colonial situations during discussion of 
the draft General Comment on article 1, see SR 478. 
Mr. Bouziri stated that the HRC was unanimous on this 
question, SR 477 pr. 67. Note also the comment of 
Professor Harris, "The 1966 Covenants do not limit the 
principle of self-determination to the colonial 
situation. It seems unlikely that they reflect customary 
international law in this respect", D. J. Harris, Cases 
and Materials on International Law, p. 101, (3d, 1983). 
Professor Cassese has argued that the more limited 
doctrine of self-determination may be jus cogens, n. 1 
above, pp. 109-111. On external and internal 
self-determination see H. Gros Espiell, n. 1 above. 
113 See Buchheit, n. 1 above. During consideration 
of the report of Senegal Mrs. Higgins, [s]ought more 
specific information about demands for autonomy in 
Casamance, which the Senegal government seemed inclined 
to interpret as a demand for secession that must be 
opposed", SR 722 pr. 10. In reply the state 
representative commented, "[s]tressed that the right to 
secession ought not to be likened to a principle of 
international law. As for the first element of article 
1, it in fact referred to a colonial situation. However, 
no colonial situation existed in Casamance", SR 722 
pr. 13. 
114 
"Above all, the determination of which 'self' 
(Footnote Continued) 
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so. That may in part reflect the inherent limitations of 
working only on the basis of consensus. 
115 
5.28 It is perhaps unfair to be too critical of the 
HRC's performance concerning article 1. In the-light of 
difficulties outlined above a minimalist, cautious and 
uncontroversial approach to article 1 may ultimately 
appear to have been the only sensible avenue open to it. 
As Mr. Tomuschat commented during the consideration of 
the HRC's draft comment on article 1, 
"The comments prepared by the Committee might seem 
rather insubstantial, but they reflected its 
experience with regard to the application of 
article 1, which was rather limited. Furthermore, a 
large number of United Nations bodies dealt with 
the implementation of that fundamental article, and 
the Committee's action could only be modest or 
1 
marginal", 
16 
(Footnote Continued) 
is entitled to determine 'what', 'when', and 'how', 
remains the central question which elude simple 
objective answers", Pomerance , n. l above, p. 73. 
115 The comments of the Chairman of the Working 
Group that drafted the general comment would seem to 
support this view, see SR 476 prs. ll-14, SR 478 prs. 7-15 
(Bouziri). 
116 SR 478 pr. 2. 
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